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Ever since the formation of limited companies became permissible, unsecured creditors 
have faced a Sisyphean struggle to regularly recover substantial levels of the debts owed 
to them should corporate creditors enter insolvency. These low recovery rates result in 
many issues for lenders, including large losses, and in some cases, the insolvency of the 
lender themselves.  
 
The causes of these low return rates are long established and clearly demarcated. They 
consist of the existence and widespread use of security interests - which remove the 
majority of the company’s assets upon insolvency occurring - and the statutory priority 
of distribution, which ensures that parties other than the unsecured creditors have their 
debts discharged first by the liquidator from the already insufficiently resourced asset 
pool.  
 
English insolvency law has sought to provide some protection to the unsecured creditors 
through the anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, 
which are intended to protect the integrity of the insolvent company’s asset pool. 
However, as concluded by this thesis, these provisions fail to afford adequate protection 
as a consequence of their substantive, evidential and remedial limitations, potentially 
resulting in the distributable assets being misappropriated and out of the reach of 
unsecured creditors.  
 
This thesis therefore analyses the limitations of the existing anti-deprivation and personal 
liability provisions before concluding as to how and why they fail to adequately protect 
unsecured creditors. This is done through a doctrinal and theoretical analysis of the 
provisions, before these conclusions are then tested empirically in two case studies.  
 
Given the inadequate protection provided by the Insolvency Act, this thesis then analyses 
the resulting trust – on which little analysis has been conducted in the context of 
insolvency – to determine whether it is capable of assisting unsecured creditors to 
increase their liquidation return rates. This increase is achieved through returning assets 
beneficially owned by the company to the company, or by preventing parties from 
becoming unsecured creditors in the first place by removing assets beneficially owned by 
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them from the company. This analysis too will adopt a doctrinal and theoretical 
methodology, and it is concluded that the resulting trust is able to assist should the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis is a study of the relationship between unsecured credit and the liquidation 
regime through a circumspect examination of the position of unsecured creditors within 
the liquidation process, and the role of the resulting trust in securing the position of a 
company’s unsecured creditors. In order to carry out an examination of these essential 
elements of this research, first and foremost, it is imperative that the role of credit in our 
modern society, and the effects non-repayment of such credit may cause, are clearly 
explained.  
 
Credit, the provision of money or goods by one party without immediate reimbursement 
by a second party1, was characterised in the seminal work of the Cork Committee as “the 
lifeblood of the modern industrialised economy.”2  In the U.K., a large majority of 
companies rely on credit as a means of maintaining financial stability3. These borrowers 
are able to raise the necessary funds from a number of sources, including trading 
businesses and large financial institutions. Given the aforementioned importance of credit 
to the corporate economy, it is imperative that an assessment is carried out on the impact 
of the English insolvency regime on the interests of unsecured creditors and the lack of 
redress to solve these issues.  
 
This chapter therefore adopts the following structure. Section 1 establishes the available 
insolvency regimes, the effect these regimes have on unsecured creditors, and the 
justifications for this thesis focusing on the liquidation process. Section 2 sets out the 
causes of the unsecured creditors’ poor position within the liquidation process. Section 3 
critiques the debate on secured credit and whether its existence can be justified. Section 
4 reviews the comments of the legal and political community on the issues of unsecured 
creditors and the insolvency regime and concludes there is a desire for reform to be 
 
1 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume A-M, 6th edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2007)  
2 Cork K, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, (1982) Cmnd 8558 
at 10; Diamond AL, A Review of Security Interests in Property, (1989) HMSO 2; see also Hutton 
W, The State We’re In, (London: Random House, 1995); Picketty T, Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: HUP, 2013) 
3 The number of registered companies in the U.K. in September 2017: Companies House, 
Incorporated Companies in the U.K: July to September 2017 (3,961,786 companies); see also 
Kershaw D, Company Law in Context, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2012) at 6 
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initiated. Section 5 analyses the use of secured credit and how it has been utilised as a 
means of ensuring partial or full discharge of debts. Section 6 sets out the scope of this 
thesis. Section 7 details this thesis’ methodology, whilst Section 8 sets out the research 
aims of this thesis and an overview of the subsequent chapters.  
 
Section 1: The Insolvency Process and Creditor Return Rates  
 
Companies are able to negotiate for, and acquire, credit in two distinct legal forms that 
greatly affect the rights of the providers of credit should the borrower become unable to 
meet their obligations. The first form of lending is unsecured credit, where the extender 
of credit does not acquire a right to seize or sell company assets should they breach their 
contractual obligations, and instead merely receives a personal claim to sue for payment4. 
The second form, secured credit, however, grants the lender a legal or equitable right5 
that should the borrower become unable to meet their obligations under the agreement, 
the creditor can seize or sell the asset. These rights ensure priority6 over unsecured and 
(some) preferential creditors in any liquidation process7. Consequently, a holder of a 
security interest is placed in a much more favourable position compared to that of an 
unsecured creditor should insolvency occur, as they are able to use identifiable company 
property to discharge any outstanding debts, whereas the unsecured creditor must resort 
to enforcing their debts in the courts though a breach of contract8.  
 
Both forms of credit are regularly used by U.K. companies. This is illustrated empirically 
in research undertaken by the British Business Bank9 (Figure 1) which covers the period 
2011-2016 and SMEs, and Zurich10 which covers 2016.  
 
 
4 Hudson A, The Law of Finance, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2009) at 864 
5 Cranston R, Principles of Banking Law, (Oxford: OUP, 1997) at 432 
6 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, 3rd edn, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2017) at 73 
7 McKendrick E, Goode on Commercial Law, 5th edn (London: LexisNexis, 2016) at 623-624 
8 McCormack G, The Priority of Secured Credit: an Anglo-American Perspective, (2003) JBL 
389, at 395; Armour J, The Law and Economic Debate About Secured Lending: Lessons for 
European Lawmaking?, (2008) 5 ECFR 3 at has concluded that the advantages of secured credit 
outweigh any social costs 
9 British Business Bank, Small Business Finance Markets 2016/17, at 12 
10 Zurich, SMEs Owed £225bn from Late Payments, http://insider.zurich.co.uk/risk-
management/smes-owed-225bn-from-late-payments/  
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Figure 1: British Business Bank 
 
 
From Figure 1, it can be seen that U.K. SMEs had credit liabilities of £167 billion to banks 
in 2014, £164 billion in 2015, and £164 billion again in 2016 - averaging £165.5 billion 
owed per annum. Asset finance also provided SMEs with an additional £14.4 billion, 
£15.8 billion and £16.8 billion in 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. The insurance group 
Zurich has also established that U.K. lenders made an additional £225 billion available to 
companies in the form of unsecured trade credit11. These high levels of bank lending and 
asset finance, which do not take into account the U.K’s larger companies (who borrow 
even greater amounts), in conjunction with the £225 billion owed through trade credit12, 
clearly illustrate the continuing prevalence of credit in the U.K. to enable companies to 
continue operating.  
 
However, should a creditor become unable to meet their contractual obligations and repay 
the loan capital and interest, they are declared insolvent13. Although a simple enough 
proposition, two tests exist in English law for determining whether a company is unable 
to pay its debts14: the cash flow test, where a company is unable to pay its debts as they 
become due, and the balance sheet test, where a company’s assets are insufficient to meet 
 
11 Zurich, SMEs Owed £225bn from Late Payments, (2016) - http://insider.zurich.co.uk/risk-
management/smes-owed-225bn-from-late-payments/  
12 The Bank of England concluded that trade creditors made up 80% of all business transactions 
- Bank of England, Finance for Small Firms: Seventh Report, (2000) 
13 Van Zwieten K, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edn (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2018) at 2 
14 There are two tests for determining whether a company has become insolvency under s123 
Insolvency Act 1986. These are the cash flow test and balance sheet tests. See Van Zwieten K, 
Goode, (No.13) at 113-176 
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its credit obligations should they be called in. Should this occur, creditors face the 
prospect of losing both the loan capital and any interest payments due, as a declaration of 
insolvency signifies the company’s assets are insufficient to cover all of its debts15. This 
prospect is particularly acute for unsecured creditors because, as outlined above, unlike 
secured creditors, they do not acquire any rights to seize company assets upon default of 
the loan obligations, and so are only entitled to the company’s remaining, and by 
definition insufficient, unsecured assets16. Examples of this phenomenon affecting 
unsecured creditors include the high-profile insolvencies of HAB Housing17, retailer T.M. 
Lewin and the restaurant chain Carluccio’s. However, two standout examples illustrate 
the potential losses best, and include JJB Sports, where only 0.34p per pound of debt was 
recovered by unsecured creditors when it entered liquidation18, and Jinn, which entered 
administration owing £100,000s to couriers and only having £186,873 in assets19.  
 
To deal with the fall out of a company becoming insolvent, English insolvency law 
prescribes that there are several regimes for resolving the debts owed by the company to 
its debtors20.  
 
The CVA enables a comprise to be reached for the satisfaction of the company’s debts or 
a scheme of arrangement of its affairs to be entered into, and allows borrowers and 
creditors to either agree to discharge some of the debt owed, create a long term repayment 
plan, or renegotiate existing contracts on more favourable terms for the company that 
enable its continued trading – thereby enabling a greater return rate to creditors21.  
 
 
15 Hudson A, The Law of Finance, (No.4) at 863 
16 McCormack G, Secured Credit Under English and American Law, (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) at 
5 
17 Jones R, Grand Designs Host Kevin McCloud’s Housing Firm at Risk of Insolvency, 14th 




18 Law Commission, Consumer Prepayments on Retailer Insolvency Summary, (2016) at 4 
19 Matthew Field, Delivery Firm Collapse Leaves 1,800 Couriers out of Pocket, 2nd 
December 2017 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/12/02/delivery-firm-
collapse-leaves-1800-couriers-pocket/   
20 Insolvency Act 1986 
21 Walters A and Frisby S, Preliminary Report to the Insolvency Service into Outcomes in 
Company Voluntary Arrangements, at 19 
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However, although the CVA regime has many positives features for creditors, it does not 
regularly result in high levels of unsecured creditor returns or customers being retained. 
Almost half of unsecured creditors recovered nothing from the CVA22, and 33% only 
recovered between 1%-29%23. Moreover, only 10% of cases result in the CVA actually 
being completed, and 53% result in the dissolution of the company or the adoption of an 
alternative insolvency regime24 - meaning valuable customers were lost to the unsecured 
creditors in the majority of cases. Although these figures strongly indicate the CVA is not 
a successful mechanism, the impact of the insolvency regime on the general body of 
unsecured creditors (all unsecured creditors in England) is strongly muted by its low 
uptake levels, with only 346 occurring in 2016, 292 in 2017 and 355 in 2019 – forming 
only 1.55% of all U.K. insolvency cases in 2017. Hence, as a consequence of their 
infrequency, their unfair impact upon the general position of the unsecured creditor is 
extremely limited, and so will not be form part of this thesis’ analysis.  
 
Another insolvency regime is the long-established administrative receiver25, which 
enables the administrative receiver to take possession of the insolvent company’s 
property that is subject to a debenture and deal with it for the benefit of the charge holder. 
Upon the appointment of the receiver, although the assets remain the property of the 
company, legal control of the assets passes to the receiver who is free to control the 
property for the benefit of the secured creditor26.  
 
Though the administrative receiver was seen by many as being an effective regime for 
dealing with insolvent companies27, many others concluded that the regime placed too 
much control over the insolvency process in the hands of secured creditors. These 
concerns were firstly founded on the obligations of the administrative receiver; for 
although they were under a duty to report their actions to the general body of creditors, 
they were under no obligation to listen or act upon their concerns, meaning the unsecured 
creditors were universally ignored in favour of the secured creditors, and received no right 
 
22 49% percent recovered zero; Walters A and Frisby S, Preliminary Report to the Insolvency 
Service into Outcomes in Company Voluntary Arrangement, at 25 
23 14% recovered 1%-9%, 10% recovered 10%-19% and 7% recovered 20%-29%; Ibid, at 25 
24 Ibid, at 5 
25 See Re Maskelyne Bristish Typerwriter Ltd [1898] 1 Ch 133 as an example.  
26 Re Joshua Shaw & Sons Ltd [1989] BCLC 362 
27 See generally Swain V, Taking Care of Business, (1999) Insolvency Bulletin 9; Frisby S, 
Making a Silk Purse out of a Pig’s Ear – Melforth v Blake and Ors, (2000) vol 63(3) MLR 413  
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to challenge the actions of the receiver28. A second issue was administrative receivers 
themselves, and their position as private professionals. As they were dependent on being 
appointed by the holders of security interests – usually banks and other financial 
institutions – their primarily concern was with ensuring future appointments, and so to 
improve their employability, they acted solely in the interests of the secured creditors at 
the expense of the general body of creditors29. This need to prioritise the interests of the 
secured creditor would result in the majority of the company’s assets being sold off to 
cover the secured debts, and little to nothing being made available to unsecured 
creditors30. In response to these concerns, the then Labour Government, through the 
Enterprise Act 2002, abolished the appointment of administrative receivers by new 
debenture holders from September 200331, which has had a devastating impact upon their 
use, with only 2 being appointed in 2017; a drop from 11 in 201532. Hence, as 
administrative receivership is now rarely used with annual cases now in single digits, and 
despite the indisputable unfairness they caused to unsecured creditors, the contemporary 
impact on the unsecured creditors is even less than that of the CVA, and so will not form 
part of the analysis of this thesis.  
 
Alternatively, insolvent companies can be placed into administration, an insolvency 
regime intended to achieve greater fairness for secured creditors by placing an 
independent expert in charge of a distressed company with the objective of rescuing it33. 
Should an administrator be appointed, they have three objectives that differentiate them 
from administrative receivers34: 1) to rescue the company as a going concern35, 2) to 
achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the 
 
28 Ferran E, The Duties of an Administrative Receiver to Unsecured Creditors, (1988) 9 Co Law 
58; DTI/Insolvency Service (2001) Insolvency - A Second Chance at 9 
29 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency, (No.6); the prioritisation of secured creditors’ 
interests can be seen in statistics of RBS receiver appointments – of the 418 appointments in 1992, 
50% ended in the break up and sale of the company’s assets; DTI Consultative Document on 
Company Voluntary Arrangements (1993); Hunter M, The Nature and Functions of a Rescue 
Culture, [1999] JBL 491 at 508  
30 Frisby S, Interim Report to the Insolvency Service on Returns to Creditors form pre- and post-
Enterprise Act Insolvency Procedures, (2007) at 34. It was found that 95% of unsecured creditors 
received nothing from the receivership regime.   
31 Enterprise Act s250 which inserts s72A into the Insolvency Act 1987 
32 Insolvency Service, Insolvency Statistics: October to December 2017 
33 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 498 
34 Ibid, Sch B1 para 3  
35 Meaning the ‘company and as a much of the business as possible’; Explanatory Notes to the 
Enterprise Act 2002 (ch 40) 
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company were wound up, and 3) to realise property in order to make a distribution to one 
or more secured or preferential creditors. Thus, unlike the administrative receiver, the 
administrator cannot act solely in the interests of the secured creditors, and unsecured 
creditor protection is reinforced as administrators must disclose their justifications should 
they be unable to act in the unsecured creditors’ interests36. 
 
By imposing these objectives, and preventing the administrator from working solely in 
the interests of the secured creditors37, the number of creditor constituencies who have 
their interests protected is increased, and the unsecured creditors’ position is enhanced (at 
least theoretically)38. However, the effectiveness in the shift in practitioner focus from the 
secured creditors to the general body has been questioned due to the continuing 
professional position of the administrator – as they are still potentially appointed by 
institutional secured creditors, who are again sources of future work, they will act in a 
manner that keeps institutional lenders happy39.  
 
Despite these reforms, only a marginal improvement in the return rates of unsecured 
creditors has been forthcoming, with 75% of administrations resulting in no return to 
unsecured creditors and only 21% of creditors recovered between 1-50% of debts owed40. 
However, the overall impact on the general body of U.K. unsecured creditors is once 
again limited, as only 1,289 administrations took place in 2017, down from 2,009 in 
201341 - accounting for just 6.84% of 2017 insolvency cases. Hence, the administration 
regime, given its ingrained objectives of maximising the position of the unsecured 
creditor and its limited application, is also beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 
36 Sch B1 para 3(1)(a) Insolvency Act 1986 
37 However, the administrator may still be appointed by the secured lender, and lead to a repeat 
of the concerns raised in connection with administrative receivership: Sch 16 paras 14-18 
Enterprise Act 2002. See also M Stevenson, The Enterprise Bill 2002 – A Move Towards a Rescue 
Culture?, [2002] 18 ILP 155 at 157 
38 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency, (No.6) at 327; Stubbins M, What Kind of World 
Are We Living In? Creditor Wealth Maximisation, Contractarianism or Multiple Values in the 
Post-Enterprise Act 2002 Insolvency Regime?, (2019) 32(2) Insolvency Intelligence 78 
39 Swain C, A Move Towards a Stakeholder Society?, [2003] 19 ILP 5 at 7-8; Zhao J and Wen S, 
The Legitimacy of Unsecured Creditor Protection Through the Lens of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, (2013) JBL 868 at 875-87. See also McCormack G, Control and Corporate Rescue 
– an Anglo-American Evaluation (2007) ICLQ 515 at 529-533 
40 Frisby S, Interim Report, at 32 
41 Insolvency Service, Insolvency Statistics: October to December 2017 
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Instead, this thesis will focus on the liquidation regime, the process adopted in the 
overwhelming majority of insolvencies. Whilst the alternative insolvency regimes have 
sought to assist in rescuing companies, liquidation involves the realisation of a company’s 
assets and the distribution of any proceeds to creditors, and is triggered either by the 
company itself42 or by its creditors43. Although both forms of liquidation have different 
rules regulating their use, they share many common elements, including the powers of 
the liquidator44. Both forms of liquidation also involve the creation of liquidation 
committees45 to oversee the liquidation process, with 5 unsecured creditors appointed 
with the power to demand that creditor meetings be called and to remove the liquidator 
from their position should they be deemed to not be acting in their general interests of the 
creditors46. These committees provide creditors with a mechanism for protecting their 
interests from those of the secured creditors. Similarly, both forms place the liquidator 
under a duty to secure, realise and distribute the assets of the company’s creditors47 in 
order to fairly discharge some or all of the company’s debts rateably – the central tenet 
of the liquidation process. The liquidator himself is, as with receivers and administrators, 
an authorised insolvency practitioner, and so the same concerns as to their favouring 
secured creditors to acquire future employment48 are aroused, except where they are 
appointed to compulsory liquidations, where their position as officers of the court49 
require them to act with ‘scrupulous fairness and impartiality’50. 
 
The impact of the liquidation process, which unsecured creditors are bound to follow51, 
on return rates is unequivocal, with unsecured creditors recovering little from the 
insolvency process. In the period 98/9952 it was found that on average 66% of all 
insolvencies resulted in less than 10% of liabilities being discharged to all creditors who 
took part in the liquidation of the company, with unsecured creditors recovering only 7 
percent of debts owed (see Figure 2). Whilst these findings cannot be said to represent 
 
42 S84(1)(b) Insolvency Act 1986 
43 Ibid, S124(1)  
44 Ibid, Sch 4  
45 Ibid, Ss 101 and 141  
46 Ibid, ss 171 and 172  
47 Ibid, ss 107 and 143  
48 Especially as insolvency practitioners can operate as administrators, receivers or liquidators 
49 Re Oasis Merchandising Ltd [1998] Ch 170 at 186 
50 Re Contract Corp, Gooch’s Case (1872) LR 7 Ch App 207, at 213 
51 S153 Insolvency Act 1986 
52 R3, 9th Survey of Business Recovery in the UK (1998-1999), at 18 
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the current returns recovered by unsecured creditors because of their age, more recent 
research53 (Figure 3) shows that return rates have not altered. It was discovered that of 
the average £1.2 million owed to unsecured creditors by insolvent companies, the average 
recovery rate was less than 4% – or £48,000. Thus, unsecured creditors receive similar 
low return rates from the liquidation process as they do with the other insolvency 
regimes54. 
 




53 Office of Fair Trading, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners (2010), at para 3.3 
54 One commentator has derisively referred to the level of unsecured creditor returns as ‘crumbs’: 
Zhao J and Wen S, The Legitimacy of Unsecured Creditor Protection, (No.39) at 869 
55 Chart 16, R3, 9th Survey of Business Recovery in the UK (1998-1999), at 18 
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Figure 356:  
 
 
However, the key contrasting feature of the liquidation process with the alternative 
insolvency regimes, and why it is the subject of analysis by this thesis, is the volume of 
liquidations when compared to the alternatives. For whilst there were only 1,289 
administrations and 292 CVAs in 2017, there were 17,243 liquidations – 91% of all 
insolvency cases. Hence, a much greater percentage England’s unsecured creditors – 
indeed nearly all unsecured creditors affected by the insolvency process – are affected by 
liquidation when compared to the alternative regimes, and so any thorough analysis of 
the unsecured creditors’ position, or how that position can be improved, must be focussed 
on the liquidation process and the overwhelming majority of creditors.  
 
Before considering the causes of low unsecured creditor returns from the liquidation 
process, it also imperative to establish the wider effects of liquidation on the unsecured 
creditor other than just the low return rates. It has been established that these creditors 
also suffer psychologically from decreased confidence that they will recover any of the 
loan capital or interest payments due from the borrower. It was established that 55% of 
unsecured creditors surveyed expected to receive nothing from the liquidation process57 
- a figure considered optimistic because only 20% of liquidations resulted in a dividend 
 
56 Office of Fair Trading, The Market, (No.53) at para 3.3 
57 Office of Fair Trading, The Market, (No.53) at 4.58 
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being paid at all58. Compounding the problem further is the length of time it takes for the 
20% of unsecured creditors to receive their dividend payments (Figure 4), as it was found 
that in 40% of cases unsecured creditors are compelled to wait 2/3 years before receiving 
any payment at all59 - meaning unsecured creditors are placed in an unenviable position 
should liquidation occur; being compelled to wait several years for a payment they are 
unsure will be ever be made, and so must presume no payment will be forthcoming.   
 
Figure 460:  
 
The fate of the unsecured creditor must also be contrasted with the favourable position of 
those creditors that acquire a security interest61, who can recover the majority of the loan 
capital62. The data63 shows that secured lenders recovered 36% of liabilities owed through 
 
58 Zhao J and Wen S, The Legitimacy of Unsecured Creditor Protection, (No.39) at 873  
59 OFT, Corporate Insolvency In-Depth Interview with Creditors, A Report for the OFT, prepared 
by Marketing Sciences, June 2010; Office of Fair Trading, The Market, at 4.107, where 48% of 
liquidations were completed within 2 years and 91 per cent within 3 years. 
60 Office of Fair Trading, The Market, (No.53) at para 4.110 
61 A full definition of a security interest is provided in Section 2 of this chapter  
62 Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency, 5th edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2017) at 749; for a 
definition of a security interest see Section 2. 
63 The OFT’s findings were again supported by historical research undertaken by R3, who found 
that secured creditors recovered an even greater amount, 53 pence in the pound: R3, 9th Company 
Survey of Business Recovery in the UK, (1999) at 18 
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the insolvency process64 - a 9 times increase on the unsecured creditor returns. This does 
not, of course, include those secured creditors that were able to realise their security 
before the beginning of the liquidation process, who will recover even greater amounts 
by realising the market value of the assets65. Secured creditors, unlike unsecured creditors, 
are therefore able to minimise their losses from a company’s insolvency and occupy a 
much securer position. This discrepancy, as set out in Section 3, is difficult to justify.  
 
Finally, it is important to note the impact of the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis and the 
worsening of the U.K. economy66, with data collected by the Insolvency Service 
establishing a clear pattern between the deterioration of the economic and the increase in 
liquidations. Using recent and historical data67, it can be seen that pre-Crisis in 2004, 
when the economy was relatively strong, a total of 12,192 liquidations took place in the 
U.K.. This remained stable until 2008, the most turbulent year of the Financial Crisis, 
when there was a sudden spike in the number to 15,535. The following year, 2009, saw 
19,077 new liquidations, with the number remaining at 16,000 up to 2012. In the figures 
for 2016, the rate easily remains above the pre-Crisis levels of 2004, with 14,820 
liquidations. Deloitte also found that recently in 2018, as a result of decreased consumer 
spending and commodity price rises, the number of retail failures reached a five year high 
in 201768. It is therefore clear that when there is a worsening of the economy the number 
of liquidations increases. With this increased rate of liquidations during troubled 
economic times, a greater number of unsecured creditors lose substantial amounts by only 
receiving 4p in the pound.  
 
Given the large amounts of unsecured credit being made available to companies by 
institutional and trade creditors, and the low return rate these creditors regularly encounter 
upon the borrower entering liquidation, it is imperative to next establish and analyse the 
 
64 Office of Fair Trading, The Market, (No.53) at 3.3 
65 Oditah F, Assets and the Treatment of Claims in Insolvency, (1992) 108 LQR 459 at 468 
66 The recent Covid-19 pandemic, and its knock-on financial impact, is still occurring at the time 
this thesis is being written. Consequently, it is not possible include these impacts, although it is 
predicted to have a similar, if not more drastic, impact on the U.K. and world economy.  
67 Insolvency Service, Insolvency Statistics April-June 2017 Tables,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/632531/Q2_2017
_Tables.xlsx   
68 Deloitte, Retail Administrations Increase for the First Time in Five Years, 8th January 2018 
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/press-releases/articles/retail-administrations-increase-
first-time-in-five-years.html . It was found the rate increased by 28 percent from the previous year.   
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cause of these low return rates, which requires analysis of the pari passu principle and 
the exceptions to its implementation.  
 
Section 2: Pari Passu, the Statutory Priority of Distribution and Proprietary Rights of 
Creditors  
 
The Insolvency Act 1986 is the legal framework of English corporate insolvency. Giving 
effect to the recommendations of the Cork Report69, and being updated by the Enterprise 
Act 2002 to implement a ‘rescue culture’ within the legal insolvency framework70, the 
legislation formally sets out the substantive law relating to the liquidation process.   
 
Central to the legal framework of the liquidation process, and expressly stated in the 
Insolvency Act 1986, is the principle of pari passu distribution of company assets71. The 
principle is enunciated in s107 Insolvency Act 1986, and clarified in the Insolvency Rules 
2016, r14.12: 
 
“Debts other than preferential debts rank equally between themselves in 
the winding up and, after the preferential debts, shall be paid in full unless 
the assets are insufficient for meeting them, in which case they abate in 
equal proportions between themselves.”  
 
The purpose of this principle is to ensure that all creditors are treated equally whilst the 
company is being wound up72. Accordingly, the assets are shared pro rata in respect to 
the amounts owed to them73, and should they be insufficient to discharge a company’s 
debts, each of the creditors’ claims will rank equally, and they shall recover a proportion 
of the company’s assets equal to the percentage of the overall debt owed74. In practice, 
 
69 Cork K, Report, (No.2) 
70 DTI/Insolvency Service, Insolvency - A Second Chance, (2001) 
71 Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency, (No.62) at 3-4; R Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency, 
2nd edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2016) at 3; See Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 291; Cork K, Report,  
(No.2) at 1220; Finch V, Is Pari Passu Passe?, (2000) IL 194; Cranston R, Principles, (No.5) at 
436 
72 See Chapter 4 for full analysis  
73 Venessa Finch, Security, Insolvency and Risk (1999) 62 M.L.R. 633, 634; Milman D, Corporate 
Insolvency: Law and Practice, 3rd edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1999) at 90 
74 Finch V, Is Pari Passu Passe? (No.71) 
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when applied in its ‘strong’ form75 between all of an insolvency company’s creditors, it 
results in the debts owed to each individual creditor being transferred into a proportion of 
the total amount owed by the company, and each creditor recovering their respective 
percentage of the total debt owed from the company’s total assets. Each creditor is 
therefore treated uniformly76, and acquires an equitable share of the insolvent company’s 
remaining assets, meaning application of pari passu is to the advantage of the unsecured 
creditors as it ensures they at least receive something from the liquidation process77.  
 
This equitable method of sharing out assets among creditors is said to be supportable on 
two grounds. The first is the need for an orderly liquidation process78. By treating 
everyone equally, creditors are not incentivised to try and jump the queue and discharge 
the whole of the debt owed to them at the expense of others79. The second is fairness80. 
As all creditors are in same the position of being owed money by a debtor who has 
defaulted on their contractual obligations, it is only fair that they are all treated the same81. 
This was made clear by the House of Lords in British Eagle, where it was held that 
creditors could not contract out of the pari passu principle82.  
 
However, as evidenced above, pari passu distribution of assets among creditors rarely 
occurs should a company enter the liquidation process83 - whilst secured creditors on 
average recover 36% of debts owed, unsecured creditors only recover an average 4% of 
 
75 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 511. ‘Strong’ pari passu is 
defined as the principle applying to the body of creditors generally, rather than within the different 
classes of creditor.  
76 Mokal does however question the ‘fairness’ of pari passu by arguing that it is similar to access 
to a building – access to a building is provided "equally" to all by way of a steep staircase does 
not necessarily prevent those using wheelchairs from being treated unfairly.” Mokal R, Priority 
as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth, (2001) 60 CLJ 579 at 607 
77 Zhao J and Wen S, The Legitimacy of Unsecured Creditor Protection, (No.39) at 873 
78 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 8; Finch V, Is Pari Passu Passe, (No.71) 
79 Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (1995) 15 International Review of Law and 
Economics 47 at 54 
80 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) see Chapter 2; Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency, (No.62) at 
3-4 
81 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at 191-199 
82 British Eagle International Airlines Ltd v Compagnie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758. 
See also Re Maxwell Communications Corporation plc (No2) [1994] 1 All Er 737 at 750. The 
Supreme Court has, however, recently adopted a more flexible approach to the restriction, but 
refused to allow creditors to contract out of pari passu: see Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v 
BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2010] UKSC 38 
83 Mokal R, Priority as Pathology, (No.76) at 589 
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debts. Hence, ‘In practice, however, this objective [pari passu distribution] is seldom, if 
ever, attained.’84  
 
The principal cause of pari passu’s non-application is another tenet of insolvency law: 
the statutory priority of distribution85. This regime, set out in the Insolvency Act 1986, 
creates several classes of creditor that have their debts discharged before the general body 
of unsecured creditors86, meaning little can then be made available for rateable 
distribution to non-preferential creditors once the process is concluded87. The order of 
distribution is as follows: 
1. The costs and expenses of the liquidation88; 
2. Preferential debts89; 
3. The prescribed part of the company’s assets subject to a floating 
charge that must be made available to unsecured debts90; 
4. Debts secured by a floating charge91; 
5. Unsecured debts92.  
 
The first class of creditor to be paid is the liquidator and any expenses incurred in carrying 
out his functions during the liquidation, as they rank above all other claims subject to the 
insolvency process93. This includes the remuneration of the liquidator and liabilities 
incurred by the liquidator under post-liquidation contracts94.  
 
The level of liquidation expenses incurred through the liquidation process are generally 
high and quickly drain the company’s assets95: the fees incurred in the high-profile British 
 
84 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at 1396; See also Mokal R, Priority as Pathology, (No.76) who provides 
an in-depth rebuttal to the proposition that pari passu is central to the English law of insolvency.  
85 Mokal R, Priority as Pathology, (No.76) at 587 
86 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 295-296 
87 The assets of a company in liquidation, owing to the definition of insolvency above, must be 
insufficient to cover all of the debts owed to creditors.  
88 Ss175, 115 and 175(2)(a) Insolvency Act 1986 
89 Ibid, at S386  
90 Ibid, at S176A  
91 Ibid, at S176ZA 
92 Ibid, at S72(2)(f)  
93 Ibid, at ss115 and 176ZA 
94 Re Tokosho Finance Plc [2002] 1 WLR 671 
95 Zhao J and Wen S, The Legitimacy of Unsecured Creditor Protection, (No.39) at 873-874 
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Homes Store insolvency alone are currently projected to reach £3.5 million96, and annual 
liquidator fees for the U.K. total £350 million per annum97. Thus, within the priority of 
distribution, the liquidation expenses, whose size may constitute a significant proportion 
of the company’s liquidation asset pool, “erode or exhaust” a significant amount of what 
would otherwise “be available to creditors, particularly unsecured creditors”98 and 
prevent a large portion of the company’s remaining assets fall inside the reach of the pari 
passu99 principle and the hands of unsecured creditors.  
 
The second class to be paid under the statutory scheme are the preferential creditors set 
out in Sch 6 Insolvency Act 1986, which includes employee remuneration, pension 
scheme contributions, social security contributions and levies on coal and steel 
production. It has been found that within the average liquidation, preferential creditors 
were only owed £25,000100 – a relatively low sum when compared to the average 
£600,000 owed to secured creditors. Thus, although preferential creditors do prevent 
assets from being rateably distrusted, in all but the lowest value insolvency101 do they 
substantially alter the returns for unsecured creditors, and so are not a meaningful 
exemption to pari passu.   
 
It is the floating charge, however, that has the most significant impact on the non-
application of the pari passu principle, which can be granted over the company’s entire 
undertaking and gives secured creditors priority over unsecured creditors102. Such was 
their negative impact prior to the Enterprise Act, Goode even reached the conclusion that 
the floating charge should be abolished103. Following the reforms104, however, the 
floating charge holder is now bound by the liquidation process, and only able to exercise 
 
96 Letter from Duff and Phelps Ltd to Frank Field MP dated 21st December 2016, 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/Duff-Phelps-to-Frank-Field-re-insolvency-fees-21-12-2016.pdf  
97 Office of Fair Trading, The Market, (No.53) at 3.8 
98 Insolvency Service, Consultation on Reforms to the Regulation of Insolvency Practitioners, 
(February 2011), para.2.22. 
99 Zhao J and Wen S, The Legitimacy of Unsecured Creditor Protection, (No.39) at 869 
100 Office of Fair Trading, The Market, (No.53) at para 3.7 
101 The average insolvent company owes £1.8 million: ibid, at 3.3 
102 Armour J, Floating Charges: All Adrift?, (2004) CLJ 560 
103 Goode R, Commercial Law in the Next Millennium, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998) at 
67-68 
104 The right was abolished by s250 Enterprise Act 2002, which inserted s72A into the Insolvency 
Act 1986 
 37 
his power of sale after the payment of liquidation expenses and preferential creditors has 
been deducted from the crystallised pool, ensuring these creditors, if not unsecured 
creditors, recover a substantial percentage of the debts owed to them105.  
 
The Enterprise Act reforms also sought to improve the position of unsecured creditors by 
acting upon the comments of Lord McNaghten106 calling for unsecured creditors to be 
given preferential status. Although not going so far as to give them preferential status, the 
Act did introduce the ‘prescribed part’, requiring the liquidator to ‘make a prescribed part 
of the company’s net property available for the satisfaction of unsecured debts.’107 It 
requires that 50% of the first £10,000 subject to a floating charge and 20% of all 
subsequent assets up, to a maximum pool of £600,000 is set aside for unsecured 
creditors108. However, the implementation of the prescribed part is hamstrung by the 
number of exceptions it is subject to, which includes the requirement that the net property 
of a company meet the prescribed minimum value or that the liquidator is of the opinion 
that making the distribution would be disproportionate to the benefits109. These 
exceptions conspire to substantially minimise the effectiveness of the prescribed part 110, 
with creditor return rates only increasing by 0.4% as a consequence of its 
implementation111. Recently in the liquidation of British Home Stores, where creditors 
were left with outstanding debts of over £1 billion112, any application of the prescribed 
part would have resulted in £600,000 being made available to unsecured creditors from 
the company’s floating charges – or 0.04% of the debts owed113. Thus, the floating charge 
can, and does, prevent high value assets from being made available to unsecured creditors.  
 
 
105 The OFT established that preferential creditors, on average, recovered 83% of the debts owed 
to them: Office of Fair Trading, The Market, (No.53) at para 3.3 
106 [1897] AC 22 HL at 53 
107 S176A Insolvency Act 1986 
108 Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 para 3 
109 S176A (3) Insolvency Act 1986 
110 Walters A, Statutory Redistribution of Floating Charge Assets: Victory (Again) to Revenue 
and Customs, (2008) CL 129  
111 Mokal R, Priority as Pathology, (No.76) at 618; see also the 11th Company Survey from R3, 
where it was predicted that return rates would either be flat or increase by 5% (at 11 Chart 19). 
The OFT have established, however, that the return rate has in fact fallen. 
112 Hudson A, BHS and Reform of Company Law, (2016) Company Lawyer 364 at 366 
113 However, the prescribed part had no application to BHS’ insolvency owing to the asset make-
up of the company - Notice of Progress Report in Voluntary Winding Up, BHS Group, March 
2020 at 2 
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Compounding the problems created for unsecured creditors by the statutory priority of 
distribution is the use of security interests granting proprietary rights that prevent assets 
from being made available for distribution114. These interests are legal or equitable 
mechanisms that provide creditors with in rem rights over an asset115 should the borrower 
become unable to meet their obligations under the agreement, and ensures priority116 over 
unsecured and (some) preferential creditors in any liquidation process117. Thereby, they 
prevent the liquidator from acquiring control of the asset, and have a devastating effect 
on the unsecured creditor, as “Every new property right, every added security interest, 
every proprietary restitutionary remedy, every equity has eroded his stake in the 
insolvency process."118 
 
Section 3: The Justifications of Secured Credit  
 
Given the palpable effects of the statutory priority of distribution and security interests 
on the unsecured creditor, their fairness, particularly in relation to the law’s allowance of 
the security interest, has been questioned. 
 
The first ground in the debate is bargain theory119, where it is argued that the parties’ 
entitlement to contract for preferential treatment at the expense of others during the 
liquidation process is justified on the grounds that other creditors have elected not to take 
such precautions120. Put another way, it is argued that the unsecured creditors have 
impliedly consented to the security interest by continuing to lend in the knowledge that 
other parties have priority121. Strong support for this position can be found judicially in 
several instances, with respected members of the judiciary such as Hoffman J (as he was 
 
114 Oditah F, Assets and the Treatment of Claims in Insolvency, (1992) 108 LQR 459 at 468 
115 Cranston R, Principles, (No.5) at 432  
116 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 73 
117 McKendrick E, Goode, (No.7) at 623-624 
118 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 110 
119 Goode R, Is the Law too Favourable to Secured Creditors?, (1983) 8 Can Bus LJ 53 at 57; 
Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (No.79) at 55; Finch V and Milman D, 
Corporate Insolvency, (No.6) at 539 
120 Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (No.79) at 55 
121 McCormack G, The Priority of Secured Credit: an Anglo-American Perspective, (No.8) at 400 
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then)122, Nourse LJ123 and Lord McNaghten124 all espousing support over the last couple 
of centuries.  
 
However, bargain theory fails to take into account the inequality of bargaining power of 
the parties involved in the creditor-debtor relationship125. This is because although large 
institutional lenders have the financial and staffing resources to insist upon the inclusion 
of a security interest, smaller creditors, who on average only lend £3,000126, face 
prohibitive legal costs when drawing up security interests on an ad hoc basis, or must 
contend with market conditions that prevent them from acquiring security interests127. 
This imbalance in economic resources, therefore, prevents a level playing field on which 
all creditors may exercise their freedom of choice, and causes discrimination against 
involuntary unsecured creditors.  
 
The second justification put forward is that of notice128: that so long as other creditors can 
establish the existence of a security interest, they can act accordingly and protect 
themselves129. This thesis has also been challenged, and it is argued that the information 
asymmetries that exist between institutional lenders (who have access to colossal amounts 
of data at a cheap price) and trade creditors (who only have access to order histories, the 
trade presses, and who cannot reasonably afford to consult the relevant registers) prevent 
the universal application of this theory130. LoPucki has therefore concluded that 
unsecured creditors “contract under varying levels of coercion with varying levels of 
awareness”131. Moreover, they also concluded that because many creditors, such as tort 
victims, do not consent to their status132, they cannot have known of the company’s pre-
existing security interests and so are ‘victimised’.   
 
 
122 Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch. 200 at 209 
123 Re New Bullas Trading [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 485. 
124 Salomon v Salomon [1897] A. C. 22 at 52. 
125 Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (No.79) at 55 
126 The average owed to unsecured creditors is £3,000: Office of Fair Trading, The Market, 
(No.53) at para 4.57  
127 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 540 
128 Goode R, Is the Law too Favourable, (No.119) at 57 
129 McCormack G, The Priority of Secured Credit: an Anglo-American Perspective, (No.8) at 400 
130 Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (No.79) at 56; Goode R, Is the Law too 
Favourable, (No.119) at 63 
131 LoPucki L, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, (1994) 80 Va L.Rev 1887, at 1893 
132 Ibid, at 1896 
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The ‘notice’ argument is further weakened by the state of the present law, where although 
mortgages and charges are required to be registered133, retention of title clauses and 
pledges are not – creating the false impression to potential lenders that the assets subject 
to these security interests are still owned outright by the company and will be available 
for distribution should liquidation occur134. This is seen most clear in Chapter 6 Section 
4, where the resulting trust is not included on the companies register owing to it being 
operation of law. Consequently, even if a creditor did attempt to establish the financial 
health of the borrower, they could not acquire the full picture, and may unfairly be misled 
when supplying goods on credit135. 
 
Additionally, the notion that notice can protect creditors from procedural unfairness does 
not extend to substantive unfairness136. This was particularly acute before the Enterprise 
Act reforms, and the then frequent utilisation by charge holders of the administrative 
receiver, which resulted in the charge holder regularly appointing a particularly 
aggressive receiver to sell all of the assets subject to the charge, and act solely in his 
interest137. Although the Enterprise Act has sought to address this issue by abolishing the 
administrative receiver, similar outcomes can be seen contemporarily in the right afforded 
the mortgagee to sell the asset. For though the mortgagee is required to obtain the true 
market value of the land138, and the courts will endeavour to investigate whether the true 
market value was obtained139, they are under no obligation to wait for preferable market 
conditions140, and so can sell the property at a price that fails to cover the outstanding 
mortgage debt. Equally fortuitous for secured creditors, if a mortgagee appoints a 
receiver, due to the receiver being the agent of the mortgagor141, the mortgagee is not 
liable for their actions. As such, the mortgagee may recover instantaneously at a low price 
whilst causing substantive unfairness to the general body of creditors by substantially 
reducing the assets that can be made available for distribution. 
 
133 Ss 4 and 51 Land Registration Act 2002; Part 25 (s 859-877) Companies Act 2006 
134 This is also known as the ‘false wealth’ impression: Registration of Security Interests: 
Company Charges and Property Other Than Land – A Consultation Paper, Law Commission 
Cmnd 164 at 2 
135 Ibid, at 2; Cork K, Report, (No.2) at 1631-65 
136 Finch V, Security, Insolvency and Risk, (No.73) at 662 
137 Shamji v Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd [1991] BCLC 36 
138 Palk v Mortgage Services Funding plc [1993] Ch 330 
139 Bishop v Blake [2006] EWHC 831 (Ch) 
140 Cuckmere Brick Co v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] Ch 949 
141 S109(2) Law of Property Act 1925 
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The final legal justification proffered in favour of secured credit is value142, where it is 
proffered that when a creditor acquires security to the value of the loan provided, they are 
not prejudicing other creditors because they are not withdrawing more than they have put 
in143. Whilst this is potentially true where the security interest is limited to a single asset 
such as land, which does not drastically fluctuate in price and the relationship between 
loan capital and security interest is clear, where the interest extends to after-acquired 
property144, no new ‘value’ is being added by the creditor and is instead being provided 
by an innocent third party. As noted by Hudson, this can result in a loan of £100 being 
secured by £1 million of assets145 – £1 million that cannot be used to discharge the 
unsecured debts of those who supplied the £1 million of assets, and is instead used to 
reduce the losses of institutional lenders.  
 
However, despite the flaws in the arguments surrounding the legal basis of security 
interests, there are strong economic advantages that assist in justifying their existence. 
First of these are the safeguards they offer creditors compared to those enjoyed by 
unsecured creditors146. As seen in Figure 3, unsecured creditors on average recover 9 
times the level of debts compared to unsecured creditors. This has the result of reducing 
the risk to the borrower by providing them with priority over the unsecured creditors – 
providing them with a mechanism through which all or a large part of the loan capital can 
be directly recovered from the borrower’s assets147. This, according to some, enables 
creditors to increase their profits by incentivising them to increase the amount they lend 
to riskier ventures with higher interest rates, as they can have confidence that all or some 
of the loan capital will be returned should the venture fail148.  
 
 
142 Goode R, Is the Law too Favourable, (No.119) at 60-63 - “In taking and enforcing his security 
the creditor is not withdrawing from the estate a single penny more than he paid in.” 
143 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 540 
144 The House of Lords in Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HL Cas 191 held that a security interest 
could attach to after-acquired assets 
145 Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (No.79) at 57 
146 See generally: Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6); McCormack G, 
The Priority of Secured Credit: an Anglo-American Perspective, (No.8); Gullifer G, Goode on 
Legal Problems of Credit and Security, 5th edn (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 2013); Van Zwieten 
K, Goode, (No.13) at 8; Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (No.79); Cranston R, 
Principles, (No.5); Cork K, Report, (No.2) 
147 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 60 
148 Finch V, Security, Insolvency and Risk, (No.73) at 637 
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Notwithstanding the safeguards offered, by taking security lenders can make substantial 
cost savings – particularly through their ability to bypass the need to undertake legal 
action at all149. The majority of security instruments can be utilised without having to seek 
the permission of the court150, which is in contrast to unsecured lenders, who must either 
pursue a claim through the courts or partake in the liquidation process, incurring the costs 
of the courts or the liquidator151. Hence, the debenture holders’ ability to greatly reduce 
or obviate their legal and court fees when enforcing the borrower’s loan obligations 
further increases their rate of return from the insolvency process.  
 
The financial savings on offer to lenders are not limited to legal proceedings. In addition, 
the lender is able to reduce costs by avoiding the need to undertake a detailed financial 
investigation into, or monitor, the borrower152. As the lender is guaranteed to recover 
some or all of the loan capital due to the security interest153, and provided the asset put 
up for security retains its value, the lender does not have to become concerned with the 
financial circumstances of the borrower. Indeed, by taking security, “The history of the 
borrower and the purpose of the loan [becomes] immaterial”154. Consequently, the 
institutional lender can reduce their costs even further by reducing the size of, or 
completely disbanding, the departments responsible for investigating clients, thereby 
reducing staff costs and maximising profits155.  
 
It must be noted, however, that the lack of monitoring by secured creditors can lead to 
“no general health check…being applied to the firm”156, and creditors may lend to 
unsuitable borrowers. Meanwhile, those not providing secured credit “will still need to 
 
149 Kripke H, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a 
Vacuum of Fact (1985) 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929, at 948. 
150 McCormack G, The Priority of Secured Credit: an Anglo-American Perspective, (No.8) at 395 
151 Ss175, 115 and 175(2)(a) Insolvency Act 1986 
152 Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (No.79) at 54 
153 McCormack G, The Priority of Secured Credit: an Anglo-American Perspective, (No.8) at 
396; Finch V, Security, Insolvency and Risk, (No.73) at 643 
154 See Fleisig H, Economic Functions of Security in a Market Economy in Norton and Andenas 
ed. Emerging Financial Markets and Secured Transactions (1998) 15 at 19. 
155 The sole reliance creditors can place upon security interests can be overstated, however. Whilst 
it is undeniable that lenders regularly utilise security, research conducted by Cosh and Hughes in 
SME Finance and Innovation in the Current Economic Crisis (2009) Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge at 10 Chart 9, which shows a 38% increase in the number of 
lenders assessing the creditworthiness of their customer  
156 Hudson J, The Case Against Secured Lending, (No.79) at 54 
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monitor the position of the firm as best they can” and “need to continuously incur search 
costs”157. Hence, whilst secured creditors may be able to reduce monitoring costs, other 
creditors must still incur this financial burden, and so any economic advantages will be 
heavily weighted in favour of the creditor.  
 
Hence, although the use of security interests may be justified on the grounds of pure 
economic efficiency158 and the increased likelihood of credit being made available159, the 
substantive unfairness these interests cause, and the poor position the liquidation process 
places unsecured creditors, has raised serious questions over whether English law is in 
need of reform to provide more adequate protection. Commentators, from the legal and 
political spheres, have raised doubts over the current regime’s fitness and sought to 
propose potential solutions.  
 
Section 4: Calls for Reform to the Position of Unsecured Creditors  
 
One of the first attempts at comprehensively reviewing the U.K.’s insolvency regime was 
the Cork Report160, which was given terms of reference to review, examine and make 
recommendations on the law and practice relating to U.K. insolvency, bankruptcy, 
liquidation and receiverships161. Upon its publication, Cork heavily criticised the then 
insolvency regime as being inadequate for the modern, industrialised economy of the 
1980s, and made a number of recommendations that would later form the basis for the 
contemporary insolvency regime162. Cork also concluded that the unsecured creditor was 
unfairly treated due to their low return rates from the liquidation process163, and made a 
number of specific recommendations to improve their position, which included the 
abolition of almost all preferential claims; the deferment of the debts owed to parent 
companies when a subsidiary in the group fails; and the imposition of a fund to be 
distributed to ordinary creditors formed by 10% of assets subject to floating charges. This 
final proposal caused the most discussion, and sought to limit the cataclysmic impact of 
 
157 Ibid, at 54 
158 Armour J, The Law and Economic Debate About Secured Lending, (No.8) at 4 
159 Ibid, at 5 
160 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 1 
161 Ibid, at 1-3  
162 Ibid, at 446-448 
163 Ibid, at para 1396 
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the floating charge had before the Enterprise Act reforms164 by increasing “the 
dividends…payable to ordinary unsecured creditors, including trade suppliers.”165 
 
Even though its implementation was not instantaneous166,  the majority of the proposals 
made were adopted and received a statutory footing through the Insolvency Act 1986. 
Two recommendations that would not be incorporated in the new legislative regime, 
however, were the abolition of preferential claims167 and the 10% fund derived from 
assets subject to the floating charge due to lobbying by the banking industry and the 
Government’s reticence in reducing the operating flexibility of the banks168. Hence, 
although the Cork Report would substantially reform and improve the U.K.’s insolvency 
regime, the rejection of the unsecured creditor specific reforms would result in a failure 
to directly improve their position169.  
 
The Diamond Review170, published 7 years after the Cork Report, sought to review the 
law on security interests in personal property, and after reviewing the existing legal 
regime, it was concluded that law’s fragmented common law/Equity foundations and the 
regular occurrence of purchasers of property being unaware the property was subject to a 
security interest171 were defective. To remedy this, it was recommended that sweeping 
reforms be implemented through the complete abolition of the present regime and 
replacement with a new law on security interests similar to that of the US and Canada. To 
complement this new American style security interest regime, a register was also 
proposed that would base priority on the date of filing and also allow registration before 
the creation of the interest172. The intention behind the reforms was to better protect 
creditors by forewarning potential creditors of the risks involved in extending credit to 
 
164 “The floating charge has serious disadvantages, and is capable of working great injustice.’: 
Ibid, at 105. 
165 Ibid, at 1532(b) 
166 The recommendations were not implemented for 4 years 
167 The continuation of the existence of preferential claims can be seen in Section 1.2 of this 
chapter 
168 McCormack G, The Priority of Secured Credit: an Anglo-American Perspective, (No.8) at 
390-391; Milman D, Ten Per Cent Fund, (1999) (2) Insolvency Lawyer 47 
169 Tarling D, The Unsecured Creditors’ Raw Deal, (2013) 34(9) C.L. 265 at 271 
170 Diamond A, A Review, (No.2) 
171 Ibid, at 2.  
172 Ibid, at 2 
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their customers. These reforms would, however, fail to find governmental support173, with 
the existing regime, and the unsecured creditors’ precarious position, being retained by 
the government as a result of a lack of constituent desire and high cost implications174. 
 
More contemporary calls for reform have not focused on the legal liquidation regime 
itself, and have instead sought to prevent unsecured creditors from having to participate 
in the liquidation process at all by ensuring prompt payment of debts. In response to the 
liquidation of Carillion, which has resulted in the debts of 30,000 suppliers going unpaid, 
many opposition politicians have called for all trade debts to be paid within 30 days, 
including former Liberal Democrat Leader Sir Vince Cable175 and Labour peer Lord 
Mendelsohn176. Lord Mendelsohn, citing research from R3177, has argued that by ensuring 
prompt creditor payment, 20% of insolvencies could be avoided, and that the existing 
legislation178 and voluntary codes179 were ineffective in ensuring prompt payment. As a 
result, he called for greater protections to be provided by looking “at ways to continue to 
add pressure through the system to encourage a resolution to late payments.”  
 
Another area that is currently under scrutiny is the protection of consumer prepayments 
to retailers, such as Christmas hamper businesses, which was the subject of a Law 
Commission Final Report180. The Law Commission, in response to the Farepak collapse 
that left tens of thousands of prepayment customers out of pocket as a result of its entry 
into liquidation, have put forward a number of recommendations to prevent this occurring 
in the future181, and include the placing of prepayments into a trust, the granting of 
preferential status to consumers who have prepaid £250 or more in the six months before 
 
173 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts and Romalpa Clauses: Substance and Nemo Dat in Corporate 
Insolvency, (2012) LQR 412 at 426 
174 Hansard, HC Debates Vol 189 col 482, April 24th 1992  
175 Cable V, Sir Vince Cable: Carillion Chaos Demands Deal for Suppliers, Evening Standard 
18th January, https://www.standard.co.uk/business/sir-vince-cable-carillion-chaos-demands-deal-
for-suppliers-a3743371.html  
176 Hansard, HL Debates Vol 788, 22nd January 2018 
177 R3, Late Payment of and Other Business Failures Cause Over 1-in-5 Corporate Insolvencies, 
https://www.r3.org.uk/index.cfm?page=1114&element=27579&refpage=1113&resultspage=1&
type=&year=2016  
178 Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998 and Late Payment of Commercial 
Debts Regulations (2002) 
179 Prompt Payment Code 
180 Law Commission, Consumer Prepayments on Retail Insolvency, (2016) No 368 
181 Ibid, at 115-117 
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the company’s insolvency, and improving information flows to consumers that 
protections are currently available to those who use credit cards to make the 
prepayments182. Although potentially wide ranging and beneficial to prepayment 
consumers by ensuring the return of some of the prepayment, the Government has yet to 
respond to the Law Commission’s consultation183, leaving its fate in limbo and 
prepayment creditors without enhanced protection.  
 
Given the concern from the legal and political community for the position of the 
unsecured creditor within the liquidation process, and the number of attempts there have 
been to improve their position, it is important to analyse in detail the failings of the current 
legal regime and the parties being affected. This analysis is conducted in Chapters 3 and 
4, before a potential solution is proposed in Chapter 5. Before this can be done however, 
it is necessary to establish how creditors themselves have sought to minimise or remedy 
the shortcomings of the present legal regime.  
 
Section 5: The Scope of this Thesis 
 
Consequently, because the existing real and quasi-security interests have proven effective 
in protecting the interests of secured creditors and minimising the effects of the 
liquidation process for these creditors, usually at the expense of the unsecured creditor184, 
this thesis will seek to build upon the existing literature and analyse whether alternative, 
and as yet unconsidered, equitable mechanisms can be used to further secure the 
repayment of debts to creditors. In order conduct this research, it is necessary to analyse 
in detail how and why the existing liquidation legal regime fails to protect the interests of 
the unsecured creditor. To clarify the impact of the legislative shortcomings, analysis of 
the liquidation process in action is carried by conducting two cases studies involving 
companies that have entered liquidation: British Home Stores and Carillion Plc. The 
conclusions from these case studies will inform this thesis as to how creditors are 
impacted by the liquidation process, and identify potential means of remedying this. It is 
important to note, however, that the case studies are utilised only to evidence to 
shortcomings of the Insolvency Act 1986, and not to evidence the effectiveness of the 
 
182 S75 Consumer Credit Act 1974 
183 https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2017-11-14.112978.h  
184 Armour J, The Law and Economic Debate About Secured Lending, (No.8) at 5 
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potential solution, owing to the nature of their factual matrices not giving rise to potential 
resulting trusts. This research on how the unsecured creditors’ position can be improved, 
as set out in Chapters 5 and 6, will involve an analysis of the resulting trust and how it 
can be used to return assets to the company in liquidation or directly to parties themselves. 
If assets are returned to the now insolvent company, then they can be utilised to discharge 
the existing unsecured debts of company in liquidation and improve the position of the 
unsecured creditor. If assets in the possession of the company are subject to a resulting 
trust, then they can prevent a party from becoming a creditor in the first place.  
 
Put concisely, the resulting trust will be analysed for two reasons. The first is that the 
property subject to such a trust is unencumbered by third party proprietary interests185. 
As any property returned to the company in liquidation will be under the sole ownership 
of the company186, it will form part of the company’s asset pool rather than its creditors’ 
security interests187, and so can be distributed rateably to unsecured creditors by the 
liquidator in accordance with the statutory scheme of distribution and be used to discharge 
debts owed to unsecured creditors. Alternatively, if property subject to a resulting trust is 
not returned to the company and is instead returned to potential creditors, the trust assets 
can be used to discharge the company’s debts outside of the liquidation process188.  
 
The second reason is tightly aligned to the first, and concerns the property usually subject 
to a resulting trust. Although there are no restrictions on the property that can be subjected 
to a resulting trust, the existing literature shows that in many instances the property is of 
a high value, particularly as many examples of the resulting trust involve land189. The 
high value of the potential assets made available to creditors through the resulting trust is 
best illustrated in the recent and high-profile Supreme Court appeal of Petrodel v Prest190, 
 
185 See generally Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, 19th edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) chaps 
7-9; Thomas G, Hudson A, The Law of Trusts, 2nd edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2010) chaps 26-26; 
McGhee J, Snell’s Equity, 33rd edn, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) 
186 National Provincial Banks Ltd v Ainswoth [1965] AC 1175; Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 705 
187 s283(3)(a) Insolvency Act 1986 
188 Ibid, at S283(a); Heritable Reversionary Company Ltd v Millar [1892] AC 598; McCormack 
G, Proprietary Claims and Insolvency, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 2 
189 See Chapter 5 
190 [2013] UKSC 34 
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where £17.5 million of residential property was held to be subject to several resulting 
trusts, and AAZ v BBZ191, where a resulting trust was imposed over high value property.  
 
Although this thesis will seek to evaluate the effectiveness of the resulting trust, the 
constructive trust will not be evaluated due its limitations. Whilst this could potentially 
increase the size of the company’s asset pool, the factual matrices applicable to companies 
in which the constructive could be imposed – bribery192, unauthorised profits193, 
unauthorised renumeration194 or use of confidential information195 - are restricted to 
instances of breach of fiduciary duty. As such, their application is limited mainly to 
instances of breaches of directors’ duties: an occurrence that is difficult to prove196. 
Secondly, it is difficult to recover substantial sums for distribution, as those responsible 
for the misappropriation of property may dispose of the assets through purchases such as 
holidays, expensive dinners and home improvements – actions that are foreseeable given 
that the majority of assets subject to a constructive trust will be liquid assets. Due to the 
restrictions in the law of tracing concerning dissipation, unascertained goods197 and 
inequitability to trace198, it becomes extremely difficult to recover the misappropriated 
assets.  
 
Section 6: Research Questions and Thesis Layout  
 
The above sections of this chapter have considered the issues relating to unsecured 
creditors upon a company’s liquidation, and the use of security interests to lessen these 
issues. It was also established that this thesis will analyse the resulting trust and whether 
it can increase creditor return rates. Thus, this thesis has three research questions: 
 
 
191AAZ v BBZ [2016] EWHC 3234 (Fam)  
192 FHR Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 
193 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; Boardman v Phipps [1966] UKHL 2  
194 Dale v IRC [1954] AC 11 
195 A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No2) [1990] 1 AC 109 
196 See generally: Hannigan B, Company Law, 4th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2016), see Part II; Davies 
P and Worthington S, Gower: Principles of Modern Company Law, 10th edn (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2016), see Chapter 16 
197 Re London Wine Co (Shippers) Ltd (1975) 126 NLJ 977 
198 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465 
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1. To what extent does the English law of liquidation impact upon an insolvent 
borrower’s unsecured creditors; 
2. What role can the resulting trust, in the factual matrices that it is imposed, play in 
addressing any impact on unsecured creditors by the liquidation regime;  
3. What advice can be provided, or recommendations proposed, to the relevant 
parties to provide more safeguards to unsecured creditors.  
 
To answer these research questions, this thesis will conduct the analysis outlined above 
by meeting the following objectives: 
 
- To analyse how and why the legal rules pertaining to the liquidation process 
impact upon on unsecured creditors;  
- To investigate how the existing literature has proposed to improve the position of 
the unsecured creditor and analyse whether they have been effective in achieving 
this objective; 
- To analyse whether the resulting trust is an efficient mechanism to increase 
unsecured creditor return rates; and  
- To make a number of recommendations on how the resulting trust can be 
effectively utilised to increase return rates.  
 
To accomplish these objectives, this study seeks to add to the existing literature by 
conducting research on the resulting trust in the context of the liquidation process. This 
research involves the doctrinal and theoretical analysis of the resulting trust and the 
application of the analysis’ conclusions in Chapter 6. This research is original in character 
as the existing, limited literature has not analysed the potential beneficial effects of the 
resulting trust for unsecured creditors in the context of the liquidation process.  
 
Section 7: Methodology  
 
To achieve the objectives set in this chapter, this thesis uses both a doctrinal and 
theoretical methodology. It adopts a partially doctrinal approach as in order to establish 
how the law on liquidation impacts upon unsecured creditors, an analysis and 
interpretation of the existing legislation and case law is undertaken. It also adopts a 
partially theoretical approach because it seeks to understand the impact of the underlying 
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legal frameworks on the legal rules that regulate the liquidation process and the resulting 
trust. To test the doctrinal analysis of the case law, a number of case studies are utilised, 
and include real world examples of U.K. companies. Finally, this section sets out the 
range of sources that are required to conduct this analysis, the majority of which take the 
form of published case law.  
 
Section 7.1: Doctrinal/Black Letter and Theoretical Analysis  
 
The main methodology used by this thesis is doctrinal analysis. The principle reason for 
its adoption is that it is the methodology traditionally utilised by legal academics and 
practitioners when analysing the law199. It has been defined as:  
 
“Research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a 
particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains 
areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future developments.”200 
 
Doctrinal research therefore seeks to determine the legal rules pertaining to a particular 
area or areas, analyse the relationship between these rules, and comment on any 
difficulties or predictions that arise. Within this thesis’ analysis of both the resulting trust 
and insolvency law the primary sources will be case law and statute and their 
interpretation, with academic commentary putting forward interpretations and competing 
interpretations of these primary sources. These rules, although set out in case law and 
binding, are not set in stone201. As a consequence, it is possible to put forward proposals 
for how the law relating to liquidation and the resulting trust should evolve by interpreting 
both the existing case law and statutes.  
 
Doctrinal analysis is similar to theoretical research, which “fosters a more complete 
understanding of the conceptual bases of legal principles and of the combined effects of 
 
199 Hutchinson T, Duncan N, Defining and Describing What we do: Doctrinal Legal Research, 
(2012) Deakin Law Review 17(1) 83, at 107; Chynoweth P, Chapter 3, Legal Research in 
Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment, (London: Wiley, 2008) at 32 
200 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding (‘Pearce Committee’), Australian Law 
Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, taken 
from Hutchinson T, Duncan N, Defining, (No.199) at 101 
201 Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 at 393 
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a range of rules and procedures that touch on a particular area of activity.” 202 Theoretical 
research thus seeks to determine and better understand the theoretical underpinnings of 
an area of law, and then analyse the impact these theoretical underpinnings have on the 
legal rules that apply to a particular area203. The need to undertake theoretical research 
was put by Pattaro, who notes legal research only makes sense “when a certain 
philosophical position (or theory) is assumed, and will make no sense at all when another 
is assumed.”204 
 
Both methodologies are consequently seeking to better understand an aspect of the law, 
and then analyse the effect this has. The difference, however, can be explained simply: 
doctrinal research seeks to analyse the impact of the law on a real-world phenomenon, 
whereas theoretical research seeks to analyse the impact of a theoretical underpinning on 
the law itself. This may include the theoretical underpinnings of why a legal rule operates. 
Although doctrinal analysis will be the primary methodology adopted by this thesis, 
theoretical analysis will also be undertaken to understand the impact the conceptual 
frameworks of secured credit and the resulting trust have on the substantive law.  
 
Section 7.2: Case Studies  
 
This thesis uses two case studies205 to test the theoretical conclusions reached in Chapter 
3 regarding the shortcomings of the current liquidation legal regime and the negative 
consequences these have on unsecured creditors. Each case study evidences how 
unsecured creditors are impacted by the borrowing company’s liquidation. The utilisation 
of case studies is appropriate owing to this methodology’s effectiveness in answering 
‘how’ questions206, and this thesis asking two primary questions: how does the law on 
liquidation impact upon the body of unsecured creditors, and how can the resulting trust 
be utilised to improve liquidation return rates. 
 
 
202 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding (‘Pearce Committee’), Australian Law 
Schools, taken from Hutchinson T, Duncan N, Defining, (No.199) at 101 
203 Smith ATH, Learning the Law, 16th edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2016) 4 
204 Pattaro, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Vol 1 (Spain: Springer, 
2005) 9 
205 Yin R, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th edn (London: Sage, 2009) 
206 Ibid, at 9 
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The first case study utilised by this thesis is that of U.K. department store retailer British 
Home Stores (BHS). BHS, after its acquisition by Sir Philip Green in 2000, was initially 
a profitable company that declared £423 million in dividends in the period 2002-04, but 
became unprofitable in the period 2009-2014. It was sold to Retail Acquisitions Limited 
(RAL) for £1 in March 2015, and although there was a vague strategy to try and stem its 
losses, it entered administration on 25th April 2016 and liquidation in December 2016. 
This has resulted in 11,000 employees losing their jobs207 and non-preferential unsecured 
creditors being owed £1,124,763,000208. 
 
The second case study is that of Carillion PLC. Carillion, the U.K.’s second largest 
construction company, carried out a number of construction and facilities management 
contracts for both the public and private sectors. Holding a number of unprofitable 
contracts, in September 2017 it revealed that in the preceding 6 months a loss of £1.15 
billion had been incurred. A further profit warning was issued in November 2017, and the 
company’s share price fell 50%, valuing the company at only £73 million with debts of 
roughly £900 million. Carillion was placed into liquidation on 15th January 2018 after 
government assistance was refused. Upon its entrance into liquidation, it had debts of 
£1.5 billion and 30,000 suppliers who had unpaid contracts with the company. 
 
Both the BHS and Carillion case studies have been selected by this thesis for the same 
reasons. Firstly, because of their high-profile nature, extensive research and literature has 
been produced on both collapses. As a result of the liquidators’ reports, the official 
Parliamentary enquiries and the extensive media coverage, sufficient evidence on the 
actions of the companies, and the impact of these actions, is widely available to this thesis 
for analysis. Secondly, because of the large size of the two companies, and the diverse 
nature of their bodies of creditors, the two case studies provide detailed evidence on the 
potential impact of the liquidation process on the diverse range of lenders that make up 
the body of a company’s unsecured creditors. Finally, by analysing two companies in 
vastly different industries – retail and construction – it may be possible to establish 
whether the impact of the liquidation process is universal to unsecured creditors.  
 
 
207 House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Innovation and Skills Committees, BHS, 
20th July 2016 at 4 
208 Report to Creditors BHS Limited (In Administration), 6th June 2016 at 9.15 
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Section 7.3: Necessary Data and its Limitations  
 
To analyse the impact of the resulting trust on an insolvent company’s unsecured 
creditors, two sets of data are required. The first relates to the doctrinal analysis of the 
resulting trust. In order to analyse how and when the resulting trust may be imposed, it is 
necessary to critically review and interpret the existing law and determine whether any 
new interpretations can be put forward. To undertake this research, references to case law, 
statutory provisions and academic publications must be made, all of which are in the 
public domain or legal databases.  
 
The second set of data needed is for the case studies. This requires a mixture of several 
sources of information, including government reports and statistical data. 
 
In relation to data concerning the actions of the companies used in this thesis’ case studies, 
it is possible to acquire this information from three key sources: Companies House 
records, Parliamentary enquiries and published judgments. The Companies House data 
includes insolvency practitioner reports and yearly financial statements which detail some 
aspects of the case studies’ actions. However, the data included is limited to the 
liquidators’ reports, and is only able to provide an outline of the companies’ actions. 
Parliamentary enquiries, owing to the powers of House of Commons’ select committees, 
are able to supply additional information on the companies and the impact of their failure 
on creditors. Published judgments also provide information not included in the 
liquidators’ reports.  
 
Section 8: Thesis Structure  
 
In conducting the above research, this thesis adopts the following structure:  
 
Chapter 2 analyses the predominant U.S. insolvency theories to determine whether they 
conclude whether unsecured creditor protection is justified and necessary. These theories 
and Creditor Wealth Maximisation, the Multiple Values Approach and Contractarianism. 
It also analyses two key texts on English insolvency law to determine whether or not 
unsecured creditor protection is justified and called for in English law.   
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Chapter 3 analysed the anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 to determine whether they are effective in protection unsecured creditors. It 
analyses both the substantive provisions, their rates of utilisation and the available 
funding available to liquidators to commence litigation should a claim be available. It 
therefore analyses whether additional measures are necessary to assist unsecured creditors 
and the characteristics any assistance needs to possess.  
 
Chapter 4 is a series of case studies that establish the impact of the liquidation process on 
the unsecured creditor. It establishes, through analysing two real world cases, how the 
shortcomings of the Insolvency Act 1986 impact upon creditors and which groups of 
creditors are affected. The two cases studies, Carillion Plc and British Home Stores, were 
chosen because of the readily available data and the diverse nature of their creditors.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses the potential uses of the resulting trust in the context of the liquidation 
process and unsecured creditors. It reviews the 4 forms of resulting trust (automatic, 
purchase price, gratuitous transfer and Quistclose) and concludes how they can, 
theoretically, return assets to the company/unsecured creditors. It sets out both the 
potential legal and practical implications of these conclusions, and helps this thesis 
comprehend the resulting trust’s potential impact on the liquidation process.  
 
Chapter 6 builds directly upon Chapter 5 and analyses whether the resulting trust, beyond 
the theoretical conclusions reached in Chapter 5, is a practicable means of assistance for 
unsecured creditors. This includes analysing how the presumptions of resulting trust can 
be rebutted, the ability to trace, resulting trust liability and whether the imposition of a 
resulting trust is justifiable.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis. The research questions raised in Chapter 1 are considered 
with reference to the findings of the previous chapters, and the role of the conclusion is 
to determine whether or not the research aims have been successfully achieved. It will 




Chapter 2: Justifying Existing and Potential Unsecured 
Creditor Protections 
 
English insolvency law, as set out in Chapter 1, places the unsecured creditor at the centre 
of its legislative and jurisprudential regime. The unsecured creditor occupies this central 
position through their inclusion in the statutory priority of distribution and their exclusion 
from many of the company’s assets by security interests. As will be seen in Chapter 3, 
English insolvency law also affords the unsecured creditor a prime position by creating a 
number of anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions designed to afford them 
protection. This is at the exclusion of secured creditors, who are unable to benefit from 
them.  
 
Many strands of England’s insolvency jurisprudence vociferously extol the centrality of 
the unsecured creditor, and the need for insolvency law to provide them with adequate 
protection, due to the concerns raised in Chapter 1. Even at the embryonic stages of share 
limited companies, Lord McNaghten in the paradigmatic House of Lord Judgment of 
Salomon v Salomon209 stated that he and many of his fellow peers were in favour of, 
although unable to confer, unsecured creditor protections: 
 
“I have long thought…that the ordinary trade creditors of a trading 
company ought to have a preferential claim on the assets in liquidation and 
in respect of debts incurred within a certain limited time before the 
winding-up.”210 
 
Hoffmann J, as he was then, also effusively affirmed the role of liquidators in protecting 
unsecured creditors, noting that “Liquidators differ from receivers in so far as they act 
primarily in the interests of unsecured creditors and members whereas receivers look to 
the interests of the secured creditor who appointed them”211.  
 
 
209 [1897] AC 22 
210 Ibid, at 53 
211 Re Potters Oil Ltd (No2) [1986] 1 WLR 201 
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Owing to the continued protection afforded to secured creditors, when reviewing English 
insolvency law in the early 1980s, Sir Kenneth Cork authoritatively concluded unsecured 
creditors were in need of protection. Throughout the Review, Sir Kenneth repeatedly 
reinforced this conclusion212. He began by noting that insolvency, and liquidation in 
particular, were “concerned exclusively” with ensuring unsecured creditors received the 
proceeds from the sale of the company’s uncharged assets to the exclusion of all of 
interested parties, including the security interests213. Cork also concluded that the general 
body of creditors were the primary party insolvency law is concerned with, and that they 
required this because “the general body of the insolvent’s creditors, each of who is 
affected…by the common disaster [the onset of insolvency].”214 Therefore, “his interest 
[that of the unsecured creditor] in those proceedings ought to be, so far as is consistent 
with the claims of his fellow creditors, as fair and reasonable as circumstances will permit, 
to compensate for the loss of his individual rights.”215  
 
Support for unsecured creditor protection has also enjoyed widespread academic 
acceptance in England. Indeed, Prof Goode has included creditor protections, and 
maximising their returns from the liquidation process, as objectives in his vision of 
insolvency law216. This is despite, as is explored below, Goode taking a somewhat 
restrictive interpretation of insolvency jurisprudence and favouring protecting pre-
insolvency rights over those constituents who are worst hit by the liquidation of a 
company.  
 
Others have tried to realign insolvency law’s focus away from outright protection of 
unsecured creditors, and have attempted to present it as having a broader function of 
protecting the wider community - thereby safeguarding through indirect methods. Such 
endeavours include the work of Anderson217, who argues that insolvency law should be 
structured so that the insolvent company is dealt with in such a way that meets the general 
needs of society and the economy. Anderson also recognises, however, that this aim 
 
212 This is analysed in detail in Section 2 of this chapter.  
213 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 17 
214 Ibid, at para 232 
215 Ibid, at para 232 
216 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 74-75. This is analysed fully in Section 2 of this chapter  
217 Anderson H, The Framework of Corporate Insolvency Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2017)  
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should not stifle economic activity218. Thus, by maintaining economic activity, the 
unsecured creditor is protected by ensuring that a market is preserved in which to operate 
and continue doing business, potentially overcoming the losses sustained through the 
liquidation.  
 
Finally, it has been recognised that central to such protection is the equality and fairness 
between creditors219, seen in the form of the pari passu principle220. Despite the numerous 
exceptions that exist to the principle, the courts have repeatedly reaffirmed221 its 
continued fundamental importance to insolvency law222. Hence, although policy 
considerations have prevented the full application of the principle, the desire to treat 
creditors equally by preventing any one of them obtaining an unfair advantage, and the 
subconscious psychological effect this has on the law, mean that creditor protection 
remains integral to insolvency law.  
 
However, the recognition that unsecured creditors should be protected does not address 
the issue of whether the protection is justified. Indeed, many of the pronouncements 
calling for unsecured creditor protections take it as gospel that they are deserving of 
protection, and fail to set out why the protection is justified beyond the simple low return 
rates. Consequently, owing to this thesis’ exploration of whether or not the resulting trust 
can enhance unsecured creditor protection, it is necessary that it is established that 
unsecured creditor protection, and the legal community’s adoption of such measures, is 
justified generally, and that this thesis is vindicated in analysing potential increases in the 
protection afforded them. For if creditor protections cannot be justified, this thesis’ 
analysis will have little practical application.  
 
In arguing that current, and prospective, unsecured creditor protection is theoretically 
justified, this chapter is split into two sections. The first analyses the theories put forward 
 
218 Ibid, at 3 
219 Milman D and Durrant C, Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice, 3rd edn (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1999) at 1; McCormack G, Secured Credit under English and American Law, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2004) at 5 
220 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 121-122 
221 Officeserve Technologies Ltd [2017] EWHC 906 (Ch) at 10 
222 Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law: Corporate and Personal, 4th edn (Bristol: LexisNexis, 
2017) at 6; Re Lines Bros Ltd [1983] Ch 1 (CA) 20E; Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] 
Ch 505 (CA) 527H 
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by leading American academics on the overarching theories of insolvency law. These 
deal with the purpose of insolvency, and so inform whether it is intended to offer 
unsecured creditors protection, and it is concluded that the three primary theories all 
provide convincing justifications. American theories are analysed owing to a dearth of 
Commonwealth commentary, primarily as a result of English law’s practical and 
functional evolution223. Second, the functional view of English insolvency law, espoused 
by Goode and Cork, and the purposes of English insolvency law are analysed to again 
determine whether creditor protection is central, and it is again demonstrated that 
unsecured creditor protection forms a key component of English insolvency law.  
 
Section 1: Underlying Theories of Insolvency  
 
Attempts to provide insolvency law with a cohesive and unified theoretical framework 
began in the United States in the mid-1980s, and many disparate and contradictory 
conclusions, as set out below, were drawn. The impetus for such advances sprang from 
sharp changes to the U.S. economy, as it entered a recession and correspondingly the 
number of insolvent companies and individuals greatly increased224. Although England 
would experience similar economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s225, owing to the 
U.K.’s piecemeal and pragmatic insolvency regime226, English scholars have assuaged 
engaging in such discussions. This is because it was concluded that an overarching theory 
was unnecessary to understand this area of the law227, and so it is the U.S. theories that 
predominate this area.  
 
 
223 See Van Zwieten, Goode, (No.13) at 89; Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 
24; and Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) 
224 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1982) 91 
Yale LJ 857; Warren E, Bankruptcy Policy, (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 775 at 
776. In between 1980 and 1982 commercial insolvencies would rocket from 43,694 to 69,300 – 
American Bankruptcy Institute, Total Business and Non-Business Filings by Year (1980-2017)  
225 Through events such as Black Wednesday and the recession of the early 1990s  
226 See Cork K, Report, (No.2); Cork K, Cork on Cork, (London: MacMillan, 1988) at 202-203; 
White Paper, A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law (HMSO, 1984), Cmnd. 9175; White 
Paper, Insolvency – A Second Chance (DTI, July 2001), Cm.5234; Stubbins M, What Kind of 
World, (No.38) at 78-79 
227 Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 24; Van Zwieten, Goode, (No.13) at 89; 
McCormack G, Apples and Oranges? Corporate Rescue and Functional Convergence in the US 
and UK, (2009) 18 Int. Insolv. Rev. 109 at 116. 
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Within the U.S. movement, three main theories have been developed that cover a wide 
spectrum of opinion228. The most prominent and influential229 theory has been that of 
Creditor Wealth Maximisation, put forward in several publications by Prof Jackson and 
his co-authors230. Put simply, the approach requires insolvency law to be predicated on 
the single purpose of maximising the return rates to secured and then unsecured creditors. 
At the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum is the Multiple Values Approach put 
forward by Elizabeth Warren231, which rejects this strict approach to insolvency priorities 
and calls for a flexible system in which each insolvency is treated on its own merits, and 
losses should be distributed to those who can withstand them the best, and assets 
distributed to those who are in the greatest need. In between these two extremes lies 
Korobkin’s Contractarian approach232, which seeks to provide order and stability whilst 
also protecting those in need by amending the insolvency rules. Given that all of these 
theories prima facie affect the position of unsecured creditors by either providing them 
with additional or fewer assets, the remainder of this section will analyse these competing 
theories and conclude whether or not they provide a justification for unsecured creditor 
protection, either within insolvency law or outside of it233.  
 
 
228 Other published insolvency theories, which are similar to those analysed in this chapter, 
include: Gross K, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, (1994) 72 
Wash ULQ 1031; Clark R, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, (1977) 90 Harv 
LR 505; Carlson D, Bankruptcy Theory and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1992) 61 U Cin LR 453; 
Flessner, Philosophies of Business Bankruptcy Law: An International Overview in Ziegel J, 
Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (Oxford: 
OUP,1994); Shuchman, An Attempt at a ‘Philosophy of Bankruptcy’ (1973) 21 UCLA L Rev 403. 
229 Mokal R, The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditor’s Bargain, and 
Corporate Liquidation, (2001) 21 Legal Studies 400 at 401-402 
230 See Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptc, (No.224); Jackson T, Of Liquidation, 
Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, (1986) 60 
Am Bankruptcy LJ 399; Jackson T and Scott R, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on 
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1989) 75 (2) VLR 155; Baird DG and Jackson 
TH, Corporate Reorganisations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment 
on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, (1984) 51 University of Chicago 
Law Review 97 
231 Warren E, Bankruptcy Policy, (No.224) 
232 Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, (1993) 71 
Texas L Rev 541 
233 It is acknowledged that there are alternative theories put forward in addition to the three 
analysed, including, but not limited to, Communitarism (Gross, Taking Community Interests into 
Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay (1994) 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 1031.) and Ethicalism (P. Shuchman, 
An Attempt at a ‘Philosophy of Bankruptcy’ (1973) 21 UCLA L. Rev. 403.). However, although 
they are unique theories in their own right, they are less distinctive and representative of the range 
of theories put forward. Therefore, they have not been included in this chapter’s analysis.  
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Section 1.1: Creditor Wealth Maximisation  
 
As acknowledged by many leading commentators234, the theory to have the greatest 
impact on insolvency law is perceived to have been Jackson’s Creditor Wealth 
Maximisation235. At its most macro level, this theory involves the simple proposition that 
creditors, both secured and unsecured, should recover the greatest amount possible from 
the insolvency process236. This objective comes at the expense of other considerations237, 
and requires a mandatory and collective regime. The justification for such a narrowly 
focused view of insolvency, according to Jackson and his co-authors, is that the 
insolvency process is simply a mechanism to collectivise debtor collection and then 
distribute all the available assets to discharge these debts238. 
 
The theory sprang out of the 1970s American Law and Economics movement239, however 
Jackson also took his theory one step further, and incorporated Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance240, arguing that creditors would, if they were designing an insolvency regime 
without the knowledge of which position they would find themselves occupying upon the 
onset of liquidation, conclude that creditor wealth maximisation would be the regime they 
would subscribe to as being the fairest and most efficient.  
 
A crucial feature of Creditor Wealth Maximisation is the need to recognise and respect 
pre-insolvency rights241. Thus, the interests of employees, shareholders and the wider 
community cannot be protected through ex post distributions of company assets. Instead, 
 
234 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 78-79; Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 
24; Finch V, The Measures of Insolvency Law, (1997) 17 Oxford JLS 227 at 230 
235 The theory has been adopted into the German Insolvenzordnung and into English academic 
thinking through the works of McCormack G, Secured Credit under English and American Law, 
(No.219) at 12 and Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 78-79. See also Stubbins M, What Kind of 
World, (No.38) for the degree to which Creditor Wealth Maximisation has been adopted into the 
Enterprise Act 2002. This adoption of the theory gives it, and this thesis’ analysis of the theory, 
credence within the English insolvency regime.  
236 See Finch V, The Measures of Insolvency Law, (No.234) at 230 
237 Mokal R, The Authentic Consent Model, (No.229) at 416 – there is an ‘appreciation of the 
nature of insolvency law and its limits, and of the boundaries between insolvency and non-
insolvency issues.’ 
238 See Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy (No.224) 
239 See the works of the founder of the Law and Economics movement; Manne H, The Collected 
Works of Henry G Manne, (US: Liberty Fund, 2009) 
240 Rawls J, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge Mass., HUP, 1971)  
241 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 90-92 
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they can only be protected either by a surplus of company assets242 or through non-
insolvency protections, which require active and generous governmental support. This 
means non-creditor parties receive little to no protection from the insolvency process as 
governments rarely provide the necessary support. Creditor Wealth Maximisation also 
leans heavily on the statutory priority of distribution considered in Chapter 1, resulting in 
secured creditors retaining their position as the first creditors to receive company 
assets243. It can, and is repeatedly, argued244 that Creditor Wealth Maximisation is merely 
a procedural mechanism that is unconcerned with policy issues and redistributive 
justice245.  
 
More prescient for unsecured creditors, however, are the alleged benefits and pitfalls 
Jackson proffers for adopting this theory246, as they affect their position within the 
insolvency process. First in the list of proposed advantages is the guarantee that creditors 
will recover something from the insolvency, or at least guarantee an equal chance of 
recovering from the process if there are no assets left in the company247. Indeed, Jackson 
argues that by utilising a mandatory and collectivised system, slow reacting creditors248 
are protected from the free for all ‘race to collect’ by removing any advantage to those 
who move the quickest and are thereby able to recover all or a substantial percentage of 
their debts at the expense of all others249. As put by Jackson, it thereby ‘stipulates a 
minimum set of entitlements for claimants’250 and protects unsecured creditors by 
 
242 Which is implausible given that insolvency is entered into only if the assets of the company 
are insufficient to cover its liabilities - s123 Insolvency Act 1986. Both tests for determining 
whether the company has entered insolvency, the balance sheet and cashflow tests, require there 
to be insufficient assets.   
243 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 90 
244 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 29; Keay A and Walton P, 
Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 24  
245 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 28, 29 
246 “…secured credit is, on the whole, socially beneficial, and that such benefits are high likely to 
outweigh the social costs of any transactions motivated by redistribution.” - Armour J, The Law 
and Economic Debate, (No.8) at 4 
247 Mokal R, The Authentic Consent Model, (No.229) at 421 
248 Those who do not actively engage in monitoring the creditor or do not have access the relevant 
information 
249 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy, (No.224) at 861. Fletcher put this as “It is a central 
tenet of the collectivity principle that the debtor’s assets are administered, and the creditors’ 
claims processed, without any regard for the chronological order in which assets are acquired or 
debts created”; Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency,(No.62) at 3; Baird DG, The Uneasy Case for 
Corporate Reorganisations, (1986) 15(1) JLS 127 at 131 
250 Ibid, at 876 
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ensuring that they enjoy a fair distribution of the available assets without a small minority 
benefiting at the expense of the general body251. Given that creditors cannot guarantee 
they will not become slow reacting creditors in any given scenario, and face high 
monitoring and unprofitable costs should they elect to be in a position to react quickly, 
this guarantee of equal access to the assets creates creditor confidence in the system, a 
cheaper credit market for solvent companies and a fair and protectionist procedure.  
 
Creditor Wealth Maximisation theory is further posited to decrease the associated costs 
of the insolvency process, and thereby increase the potential return rates to creditors252. 
Jackson argues that by compelling all parties to participate in the same system, and 
participate in it equally, the procedural and legal costs are reduced by preventing multiple 
creditors from engaging in identical, counterproductive and costly procedural actions253 
– what are described as attempts ‘to beat out’ other creditors254. By preventing such 
inefficient procedural actions, and replacing them with a unified system, many procedural 
actions can be reduced in quantity and fewer administrative costs be incurred as a result. 
Jackson also acknowledges that although creditors could contract for and achieve a 
collectivised insolvency system, accomplishing such an outcome would be both time 
consuming and economically costly255. This is because troublesome creditors would be 
free to hold out from agreeing to the process256, and could therefore demand increased 
shares of the asset pool and result in delayed and frantic negotiations. By compelling a 
mandatory process, Creditor Wealth Maximisation is able to avoid unfair distributions to 
creditors by preventing these holdouts from having the power to frustrate the adoption of 
this efficient system257, and ensure that creditor and company assets are not inefficiently 
expended enforcing and defending a multiplicity of similar or identical claims. 
 
The theory does not limit itself to minimising procedural costs, however, and also 
proclaims to be able to maximise the value of the insolvent’s asset pool. This is 
 
251 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 1 
252 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, (No.224) at 862; Anderson H, The 
Framework, (No.217) at 3 
253 See Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.224) at 1; Van Zwieten K, Goode 
(No.13) at 78 
254 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, (No.224) at 862 
255 Ibid, at 865 
256 Ibid, at 865-866 
257 Jackson T, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and 
Nonbankruptcy Rules, (1986) 60 Am Bankruptcy LJ 399 at 402 
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accomplished by allowing the liquidator to sell the company’s assets as a going 
concern258. As posited, if individual creditors were free to race to enforce their debts 
individually, this would lead to a piecemeal break-up of the asset pool and a premature 
removal of the necessary operating assets259. Such a course of action would fail to 
maximise the value of the asset pool as the majority of its value is the business itself. 
Thus, the “substitution for individualistic remedies may be advantageous to the creditors 
as a group”260 because the insolvency practitioner is placed in a position where they are 
able to maximise the asset pool’s value and return that value to the creditors, minimising 
their potential losses. In calling for such an outcome, Jackson is implicitly stating that 
creditors, and unsecured creditors in particular as a consequence of their low return 
rates261, are deserving of the assistance of insolvency law in order to increase their low 
return rates as the level of recovery creates an unfair situation.   
 
What can, therefore, be extrapolated is that although it is not couched in the language of 
creditor protection, and Jackson does not explicitly state it is the purpose of insolvency 
law, unsecured creditor protection lies at the heart of the insolvency regime. By 
minimising the associated costs of the insolvency process through a mandatory and 
collective system, ensuring that all creditors receive a fair and equal share of the 
company’s insufficient assets, and ensuring that the asset pool’s inherent value is 
maximised, the unsecured creditor is protected from the alternative possibility of a race 
to enforce claims, large enforcement costs and the majority of creditors not receiving 
anything at the expense of the few. By doing so, a modicum of equity and fairness is 
achieved, even if it is not put in the explicit manner as with the provisions set out in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Despite the centrality of creditor protection, and the clear fiscal advantages it has for the 
unsecured creditors, the theory is also problematic for such creditors. This is as a 
consequence of the dilution of unsecured creditor protections by Jackson’s requirement 
that secured creditor interests not only be protected, but be given priority over all other 
parties to the insolvency262. As was graphically illustrated in Chapter 1, providing secured 
 
258 Ibid, at 893 
259 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, (No.224) at 864 
260 Ibid, at 864 
261 McCormack G, Proprietary Claims, (No.188) at 1   
262 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, (No.224) at 868-869 
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creditors with such protections and priority over other creditors results in the majority of 
the company’s asset pool being stripped away in their favour.  
 
In supporting this proposition263, Jackson first argues that by secured creditors deferring 
their enforcement rights and keeping the property in the asset pool, they are benefitting 
the unsecured creditors through reduced costs and by allowing the business to be sold as 
a going concern264. To reach this conclusion it is also posited that if the secured creditors 
were to remove their assets, the business’ assets would be severely depleted and the 
possibility of a sale as a going concern would be severely diminished, if not extinct. 
Hence, it is only by including the secured assets, which the secured creditors are otherwise 
free and likely to remove but for a collectivised system, that the unsecured creditors are 
able to utilise the protections outlined above265.  
 
This line of reasoning for secured creditor priority is even more unsettling for the 
unsecured creditors, however, as it requires them to pay interest for the privilege of 
secured assets remaining in the asset pool. This is because secured creditors would be 
compelled to wait for their repayment, and so lose out on the opportunity to use the assets 
in an economically profitable manner266. In Jackson’s own words, “One would expect, 
therefore, that the unsecured creditors would be willing to pay a secured creditor at least 
something to agree to join in the collective proceeding”267. This additional cost is of 
course problematic for unsecured creditors. For although it is true secured creditors would 
lose out on using the recovered debt in an economically advantageous manner, the nature 
of their security interest in guaranteeing them access to company assets enables them to 
minimise any losses268. The unsecured creditors, on the other hand, must deal with there 
being insufficient assets to cover the company’s unsecured liabilities, must cover the high 
costs of the liquidation, and must deal with having their debts paid in a rigid and 
hierarchical order that prevents the majority from recovering anything269. Should 
 
263 Which has been supported on the grounds of freedom of contract; per Hoffmann J in Re 
Brightlife [1987] Ch 200 at 209; Nourse LJ in Re New Bullas Trading Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 485 
264 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, (No.224) at 869; Baird DG, The Uneasy 
Case for Corporate Reorganisations, (1986) 15(1) JLS 127 at 133 
265 Ibid, at 893. See also Jackson T and Scott R, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on 
Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, (1989) 75 (2) VLR 155 at 159 
266 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, (No.224) at 870 
267 Ibid, at 869 
268 See Figure 3 in Chapter 1, which shows secured creditors only recover some of debts owed.  
269 Through the statutory priority of distribution  
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unsecured creditors pay interest for the privilege of secured assets remaining in the asset 
pool, any negligible gains made by selling the assets as a going concern will be lost to the 
already insulated secured creditors. Consequently, notwithstanding Jackson’s subsequent 
climbdown over the issue270, protection of unsecured creditors is heavily qualified – 
whilst it gives with one hand through the going concern value, it takes with another in the 
form of interest payments.  
 
Although severely qualified, the narrow focus of the theory on contractual creditors 
further assists the unsecured creditors’ position within the liquidation process271. As noted 
above, cardinal to Creditor Wealth Maximisation is the rejection of post ante distributions 
of company property272, preventing insolvency law from protecting non-consensual 
parties273. This is justified on the basis that if such parties were protected, they would be 
encouraged, owing to the limited rights they have prior to the onset of insolvency, to 
initiate the process274 - improving their position at the expense of the contractual creditors, 
and will be incentivised to bring the company to an end prematurely and before it becomes 
uneconomic to sustain. In order to prevent such behaviour, contractual creditors may be 
held to ransom and be compelled to enter into costly and time-consuming negotiations to 
prevent such actions275. Instead, it is stated that if they should be protected, it must be 
done by the substantive law in other areas such as employment law or torts law276. 
Alternatively, if they occupy a special position277, they may leverage that position to 
demand full repayment from the business. Irrespective of which non-insolvency 
mechanism is used to protect non-consensual creditors, by maintaining pre-insolvency 
rights, fewer parties are entitled to the asset pool, and so a larger share of the asset pool 
can be distributed to the contractual creditors. As a result of this, the liquidation dividend 
will be greater for the unsecured creditors at the expense of these non-consensual parties, 
 
270 Jackson T and Scott R, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and 
the Creditors’ Bargain, (1989) 75 (2) VLR 155 at 159 
271 It has also been argued that this narrow focus is supportable owing to the natural human 
reaction to individuals acquiring property thought of as belonging to the creditor; Parry R, 
Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 9 
272 Jackson T, Of Liquidation, (No.257) at 406 
273 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, (No.224) at 902 
274 Ibid, at 903 
275 Ibid, at 904 
276 Ibid, at 905 
277 Such as a council that must issue licences in order for the company to operate Jackson; T, Of 
Liquidation, (No.257) at 420 
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and the insolvency regime must create this preference in order to achieve fairness for the 
unsecured creditors.  
 
Accordingly, we see that improving the unsecured creditor’s position, and achieving 
fairness for this constituency, is central to the theory. This is achieved through ensuring 
that each creditor has an equal opportunity to recover something from the liquidation 
process and that the procedural costs are minimised. It further improves their position by 
prioritising their interests and excluding non-creditors from having any access to the 
company’s property, thereby protecting the asset pool for distribution to unsecured 
creditors. However, as also seen above, these improvements to their position are 
hampered by the inevitable need to respect and give priority to secured creditor interests 
– also meaning that the willingness to provide them with equity is severely limited. Given 
that secured assets make up the bulk of a company’s asset pool, and these remain 
unavailable to the unsecured creditors, large levels of the company’s assets are siphoned 
off and made unavailable for distribution278.  
 
Though improvements to the unsecured creditor position are heavily qualified, there is 
nothing within the theory that prohibits wider insolvency law279 from providing these 
creditors with additional protections that can improve their return rates. Although the 
secured assets will evidently be unavailable to fund such actions as they can only be used 
to cover secured creditor costs280, it does not mean that their rights cannot be truncated to 
protect unsecured creditors. Indeed, Jackson himself calls for limitations to secured 
creditor enforcement of their rights if selling the company as a going concern will return 
greater amounts than a piecemeal carve up of the business – which is itself an oblique 
form of unsecured creditor protection as outlined above. Therefore, although not explicit, 
the protection provisions set out in Chapter 3 fall within Creditor Wealth Maximisation 
as, just like the theory, they improve the unsecured creditors’ financial position. Hence, 
it is submitted that so long as pre-insolvency rights are respected, and the secured assets 
are left intact, there is nothing within the theory to prevent attempts to expand unsecured 
 
278 This principle of protecting secured creditor rights is deeply inscribed into English insolvency 
law: see Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 115-116 
279 Those areas of insolvency law not directly affected by the theory  
280 Recognised in English law by Re Leyland DAF [2004] UKHL 9, where it was held by the 
House of Lords that there are two ‘funds’ (secured and unsecured) that must cover their own costs. 
See Chapter 5 for detailed analysis.  
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creditor protections. Finally, given the prominence secured creditors interests are given, 
the theory also implicitly justifies not only attempts to maintain the size of the asset pool, 
but also increase return rates. This is discerned from Jackson’s justifications for the theory 
resting primarily on the fiscal advantages for the unsecured creditors in acquiring a greater 
and more equitable share of the company’s assets. The protectionist nature Creditor 
Wealth Maximisation cannot, therefore, be doubted. 
 
Section 1.2: Criticisms and Alternative Theories  
 
Notwithstanding Creditor Wealth Maximisation’s popularity and appealing theoretical 
simplicity, the theory was been heavily criticised by many, including Carlson, who 
forcefully concluded in his review that “Thomas Jackson has written an unremittingly 
dreadful book”281. Whilst there are many existing criticisms of the theory, owing to the 
narrow focus of this chapter to unsecured creditor protection, and the criticisms only 
having a passing relationship with this issue, they will only be briefly outlined.  
 
The disparagement of Creditor Wealth Maximisation has focused on two principal 
objections. The first is that the theory relies too heavily on assumptions of behaviour. As 
noted above, Jackson’s bases his theory on Rawls’ veil of ignorance, which makes 
presumptions about the behaviour of the uninformed party/creditor should they partake 
in the insolvency process, and asserts that they would agree that maximising creditor 
returns is the fairest outcome. Despite this having some compelling features, it has been 
observed that these assumptions are open to serious questioning282. It is posited that 
human behaviour is not so predictable, and many will act in a manner contrary to that 
concluded by Jackson. Indeed, each creditor in the real world, as well as in the theoretical 
model where general personalities are retained, has their own knowledge, experience and 
prejudices that impact on the decisions they make when faced with the prospect 
insolvency. Not every creditor, particularly those with greater resources, would therefore 
conclude that such an insolvency system would be beneficial for them, and would find 
alternative non-collective models compelling. Additionally, Jackson’s work focuses 
solely on the contractual creditors at the expense of non-contractual creditors, who again 
 
281 Carlson D, Philosophy in Bankruptcy (Book Review), (1987) 85 Mich LR 1341 
282 Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 26 
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have very different priorities among this constituency. Accordingly, Creditor Wealth 
Maximisation has been criticised for being prefaced on unstable assumptions.  
 
The second primary objection builds upon the exclusion of non-contractual creditors from 
the insolvency regime. As concluded above, the narrow focus of Creditor Wealth 
Maximisation reduces the number of parties who have a right to a share of the company’s 
assets. However, for those excluded, the consequences can be disastrous, with no 
protection being provided at all from the insolvency process283. As non-contractual 
creditors include tort victims and employees284, who are not in a strong enough position 
to protect themselves through alternative measures, these creditors must bear the brunt of 
the insolvency285. This is illustrated by Finch, who notes that employees and similar 
creditors are unable to recover their ‘displacement costs’286 nor receive any form of 
priority287 despite them possibly considering that their claims have moral superiority over 
those of contractual creditors288. Consequently, the theory has been categorised as 
occupying an unfair position. Despite these criticisms though, there is nothing in either 
of them that argues that Creditor Wealth Maximisation should not provide unsecured 
creditors protection within the insolvency system. In fact, the argument that those in 
distress should be afforded greater protections implicitly calls for an increase to unsecured 
creditor protections as a result of their precarious position, as does the criticism of the 
assumptions drawn, as the broader the constituency the more protections that are likely 
to be demanded.  
 
In light of these retorts, and seeking to build upon them, a number of alternative theories 
have been proffered, the most extreme of which has been Elizabeth Warren’s Multiple 
Values Approach289. Although Warren’s theory is the most prominent alternative theory 
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286 Such as finding new employment, lost wages during this process and any retraining they must 
undertake in order to acquire new employment  
287 Apart from priority over shareholders – s107 Insolvency Act 1986 
288 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 32; Carlson D, Philosophy in 
Bankruptcy (Book Review), (1987) 85 Mich LR 1341 at 1353 
289 Warren E, Bankruptcy Policy, (No.224) 
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on this issue, and so is the one analysed in this chapter, many others including Gross290, 
the British Government‘s Department of Trade and Industry291, Fletcher292 and the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law293 have all proposed similar ideas. 
Owing to their similarly to Warren’s theory, however, they will not be analysed.  
 
The Multiple Values Approach, in stark contrast to Creditor Wealth Maximisation, does 
not possess a simple and single purpose with a narrow set of constituents. Instead, it is 
concerned with a varying and ever-changing roster of parties that have complex and 
competing interests that prevent the creation of neat and easy to apply priorities. It is 
therefore proffered that instead of the structured distribution of the company’s assets to 
contractual creditors, insolvency law should be fluid and distribute losses according to 
those who can withstand them the most294. This is because whilst some creditors may lose 
out as a result of their own actions, they may also lose out as a result of “unforeseeable” 
circumstances out of their control295. Central to achieving this outcome, the theory 
requires the judiciary to be given large levels of discretion to determine how the assets 
should be distributed and to whom they should be received. Again, in contrast to 
Jackson’s protestations, the theory also calls for the opportunity to restructure a company, 
especially if it will safeguard individuals in employment or suppliers with valuable 
contracts296. Definitive conclusions are thereby prevented from being drawn, with each 
insolvency taking on a unique character with potentially widely different outcomes.  
 
Given these objectives, it is evident that the Multiple Values Approach is concerned with 
protecting vulnerable parties involved in insolvency proceedings. It also evident that in 
order to achieve this, there must be a disturbance of pre-insolvency interests and a 
potential reduction in the assets protected by secured interests. In determining how asset 
 
290 Gross K, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, (1994) 72 Wash 
LR 75 
291 Department of Trade and Industry, Insolvency - A Second Chance, (White paper, Cm 5234, 
July 2001) at para 2.5 
292 Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency, (No.62) 
293 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (UN 2005) 
294 McCormack G, Secured Credit under English and American Law, (No.219) at 6; Finch V and 
Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 39; Warren E, Bankruptcy Policy, (No.224) at 
777 
295 Warren E, Bankruptcy Policy, (No.224) 775 at 778.  
296 Ibid, at 778, 788 
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distributions should be made, four main factors are provided297: 1) the relative ability for 
parties to bear the costs of a default298; 2) whether or not the parties have been incentivised 
into providing the necessary credit to keep the company functioning and avoid 
insolvency; 3) whether creditors who share similar characteristics such as unsecured 
creditors can, and should, be treated in an identical manner; and 4) whether or not a 
contract or transaction entered into with the now insolvency company is of benefit to the 
estate.  
 
The use of these ill-defined factors fails to provide a measure of predictability among 
insolvency cases. For example, using the factor of the ability to bear the costs of a default, 
it is impossible to predict who will be able to best bear the loss. In many instances, as 
outlined in Chapter 1, institutional lenders will be able to absorb the losses that arise from 
the creditor entering into insolvency due to their ample financial resources. Meanwhile, 
the employees will be unable to do so owing to their relative limited financial resources. 
However, should the institutional lender overextend themselves and lend too much to the 
creditor or be in severe need for the loan repayments to cover other debts that they owe, 
or the employees be sufficiently well remunerated so as to be in a position to easily 
withstand the loss of employment and find new employment, the traditional manifestation 
of the balance of tolerance within the insolvency process will be turned upon its head. 
Despite the above only covering a limited number of examples, the potential 
agglomeration of parties and their financial resilience are myriad and impossible to 
foresee.  
 
Equally with the utility of contracts or transactions, the same worker will be treated very 
differently depending on factors out of their control. Taking a mechanical engineer as an 
example, they may possess the skills few have to keep a machine running. Therefore, they 
will be valuable to an insolvent company in seeking to restructure the business or a 
purchaser who wishes to purchase the insolvent asset for their own use. This will result 
in the employment contract being respected and the job maintained. However, the same 
engineer with the same skills may not be so valuable should the company not be seeking 
 
297 Ibid, at 790-793 
298 For example, employees are unable to bear the cost of not being paid or being out of work, 
whereas institutional secured creditors with large levels of resources can withstand the financial 
hit 
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to restructure299 or should the purchaser of the asset already have employees with the 
necessary skills. This will result in a termination of the contract and the loss of the job 
despite possessing identical qualities. All workers, irrespective of their qualification and 
experience, will face high levels of unpredictability over their eventual treatment within 
this flexible insolvency regime, whereas under Creditor Wealth Maximisation their 
position is already known.  
 
Warren herself recognises this feature of unpredictability within her theory, calling it a 
“dirty, complex, elastic, inter-connected view”300. Undeterred, she also claims that her 
plans to provide the judiciary with wide scale discretion do not “amount to fuzzy "do 
equity" preachments of the hopelessly confused, who leave good results to good people 
and assume that ideas and analysis have no content.”301 Despite Warren’s protestations to 
the contrary, there appears to be nothing in her theory, or the guidelines she provides to 
enable to the judiciary to implement her view of insolvency law, that would give credence 
to the assertion that it would not amount to the judiciary merely achieving ‘fuzzy 
equity’302. This is because nothing is provided that would create a reasonably predictable 
insolvency framework. Similar conclusions have been reached by Schermer303, who 
concludes that a fundamental issue with the theory is that “there are an infinite number of 
community interests…and their boundaries are limitless” – meaning that foreseeability 
of the end result goes out the window.   
 
The Multiple Values Approach therefore has two potential outcomes for a company’s 
unsecured creditors. Under the first, given that many creditors are left in a perilous 
position by the onset of insolvency through the prospect of recovering little, and Warren 
actively wishing to protect such constituents from their vulnerabilities, it is clear they are 
deserving of high levels of protection. As such, the judiciary would accordingly have the 
discretion to grant them increased access to the company’s asset pool or affirm a contract 
at the expense of the secured creditors, and thereby reduce their potential losses. By doing 
 
299 This may occur due to the futility of trying to turn around the business, especially in dying or 
troubled industries   
300 Warren E, Bankruptcy Policy, (No.224) 775 at 811 
301 Ibid, at 798 
302 See the above analysis  
303 Schermer, Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the Community into Account 
in Bankruptcy, (1994) 72 Wash ULQ 1049 at 1051 
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so, this outcome of the theory would be beneficial to the unsecured creditors and ensure 
greater levels of fairness through increased protections.  
 
However, it is also foreseeable that in many instances it may be detrimental and lead to 
catastrophic outcomes for the unsecured creditors. This a real possibility as although the 
unsecured creditors regularly occupy a precarious financial position, the position of tort 
creditors and employees is often much worse. Given the possibility of there being 
numerous such parties, particularly if the company was engaged in dangerous industrial 
ventures, the judiciary may be inclined to use their discretion to favour such parties over 
the unsecured creditors by granting victims limited access to the asset pool or preventing 
the unsecured creditors from recovering anything at all. As such, the meagre unsecured 
creditor returns currently received could potential be wiped out in such a discretionary 
system. Similarly to Creditor Wealth Maximisation, Warren’s theory purports to give 
with one hand, it takes with another.  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of predictability, it is apparent that the theory does call for 
protections to be provided for these creditors. It acknowledges that where the unsecured 
creditors are the worst affected constituents, they should be afforded a greater share of 
the company’s assets to ensure a more equitable outcome. In order to achieve this, 
although not expressly considered by Warren, the protection mechanisms set out in 
Chapter 3 are indispensable so as to ensure the asset pool remains intact and can then be 
used in a discretionary manner. Similar conclusions to that with Creditor Wealth 
Maximisation can be drawn, that although the extent of the protections afforded 
unsecured creditors is qualified, it is unquestionable that the Multiple Values Approach 
calls for some form of creditor protection owing to the unfair position unsecured creditors 
occupy.  
 
Lying in between the extreme positions of Warren and Jackson’s theories rests 
Korobkin’s Broad Based Contractarianism304, which seeks to propose a reasoned middle 
ground for insolvency’s theoretical foundations. In contrast to Creditor Wealth 
Maximisation’s use of the veil of ignorance, Contractarianism includes other constituents 
affected by the onset of insolvency, such as employees, managers, tort victims and the 
 
304 Korobkin D, Contractarianism, (No.232) 
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wider community. By including these additional constituents, it is contended that a 
broader and more representative section of society are enabled to set insolvency policy305, 
and are able to create a fairer system that foresees widespread damage from the collapse 
of the company and the need to spread the risk306.   
 
In expanding the constituency of those who set insolvency interests, Korobkin argues that 
two principles would be adopted by those behind the veil. The first is the principle of 
‘inclusion’. This mandates that all parties affected by the insolvency are entitled to make 
submissions that they are entitled to a share of the asset pool. Thus, parties other than 
contractual creditors would be able to petition for a favourable outcome to insolvency 
proceedings. The second principle, ‘rational planning’, appraises these requests for access 
to the asset pool and determines the extent to which they would be able to enforce their 
submissions. This second principle would seek to give effect to the most important aims 
and achieve what was best in the long-term interests of the company307. This is to be done 
even if it ignores and violates pre-insolvency rights, again meaning secured creditors’ 
interests are placed at risk308. It thus mandates that those in the most precarious positions 
should be afforded priority over those who can better withstand non-repayment, and does 
in effect call for the creation for a form of preferential creditors. 
 
Even though Contractarianism prima facie shares more similarities with the Multiple 
Values Approach than Creditor Wealth Maximisation due to its desire to protect 
vulnerable constituents, it diverges on the basis that instead of granting the judiciary free 
rein to exercise discretion in each individual case, a uniform and structured insolvency 
system is called for. Indeed, in rejecting the adoption of ‘pure equity’, Korobkin posits 
that the judiciary must be given strict limitations on what they can and cannot order so as 
to provide some sense of predictability. This necessitates a system similar to that already 
adopted in many jurisdictions. Unlike under the Multiple Values Approach, where it is 
impossible to predict what position the unsecured creditors will inhabit, their position is 
 
305 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 34 
306 Other alternative theories include Communitariansim (Gross K, Taking Community Interests 
into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, (1994) 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 1031) and Ethicalism (Shuchman 
P, An Attempt at a ‘Philosophy of Bankruptcy’, (1973) 21 UCLA L. Rev. 403), however neither 
theory clearly demarcates its boundaries. 
307 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 34 
308 Korobkin D, Contractarianism, (No.232) at 550; Mokal R, The Authentic Consent Model, 
(No.229) at 404 
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governed by substantive and known rules, in a similar manner to Creditor Wealth 
Maximisation.  
 
Additionally, although a middle ground between the extreme theories outlined above, 
three things become evident. The first is that Contractarianism suffers from the same 
issues surrounding the use of a veil of ignorance309. This is because even though Korobkin 
may improve upon Jackson’s use of the veil by including a wider range of constituents, it 
also fails to account for the different reactions individuals have to their position, and that 
they regularly fail to act in a rational manner. Thus, the theory fails to accommodate both 
those who are risk adverse or risk takers, both of whom would have very different 
conclusions, in the same uniform system.  
 
Secondly, the theory has been attacked on the grounds that it does not go far enough. In 
his appraisal, Mokal310 put forward that as Korobkin limits his approach to insolvency 
law, and does not wish to reform any other areas, an unfairness is created to those who 
are reliant on companies that do not technically enter into insolvency311. This is because 
they are unable to take advantage of the benefits Korobkin puts forward due to them being 
limited to the use of insolvency regimes312. This accordingly ‘creates a discrepancy in the 
treatment of people who are going through exactly the same problems’313, and causes 
inequitable treatment of unsecured creditors.  
 
Finally, it becomes evident that unsecured creditor protection has an important role to 
play within the theory. Even though not as potentially beneficial as Warren’s approach 
may be, by using the ‘rational planning’ principle in allocating company assets to those 
who require them the most, unsecured creditors may be in line to receive an increased 
allocation compared to Creditor Wealth Maximisation due to their high losses. However, 
as with Multiple Values, the unsecured creditor may also not be deemed ‘worthy’ enough 
of receiving an increased share of company assets, or any assets at all, and instead find 
 
309 Loughlin M, Public Law and Political Theory, (London: Clarendon Press, 1992) at 96; Finch 
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them allocated to tort victims or employees as preferential creditors. The further 
difference between Korobkin and Warren is that in spite of the fact that Warren’s theory 
means these worries are limited to individual insolvencies and members of the judiciary, 
Korobkin’s calls for structured rules, which means the insolvency system must either be 
generous in all circumstances to unsecured creditors or be detrimental in all 
circumstances. 
 
Section 1.3: Conclusions on the Position of Creditor Protections 
 
To conclude on all three theories, it is clear that they all promote or condone the existence 
and use of creditor protections. All the theories analysed above place the unsecured 
creditor towards the centre, if not the actual centre, of their theoretical model. The basis 
for this protection, which is uniform amongst all of the theories, is the unfair position of 
the unsecured creditor. All conclude that as they receive very little from the insolvency 
process, and others receive substantially more, action must be taken to maximise their 
liquidation dividend. It is also concluded in the Creditor Wealth Maximisation and 
Contractarian theories that these features of insolvency law can be supported on the basis 
that the majority of parties, when placed behind the veil of ignorance, would call for such 
protections.  
 
The extent to how far insolvency regimes should go to protect these creditors is 
vociferously contested, however, with very little agreement existing. At the very 
minimum, as all the theories require an intact asset pool, they condone the existence of 
mechanisms to maintain its integrity and prevent improper distributions. Beyond this, 
agreement is lacking on what insolvency law should seek to achieve. The least ambitious, 
Creditor Wealth Maximisation, seeks to merely distribute non-secured assets in 
accordance with the statutory priority of distribution on a pro-rata basis, with changes to 
this strictly forbidden and the benefits stemming from predictability and reduced 
procedural costs. The alternative theories, which seek to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of company assets, go beyond this and attempt to assist those in most need 
by a non-proportionate distribution of assets. Notwithstanding this fundamental 
disagreement of how the assets should be distributed, all of the theories at a minimum 
permit creditor protections so long as they do not negatively impact upon other classes of 
creditor (particularly secured creditors), meaning that so long as the secured creditor 
 76 
interests are respected, there is scope for extending creditor protection. Hence, all three 
theories justify the use and expansion of unsecured creditor protections.   
 
Section 2: Purposes of English Insolvency Law 
 
In sharp contrast to American attempts, English insolvency law has elected to adopt a 
more pragmatic approach and limited its concerns to identifying its practical purposes314. 
Accordingly, as this thesis is focused upon the English insolvency regime, it is imperative 
that this practical approach is analysed to determine whether or not the unsecured creditor 
protections advocated in the theoretical models have been adopted into the real world. 
 
The practical foundations of English theory have been set out in two landmark texts, both 
of which demonstrate the extent to which the American theories outlined above have been 
adopted into English law. The first of these texts, the Cork Report315, provides a 
Government sanctioned review of English insolvency law, its principles and purpose. The 
second text, originally by Prof Goode316, provides an academic analysis and perspective. 
Although both texts have some diverging opinions on insolvency law and its ideal form, 
the prime positions they both afford to unsecured creditors and their respective 
protections is unquestionable. It is necessary to analyse these two texts, rather than 
governmental policy documents, as those documents fail to properly set out the purpose 
of insolvency law, and instead solely focus on setting out substantive policy changes317. 
This is particularly true of the Cork Report as it would form the underpinnings of the 
Insolvency Act 1986.  
 
 
314 Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 25; Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 75-
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316 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) 
317 See Department of Trade and Industry, A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law, (White 
Paper, Cm 9175, Feb 1984); Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Insolvency 
and Corporate Governance: Government Response, (26th August 2018) for a contemporary 
example; Stubbins M, What Kind of World, (No.38) 
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Within his report318, Sir Kenneth places the unsecured creditor at the centre of the 
insolvency regime, raising them to the position of the primary constituent insolvency law 
is concerned with319. As observed in the Report:  
 
“Insolvency proceedings are inherently of a collective nature; their prime 
beneficiary is the general body of the insolvent’s creditors, each of whom 
is affected, though clearly by no means necessarily to the same extent, by 
the common disaster. If each such creditor is denied by law the right to 
pursue separate remedies against the insolvent and is obliged to rely on the 
outcome of collective proceedings, then his interest is those proceedings 
ought to be, so far as is consistent with the claims of his fellow creditors, 
as fair and reasonable as circumstances will permit, to compensate him for 
the loss of his individual rights.”320 
 
From this approach several facets of insolvency law’s purposes can be extrapolated. The 
first is that the party who should benefit most from the insolvency process is the 
unsecured creditors. This reflects the Creditor Wealth Maximisation theory, that 
although secured creditors should be protected in the insolvency process, it is the 
unsecured creditors who should benefit most from administrative efficiencies. In contrast 
to Jackson, however, Cork concludes that this should occur because of how poorly they 
are treated by the insolvency process rather than any benefits they might acquire. It is 
instead posited that as creditors are required to concede their rights to sue individually321, 
and so lose the ability to rush and recover all of the debts owed to them, the insolvency 
procedure must be equitable and reasonable to them. To ensure this takes place, they 
must be entitled to a pro rata share of the company’s assets. As outlined below, in order 
for these objectives to become effective, it is requisite that there be creditor protections 
that prevent the dissipation of, and provide for the opportunity to enlarge, the company 
asset pool. If such protections are unavailable, and parties are free to chip away at the 
 
318 See the Insolvency Act 1986, the current legislative framework for English law   
319 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 17: “The laws of bankruptcy and company winding up are 
concerned exclusively with the realisation of the debtor’s uncharged assets and the distribution of 
the proceeds among unsecured creditors.” 
320 Ibid, at 232 
321 A concession Jackson argues to be beneficial for all unsecured creditors affected by the 
insolvency  
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asset pool322, a fair and equitable distribution of assets becomes impossible, with only 
the most quick-witted recovering, and an unjust system is created.  
 
Further justifications for prioritising the protection of unsecured creditors include that 
economic realities require robust safeguarding mechanisms323. It is argued that by 
allowing the existence of the banking system, and the credit it provides to companies, 
risks of insolvency and losses to those who extend credit are multiplied and made much 
more foreseeable324. In addition, given the prevalence of credit325, and that the majority 
of creditors acquire unsecured status, should confidence be lost, companies would 
become unable to acquire the credit they require, and economic activity would grind to 
a halt326. To ensure that creditors have the confidence to lend327, have the confidence that 
commercial morality will be maintained, and that they will not be subject to 
mistreatment328, it is necessary that all creditors are offered adequate protection to ensure 
the continued supply of credit. Hence, in Cork’s view insolvency law must protect the 
unsecured creditor for fear of the fatal economic consequences that would follow should 
confidence in the system be lost.  
 
The conclusions reached by the Report were put into practical form by a number of 
recommendations made for how unsecured creditors might be protected. The first of 
these recommendations was the abolition of the majority of preferential debts, as these 
frustrated the possibility for true pari passu distribution between the general body of 
creditors329. These creditors, who are given priority over the general body, had, 
according to Cork, become so numerous330 and so unpopular with the judiciary331 that 
 
322 As happens in an un-collectivised system. The result of allowing parties free rein to collect 
their debts is illustrated in the receivership mechanism; Anderson H, The Framework, (No.217) 
at 44-47 
323 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 23: “We consider that it is incumbent upon society to provide 
machinery which, in the event of insolvency, is adequate to ensure a fair distribution of the 
insolvent’s assets among his creditors.” Others to conclude similarly include: Anderson H, The 
Framework, (No.217) at 3,6; and Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (222) at 1 
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325 See Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at Chapter 3 
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330 See the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1897 
331 See Re Rudd & Sons [1984] Ch. 237 per Nourse J for an example of judicial  
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they threatened the fundamental effectiveness and viability of the floating charge332. In 
undermining the attractiveness of the floating charge – the go to security interest until 
the Enterprise Act 2002 reforms – a pillar of the necessary confidence for creditors to 
lend was eroded. Abolishing the majority of preferential creditors333 would immunise 
unsecured creditors from the harshest elements of the insolvency process by ensuing that 
the meagre general creditor assets pool could be fairly distributed, and creditors being 
confident of equal treatment334. Thus, creditor protections, on a practical level, not only 
ensure a just solution to the onset of insolvency, but also help instil stability into the 
wider corporate and finance worlds. Insolvency law is therefore pertinent not only to 
corporate failure but also the general commercial activity.  
 
Secondly, it was recommended that the fraudulent trading provisions be retained and 
new provisions for wrongful trading be created in order to protect the asset pool335. 
Though these provisions are analysed fully in Chapter 3, it can be briefly stated that they 
impose personal liability on those who partake in the running of a company against the 
interests of the general body of creditors in the period before it enters liquidation. Even 
though the effectiveness of these provisions has been vehemently questioned336, the 
inclusion in the Report of provisions that would return assets to the company from third 
parties means that it is possible to deduce that it was aspired to clamp down on unethical 
dispositions of company assets and improve the position of the unsecured creditors 
through providing assets to the company to make up for losses that should not have been 
sustained. In doing so, it is again evidenced that unsecured creditors should form the 
centre of the insolvency system.  
 
Finally, broader recommendations were also made to try and enlarge the distributable 
assets for unsecured creditors through non-personal liability means, with attempts made 
 
332 Milman D and Durrant C, Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice, 3rd edn (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1999) at 143. The floating charge was, and remains, one of the primary security 
devices available to secured creditors.  
333 The only ones to survive were those that could be ‘justified by reference to principles of 
fairness and equity which would be likely to command general public acceptance’ - Cork K, 
Report, (No.2) at 1398 
334 Ibid, at 198 and 1396 
335 Ibid, at Chapter 44 
336 See Chapter 5 for full analysis, where it is concluded that the provisions fail to adequately 
protect unsecured creditors. 
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“to increase the amount available in an insolvent’s estate for the ordinary creditors”337. 
This included the gradual replacement of the individualistic receivership with a new 
collective process338. Despite Cork never expressly calling for the abolition of 
receivership, it was recommended that the alternative administrative receivership be 
created339. By proposing an insolvency mechanism through which the company could 
be turned around and rescued, unsecured creditors were being given the opportunity to 
be insulated from the prospect of receivership, with secured creditors being prevented 
from dismantling the company solely for their own purposes. Should the secured 
creditors undertake action solely in their own interests, there would be no prospect of 
any business turnaround occurring or sell-on value being accumulated. In preventing 
these outcomes, the insolvency process is able maximise the assets received by the 
general body of creditors – adopting the conclusions of Jackson. Cork’s recommendation 
was subsequently given effect through the abolition of receivership by the Enterprise Act 
2002340, which has seen successful examples of this intention including the rescue of 
House of Fraser.  
 
It was further recommended that a 10% fund, already analysed in Chapter 1, be created. 
Notwithstanding that its eventual implementation through the ‘prescribed part’341 would 
be largely ineffective342, the intention and aims behind the recommendation were clearly 
to improve the unsecured creditors’ financial position at the expense of the floating 
charge holders and centralise the position of the unsecured creditor within the English 
insolvency regime343.  
 
Building upon the Cork Report, and evidencing the general reception to both it and the 
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In setting out his conclusions on English insolvency law – conclusions that broadly 
follow the standard discourse set out above – it is stated that the objectives of English 
insolvency law are “…to maximise the return to creditors; to establish a fair and 
equitable system for the ranking of claims and the distribution of assets among creditors, 
involving a limited redistribution of rights…”345 Goode is therefore a disciple of Jackson 
and the Creditor Wealth Maximisation theory, and views the primary objective of 
insolvency as being to ensure only the legitimate creditors are able to enforce their 
claims. Should they be successful in doing so, they should also able to recover the 
greatest amount possible – a protectionist stand in favour of creditors. 
 
In adopting the Creditor Wealth Maximisation theory, which has not been 
unquestioningly accepted by contemporaries346, it is also elaborated on how this is to be 
achieved in practical terms. The first means of achieving the objectives is for the retention 
of company assets until they can be distributed by the liquidator for the benefit of the 
unsecured creditors347 - referred to as the ‘anti-deprivation rule’348. The result of this rule 
is that the unsecured creditors are protected by keeping the asset pool intact and out of 
the hands of those parties who have no right to the property. To identify those who have 
a legitimate interest in the assets, the second mechanism is the subjugation of individuals’ 
rights349. Echoing Jackson, it is argued that if creditors were free to enforce their claims 
on a first come basis, the insufficient company assets would go to those who can react the 
quickest and it would be impossible to acquire the maximum value of the assets. 
Consequently, limiting creditors’ individual rights is essential for achieving fairness. The 
final aspect is providing creditors, be they secured or unsecured, priority over other parties 
with an interest in the insolvency350. Again echoing Jackson, it is argued unfair to change 
pre-insolvency rights, as those who have entered into these agreements are entitled to 
expect them to be honoured351.  
 
345 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 73-75 
346 See Finch V and Milman, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 28-33; Keay A and Walton P, 
Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 26-30; and Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency (No.62) at 2. These 
authors, whilst acknowledging there is a place for Creditor Wealth Maximisation, identify other 
constituents and priorities for the insolvency process. These authors thus adopt elements of 
Contractarianism and the Multiple Values Approach into their writings.  
347 Van Zwieten K, Goode (No.13) at 78-79 
348 See Chapter 5 for full consideration of the principle  
349 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 78-79 
350 Ibid, at 83-85 
351 Jackson T, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy, (No.224) at 902 
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To reinforce the anti-deprivation rule, and make it effective, it is acknowledged that there 
must be active and effective creditor protection mechanisms, including provisions on 
preferences, transactions at an undervalue, fraudulent trading and wrongful trading352. 
Indeed, Goode is so supportive of their existence that he refers to them as  “…major 
instrument[s] of corporate insolvency law…”353 to ensure unscrupulous parties are not 
allowed to profit from the asset pool unfairly, meaning the provisions protections lie at 
the heart the insolvency system354. 
 
Even though the majority of Creditor Wealth Maximisation is accepted and then adopted, 
certain aspects are also rejected355. In opposition, it is stated that whereas the theory is 
only concerned with contractual creditors, English insolvency law must have a broader 
perspective and be concerned with a greater number of interested parties356. 
 
Therefore, some ex post creditors, such as tort victims, should be entitled to sue as 
preventing them from doing so would be ‘grossly unfair’357 and cause hardship358. 
Consequently, “no distinction is made between voluntary (consensual) and involuntary 
(non-consensual) claimants”359. The same is true for unmatured claims360, such a long 
term debt claims, as in a recall of Cork, not allowing them to enforce their debts would 
“discourage long term loan capital and be likely to precipitate contractual debt 
acceleration in the event of default.”361 Hence, Jackson’s argument is “neat, but ultimately 
unpersuasive…”362 and “It is also clear that insolvency law has at least some 
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Avoidance, (No.271) at 12 
358 This is as a consequence of their poor bargaining position inability to effectively monitor the 
debtor; McCormack G, Secured Credit under English and American Law, (No.219) at 6 
359 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 108 
360 Claims that were not enforceable before the onset of insolvency  
361 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 108. Similar views have been expressed by Gulliffer in 
Goode R and Gulliffer L, Goode On Legal Problems of Credit and Security, 6th edn (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2017) 1 
362 Goode R, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 3rd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 
at 73 
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redistribution role to play…”363 A more paternalistic view of insolvency law is therefore 
offered by Goode that includes a greater willingness for English law to offer greater 
protections to unsecured creditors.  
 
Notwithstanding this call for greater protection, beyond allowing ex post creditors to 
claim as unsecured creditors, Goode, as with Cork, refuses to offer them the greater and 
more effective position of preferential creditors, on account of not wishing to disturb pre-
insolvency entitlements and ensure equitable distributions among the general body of 
creditors364. Neither are there demands for any additional mechanisms that would assist 
in reducing unsecured creditor losses. Consequently, even though there is a call for 
protections, a clear limit exists on what form they may take – including not disturbing 
pre-existing rights365 - and resulting, as a consequence of recognising some ex post 
creditors, in a greater number of unsecured creditors with no major increase in the size of 
the asset pool.  
 
Having analysed the foundational commentators on contemporary English insolvency 
law, it is apparent that both are broadly in alignment over the issue of unsecured creditors. 
Both texts, in adopting a practical perspective on insolvency law, categorically set out 
that creditors are entitled to protection from the law. The mechanisms they call for in 
order to achieve this protection are several, and include limitations to the classes of 
preferential debt, personal liability provisions, abolition of receivership, and creation of 
a 10% fund. Notwithstanding these practical and (theoretically at least) effective 
mechanisms, both also recognise that limitations must be placed upon them, particularly 
respecting the pre-insolvency entitlements of secured creditors.  
 
Section 3: Conclusion  
 
Of the two aspects analysed in this chapter, insolvency theory and insolvency practice, it 
can be concluded that both demand and propose some form of unsecured creditor 
safeguard. As both aspects include creditor protections, this demonstrates clear, if not 
unqualified, acceptance of the principle into English insolvency law.  
 
363 Ibid, at 76 
364 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 75-76, 112-113 
365 Thereby the protecting the interests of the secured creditors 
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Within the theoretical models, although none can agree on what form insolvency law or 
unsecured creditor protection should take, and some may actively place the unsecured 
creditor in a poorer position should other constituents be more vulnerable, all 
acknowledge that something should be done to maintain or increase liquidation dividends. 
Given that Creditor Wealth Maximisation is widely perceived as being the dominant and 
most accepted theory, this means the primary methods of offering protection are through 
the minimising of insolvency costs, the guarantee of equal treatment and the continued 
integrity of the asset pool. The majority of the theories also call for clear, uniform 
substantive rules to ensure this equal treatment.  
 
English insolvency, through its piecemeal evolution, has likewise acknowledged that 
some form of creditor protection is necessary. Building upon the three main theories, it 
has been concluded that insolvency law must act to make certain there is a fair and 
equitable system which ensures creditors, particularly those who acquire unsecured 
status, will be treated fairly and equally. In making these postulations, a number of 
practical protection methods are put forward including limitations to the classes of 
preferential debt, personal liability provisions, abolition of receivership, and creation of 
a 10% fund. All of these are intended to either maintain or enlarge the asset pool by 
preventing improper divestments of company property.  
 
Although theoretically sound, there is a strict limit placed on how far the protections can 
go. Notwithstanding the Multiple Values and Contractarian theories permitting the 
disturbance of pre-insolvency rights, particularly those of the unsecured creditor, the 
majority of insolvency theory and practice does not permit such disturbances. Given that 
English law has categorically accepted this restriction, any protection mechanisms must 
respect secured creditor interests. Otherwise, there is little to restrain evolution in 
protection mechanisms beyond ensure there are clear and uniform rules, and indeed the 
majority of commentators call for more to be done. Consequently, any conclusions drawn 
by this thesis that the resulting trust is an effective mechanism will be based upon 
justifiable grounds. The effectiveness of the current English creditor protections is 
analysed in the next chapter to determine whether alternatives need be explored. 
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Chapter 3: The Limitations of the Liquidation Process for 
Unsecured Creditors366 
 
In tandem with the security interests and the statutory priority of distribution analysed in 
Chapter 1, unsecured creditors partaking in the liquidation of an insolvent creditor are 
affected by improper divestments of company property in the lead up to the company 
entering insolvency367. These divestments include the company transferring property to 
creditors in preference to the general body of creditors368, entering into uncommercial 
contracts below market value369, and continuing to trade both fraudulently370 and 
wrongfully371. The effect of these improper divestments by the company is to reduce the 
available assets that can be distributed to unsecured creditors through the liquidation 
dividend, and place them in the hands of creditors or other parties who are now in a better 
position than had they participated in the insolvency process. Such provisions are vital 
for unsecured creditors owing to impact of security interests – given their priority, it is 
necessary to protect the remaining meagre asset pool to enable a distribution to unsecured 
creditors.  
 
Given the potential adverse consequences of improper company divestments on 
unsecured creditors, English law has long sought to protect such unsecured creditors 
 
366 This analysis of the anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions is confined to the context 
of liquidation, even though s177 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, inserting 
s246ZA Insolvency Act 1986, grants administrators the power to bring claims for fraudulent and 
wrongful trading. This is because despite the 2015 reforms increasing the pool of potential 
applicants, administrators are term limited to 1 year (Sch B para 76 Insolvency Act 1986) unless 
extended with the consent of the creditors or court (Sch B paras 76(2) and 77 Insolvency Act 
1986), and thus investigating and commencing litigation within the short-term limit is 
troublesome. Equally, as the administrator’s first priority is to rescue the company as a going 
concern (Sch B para 3 Insolvency Act 1986), this will require them to focus their time and 
resources on selling off and restructuring the business, rather than engaging in speculative and 
drawn about litigation. See Williams R, We Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent 
Trading Remedy?, [2015] 78 MLR 55, who concludes the 2015 reforms will have little impact. 
For these reasons, it is unforeseeable that many administrators will engage in such litigation, and 
so will not impact upon the body of unsecured creditors.  
367 Keay A, Transactions Defrauding Creditors: The Problem of Purpose Under Section 423 Of 
the Insolvency Act, [2003] CPL 272 
368 S239 Insolvency Act 1986 
369 ss238 and 423 Insolvency Act 1986 
370 s213 Insolvency Act 1986 
371 s214 Insolvency Act 1986  
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through the ‘anti-deprivation’ rule372, which is intended to protect the insolvent estate and 
maximise the available assets for distribution373. This rule is central to the English law of 
insolvency, and its manifestations can be seen in the historical abolition of the divestment 
of ownership in liquidation clauses. Unlike legitimate Romalpa clauses374, which prevent 
title from passing to the creditor, these contractual clauses transfer title to the company 
on the understanding that the property will be retransferred to the creditor should the 
borrower become insolvent. Such clauses are thus repugnant to the outright transfer of 
property375, and so are unavailable under English law376. Similarly, English law also 
annuls contractual terms that increase a company’s contractual obligations upon the 
company entering liquidation – for example increasing the amount due to redeem a 
mortgage377 or allowing the whole of the royalties due to the company to be retained 
instead of the half before liquidation378. 
 
Given the protective nature of the anti-deprivation rule, and the conclusion reached in the 
previous chapter that unsecured creditor protections are justified, this chapter will 
therefore analyse the modern proprietary anti-deprivation provisions, their associated 
personal liability provisions, and conclude whether they are effective in protecting 
unsecured creditors within the liquidation process by safeguarding the integrity of asset 
pool. This protection is necessary owing to the precarious position outlined in Chapter 1 
of the unsecured creditor within the liquidation regime. This chapter’s analysis will 
thereby inform whether the existing insolvency regime is effective in protecting 
unsecured creditors compelled to partake in the liquidation process, and whether it is a 
further cause their unsatisfactory position. It will also inform whether further efforts are 
necessary to protect such creditors.  
 
 
372 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 255-261; Anderson H, The Framework, (No.217) at 174  
373 Milman D, Transactional Avoidance in Insolvency: an Update on Recent Developments, 
[2013] Insolvency Intelligence 81 at 81 
374 See Chapter 1 for detailed analysis  
375 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 255-256; Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2012] 1 A.C. 383 
376 See Metcalfe v Metcalfe (1889) 43 Ch D 633. See also Holroyd v Gwynn (1809) 2 Taunt 176; 
the terms also offend against the principle that property cannot be transferred to a person on terms 
that are unavailable to his creditors - Ex p Mackay (1873) LR 8 Ch App 643.  
377 Re Johns [1928] Ch 737 
378 Re Jeavons, ex p Mackay (1873) 8 Ch App 643 
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This chapter concludes that the existing legislative provisions are insufficient to protect 
the asset pool and the general body of creditors. It is therefore submitted that owing to 
alternative government priorities, an alternative mechanism of protection, outside the law 
of insolvency, is required to protect and improve the position of unsecured creditors by 
increasing their returns from the liquidation process. This alternative mechanism, the 
resulting trust, is set out and analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. Although Chapter 5 and 6 
conclude that the resulting trust is not able to directly address the limitations of the 
Insolvency Act, they do conclude it is able to address the overarching issue – limited 
revest of property – and the analysis of Chapters 3 and 4 will also assist in identifying the 
limitations of utilising the resulting trust and the compact role it can have .   
 
This chapter is therefore split in three separate sections. Section 1 addresses the anti-
deprivation provisions set out in the Insolvency Act 1986, and the law of preferences, 
transactions at an undervalue and transactions defrauding creditors in particular. It 
concludes that the provisions are ineffective in preventing disbursement of a company’s 
asset pool in the period leading up to the onset of insolvency. Section 2 will address the 
personal liability of directors in the context of wrongful and fraudulent trading. It 
similarly concludes the provisions are ineffective in maintaining or protecting the 
company’s asset pool. Finally, Section 3 analyses the availability of funding for 
liquidators to initiate litigation. It concludes that the substantive rules and economic 
conditions result in insufficient funding available being available to liquidators, 
preventing them from initiating litigation.  
 
Section 1: Anti-Deprivation Provisions 
 
Section 1.1: Justifications and Rationale  
 
The modern anti-deprivation provisions contained within the Insolvency Act 1986 are 
intended to prevent the improper divestment of a company’s assets in the period before 
the commencement of liquidation379. These provisions, also known as the avoidance of 
transactions provisions, grant the liquidator the powers to ‘avoid’, or set aside, 
transactions that were at a gross undervalue or were an unauthorised reduction of 
 
379 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 255-256 
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capital380. All are intended to the help protect the general body of creditors against 
reductions of company assets that also confer an unfair or improper advantage to a third 
party381.  
 
Before considering the provisions in detail, it is necessary to state the theoretical 
justifications these anti-deprivation provisions are based on so as to ‘discern the 
parameters of the provisions’382. Prof Goode, with whom the Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court agreed with in the Rubin v Eurofinance appeals383, begins his authoritative 
analysis of the anti-deprivation rules by arguing that they are unjust enrichment 
procedures, with unjust enrichment affecting creditors in one of two ways384. The first is 
that it may reduce the company’s net asset value if it involves a transfer of company 
property to another party at an inadequate price, or if it involves the purchase of property 
by the company at an inflated price. Secondly, it may, without disturbing the company’s 
net asset value, involve the payment or satisfaction of debt, thereby giving the creditor a 
preference over other creditors at the disregard of the statutory priority of distribution385 
and pari passu principle386. These provisions, according to Goode, are necessary to ensure 
the preservation of the company’s net asset value and ensure the equality of distribution 
within the statutory priority of distribution. Goode consequently uses the term unjust 
enrichment in a very narrow sense, being solely in relation to the conferment of an 
improper advantage at the expense of the company’s existing creditors. It does not relate 
to the members of the company as they possess alternative mechanisms through which to 
protect and deal with their interests387. Neither does it relate to the different treatment of 
 
380 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409; see also Armour J, Avoidance of Transactions as 
a ‘Fraud on Creditors’ at Common Law, in Armour and Bennett’s Vulnerable Transactions in 
Corporate Insolvency (Oxford: Hart, 2002)  
381 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 614-615; Keay A, In Pursuit of the Rationale Behind the 
Avoidance of Pre-Liquidation Transactions, (1996) 18 Sydney LR 55 at 60; Calnan R, 
Proprietary Rights, (No.71) at 33; Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd [2012] 1 A.C. 383 per Lord Collins  
382 Keay A, In Pursuit, (No.381) at 56 
383 Rubin v Eurofinance [2010] EWCA 895, at para 55; Rubin v Eurofinance [2012] UKSC 46, at 
para 95 
384 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 616-617 
385 See Chapter 1  
386 See Chapter 1  
387 Goode R, Principles, (No.392) at 523 
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creditor classes, as it strikes a balance between the interests of parties to the transaction 
and the insolvent estate as a whole388.   
 
Building on Goode’s analysis, Parry has put forward a third justification for the anti-
deprivation provisions389, and argues that they also have the potential to act as a 
discouragement against attempts to impugn the integrity of the asset pool. Owing to the 
possibility that property will be recovered, Parry posits that these provisions discourage 
directors in troubled companies from taking actions that prejudice the interests of the 
legitimate creditors by forewarning them that they will be unable to retain their ill-gotten 
gains. Goode, though, challenges the validity of this submission, arguing that the 
limitations that exist regarding the use of these provisions390, and the widely 
acknowledged probability the liquidator will be unable to undertake the necessary 
litigation391, severely limit the discouragement the provisions may achieve392. Milman, 
though, has argued that they are “essential in ensuring that ethical standards of 
stewardship…”393. Despite Goode’s objections to the inclusion of the discouragement 
argument, the mere existence of the provisions, and the diffusion of their existence by 
accountants, auditors and business advisers, must discourage at least some (if not all) 
informed directors from engaging in improper divestment of company assets, especially 
as not all parties will be aware of the limitations associated with the provisions394.  
 
Despite the academic community piecing together well articulated justifications, such 
assistance from the judiciary and legislature have not been forthcoming. Indeed, Keay 
comments that “there is little evidence of the courts seeking to ascertain the rationale for 
the existence of these provisions…”395 
 
 
388 Anderson H, The Framework, (No.217) at 179 
389 Parry R, Funding Litigation in Insolvency, [1998] CfiLR 121; see also Alderson v Temple 
(1768) 98 ER 1277 at 1279, per Lord Mansfield – the provisions are useful in “preserving 
commercial morality and the prevention of fraud.” 
390 See Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter 
391 See Section 3 of this chapter  
392 Goode R, Principles, (No.392) at 523; see also Keay A, In Pursuit, (No.381) at 77 
393 Milman D, Facilitating Recovery and Avoidance Claims by Insolvency Office-Holders, [2015] 
CLN 1 at 1 
394 Katz and Mumford, Making Creditor Protection Effective, Centre for Business Performance, 
ICAEW, 2010) at 63; Anderson H, The Framework, (No.217) at 180 
395 Keay A, In Pursuit, (No.381) at 55 
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Milman has also welcomed the existence of the anti-deprivation provisions, even if there 
are no cogent justifications from the judiciary or legislature, arguing that they are a ‘win-
win’: 
 
“Anything that can facilitate the restoration of “lost assets” is therefore a 
welcome step in the process of maximising potential distributions to 
creditors…Recovery thus represents a “win-win” outcome for any just and 
effective system of corporate law.”396 
 
Thus, it can be ratiocinated that the anti-derivation provisions are supportable as 
mechanisms to restore misappropriated assets to the insolvent company, thus maximising 
the returns to creditors through the statutory priority of distribution. It can also be stated 
that the provisions are also necessary to ensure the ethical standards of directors by 
discouraging the dissipation of assets through the knowledge that those assets can be 
‘clawed back’ by the liquidator at a later date. Hence, this chapter’s analysis of the anti-
deprivation provisions is framed by whether these provisions effectively and efficiently 
give effect to these academically articulated policy justifications.  
 
Section 1.2: The Qualifying Requirements of the Anti-Deprivation Provisions  
 
Although the anti-deprivation provisions all have their own substantive legal 
requirements, they also have four qualifying requirements that must be met before these 
provisions become operational and the transaction be upset. Therefore, these four 
requirements will be considered in insolation and before the substantive individual anti-
deprivation provisions. These four requirements will be analysed to determine whether 
or not they assist or hinder creditor protections.  
 
The first prerequisite for the provisions to be made available to the liquidator is the need 
for the company to have entered insolvency. Thus, these provisions are not available to 
members of a solvent company who are dissatisfied with transactions entered into by its 
directors; they must seek redress through the provisions of the Companies Act 2006.  
 
 
396 Milman D, Facilitating Recovery, (No.393) at 1 
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Support for this requirement is put forward most authoritatively by Goode, who argues 
that so long as a company is solvent, and the company is acting in a lawful manner, the 
law has no justification for unsecured creditors to attack the transaction or interfere in the 
company’s affairs397. As the company is able to repay the unsecured creditors, they have 
no interest in the company’s assets nor any right to question how the company conducts 
its affairs – especially as the company’s business is sufficiently efficient to maintain the 
necessary turnover to make the necessary repayments. Goode further justifies his support 
for the onset of liquidation as prior to this occurring, particularly under the inability to 
pay debts test398, the creditors have a more direct methods of obtaining payment by 
instituting proceedings against the debtor company within the law of contract for breach 
of contract, obtaining judgment for damages and enforcing that judgment. Thus, the laws 
of contract and debt offer detailed and efficient mechanisms to protect creditors of solvent 
companies – particularly the rights to seize and sell assets399 - and so the law of insolvency 
is not required to offer any further assistance in these instances.   
 
Finally, both Goode400 and Keay401 have posited that the need for liquidation is necessary 
to ensure ‘collectivism’ – that creditors are required to act together in enforcing these 
provisions402. Both argue that no single creditor should be allowed to place himself in a 
better position at the expense of other creditors, especially as the right to set aside belongs 
to the general body of creditors collectively. Keay403 takes this position one step further 
by arguing that liquidation protects smaller, less powerful creditors by nullifying the 
oversized ‘clout’ of the larger creditors. Additionally, Keay submits that the liquidation 
process protects recent creditors of the insolvent company, and means they are not 
punished for their lack of due diligence in determining whether the debtor company is 
able to the repay their debts. Hence the liquidation process, which demands a collective 
approach404, is the ideal mechanism to give effect to these policy factors and protect the 
competing interests of unsecured creditors. This prerequisite does not, therefore, preclude 
 
397 Goode R, Principles, (No.392) at 525 
398 S123 Insolvency Act 1986  
399 For detailed analysis see Chapter 1 
400 Goode R, Principles, (No.392) at 526 
401 Keay A, In Pursuit, (No.381) at 61 
402 See Chapter 2 for consideration of the advantages and role of collectivism  
403 Keay A, In Pursuit, (No.381) at 64 
404 See Chapter 1 
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or hinder creditor protection, and in fact strengthens the protections provided to smaller 
creditors.  
 
Secondly, there must be a diminution of the assets that can be made available to the 
general body of creditors. Such a reduction can occur in two ways: by a reduction in the 
net asset value of the company, or by granting an individual creditor a preference at the 
expense of the other creditors. However, where the company has received full value for 
assets, creditors have no need for recourse as the company has not suffered a diminution 
in value – and have thus not suffered a decrease in the level of assets that can or will be 
made available to them in the liquidation dividend405. Equally where the company 
purchases property at its true market value, no diminution to the company’s assets occurs 
- it has merely been converted from one from to another. Thereby, there is no need for 
the law of insolvency to disturb such transactions as there has been no diminution which 
reduces the assets that can distributed to unsecured creditors.  
 
The anti-deprivation provisions also require the company to be insolvent at the time of 
the transaction or to have entered into insolvency as a consequence of the transaction. 
Determining whether this has occurred has been assisted by BNY Corporate Services v 
Eurosail406, where it was held that rather than the company needing to reach the ‘point of 
no return’407, the company merely has to reach the position that upon a comparison of its 
present and future liabilities it is established it can no longer meet its obligations408. Thus, 
following this relaxation of the insolvency test there are now more opportunities for the 
liquidator to successfully argue the company was insolvent.  
 
The need for the company to have entered liquidation was again put forward 
authoritatively by Goode409, who argues that if the company was solvent at the time of 
the transaction, and the transaction does not cause the company to become insolvent, there 
is no prejudice to the creditors by the diminution in value to the company. Instead, it is 
only the members of the company, who should the company be dissolved at that point 
lose out, who have the right and standing to challenge such transactions. Thereby, it limits 
 
405 Goode R, Principles, (No.392) at 526-7 
406 [2013] UKSC 28 
407 Ibid, at 42 
408 Ibid, at 38 
409 Goode R, Principles, (No.392) at 527 
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standing to those directly affected by the transaction, and prevents the courts being 
deluged by desperate creditors looking for any means to recover their debts. 
 
Finally, the company must enter liquidation within the ‘relevant time’ after the transaction 
was entered into. Two ‘relevant’ periods are operational: 6 months for unconnected 
parties410 and 2 years for a connected party411. As noted above, the reform to the 
insolvency tests has assisted liquidators in establishing the onset of insolvency by relaxing 
the strictness of the test from the ‘point of no return’, and there is therefore greater 
flexibility in determining when the company became insolvent.  
 
However, the 6-month relevant time period for unconnected parties is restrictive, and 
although it has supporters, it also has the potential to seriously hamstring attempts at 
bringing proceedings. Those in favour of the strict time limit argue that the transaction 
becomes ‘cleansed’ with time, as it is unfair for contracting parties to be exposed to 
indefinite liability to restore the property to the company412. Notwithstanding the merit of 
this submission, and honest parties to commercial transactions do undoubtably require 
protection, the argument is taken further and stated that creditors should take steps to 
place the company in liquidation within the relevant period413. This does not, however, 
stand up to scrutiny. Firstly, it is difficult to sustain the argument that creditors should be 
aware of the improper transaction414. As seen in the case law on preferences, it is 
troublesome enough establishing whether a company was insolvent with the aid of 
hindsight415. Expecting unsecured creditors, who have little knowledge of the company’s 
inner dealings416, to be aware of such transactions is impossible. Secondly, expecting 
unsecured creditors to find out the relevant information, process it, apply for a winding 
up order and cover the costs of this process within the six-month time limit is also asking 
too much of such under resourced parties.  
 
 
410 S240(1)(b) Insolvency Act 1986  
411 S240(1)(a) Insolvency Act 1986 
412 Goode R, Principles, (No.392) at 528 
413 Ibid, 529 
414 Williams R, What Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?, 
[2015] 78 MLR 55 at 58 
415 Especially where the valuation of the company is unclear: Anderson H, The Framework, 
(No.217) at 30-32 
416 See Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at Chapter 3 
 94 
Those against the six-month time limit reference the challenges this poses for liquidators. 
Calnan notes that the restrictive timeframe creates a new, and usually insurmountable, 
obstacle to liquidators being able to bring anti-deprivation claims417. Despite not being 
referenced by Calnan, this is particularly the case where the transaction does not 
immediately cause the company to enter liquidation and instead limp along terminally 
weakened. As the directors and contracting parties may be able to structure the transaction 
so that enough is left in the business to keep it ticking over for the relevant period, creative 
directors may be able to unjustly enrichment themselves whilst staying outside of the 
law’s clutches. This has led some commentators to question whether or not the relevant 
period should be extended418, however moves to amend the length have been 
unforthcoming, and so the majority of transactions are unassailable.  
 
In contrast, where the parties are connected419, the two-year time-limit is not so 
problematic. A connected person is defined as including relatives, business partners or 
employees. This extension makes it more realistic that a company will enter liquidation 
following the transaction and so be attackable420, however the restriction to ‘associates’ 
severely limits the practical application of the anti-deprivation provisions in the majority 
of insolvencies by excluding merely unfavourable commercial transactions – transactions 
that is easy for the company to enter into.  
 
Section 1.3: The Substantive Provisions 
 
a) The Law of Preferences  
 
The law of preferences is well-established and stretches back to 1768421 and its 
codification in 1914422. Now set out in s239 Insolvency Act 1986, the court may, on the 
application of the liquidator, make an order restoring property to the company if a 
preference has been given to a creditor. A preference is where a company does anything 
 
417 Calnan R, Proprietary Rights, (No.71) at 33-34   
418 Wong C, Are the Avoidance Provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 in Need of Reform?, [2017] 
CL 353 
419 s249 Insolvency Act 1986. See s435 Insolvency Act 1986 for the definition of an associate 
420 See Chapter 4 and the case study of BHS 
421 Alderson v Temple (1768) 4 Burr 2235 
422 S44 Bankruptcy Act 1914 
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or suffers anything to be done which has the effect of putting a creditor in a position 
which, in the event of the company’s liquidation, will be in a better position than had that 
thing not been done423. Put simply, a preference is the improvement of one creditor at the 
expense of the other creditors without legal justification – “Peter has been robbed to pay 
Paul”424. The allure of preference claims for liquidators can be seen in the extensive and 
potentially profitable powers awarded to the court to remedy a preference, which include 
the revestment of property to the company, the discharge of a security given by the 
company, or the requirement to make a payment to the liquidator by an individual of any 
benefits received from the company425. 
 
Substantively, central to the English law of preferences is the need for intention426. Whilst 
the previous law demanded that the intention to prefer was the dominant intention427, the 
Insolvency Act 1986 reformulated the criteria to require a ‘desire’ to place the creditor in 
a better position than if the payment had not been made428. The differences between the 
two requirements was considered by Millet J (as he was then) in Re MC Bacon429 and 
recently affirmed in Re Oxford Pharmaceuticals430.  
 
Millet J began his analysis by “emphatically protest[ing]” against the applicability of the 
old law, arguing that the two provisions were now “completely and deliberately”431 
different. In defining the present requirements for a preference to have occurred, Millett 
J then rejected the need for the intention to prefer to be the dominant intention (it need 
only be an influencing factor) or for there to be direct evidence of the desire432, and instead 
held that there must be a “desire to produce the effect”433. Although this conclusion may 
appear prima facie to benefit liquidators by only requiring the desire to be present, and 
 
423 The role of preference law was set out by Professor Weisberg in Commercial Morality, the 
Merchant Character, and the History of Voidable Preference, (1986) 39 Stanford LR 3 
424 Farrar, The Bankruptcy Law of Fraudulent Preference, [1983] JBL 390 
425 S241 Insolvency Act 1986  
426 S239 Insolvency Act 1986 
427 S44 Bankruptcy Act 1914 
428 S238(5) Insolvency Act 1986 
429 Re MC Bacon [1990] BCC 78 
430 [2010] BCC 834 
431 Re MC Bacon, (No.429) at 86 
432 Ibid, at 86 
433 Ibid, at 78 
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avoid the insurmountable evidential issues434 associated with showing that the wish was 
the dominant reason for transaction, Millet J’s definition undermines this benefit435. 
Indeed, desire was defined as being subjective and open to interpretation436 - “Intention 
is objective, desire is subjective. A man can choose the lesser of two evils without desiring 
either.”437 Thus, the liquidator must now also show that the company itself subjectively 
desired to improve the position of the creditor, rather than was pressured into making the 
transaction – a task that is troublesome for the liquidator to effectively complete given 
the numerous natural persons who control the company’s ‘mind’438. 
 
The consequences of Re MC Bacon are well documented in the academic literature439, 
and mean that should a creditor be forceful in their demands to be repaid, and the company 
pays in the belief it will keep the company operating, there is no ‘desire’ on the part of 
the company.440 Equally, as s239 focuses solely on the debtor company, and not the 
creditor, the latter is incentivised to strong arm debtor companies into entering into 
transactions that place them in a better position441. The limitations of the need to show a 
‘desire’ are seen in Re MC Bacon itself, where it was held that the granting of the creditor 
bank a debenture in the final days of the company was not a preference owing to mistaken 
belief that by granting the debenture, the bank would have to provide support to the 
company. Consequently, even if the directors are incompetent and mistakenly interpret 
the situation, or are even just indifferent442, it will be found that there is no preference.  
 
 
434 Including how a company may form a desire, and which human agent can be responsible - Van 
Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 681; Bowen LJ in Ex parte Hill (1883) 23 Ch D 695; Cork K, 
Report, (No.2) at para 125 
435 Ischac v David Securities Pty Ltd (No 6) (1992) 10 Australian Company Law Cases 652, per 
Young J at 653 who recognises that ascertaining the intention of a company is “a very tricky 
business”.  
436 Keay A, Preferences in Liquidation Law: A Time for a Change, [1998] 2 CFILR 198 at 205 
437 Re MC Bacon, (No.429) at 86 
438 Leonard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 707; El Ajou v Dollar Land 
Holdings [1994] BCC 143; Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services 
Ltd [2012] 1 A.C. 383 per Lord Collins at [75]  
439 McCormack G, Swelling Corporate Assets: Changing What is on the Menu, (2006) 6 J Cor L 
Studies 39 at 41-43 
440 Ibid, at 46 
441 Ibid, at 46 
442 Ibid, at 46 
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The problematic nature of the ‘desire to prefer’ was more recently illustrated in Re 
Hawkes Hill443, which concerned the sale of a failing magazine business and the granting 
of a debenture444. Two publications were created, and a small business loan was granted 
to the company in return for a debenture over the whole of the company’s assets and a 
personal guarantee from the directors. Upon attempts to sell the business, the bank 
demanded the sale proceeds be used to discharge the debenture – which duly occurred 
upon the sale. It was this payment, and the linked discharge of the guarantee, that the 
liquidator submitted formed the necessary desire to prefer. It was held that if the 
transaction had not occurred, the bank would have initiated the sale themselves, recovered 
the £20,000 and discharged the debenture, and consequently the personal guarantee. It 
can therefore again be seen that where there is sufficient commercial pressure from a 
creditor, no preference will exist even if the directors personally benefit at the expense of 
unsecured creditors.  
 
Finally, in relation to desire and unconnected persons, the evidential limitations are 
exacerbated should companies be run in a disorganised manner445. It is argued that where 
the company is run in such a manner, the confusion makes it extremely difficult for the 
liquidator to piece the evidence together to establish the requisite desire – which is made 
even harder by the courts’ reticence to make inferences of the mind of the company that 
the desire to prefer was present446, and they instead require clear evidence of the relevant 
desire. Although a rebuttable presumption in favour of the desire being present when the 
transaction involves connected parties447, this too can be easily rebutted should the 
evidential hurdles mentioned above arise and doubt seep into the liquidator’s case448.  
 
Given the substantial limitations of the requirement to desire, many have questioned its 
use, with Keay asserting the subjective nature of the test is “unrealistic and 
unreasonable”449, and Finch concluding “The present subjective test and its weak 
 
443 Re Hawkes Hill Publishing [2007] BCC 937  
444 See also Re Fairway Magazine Ltd [1992] BCC 924 
445 Wong C, Are the Avoidance Provisions, (No.418); Finch V and Milman D, Corporate 
Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 489 
446 Fletcher I, Voidable Transactions in Bankruptcy Law in J. Ziegel (ed.), Current Developments 
in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); 
Re Beacon Leisure [1991] BCC 213; Re Fairway Magazines [1992] BCC 924 
447 S239(6) Insolvency Act 1986 
448 Keay A, Preferences in Liquidation, (No.436) at 201  
449 Ibid 
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protection of pari passu has the effect of adding further to the unfair burden that 
unsecured creditors bear: they, after all, are parties that depend on strong application of 
the pari passu principle.”450 Many have therefore called for the adoption of an objective 
test451, with Cork examining the case for it. He did, however, reject such a move on the 
basis that the law should not interfere with the lawful discharging of debts and that 
creditors should not be discouraged from attempting to recover their lawful debts452. 
Though this conclusion has been strongly criticised on the basis that it helps subvert the 
pari passu principle453 and encourages creditors to enter the ‘race to collect’454, there 
appears little Parliamentary appetite to reform the law of preferences455, and so unsecured 
creditors in the majority of cases are unable to benefit from liquidator brought litigation 
to recover assets from ‘preferred’ creditors456 despite the extensive powers granted to the 
courts.  
 
b) Transactions at an Undervalue  
 
In tandem with the preference provisions, the English insolvency regime seeks to protect 
unsecured creditors by preventing directors and creditors from disgorging company assets 
at an undervalue shortly before the onset of liquidation. The introduction of s238, which 
had no predecessor457, was championed by Cork as a mechanism for achieving greater 
unsecured creditor equality. In order for a transaction to be considered to have been at an 
undervalue, it must have been entered into at the relevant time458 and the transaction must 
have been a gift or at a level of consideration whose value in money or money’s worth is 
significantly lower than its true value459. Furthermore, the transaction must occur when 
 
450 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 490 
451 Wong C, Are the Avoidance Provisions, (No.418); Keay A, Preferences in Liquidation, 
(No.436) at 198   
452 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 1256 
453 Keay A, Preferences in Liquidation, (No.436) at 212 
454 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 489; see also Cork K, Report, 
(No.2) at 1257 
455 Keay’s repeated attacks on the adequacy of s239, and calls for reform over a 25-year period 
evidence the lack of desire to reform. Also, the Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 
2015’s non-inclusion of reform to the substantive preference provisions indicate a lack of current 
Parliamentary interest in effecting such a change.  
456 Wong C, Are the Avoidance Provisions, (No.418) at 533 
457 Parry R, Transaction Avoidance, (No.271) at 78.  
458 Six months for unconnected persons and 2 years for connected persons  
459 S238 Insolvency Act 1986 
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the company is insolvent or cause the company to become insolvent as a consequence of 
the transaction460. This usually involves the company entering into transactions in which 
it receives little or no consideration461, and sees the sale of assets, the acceptance of low 
value assets in lieu of payment, the creation of trusts in favour of creditors, the creation 
of leases and outright gifts.  
 
Problematically, to fall within the remit of s238, the debtor must have taken some step to 
participate in the transaction. However, to assist liquidators in bringing claims, it has been 
concluded that the company’s passive acceptance of other parties’ actions – such as 
instructing or allowing other parties to transfer assets or payments due to the company at 
the company’s expense – ensuring that backhanded and off the book transactions between 
the company and its creditors are vulnerable to attack by liquidators462 and do not form a 
lacuna within the anti-deprivation provisions. 
 
This revestment of company property is achieved through the wide powers granted to the 
court463. Under s238, the court is granted the powers to ‘make such order as it thinks fit 
for restoring the position’ of the company prior to the transaction, and s241 grants the 
court the specific powers to order the vesting of property transferred as part of a 
transaction involving the company464, require property to be vested in the company if it 
represents the proceeds of the sale of property involved in the transaction465 and releasing 
or discharging any security given by the company466. Therefore, in the same manner as 
the powers granted to the courts by s239, a successful transaction at an undervalue claim 
is potentially lucrative for the liquidator to pursue in their quest to return assets to the 
unsecured creditors.  
 
Although the purpose of s238 is clear, the effectiveness of the provision is debatable, as 
although prima facie the requirements appear simple to meet, their interpretation has 
proved problematic. This uncertainty begins with the need for a transaction “whose value 
 
460 S238(5) Insolvency Act 1986; See above for details  
461 S238(4) Insolvency Act 1986 
462 Hunt (Liquidator of Ovenden Colbert Printers Ltd) v Hosking [2013] EWCA Civ 1408. 
463 Ss 238 and 241 Insolvency Act 1986 
464 Ibid, at S241(1)(a)  
465 Ibid, at S241(1)(b)  
466 Ibid, at S241(1)(c)  
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in money or money’s worth is significantly lower than the value of consideration provided 
by the company”467. For although it is usually possible to identify the relevant 
transaction468, identifying the relevant consideration, and whether it is a significantly 
lower value, has proved controversial469. 
 
In seeking to assist identifying the relevant consideration, and whether this consideration 
was significantly below market value, Brewin Dolphin470 clarified the meaning of 
‘significantly below market value’, with Lord Scott suggesting that market value is “the 
amount that a reasonably well informed purchaser is prepared, in arm’s length 
negotiations, pay for it.”471 This has subsequently been held to be the market value where 
there is a market472 or expert evidence where no market exists473. Although the adoption 
of objective means of identifying the true market value of the asset disposed of by the 
company, and so the disparity between it and the consideration provided in the 
transaction, assists both the courts and the liquidator in determining whether the 
transaction was at an undervalue by providing a reliable baseline from which to operate, 
this process is undermined by the retention of a subjective element. This is because, 
although the asset’s value is determined by its objective value474, this value is only the 
value ascribed by the company, not the wider world or market475. Thus, should it be 
shown that whilst the asset has inherent market value, but little value to the company476 
or the company’s position is such that it cannot acquire the true market value (such as it 
has no expertise in dealing with the asset or its poor financial position makes its 
negotiating position perilous), there will be no transaction at an undervalue, and so no 
protection for the unsecured creditors.  
 
 
467 Philips v Brewin Dolphin [2001] 1 WLR 143 
468 Even if the transaction occurs between third parties and not directly with the company, due to 
the movement of assets 
469 Parry R, Transaction Avoidance, (No.271) at 81 
470 Philips v Brewin Dolphin, (No.467) 
471 Ibid, at 154; See also Milman D, Facilitating Recovery, (No.437) at 3  
472 Re Brabon, Treharne v Brabon [2001] BCLC 11 
473 Re Hollier, Carman v Letchford [2010] EWHC 3155 (ch)  
474 With the assistance of hindsight: see Green v El Tai [2015] B.P.I.R. 24 at 82 
475 Re Thoars (No2), Reid v Ramlort Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 800 
476 Because the company cannot make use of it – such a mining company owning the intellectual 
property to a hybrid car engine  
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Equally problematic is identifying the existence of consideration in the context of s238477. 
Brewin Dolphin confirmed that the relevant consideration is not strictly limited to the 
transaction itself, but also included collateral agreements that were entered into by the 
company and relevant parties, and that the relevant consideration is a combination of the 
relevant collateral transactions478. Owing to the prevalence of collateral contracts479 as a 
means of reducing tax liabilities480 and corporate group priorities, these collateral 
contracts can be “indissolubly bound up as part of the same overall transaction”.481 In 
Delaney v Chen for example, the relevant transaction involved the sale and lease back of 
land. The land was sold for £210,000 with a lease back from 21 years at a fixed rent of 
£500 a month that was unassignable. The liquidator argued the true value was £275,000, 
meaning an undervalue of £65,000. However, as the court valued the lease at £80,000482, 
and as £210,000 had already been received, the transaction was £25,000 above the market 
value and so not at an undervalue.  
 
However, the adoption of collateral contracts as a mechanism for determining the level 
of consideration can benefit claims brought by liquidators, rather than hinder them, as is 
seen in Agricultural Mortgage v Woodward483. The first defendant borrowed money from 
the claimant who was granted a mortgage over the defendant’s farm. Shortly before the 
deadline to repay the mortgage arrears, the defendant granted the second defendant an 
agricultural tenancy at market value. In granting such a tenancy, the value of the first 
defendant’s farm fell from £1 million to £500,000, and granted the second defendant the 
position of extorting the claimant by demanding a release fee to enable the sale of the 
farm. Taking both contracts into consideration, despite the tenancy being at full market 
value, the court concluded that the agricultural tenancy depreciating the value of the farm 
by half meant that the transaction was at an undervalue. Whilst Delaney illustrates the 
potential pitfalls liquidators face in establishing the transaction was at an undervalue, such 
as unknown collateral contracts that are of value to the company, Woodward illustrates 
 
477 Wong C, Are the Avoidance Provisions, (No.418) at 354 
478 Philips v Brewin Dolphin [2001], (No.467) at 150 
479 Parry R, Transaction Avoidance, (No.271) at 81 
480 See Brewin Dolphin itself, where the transaction involved the sale of the business for nominal 
consideration in return to a valuable lease agreement to reduce the purchaser’s tax liabilities.  
481 Delaney v Chen [2010] EWHC 6 (ch) at para 10, and later affirmed by the CA at [2010] EWCA 
1455; see also NatWest v Jones [2002] 1 BCLC 55  
482 Owing to the below market rent and presumed surrender value that could be demanded by the 
company 
483 [1994] BCC 688 
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that the court will not be bound by the market value of a transaction, and will acknowledge 
any peripheral consequences of the transaction has on the diminution of the asset value 
of the company. Thus, the courts’ embrace of ‘reality’ over strict contractual formality 
both assists and hinders transaction at an undervalue claims. This balance between the 
interests of the company and the creditors has also been praised by Parry, who 
acknowledges that it “provides a commercially realistic approach” that reduces the 
concerns of the parties484 .  
 
Another potential hurdle to s238 claims is the courts’ attitude to security interests, which 
in the last two decades has shifted into uncertainty. Initially, Re M.C Bacon485 concluded 
that arguing a security interest could be classified within the undervalue provision was 
‘misconceived’, as the granting of a security interest does not deplete the company’s 
assets nor does it diminish their value. Additionally, Millett J also concluded that as a 
company retains the right discharge the security interest and sell or remortgage the assets, 
the company loses the capability to use the proceeds of sale at its free will – something 
that cannot be determined by a monetary value.  
 
Despite the soundness of this conclusion on the ground that the company’s asset value is 
not diminished but merely reattributed for the life of the security interest, as recognised 
by Stubbs486, this has been questioned by recent case law. Stubbs cites Re Leyland Daf487, 
as undermining Re M.C. Bacon due to their Lordships’ conclusions that assets subject to 
a security interest belong to the creditors, with the company only retaining “an equity of 
redemption”488, and thus only retaining legal title to the asset. Arden LJ489 has also 
questioned the correctness of Re M.C. Bacon as assets subject to security interests are no 
longer the property of the company. Although Arden LJ’s comments were obiter, and 
there has been some academic objection490, Stubbs does conclude that a shift has occurred 
in the treatment of security interests under s238. It is concluded that although Re M.C 
Bacon must be treated as good law, in some circumstances the granting of a security 
 
484 Parry R, Transaction Avoidance, (No.271) at 82 
485 [1990] BCC 78 at 91-2 
486 Stubbs R, S423 of the Insolvency Act in Practice, [2008] Insolvency Intelligence 17  
487 Re Layland Daf, Buchler v Talbot [2004] UKHL 9 
488 Ibid, at 29, per Lord Hoffmann  
489 Hill v Spread Trustee [2007] 1 WLR 2404 
490 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 644-645 
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interest may constitute an under value should the correct factual matrix occur491 - although 
that correct factual matrix remains elusive. Hence, any liquidator posed with a transaction 
at an undervalue involving security interests is unlikely to pursue the claim and risk the 
integrity of the asset pool on a gamble of possessing the illusive factual matrix – leaving 
unsecured creditors exposed. 
 
Despite many hurdles existing, liquidators are somewhat assisted by its objective nature 
when compared to the preference provisions. Under s238, the company is not required to 
subjectively intend any outcome – liability is a results-based test on whether true market 
value was acquired by the company492. As a result of not being required to analyse the 
company’s intentions, the issues associated with evaluating ‘desire’ outlined above are 
avoided493, and a more reliable mathematical calculation can be made.  
 
Although partially aided by its objective nature, s238 is further hamstrung by the ‘in good 
faith and for the purpose of carrying on business’ defence made available under 
s238(5)(a)494 that the transaction was entered into in good faith and that at the time of the 
transaction, there were reasonable grounds for believing the transaction would benefit the 
company. Although there is a need for reasonable grounds, this does not require honesty 
– the company is able to sell goods at an unsatisfactory quality495 and is able to purchase 
property on credit that it knows it cannot repay, so long as it promotes the company’s 
interests496. Instead, all that is required is the existence of reasonable, objective grounds 
for believing the transaction was beneficial to the company to avoid liability. Thus, 
although not as problematic as the subjectivity of ‘desire’, the existence of this defence 
could potentially scupper any potential claim, and deter any liquidator from pursuing as 
claim – irrespective of how attractive the available remedies are.  
  
c) Transactions Defrauding Creditors  
 
 
491 Stubbs R, S423 of the Insolvency Act in Practice, [2008] Insolvency Intelligence 17 at 21 
492 Milman D, Transactional Avoidance, (No.373) at 83 
493 Wong C, Are the Avoidance, (No.418); Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, 
(No.6) at 492  
494 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 492  
495 Parry R, Transaction Avoidance, (No.271) at 124 
496 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 648-649; Also includes the closing down of the business - 
Re Scarflax [1979] Ch 592; Wallach v SS for Trade and Industry [2006] EWHC 989 (Ch) 
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An alternative mechanism open to liquidators to revest property in an insolvent company 
is s423 Insolvency Act 1986, which prohibits ‘transactions that defraud creditors’497. It 
applies whenever a transaction is entered into at an undervalue, and where the purpose of 
the debtor was to place the asset out of the reach of creditors who may have a claim 
against the now insolvent company. Although s423 is not limited to insolvency 
proceedings, and instead adopts a looser ‘victim’498 requirement, some have argued that 
it is a ‘provision with untapped potential’499 for liquidators as unlike ss238 and 239, there 
is no fixed time period in which the transaction is vulnerable to attack by the liquidator500. 
Equally appealing are the powers granted to the court, which are similar to those granted 
under s238 and 239, and are to restore the position prior to the transaction occurring – 
meaning it could potentially prove lucrative for the liquidator to pursue in order to 
increase the liquidation dividend.  
 
Disappointingly, although superficially appealing, s423 is also fundamentally flawed for 
achieving revestment of property, which explains its low utilisation. The first of these 
detractions is the need for the transaction to have occurred at an undervalue501. This 
requirement is the same as for s238 claims502, and so shares the same uncertainties. Thus, 
establishing the transaction had a negative impact upon its ‘victims’ may be troublesome 
for liquidators to evidentially prove.  
 
The second detraction is the need to show that the ‘purpose’ of the transaction was to 
place the asset beyond the reach of the company’s general creditors503. As with preference 
claims, the liquidator must establish the debtor’s intention, and it is insufficient to 
establish that the transaction had the result of placing the asset beyond the reach of 
creditors504. The issue with establishing the requisite purpose was acknowledged in Brady 
 
497 It cannot, however, be used to challenge preferences: Re Lloyd’s Furniture Palace Ltd, Evans 
v Lloyd’s Furniture Palace Ltd [1925] Ch 853  
498 Victim includes both current creditors and parties that may later be prejudiced by the disputed 
transaction – a results-based test is utilised: Fortress Value Recovery Fund v Blue Skye 
Opportunities [2013] EWHC 14 (Comm) 
499 Milman D, Facilitating Recovery, (No.393) at 4 
500 Milman D, Transactional Avoidance, (No.373) at 83 
501 S423(1) Insolvency Act 1986 
502 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 493 
503 Milman D, Transactional Avoidance, (No.373) at 83 
504 Keay A, Transactions Defrauding Creditors, (No.367) at 273 
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v Brady505, which noted that purposes can have many shades and that no definitive 
definition exists for the term. Furthermore, determining a purpose is challenging from an 
evidential perspective506. This is especially the case for companies because, as 
acknowledged above, it is impossible for the company to have a mind of its own owing 
to it being an abstraction, and so the liquidator and court must both establish and prove 
which human controller within the company was responsible for the transaction and what 
their intention was507. As set out above, this is potentially troublesome for liquidators to 
evidentially prove.  
 
Adding to the issues with establishing the requisite purpose are the courts’ attitudes of 
whether the purpose must be dominant or substantial. The earlier cases to consider s423 
adopted the requirement that rather than the purpose being the only reason for the 
transaction, it must be the dominant purpose for the transaction508. Although reducing the 
evidential burden for liquidators by allowing the existence of multiple potential purposes 
to exist concurrently, the need for dominance remains problematic when two or more 
equal purposes were in mind during the transaction, as it is impossible for the courts to 
determine which took precedence509 - especially given the judiciary’s reticence at 
imputing intentions to the defendant. Given these difficulties, the need for a dominant 
purpose has been doubted by some members of the judiciary510, and in IRC v Hashimi511 
Arden LJ rejected the need for a dominant purpose and instead held that a ‘substantial’ 
purpose was required – that the debtor had positively intended to put the asset out of the 
reach of creditors amongst all of the existing purposes512. Her Ladyship also opined that 
purpose must be substantive, rather than consequential – meaning that if the transaction 
was entered into for alternative purposes, but happened to prejudice creditors, a claim 
could not be sustained. Thus, establishing the relevant purpose will be troublesome due 
to this high, and difficult to establish, burden of proof513, and so the use of s423 for the 
 
505 Brady v Brady [1989] A.C. 755 
506 Royscott Spa Leasing Ltd v Lovett [1995] B.C.C. 502 
507 Keay A, Transactions Defrauding Creditors, (No.367) at 285 
508 Chohan v Saggar [1992] BCC 502  
509 Keay A, Transactions Defrauding Creditors, (No.367) at 276 
510 Pinewood Joinery v Starelm Properties [1994] 2 BCLC 412; The Law Society v Southall [2001] 
BPIR 303 
511 [2002] BCLC 489 
512 Ibid, at 504 
513 Milman D, Transactional Avoidance in Insolvency, (No.373) at 83 
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benefit of unsecured creditors has been heavily circumscribed514. Indeed, this is 
evidenced in two recent cases, where in Rubin v Dweck515 the claim was defeated by 
showing the transaction’s purpose was to avoid a divorce, and in Withers v Harrison-
Welch516 the purpose was shown as giving effect to a previous domestic arrangement. 
Consequently, although s423 provides yet another mechanism to attack pre-insolvency 
transactions, making out the relevant liability is challenging and economically inefficient 
for liquidators to make out.   
 
Section 1.4: Do the Anti-Deprivation Provisions Achieve Their Objectives? 
 
As contended above, in analysing the anti-deprivation provisions, it is necessary to 
scrutinise whether or not they are adequate at achieving their intended objectives: 
maintaining the integrity of the asset pool, preventing creditors from acquiring 
preferences at the expense of other creditors, and deterring poor director behaviour.  
 
It is apparent that the four prerequisites needed to initiate the anti-deprivation provisions 
do not substantially impair their use by the liquidator, and neither do they substantially 
frustrate the protection of unsecured creditors. Indeed, the need for liquidation can be 
justified on the basis that prior to insolvency, the company has sufficient assets to repay 
its creditors, and therefore they have no interest in the company’s running until the advent 
of insolvency. Linked to this is the need for diminution in value of the company’s assets. 
This too does not negatively impact upon the unsecured creditors as without the company 
asset pool being diminished, the general body of creditors is in the same financial 
position, and so has no justification for seeking legal recourse517 . 
 
The need for the company to enter insolvency within the specific time period does, 
however, have the potential to limit the options of liquidators. By imposing 6- and 24-
month limits518, the creditors are compelled, unwittingly, to enter a race against time to 
instigate winding up. They may not, however, have the relevant information available to 
make an informed decision on whether to initiate the liquidation process, such as 
 
514 Keay A, Transactions Defrauding Creditors, (No.367) at 284 
515 [2012] BPIR 853 
516 [2012] EWHC 3077 (QB) 
517 Anderson H, The Framework, (No.217) at 179; Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 1481-1484 
518 S240 Insolvency Act 1986 
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information of the company’s perilous financial position or the improper conduct. Neither 
may they have the relevant time or financial resources, even if the data is available, to 
process it within the 6-month window519. Given many creditors may not be in a position 
to initiate liquidation proceedings in time, they would be statutorily barred from 
exercising their protections, and so many potential claims that are capable of increasing 
the size of the asset pool would be stifled.  
 
Another relevant factor are the orders available to the court. S241 provides a large range 
of powers to the court that include transferring property to the company, requiring the 
payment of money to the liquidator for any benefits received or discharging a security 
interest over company property. The comprehensiveness of these orders, and the 
discretion of the court to make the one that is the most relevant, suggest prima facie that 
they are largely adequate mechanisms for maintaining the asset pool and deterring 
misappropriation of assets as the misappropriated property may be to be returned and then 
distributed according to the statutory priority of distribution.  
 
Notwithstanding their apparent attractiveness, their enforceability can prove problematic 
owing to the need for a court order. Whilst true proprietary ‘remedies’, such as resulting 
or constructive trusts, arise upon the occurrence of the relevant facts and have priority 
over all subsequently created property interests520, the anti-deprivation orders under s241 
require the judgment of the court. Consequently, in practice they operate in a similar 
manner to the proprietary Canadian remedial constructive trust521 – they only acquire 
effective priority against valid security interests created after the judgment522, and so are 
vulnerable to any security interests validly created in the period between the occurrence 
of the transaction and the judgment being handed down. Given the lengthy timeframes 
involved in the liquidation and litigation process, this could be sizeable. Any order is also 
at risk to purchases by bona fide purchasers for value523, which bar the liquidator from 
acquiring the property. Given the traditional arm’s length negotiations that occur between 
commercial parties, a veil of ignorance frequently attaches to the third party of the 
 
519 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.2) at Chapter 3; Calnan R, Proprietary 
Rights, (No.71) at 33-34 
520 Re Sharpe [1980] 1 All ER 198, at 203, per Browne-Wilkinson J 
521 Hunter Engineering v Syncrude Canada (1989) 57 DLR (4th) 321 
522 S241(2) Insolvency Act 1986 
523 Wilkes v Spooner [1911] 2 KB 473; Barclays Bank v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180  
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preference or undervalue transaction, and as such the purchaser has a lack of notice of the 
impropriety of the transaction. This ignorance is compounded by the fluctuating and 
bamboozling commercial value of many assets524, regularly preventing the existence of 
constructive notice525, and resulting in bona fide purchases. Consequently, this means that 
many orders may not be enforceable against these innocent parties even if made.  
 
The final aspects to limit the anti-deprivation provisions’ effectiveness are the substantive 
elements. As seen above, s239 requires the liquidator to prove that the company 
subjectively ‘desired’ to prefer the recipient of the company’s assets. As a consequence, 
and the exception that creditor pressure can negate a desire to prefer – a factual occurrence 
that is likely to occur – s239 is a difficult claim for liquidators to sustain, and so unable 
to offer unsecured creditors much protection or discourage from inappropriate 
behaviour526.  
 
Equally ineffective is s238, which owing to Brewin Dolphin’s recognition of disparate 
collateral contracts as effective consideration, and the uncertainty surrounding whether 
security interests reduce the company’s asset pool, s238 too is troublesome for liquidators 
to sustain.  Finally, s423 combines the weaknesses of s239 – the need for a subjective 
‘purpose’ to defraud creditors – and the weaknesses of s238 – the need for inadequate 
consideration – and so is even more troublesome to sustain than the other provisions.  
 
The lack of protection ss239, 238 and 423 offer unsecured creditors can be seen 
empirically in the research of Williams527, who sought to identify the number of actions 
brought under these legislative provisions. In his research, it was established that only 80 
s238 actions, and 50 s239 actions, were initiated up to 2013. This equates to a combined 
4.8 claims a year for the provisions. Given that in 2018 the U.K. had 4 million registered 
companies528, this equates to next to nothing, and so it is clear that none of the provisions 
 
524 Establishing the true market value of the product may, therefore, be open to interpretation and 
debate. Also subject to fluctuation is where the selling party does not have the relevant expertise 
or negotiating position to demand the full value of the item.  
525 Barclays Bank v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 at 195; Credit Agricole Corporation and Investment 
Bank v Papadimitrou [2015] UKPC 13  
526 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 665 
527 Williams R, What Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?, 
[2015] 78 MLR 55 at 60-61 
528 Companies House, Incorporated Companies in the UK January to March 2018, 26th April 
2018 
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are adequate at either protecting the integrity of the asset pool nor deterring improper 
corporate behaviour, owing to their pitiful utilisation and fundamental flaws.  
 
Section 2: Person Liability  
 
As noted in Section 1, despite the anti-deprivation provisions being proprietary in nature, 
they operate in a similar manner to the remedial constructive trust529, and so are of limited 
value to the liquidator should the defendant have limited financial resources to give effect 
to any judgment. To make up for the potential shortfall, liquidators can seek to impose 
personal liability – primarily on the company’s directors – to boost the asset pool. This is 
achieved through the fraudulent and wrongful trading provisions of the Insolvency Act 
1986. This section therefore analyses whether they are effective in enlarging the asset 
pool.  
 
a) Fraudulent Trading  
 
The primary mechanism for imposing liability on directors of companies engaged in the 
liquidation process is s213 Insolvency 1986 for fraudulent trading. This provision 
potentially makes the defendant, who can be either a director or party with knowledge of 
the fraudulent trading530, liable to make a contribution to the company’s assets for 
distribution to the general body of creditors. S213 requires that if the business of the 
company was carried out with the intent to defraud creditors of the company, or for any 
fraudulent purpose, the court can make an order requiring them to make a contribution to 
be made to the company’s assets. The purpose, if not effect, of this provision is to 
discourage directors from carrying on business at the expense of the general body of 
creditors531 by making them personally liable, from their own assets, for the losses caused 
by their dishonesty. Despite no time limit existing on the defendant’s liability within s213 
itself, liquidators must bring the claim within 6 years of their powers becoming 
exercisable532, thereby granting the liquidator, in contrast to the anti-deprivation 
provisions, sufficient time to investigate and bring a claim.  
 
529 Hunter Engineering v Syncrude Canada (1989) 57 DLR (4th) 321 at 348 
530 Re Gerald Coop (Chemicals) Ltd [1978] CH 262  
531 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 1776-1786 
532 S9 Limitation Act 1980 
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As with the anti-deprivation provisions, the courts are granted substantial remedial 
powers should a breach of s213 be established. They are able to make an order for the 
defendant to ‘make such contributions (if any) to the company’s assets as the court thinks 
proper’533. Although prima facie this grants a large amount of discretion in the orders that 
can be made, a series of restrictions have been put in place severely limiting the potential 
boon this could provide for liquidators. Firstly, s213 requires that a causal link between 
the loss and the fraudulent trading must be established534, and limits the defendant’s 
liability to losses related to the fraudulent trading itself535, rather than the general losses 
sustained prior to the insolvency, substantially limiting the potential recoveries of 
liquidators. Secondly, it is to be used to compensate creditors rather than punish directors 
for improper behaviour536. This accordingly means that the provision cannot be used to 
act punitively and increase the size of the order to punish egregious conduct537. However, 
as the order is for the benefit of all the company’s creditors rather than just its victims538, 
s213 does have the potential to benefit the general body of creditors and increase their 
dividend payment – so long as the defendant has the requisite resources to give effect to 
the order.  
 
S213, similarly with the anti-deprivation provisions, is also problematic to prove and 
greatly under used539 despite the potential benefits it may provide for unsecured creditors. 
This stems from the barriers the courts have placed in their interpretation of the fraudulent 
intention. In the early case law, it was found that this required ‘actual dishonesty 
involving, according to current notions of fair trading among commercial men, real moral 
blame’540 – a troublesome to prove subjective/objective hybrid test in which the defendant 
must have considered that the trading was objectively dishonest541, although the further 
 
533 S213(2) Insolvency Act 1986  
534 Morphitis v Bernasconi [2003] Ch 552 
535 Which maybe causally limited to only a small financial value 
536 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 597  
537 Morris v Bank of India [2005] BCC 739 
538 Esal (Commodities), Re [1997] 1 BCLC 705 (CA) 
539 Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 668; Doyle L, Insolvency Litigation, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) at 144 
540 Per Maugham J, Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd [1933] Ch 786 at 790; later endorsed in L Todd 
(Swanscombe) Ltd, Re [1990] BCC 125 and Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA 
(No.14) [2003] EWHC 1868 (CA) 
541 Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 670 
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the defendant departed from the objective standard of honesty the more likely he was to 
be found dishonest542. It has been found that ‘blind eye’ knowledge – a deliberate decision 
to avoid confirming the existence of the suspected fact – is sufficient for actual 
dishonesty, thereby encompassing incompetent defendants543. However, one issue that 
has repeatedly troubled the courts has been the incurring of debts shortly before 
insolvency. Early case law suggested that the incurring of debt with the knowledge that 
it could not be paid as debts became due, but with the belief they could be discharged at 
some time in the future, was insufficient for fraudulent trading544. This contention was 
rejected in R v Grantham545, however, where it was held fraudulent trading occurred when 
the defendant realised that the company’s debts could not be paid as they fell due. Thus, 
as a consequence of the need for ‘real moral blame’, and the subsequent confusion as to 
its meaning and application, it is clear that proving dishonesty is challenging for 
liquidators bringing proceedings and creates uncertainty.  
 
In Morphitis546, this high bar of proving fraudulent trading was raised even further with 
Chadwick LJ’s rejection of a composite interpretation of ‘with intent to defraud’, and 
instead the need to prove both intention and fraud separately was adopted. This differs 
from the criminal concept, which establishes intention should it be proven that the 
consequence of the action was virtually certain547 - a lower standard of proof. Therefore, 
under s213 a higher evidential bar has been set that requires the liquidator to prove that 
not only was the trading fraudulent, but also establish that the transaction was entered 
into with the intention to defraud548. Although it has been put forward that such a 
requirement may be understandable for criminal liability549, owing to the potential 
ramifications of conviction and incarceration, it has also been argued that it has made 
bringing a claim a challenge as every element must be clear cut, particularly given the 
evidential issues surrounding intention outlined above550. This divergence from the 
criminal law, and the challenge it presents to liquidators, has led some to call for the 
 
542 Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers [2001] BCLC 324, at 330 
543 Manifest Shipping v Uni-Polaris Shipping [2003] 1 AC 469 
544 Re White and Osmand (Parkstone Ltd) (1960), (unreported) 
545 [1984] 2 All ER 166 
546 Morphitis v Bernasconi [2003] EWCA Civ 289   
547 R v Woolin [1998] 3 WLR 382 at 389 
548 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 597 
549 Ibid, at 597 
550 Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency, (No.62) at 831 
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Supreme Court, should it hear an appeal on the issue, to reject the interpretation set out 
in Morphitis551; however, the prospect of the Supreme Court hearing such an appeal is 
sparse given the paucity of claims initiated in the English courts. Consequently, the 
unhelpful conclusion of Chadwick LJ set out in Morphitis is unlikely to be overruled in 
the foreseeable future, and as such liquidators face a difficult if not impossible evidential 
bar to clear.  
 
Put bluntly, as a result of Morphitis it is easy for defendants to escape liability for 
fraudulent trading, and Milman has concluded that “Civil actions brought to enforce s.213 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 are very much long shots.”552, and so they are largely 
unsuitable for liquidators to pursue.  
 
b) Wrongful Trading  
 
Because of the shortcomings of the fraudulent trading provisions, the Cork Committee 
concluded that a new form of directorial liability should be created to remedy this lacuna. 
Cork concluded that as fraudulent trading was fatally hamstrung and unappealing to 
practitioners553, a new and easier to prove civil remedy should be made available to 
liquidators554. This was termed ‘wrongful trading’555, and although controversial 
throughout the various Parliamentary stages556, many academic commentators were of 
the opinion that it could be a ‘great hope for the unsecured creditor’557 due to its 
employment of objective standards of managerial behaviour558. It has been questioned, 
however, whether wrongful trading did turn out to be the unsecured creditors’ ‘great 
hope’, or is in fact as flawed as s213.  
 
 
551 Savririmathu A, Morphitis in the Court of Appeal: Some Reflections, (2005) 26 Co Law 245 
at 248 
552 Milman D, Company Directors - Their Duties and Liabilities Revisited, [2004] CLN 1 at 3 
553 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 1776; Parry R, Transaction Avoidance (No.271) at 473 
554 Ibid, at 1778 
555 Although neither term appears in s214; Simmons M, Wrongful Trading, [2001] Insolvency 
Intelligence 12 at 12 
556 Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency, (No.62) at 835 
557 See: Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 599; Oditah F, Wrongful 
Trading, [1990] LMCLQ 205 
558 Milman D, Facilitating Recovery, (No.393) at 3  
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S214 Insolvency Act 1986, which gave effect to Cork’s proposals, states that where a 
company has entered liquidation, the liquidator, should they find evidence that at some 
time before the commencement of the liquidation, the director(s) of the company knew 
or ought to have concluded that there was no prospect of the company avoiding 
liquidation, and continued to trade at the expense of the company’s creditors, may apply 
for an order that the director(s) is liable to make a contribution to the company’s assets. 
Therefore, the liquidator must prove the ‘moment of truth’559 – that the defendant realised, 
or ought to have realised, the company was beyond rescue and thus ceased trading. 
 
Thus, the purpose of s214, according to Keay, is to stop directors from passing on the cost 
of the company’s debts and placing the risks of further trading560 at the feet of its 
unsecured creditors and taking unnecessary or dangerous risks561. This is because, as 
Keay further points out, the creditors are the residual claimants to the company’s assets, 
and so the directors have a duty to minimise their potential losses when they conclude 
there is no prospect of the recovery562.  
 
The substantive elements require the liquidator to prove that the defendant director knew 
or ought to have concluded that the company had reached the ‘moment of truth’ outlined 
above563. From the limited case law available, it is apparent that one easy to ascertain 
factor in determining whether the moment has occurred is should the company repeatedly 
fail to find the necessary funds to discharge their debts as they become due564. Hence, in 
Rubin565 directors were found liable after the date they ought to have concluded that 
promised funds would not be forthcoming from an investor who had given numerous 
assurances the moneys would be provided but had failed to provide them. Similarly, in 
Roberts566 it was found that the moment occurred when the directors knew their bank’s 
funding conditions could not be met, and in Re DKG Contractors567 the moment occurred 
when a supplier refused to supply. Although in these instances there was a clear event 
 
559 Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency, (No.62) at 836 
560 Trading beyond the ‘moment of truth’ 
561 Keay A, Wrongful Trading: Problems and Proposals, [2014] 65 (1) Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 63 at 66  
562 Ibid, at 66 
563 S214(2) Insolvency Act 1986 
564 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 599 
565 Rubin v Gunner and another [2004] BCC 684 
566 Roberts (Liquidator of Onslow Ditching Ltd) v Fröhlich [2011] EWHC 257 (Ch) 
567 Re DKG Contractors Ltd [1990] B.C.C. 903  
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that triggered the requisite knowledge for the directors568, this will regularly not be the 
case, and so the liquidators will be compelled to analyse the relevant evidence, including 
cash flow forecasts, the loss of employees, contracts and denials of credit569. Analysing 
this evidence, particularly if the evidence is oral or poorly recorded, will therefore be both 
time consuming570 and costly for the liquidator to undertake, and makes the investigation 
process undesirable to undertake. Adding to the evidential issues is the entitlement of the 
director to conclude that the best interests of the creditors is to continue trading on the 
grounds that profitability will return in the future571. Thus, not only must the liquidator 
show that the director had sufficient knowledge, but they must also show that the director 
had no legitimate grounds for concluding that profitability will return – a factual outcome 
that is extremely difficult to make out given the volatility of consumer tastes and 
international markets, and the subjective nature of business.  
 
Beyond the demand to show the requisite actual or constructive knowledge, the liquidator 
is also hampered by the need to prove that there was a causal link between the wrongful 
trading and losses of the creditors, and that the company was worse off as a result of the 
continued trading after the alleged moment of truth572. Thus in Brooks v Armstrong573 it 
was held that as ceasing to trade at the point of realisation would have made the assets 
valueless, whereas continuing to trade would generate positive cash flows and provide 
for a going concern value, there was no causal link between the losses sustained during 
the trading period and the wrongful trading. Similarly in Re Ralls574, it was concluded 
necessary to prove that the decision of the directors of a building firm to continue trading 
increased the liability to creditors after the moment of truth, and that as the net deficit of 
company debts decreased by £3,885, there was no causal link. It was additionally held 
that the alternative submission, that a casual loss had been sustained through the need to 
investigate and pursue the wrongful trading claim, was insufficient to establish a causal 
 
568 Werdnik R, Wrongful Trading Provision - is it Efficient?, [2012] Insolvency Intelligence 81 at 
82 
569 Katz and Mumford, Making Creditor Protection Effective, Centre for Business Performance, 
ICAEW, 2010) Chapter 5; Werdnik R, Wrongful Trading Provision - is it Efficient?, [2012] 
Insolvency Intelligence 81 at 82 
570 To locate and analyse  
571 Singla v Hedman [2010] EWHC 902 (Ch) para 107 
572 Liquidator of Marini v Dickenson [2003] EWHC 334 (Ch); Re Continental Assurance Co of 
London [2001] BPIR 733 
573 Brooks v Armstrong [2016] EWHC 2839 (Ch) 
574 Re Ralls Builders Ltd [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch) 
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link. The liquidator must, if they wish to pursue a claim, undertake a commercial appraisal 
of both the company’s debts and its going concern value – values that are once again 
tricky to accurately predict and so off putting and unrecoverable should no loss actually 
be sustained575. Additionally, following Re Ralls, this investigation must be undertaken 
with the knowledge that the financial risks, should no liability be imposed, fall squarely 
on the liquidator and the already small insolvent estate, with no hope of a contribution 
from the defendant.  
 
Notwithstanding that the evidential and causation issues have proved problematic for 
liquidators, s214 does assist liquidators by abandoning the subjective test set out in Re 
City Equitable Fire Insurance Co576. In its place, the director is judged not only by their 
own subjective knowledge, skill and experience, but also the general knowledge, skill and 
experience of a reasonable director577. Consequently, the director is now judged by a 
minimum standard that they must meet578. This standard accordingly not only removes 
the loophole that incompetent or unqualified directors could escape liability, but also 
simplifies the task of the liquidator by removing the need to investigate the director 
individually – they can undertake their assessment of whether or not to pursue a claim 
with the surety that there is a minimum standard of care and skill required.  
 
Despite the apparent surety this objectivity provides liquidators, issues still remain for the 
liquidator in proving the defendant fell below the level of care and skill required. 
Primarily this is that even reasonable directors may be unable to recognise when the 
moment of truth has occurred579. As noted by Simmons580, if the company is being kept 
afloat with financial support, the directors will, in the majority of cases, have no reason 
to suppose that such support will be withdrawn. Thus, even if the company is technically 
insolvent, they will have the genuine belief that the company will survive, and the 
moment of truth will not arise. However, should the finance be withdrawn, it is unlikely 
to be with any warning, and whilst the directors are considering their options, debts are 
 
575 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 600 
576 [1925] Ch 407 
577 S214(4) Insolvency Act 1986 
578 Re Produce Marketing Consortium [1989] 5 BCC 569 
579 However, if the company is hopelessly insolvent, no relief will be forthcoming: Re Bangla 
Television Ltd (In Liquidation) [2009] EWHC 1632 (Ch). 
580 Simmons M, Wrongful Trading, [2001] Insolvency Intelligence 12 at 13 
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likely to be incurred to keep the company afloat. The courts have therefore given directors 
a large margin of appreciation. Such leeway can be observed in Brooks v Armstrong581, 
where both the first instance and appeal judges gave the benefit of the doubt to directors 
who were struggling to manage and keep afloat a distressed company, and the assertion 
by several commentators is that the courts are likely to be more generous with companies 
that only conduct a small amount of business582. Hence, should a liquidator seek to 
impugn the directors’ lack of action, even the objective standard may not assist their 
claim, and as such the liquidator is further discouraged from pursuing a claim from 
uncertainty.  
 
Finally, s214’s effectiveness has been undermined by the judicial ‘flip-flopping’ in their 
approaches to s214583. In relation to the purpose of s214, the judiciary have either 
interpreted as being compensatory or penal. Whilst Knox J has treated it as 
compensatory584 (entitling the liquidator to only recover the direct losses), other members 
of the judiciary have interpreted it as being punishing in nature. Thus, in Re Sherbourne585 
the judge, who was sympathetic to the directors who were hardworking, honest and well 
respected, found there was no liability as they were acting in ‘difficult times’. In contrast, 
in Re Purpoint586 liability was imposed on a director who failed to monitor their 
company’s financial affairs, and in Re DKG Contractors587 liability was imposed when 
the directors failed to abide by basic company law requirements. By the courts varying 
their approach to requiring contributions to be made, the liquidator is faced with 
uncertainty as to whether a compensatory approach, which will result in either a 
contribution or a culpability approach, which will vary from case to case and judge to 
judge, will be adopted, and the ‘bite of the wrongful trading provisions is, therefore, 
diminished’588. 
  
Section 2.1: Does Personal Liability Protect Unsecured Creditors? 
 
581 Brooks v Armstrong [2015] BCC 661; Brooks v Armstrong [2016] EWHC 2839 (Ch) 
582 See Parry R, Transaction Avoidance, (No.271) at 473; Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, 
(No.222) at 658 
583 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 602-603 
584 Re Produce Marketing Consortium [1989] 5 BCC 569 
585 Re Sherborne Associates Ltd [1995] BCC 40 
586 [1991] BCLC 491 
587 [1990] BCC 903 
588 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 603 
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Similarly to the anti-deprivation provisions evaluated above, it is submitted that the 
imposition of personal liability, or the theoretical potential of the courts to impose liability 
at least, are ineffective at adequately protecting unsecured creditors owing to a number 
of fundamental shortcomings within both fraudulent and wrongful trading.  
 
With s213, the courts have interpreted the section as requiring liquidators to show that 
there was ‘actual dishonesty…real moral blame’589. Despite some conduct, such as wilful 
blindness, being held sufficient conduct, the courts have had more trouble with the 
incurrence of debts with the knowledge that they cannot be paid as they fall due – 
behaviour that is more likely to occur in a commercial context590. Adding to the issues 
associated with s213 is the almost impossible evidential burden set by the courts in 
Morphitis591, by which the liquidator must separately prove the trading was fraudulent 
and intentional. Given the evidential limitations of proving intention, and the rejection of 
the criminal presumption of intention if the outcome was virtually certain, the liquidator 
faces an evidential burden heavier than a criminal prosecutor, without possessing the skill 
or expertise required to evidentially prove such conduct. This confusion, in practice, 
means that liquidators have no guidance on what form a successful claim will take. Hence 
liquidators are unwilling to take the financial and reputational risk592 of undertaking such 
litigation, no recoveries will be made for the benefit of the asset pool nor the unsecured 
creditors.  
            
The introduction of liability for wrongful trading has also failed to adequately protect 
unsecured creditors, despite the inclusion of a clear statutory imposition of an objective 
requirement on the directors of the company. However, aside from the courts’ willingness 
to accept the factual matrix of repeated failures to pay debts as sufficient evidence593, and 
these matrices being comparatively easy and economical to prove, the high evidential 
barriers they have set limit s214’s effectiveness. These barriers necessitate liquidators 
expending large amounts of time and expense to acquire and analyse evidence for 
 
589 Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd [1933] Ch 786 at 790 
590 Re White and Osmand (Parkstone Ltd) (1960), (unreported); R v Grantham [1984] 2 All ER 
166 
591 Morphitis v Bernasconi [2003] Ch 552 
592 Which will result in a loss of prospective work and the associated financial penalty  
593 Rubin v Gunner and another [2004] BCC 684 
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alternative matrices – if the evidence even exists. This risk and high costs prohibit all but 
the largest insolvencies from engaging in this investigation, and thus severely inhibits its 
utilisation. Additionally, given that the liquidator must further prove a causal link between 
the between the wrongful trading (if that can be proven) and any losses sustained594, a 
further evidential hurdle is placed in bringing a claim, and is a hurdle many claims fall 
at595. 
 
Finally, even if the liquidator is able to thread the eye of a needle and establish liability, 
they face not knowing what remedy will be granted. Despite the power for the court to 
order a director to make any contribution they see fit, the judiciary has had a 
schizophrenic response to this discretion, either concluding it should be used to punish596 
the defendant or merely compensate597 the creditors for their losses598. In principle this 
means that even should the liquidator prove the existence of wrongful trading, they cannot 
guarantee what they would even recover. Finally, should the liquidator manage to achieve 
these two near impossible feats, if the director has suffered losses as a result of the failure 
of the company, and does not have the necessary financial resources to give effect to the 
order, which is likely if their personal wealth is linked to the fortunes of the company599, 
the liquidator will be unable to recover the order or the costs of conducting the litigation. 
The existence of these substantial doubts means that liquidators cannot enter into 
litigation as the potential cost implications could be crippling not only to them, but also 
to those who fund the litigation600 and the unsecured creditors if the asset pool has been 
used to fund the litigation.  
 
Given the many flaws of s214, it is unsurprising that few liquidators have sought to utilise 
the provision. In Williams’ research601, he established that between 1986 and 2013, only 
 
594 Liquidator of Marini v Dickenson [2003] EWHC 334 (Ch); Re Continental Assurance Co of 
London [2001] BPIR 733 
595 See Brooks v Armstrong [2016] EWHC 2839 (Ch) 
596 Re Purpoint [1991] BCLC 491 
597 Re Sherborne Associates Ltd [1995] BCC 40 
598 The judiciary’s unpredictable interpretation of s214 can be likened to that of Lord Denning’s 
judgments such as DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 
1 WLR 852 and Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 
599 Williams R, What Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?, 
[2015] 78 MLR 55 at 77  
600 See Section 3 below  
601 Ibid, at 60-61 
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29 reported applications were made in relation to wrongful trading. This equates to 0.9 
applications a year. Adding to the palpable anaemia is that of the 29 applications, only 11 
were successful and resulted in contributions being made – a contribution being made 
only on average every 2.5 years and in 38% of cases. Consequently, it is clear the 
probability that unsecured creditors will ever recover is almost zero. Thus, Cook’s 
description of wrongful trading as being a ‘paper tiger’602, rather than a genuine threat to 
misbehaving directors, is apt, as by discouraging liquidators from initiating litigation, 
unsecured creditors go unprotected.  
 
Section 3: Funding of Liquidation Litigation 
 
Notwithstanding the many limitations that exist on the use of the Insolvency Act 
mechanisms603, they at least provide theoretical means through which the company’s 
asset pool can be increased in size604, and should this occur, a larger liquidation dividend 
distributed to the unsecured creditors. For these mechanisms to progress from being mere 
theoretical possibilities to practical realities, the liquidator must have the necessary 
funding made available to commence litigation. Indeed, aside from the substantive 
limitations of the creditor protections set out in the Insolvency Act, it is the lack of funding 
that is usually the biggest hurdle for a liquidator intending on pursuing a claim605.  
 
Equally, bringing claims against such well-resourced and advised defendants is 
financially problematic as they will seek to deny liability or prevaricate in making 
payments, and so the legal costs will have to be borne by the liquidator personally until 
 
602 Cook C, Wrongful Trading – Is it a Real Threat to Directors or a Paper Tiger? [1999] 
Insolvency Lawyer 99 at 100 
603 McKenzie D, Wrongful Trading – A Paper Tiger?, [1995] JR 519  
604 Anderson H, The Framework, (No.217) at 176 
605 Hicks A, Wrongful Trading – Has it Been a Failure? (1993) 8 Insolvency Law & Practice 134 
at 134; Walters A, Foreshortening the Shadow: Maintenance, Champerty and the Funding of 
Litigation in Corporate Insolvency (1996) 17 Co.Law. 165; Milman D and Parry R, A Study of 
the Operation of Transactional Avoidance Mechanisms in Corporate Insolvency Practice, 
(Wallingford; GTI Specialist Publishers, 1997); Walters A, Creditor-Funded Litigation in 
Corporate Insolvency (1997) 1 CfiLR 126; Parry R, Funding Litigation in Insolvency (1998) 2 
CfiLR 121.  
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payment is, if ever, made606. As noted in Re Exchange Travel607, the liquidator must 
therefore think carefully before deciding whether to pursue litigation – especially if the 
potential award is small in size. In Re Exchange Travel itself, the litigation costs exceeded 
the value of the claim, and thus in practice only high value claims, owing to the high legal 
costs, are likely to be initiated. 
 
Furthermore, the liquidator is also under a duty to protect the insolvent estate for the 
benefit of unsecured creditors. Thereby, in pursuing expensive and uncertain litigation, 
either in terms of success or payment, the liquidator places the asset pool at risk608. Should 
this gamble prove to be unsuccessful, the liquidator will not be thanked as the asset pool 
will be reduced in size609 and the unsecured creditors dividend be wiped out. This gamble 
is made even riskier by the ineligibility of companies and liquidators for legal aid to fund 
the litigation610.  
 
These restrictions611 therefore led Cork to conclude that bringing litigation had become 
too difficult for liquidators, resulting in too few claims being brought to challenge 
illegitimate transactions612, and leaving the general body of creditors unprotected. Despite 
this conclusion, Cork did not propose any remedy to the solution613.  
 
Notwithstanding the apparent obstacles in bringing litigation, there are a number of 
benefits to initiating litigation. For the unsecured creditors in particular, litigation can 
prove profitable owing to the destination of the recovered sums, as it has been held that 
such sums fall outside the scope of the floating charge614. Indeed, recoveries received by 
 
606 Keay A, Wrongful Trading: Problems and Proposals, [2014] 65 (1) Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 63 at 72  
607 Re Exchange Travel (Holdings) Ltd (In Liquidation) (No3) [1997] BCC 784, per Phillips LJ at 
798 
608 Anderson H, Insolvent Insolvencies, (2001) 17 IL&P 87 
609 Keay A, Pursuing the Resolution of the Funding Problem in Insolvency Litigation, [2002] 
Insolvency Lawyer 90  
610 Sch 2 para 1 (g and h). See generally Munro R, Assignment of Cause of Action, [1998] IL&P 
14(2) 148; Shaw P, Liquidators’ Assignments of Causes of Action: Part 2: Legally Aided 
Plaintiffs, [1998] 14(3) IL&P 199 
611 Which existed at the time of the Cork Report  
612 Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 1257 
613 Ibid  
614 Re Yagerphone [1935] 1 Ch 392, confirmed in Re MC Bacon Ltd (No.2) [1990] 3 WLR 646 
per Millett J 
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the liquidator are held on trust for the general body of creditors as they were not the 
property of the company due to them only coming into being after the onset of 
liquidation615, and so after the floating charge has crystallised616. Thus, if the litigation is 
successful, it is unsecured creditors, and not the secured creditors, who stand to benefit. 
This section will hence analyse the funding predicament of liquidators, before concluding 
the impact this had on the utilisation of the anti-deprivation and personal liability 
provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
 
Section 3.1: Re Leyland Daf 
 
Prior to the far-reaching reforms brought about by the Companies Act 2006, the expenses 
of the liquidator, and the costs they incurred in winding up the company, could not be 
paid out of the assets subject to floating charges617. The reasoning in Re Leyland Daf was 
based on a distinction between the company’s assets. It was held that ‘free’ assets (those 
not subject to a security interest) belonged both legally and beneficially to the company, 
and so were the company’s assets and could be used to fund litigation proceedings. Those 
assets subject to a security interest, however, were only legally, and not beneficially, the 
property of the company618. According to Lord Millett, each ‘fund’ had to cover its own 
costs, and so the assets subject to a security interest were only compelled to cover the 
costs of their realisation, whereas the free assets were responsible for all the expenses 
associated with the winding up of the company619.  
 
Upon publication, some commentators came out in favour for this distinction. 
McCormack620 argued that this distinction was favourable and fair to the floating charge 
holders, who no longer had to fund a process they (at least in part) did not participate in. 
As evocatively put, “the charge holder [prior to Re Leyland Daf] had to pay the costs of 
a liquidator who was trying to cut its throat rather like a totalitarian regime might require 
a condemned prisoner to fund the bullets for his own execution”621 and given the proceeds 
 
615 Re Oasis Merchandising [1998] Ch 170 
616 See McCormack G, Swelling, (No.439) at 56 
617 Re Leyland DAF [2004] 2 AC 298, overruling Re Barleycorn Enterprises Ltd [1970] Ch 465 
618 The impact of their Lordships’ conclusion was set out above in relation to transactions at an 
undervalue.  
619 Ibid, at 62 
620 McCormack G, Swelling, (No.439) at 60  
621 Ibid, at 60 
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of litigation could not be made available to the secured creditors, it was just that they 
should not contribute to the litigation. Support was also proffered by Armour and 
Walters622, who argued that as the liquidation process is for the benefit of the general 
body of creditor and not the secured creditors, it is they who should fund it623.  
 
However, although the arguments put forward by McCormack and Armour prima facie 
are understandable, the obvious limitation of the submissions is that a major source of 
litigation funding is cut off from the liquidator624. Owing to the large percentage of a 
company’s assets that are likely to be subject to security interests625, it created the 
possibility that not only would litigation not be funded, but also the liquidator expenses 
would be unpaid626 and result in losses for the liquidator. Consequently, it was argued 
that Leyland Daf’s funding restrictions seriously undermined the public interest role of 
the liquidation process and the liquidator, as the funding gap and uncertainty meant 
liquidators were further disinclined to pursue litigation627 - giving secured creditors free 
rein628 and made the unsecured creditor protection provisions practically toothless.  
 
Although Re Leyland Daf seriously undermined unsecured creditor protection, this has 
been reversed through s176ZA Insolvency Act 1986629. Under s176ZA, liquidators’ 
expenses and the general liquidation expenses now have ‘super priority’ over the assets 
subject to floating charges if the free assets of the company are insufficient to cover the 
amounts630, meaning that Lord Millett’s division between ‘free’ and secured assets is now 
of much lesser importance, and the floating charge assets can be used to fund litigation. 
Notwithstanding S176ZA, the position of the fixed charge has remained untouched, and 
thus Re Leyland Daf partially applicable. Hence, should the insolvent company’s assets 
 
622 Armour J and Walters A, Funding Liquidation: A Functional View, [2006] LQR 295 at 301 
623 Ibid, at 309 
624 Moss G, Liquidators Stung for Costs and Expenses, (2004) 17 Insolvency Intelligence 78  
625 See Chapter 1 
626 Welby R, Antecedent Recoveries and Litigation Funding – A Practical Perspective, (2006) 
Recovery 32  
627 Re Pantmaeong Timber [2004] 1 AC 158 
628 Mokal R, What Liquidation Does for Secured Creditors and What it Does for You, (2008) 71 
MLR 699  
629 Inserted by s1282 Companies Act 2006 
630 S176ZA (1) Insolvency Act 1986.  
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be formed primarily of static, unchanging property631 that are subject to fixed charges, 
these assets will remain beyond the reach of the liquidator and unable to finance litigation.  
 
The effectiveness of s176ZA is further restricted by the Insolvency Rules’ requirement 
that the liquidator acquire permission from the floating charge holders to use the floating 
charge assets to cover the litigation expenses632 by creating a statement specifying the 
amount sought from the charged assets633 for the charge holder. The charge holder has no 
restriction on the exercise of their discretion, and can exercise it solely in their best 
interests. This need for approval provides the charge holder a great deal of power to 
prevent the necessary funding being made available, especially as the liquidator cannot 
resubmit an application that has been rejected634. Keay notes that the creditor is likely to 
reject the application out of hand as, owing to Re Oasis Merchandising, they cannot 
benefit from the litigation due to their position as a secured creditor. However, Keay also 
notes that if the litigation is likely to recover a large amount, and that large amount could 
be used to decrease any shortfall faced by the charge holder, they may approve the 
request635. Despite the natural appeal of Keay’s proposition, the likelihood of floating 
charge holders risking the assets to increase their returns is paltry, and similar to the 
reticence of unsecured creditors in funding litigation (see below). Hence, although 
s176ZA in principle increases the availability of litigation funds, in practice the likely 
reticence of charge holders to authorise the use of charged assets prevents any increase in 
the funding open to liquidators.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that despite the recent legislative reforms by the Companies 
Act 2006 and the Insolvency Rules 2016, little has changed in the availability of insolvent 
company assets to fund litigation. It can be seen that although the floating charge assets 
may now be made available to fund litigation, the floating charge holders retain a 
discretionary and unchallengeable veto of their use. Given the charge holder is unlikely 
to want to risk the charged assets, they will in most cases be unavailable. The recent 
legislative reforms that also may not attempt to reform the position in relation to fixed 
 
631 Such as factories, intellectual property or office buildings that are likely to be subject to a 
mortgage or fixed charge 
632 Rs 6.45(3) and 7.113(3) Insolvency Rules (England and Wales) 2016  
633 Rs 6.46(1)(b) and 7.114(1)(b) Insolvency Rules (England and Wales) 2016  
634 Keay A, Litigation Expenses In Liquidations, (2009) Insolvency Intelligence 113 at 115 
635 Ibid, at 116 
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charges, and so, if a company is subject to many fixed charges that cover the majority of 
the company’s assets, little will be made available, and so acquiring the necessary funds 
from the insolvent estate remains problematic.  
 
Section 3.2: Alternative Funding Sources 
 
Given the issues associated with funding litigation from the company’s asset pool636, 
many liquidators are compelled to consider the use of outside sources of funding, with 
the most appealing being the general body of creditors themselves. This is because it is 
they, and not the secured creditors, who enjoy the proceeds from any litigation637. Also 
appealing to creditors, the proceeds can be used to indemnify them for the legal costs 
ahead of the other general creditors638, preventing those that take the risk and provide the 
funding from losing out to those who contributed nothing. However, the attractiveness to 
those creditors is slightly tempered by the pari passu principle, which precludes them 
from acquiring an increased share of the proceeds, and instead they only receive their pro 
rata share.   
 
Although prima facie funding litigation is appealing to the general body of creditors, 
many are reticent in providing the necessary funds639. A number of factors contribute to 
this reticence, with the most fatal being the uncertainty surrounding the litigation640. As 
outlined above, all of the potential causes of action are difficult to make out and sustain. 
Hence, potential contributors, after obtaining advice and similar conclusions, are 
unwilling to take the financial risk and ‘throw good money after bad’, and instead wish 
to cut their losses641. Secondly, creditors can be wary of the motives of the liquidator in 
pursuing litigation. As Wheeler has shown642, owing to practitioner behaviour and 
 
636 Werdnik R, Wrongful Trading Provision - is it Efficient?, [2012] Insolvency Intelligence 81 at 
86 
637 Re Oasis Merchandising, (No.615); Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 723 
638 Re Exchange Travel (Holdings) Ltd (In Liquidation) (No3) [1997] BCC 784 
639 See generally: Milman D and Parry R, A Study of the Operation of Transactional Avoidance 
Mechanisms in Corporate Insolvency Practice, (Wallingford; GTI Specialist Publishers, 1997); 
Milman D, Litigation: Funding and Procedural Difficulties, (1997) Amicus Curiae 27; Parry R, 
Funding Litigation in Insolvency, [1998] CfiLR 121 at 122 
640 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 474 
641 Walters A, Staying Proceedings on Grounds of Champerty: More Reasons to Question the 
Result in Oasis Merchandising? (2000) Insolvency Lawyer 16 at 17  
642 Wheeler S, Empty Rhetoric and Empty Promises: The Creditors’ Meeting, (1994) 2(3) JL & 
Soc 350  
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attempts to prevent others from taking the position of liquidator, creditors are bamboozled 
and mistrustful of the entire liquidation process. Should the liquidator, who does not have 
the trust of creditors, request they risk large sums, in addition to the losses they have 
already incurred, many speculate that the liquidator is merely seeking to string out the 
process and increase his expenses. Finally, because of the English legal system’s 
approach to ‘loser pays’ in relation to litigation costs, and the courts’ powers under s51 
Senior Courts Act 1981643, creditors are fearful that not only must they cover the costs of 
the liquidator, but also those of the defendant, potentially proving financially ruinous for 
them.  
 
As a repercussion of the general body of creditors’ reluctance, liquidators are obliged to 
seek further alternative funding arrangements from non-connected parties with the 
liquidation. This usually involves an outside funder, to whom the claim will assigned for 
a fixed sum, or involves the funder providing the funding to the liquidator on agreement 
that a share of the recovery will be made available. The advantages to the liquidator and 
general body of creditors of this structure are evident: there is no financial risk to either 
party and instead the risk is taken by the party providing the funding, the integrity of the 
insolvent company’s asset pool remains intact for the benefit and distribution to both 
parties, and also the provision of finance also illustrates that an external and objective 
party has confidence in the proposed litigation. However, as illustrated in Re 
Longmeade644, these upsides are not always sufficient to entice the general body of 
creditors to agree to such a funding arrangement. In Re Longmeade itself, the liquidator 
negotiated a funding agreement with an external funder that posed no risk to the insolvent 
estate. However, the company’s biggest creditor, HMRC, objected as the primary 
defendant was another government department and so they wished to avoid the negative 
publicity of one government department suing another. Although Snowden J agreed with 
the liquidator and rejected HMRC’s contention it had a legitimate objection to the 
pursuance of the litigation, he also concluded the liquidator should consult with the 
creditors if there are ‘legitimate’ objections to the litigation645. If one unsecured creditor 
 
643 To “determine by and whom to what extent the costs are to be paid”. Orders can be made 
against those that have a substantial connection to the proceedings – Symphony Group v Hodgson 
[1994] QB 179, although exceptional circumstances are necessary for an order to be made against 
such a party; Dolphin Quays Development v Mills [2007] EWHC 1180 (Ch) 
644 Re Longmeade Ltd (in Liquidation) [2016] EWHC 356 (Ch)  
645 Ibid, at 66 
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has sufficient leverage to influence the liquidator, such as an institutional lender that 
regularly provides fee work, they may be able to stifle litigation which would otherwise 
protect smaller unsecured creditor despite the lack of financial risk.  
 
The courts’ approach to third party funding of insolvency litigation has also hampered 
the effectiveness litigation646. Generally, external funding involves the sale of a bare 
cause of action for an agreed sum or share of sums recovered. However, it was held in Re 
Oasis647 that if the liquidator sought to sell the recoveries of a s214 claim the sale did not 
fall within the exception to champerty. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal 
drew a distinction between claims that were available before the onset of liquidation, and 
so belonged to the company itself and could be assigned, and those claims that only 
became available once liquidation has occurred, which belonged personally to the 
liquidator to be used in favour of the company and which could not be assigned. As the 
anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions are contingent on the commencement 
of liquidation, Re Oasis precluded them from being funded by assignment of the proceeds. 
This therefore meant that “Effectively, office-holders are, in many cases, left with little 
alternative but to turn their backs on litigation”648 as there was no viable mechanism to 
acquire third party funding.  
 
Following sustained academic criticism of Re Oasis’ restrictiveness649, recent legislative 
reforms have sought to improve the potential third-party funding arrangements open to 
the liquidator. Under s246ZD Insolvency Act 1986650, liquidators are now able to assign 
the rights of action of fraudulent trading, wrongful trading, transaction at an undervalue, 
and preference claims. The potential, therefore, exists for liquidators to sell these claims 
to the highest bidder and make the proceeds available to the unsecured creditors, 
particularly as s176ZB Insolvency Act 1986651 reaffirms that the proceeds belong to the 
general body of creditors and not secured creditors.  
 
646 Walters A, Staying Proceedings on Grounds of Champerty: More Reasons to Question the 
Result on Oasis Merchandising?, (2000) Insolvency Lawyer 16 
647 [1997] 2 WLR 764 
648 Keay A, Pursuing the Resolution of the Funding Problem in Insolvency Litigation, [2002] 
Insolvency Lawyer 90 
649 Ibid; Walters A, Staying Proceedings on Grounds of Champerty: More Reasons to Question 
the Result on Oasis Merchandising?, (2000) Insolvency Lawyer 16 
650 Inserted by s118 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
651 Inserted by s119 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
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Once again, though, the prima facie reform brought about by this method of funding is 
illusory. This is because although assignment is now possible, it does not make it an 
attractive proposition to potential funders. Given the high financial costs of pursuing 
litigation, the company providing the necessary funds will seek to minimise the potential 
risks by only funding those claims where the prospect of success is high and the defendant 
has assets commensurate to their liability. Such a turn of circumstances occurred in Re 
Longmeade, where the prospect of success for a claim was high and the defendant, 
HMRC, owing to their position as a government department, had almost limitless access 
to assets. The majority of claims, however, have a low prospect of success owing to the 
substantive limitations set out above, and defendants with limited assets652, seriously 
discouraging potential purchasers653. 
 
Also limiting are the needs of potential funders should they take the risk and purchase the 
cause of action654. Owing to the high value of the potential claim, liquidators stand to 
recover substantial amounts if success. If this was self-funded, the majority of the 
proceeds could therefore be made available for the unsecured creditors. However, if cause 
of action is purchased, then in order to make a profit, a ‘significant discount’ will have to 
offered to the purchaser to interests them655. Given this, it is foreseeable that the 
improvement in the unsecured creditors’ dividend will be muted if such an assignment 
occurs.  
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions set out in 
the Insolvency Act 1986, and concluded that they offer inadequate protection to 
unsecured creditors. Their ineffectiveness stems from neither set of provisions providing 
sufficient mechanisms to revest assets in an insolvent company nor deter parties from 
seeking to misappropriate company assets. This is despite five separate statutory 
 
652 Particularly directors whose financial security is tied to their companies: Williams R, What 
Can We Expect to Gain from Reforming the Insolvent Trading Remedy?, [2015] 78 MLR 55 at 
76 
653 Ibid, at 68 
654 Ibid, at 69 
655 Ibid, at 69 
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mechanisms existing with the express intention of protecting the general body of 
creditors.  
 
As seen from the analysis above, the flaws in the legislative provisions are many, but 
most fall into three categories: remedial, substantive and evidential. Taking the remedial 
limitations first, all the provisions have prima facie satisfactory remedial powers that 
allow the court to order the revestment of property into the company. However, owing to 
the potential orders’ reliance on the court’s judgment to become effective, they are at risk 
of dispositions of property to bona fide purchasers for value and the defendant either 
having insufficient assets to give effect to the judgment or granting beneficial interests to 
third parties – and having no proprietary rights granting them priority to the assets. As 
such, many potential claims face the prospect of succeeding and being unable to enforce 
the successful judgment.  
 
Secondly, the substantive requirements of the provisions hinder their utilisation. Within 
the preference provisions, rather than an objective test, it is necessary for the liquidator 
to prove that the defendant company subjectively ‘desired’ the end result. As 
demonstrated, this subjective element is almost impossible for the liquidator to 
successfully make out. The problems associated with preferences is also mirrored in the 
fraudulent trading provisions, which following Morphitis require the liquidator to prove 
the defendant separately defrauded creditors and that they did so intentionally, diverging 
significantly from the criminal law standards which set a much lower bar and is much 
easier to prove. As a result, fraudulent trading is next to impossible for liquidators to make 
out.  
 
Finally, there are many evidential limitations to the provisions. In order to establish a 
transaction occurred at an undervalue, the liquidator faces not only the issue of proving 
the market value of the transaction but must also disentangle many potential collateral 
contracts that could be argued to have provided the company with valuable consideration. 
Similarly, the liquidator must also establish the chain of causation in wrongful trading 
claims, and prove that the trading caused the loss – a link that many claimants have failed 
to adequately prove.  
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Compounding these issues even further is the funding regime available to liquidators. As 
seen above, liquidators historically did not have access to large sections of the company’s 
asset pool to fund litigation, with Re Leyland DAF concluding that secured creditors were 
not required to contribute to litigation costs. Although legislative reform has attempted to 
reverse this issue through granting access to secured assets, floating charge holders retain 
the right to refuse use of the assets, preventing their use by the liquidator. Equally 
frustrating have been attempts to provide access to third party funding, which have not 
proven effective. Hence, even if the liquidator possesses as valid claim that will revest 
property to the company for the benefit of the unsecured creditors, it is unlikely that such 
a claim will receive the necessary funding.  
 
As a result of these severe limitations, and given the justifiable existence of the 
protections, it is submitted that unsecured creditors require an alternative method of 
protection to increase their liquidation dividend, one that lies outside the law of 
insolvency. The need to go beyond the law of insolvency, rather than reform the 
Insolvency Act’s statutory provisions, stems from the remoteness that substantial reform 
will be forthcoming. Presently, owing to competing political priorities, including matters 
with the European Union and Covid-19, there is limited Parliamentary resources. As seen 
in the Queen’s Speech of 2017656, the present Government’s focus is on other social issues 
including NHS funding and national infrastructure. Secondly the recent reforms enacted 
by the previous Government through the Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
focused on expanding the availability of the Insolvency Act provisions, rather that 
fundamentally reforming them. Seemingly, there is thus no appetite for serious reform as 
occurred with the Enterprise Act 2002 and the abolition of the administration receiver. 
This is evidenced further in the recent Government response paper, which failed to 
include developed plans on how to reform this area of insolvency law, instead calling for 
greater consultation657. Thus, it is unlikely that major legislative reform to remedy the 
Insolvency Act will occur in the foreseeable future, and so alternative methods must be 
considered. Indeed, Beale has described the response as “...the English courts [and 
 
656 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2017  
657 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Insolvency and Corporate 
Governance: A Government Response, (26th August 2018) 37 
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Parliament] have done nothing for the plight of unsecured creditors, apart from 
occasionally expressing sympathy for that plight...”658. 
 
It is further submitted that in order to remedy the lack of protection, any proposal must 
have three necessary qualities. The first of these is that it must be capable of increasing 
the assets pool of an insolvent company. These assets must then be available to the general 
body of creditors through the liquidation dividend. Owing to the issues of the anti-
deprivation provisions, this remedy should be proprietary in nature to ensure priority to 
any assets. Secondly, the remedy should have clear and easy to establish provisions, 
enabling the liquidator to be confident of initiating litigation – as opposed to the 
uncertainty faced under the present Insolvency Act provisions. Finally, any potential 
remedy should be attractive to third party litigation financiers, as it is unlikely the 
company will have insufficient assets to fund such litigation itself.  
 
Given the need for any potential remedy to possess these features, this thesis analyses the 
resulting trust in Chapters 5 and 6, where it is posited that it can meet all three 
requirements by returning assets to the company, having clear and predictable rules, and 
being attractive to third party litigation funders. Before that, however, the theoretical 
conclusions reached in this chapter are tested against real world case studies to identify 
whether they hold up to scrutiny. 
  
 
658 Beale H, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 14 
 131 
Chapter 4: Case Studies of Carillion and British Homes 
Stores  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis analysed and set out the theoretical limitations of the anti-
deprivation and personal liability provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986. It was concluded 
that as a consequence of the provisions’ evidential and substantive requirements, in 
addition to the issues of funding the necessary litigation to enforce them, none of the 
provisions, nor the provisions collectively, provided an adequate or effective means of 
protecting unsecured creditors by means of revesting assets in now insolvent companies.  
 
Despite Chapter 3 establishing the theoretical limitations of the provisions, both it and the 
existing literature have not provided empirical evidence concerning their effectiveness. 
Hence, a case study into whether the provisions afford adequate protection for unsecured 
creditors would provide the necessary empirical data to substantiate Chapter 3’s 
conclusions.  
 
This chapter will therefore seek to provide the necessary empirical evidence of the 
Insolvency Act’s provisions through two case studies of companies that entered 
liquidation with substantial liabilities to unsecured creditors. These case studies will 
challenge the conclusions of Chapter 3 and analyse whether the theoretical conclusions 
have application in practice. The chapter will also fill a gap in the existing literature by 
providing empirical evidence of the provision’s limitations. It must be noted, however, 
that the cases studies pertain only to the issues of the Insolvency Act, and are not 
applicable to the analysis of the resulting trust in Chapter 5 and 6 owing to their factual 
matrices not giving rise to a resulting trust. They will, however, assist in identifying areas 
that are not covered by the Insolvency Act, which areas require address, and also assist 
in identifying the limitations of the assistance the resulting trust can provide. 
 
The two companies that form the basis of this chapter’s case studies are Carillion Plc, 
which became insolvent in January 2018, and British Home Stores (BHS), which entered 
insolvency in August 2016. Both will be analysed to determine whether the provisions 
would have provided any protection to the companies’ unsecured creditors, and also to 
provide evidence of the provisions’ limitations in real world application.  
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As noted in Chapter 1, both companies were chosen for several reasons.  
 
First, both companies made headlines for their poor corporate governance and high-
profile corporate mistakes659. Carillion entered insolvency having made a number of 
costly and notorious takeovers, and was also known to have bid for contracts at below 
cost price whilst declaring large dividends. Similarly, BHS was famously sold by Sir 
Philip Green for £1 after years of large dividends having been declared, and also had a 
pension deficit of £571 million at the time of its collapse. Given these actions, it is prima 
facie possible that the Insolvency Act 1986 provisions may be applicable to these 
insolvencies.  
 
Secondly, the unsecured creditors of the two companies face losing substantial amounts 
of money from the respective insolvencies. Carillion entered insolvency owing £2 billion 
to creditors, of which only £30 million was covered by insurance policies660. When BHS 
entered insolvency, it owed £1.3 billion to creditors661, and so far, only £36 million has 
been repaid. Thus, both case studies will provide empirical evidence of how creditors fare 
in the liquidation process and also whether the provisions provide adequate protection.  
 
Thirdly, both companies were subject to Parliamentary enquiries as a consequence their 
corporate behaviour and societal impact. This means that Select Committee reports were 
published, outlining the conduct of the respective boards and companies. Consequently, 
there is sufficient evidence, publicly available, to analyse and determine the applicability 
and effect of the provisions.  
 
This chapter has 2 parts. Part 1 is the case study of Carillion and its insolvency, with 
Section 1 setting out the actions of Carillion. Section 2 analyses these actions’ 
 
659 Wearden G, Carillion Collapse Exposed Government Outsourcing Flaws – Report, (2018) 9 
July:  
 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jul/09/carillion-collapse-exposed-government-
outsourcing-flaws-report; Monaghan A, Philip Green Escapes Company Director Ban for BHS 
£1 Deal, (2018) 27 March: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/mar/27/philip-green-
escapes-company-director-ban-for-bhs-1-deal  




applicability to the Insolvency Act’s provisions. Part 2 is the case study of BHS and its 
insolvency, with Section 3 setting out the actions of BHS. Section 4 analyses these 
actions’ applicability to the Insolvency Act’s provisions. Finally, there is a conclusion on 
the empirical results of the case studies and whether the empirical evidence supports or 
contradicts the theoretical conclusions of Chapter 3. Each case study will be analysed in 




Case Study 1: Carillion  
 
Prior to its collapse in January 2018, Carillion gave the appearance of a stable company 
that declared regular dividends and carried out a large number of private and public sector 
contracts. However, on 10th July 2017, the company issued a warning that profits would 
be £845 million lower than expected662. When it released its interim financial results in 
September 2017, an extra £200 million write-down was declared663. These combined 
losses represented the accumulative profits for the previous 7 years, and net debts were 
calculated at being £405 million. The reaction of the financial markets was swift and 
unequivocal – Carillion’s share price tumbled 70% - from 192p on 7th July to 57p on 12th 
July.  
 
As a result, Carillion began to seek compromise agreements with its creditors and lenders. 
On 25th January 2018, such a compromise between the company and its creditors was 
concluded to be unviable, and so the company was placed into liquidation. Although the 
company could theoretically have entered administration, this was not a viable option 
owing to Carillion’s debt to asset ratio in January 2018; it owed £2 billion to creditors 
and only had £29 million in liquid assets, making a turnaround impossible. Such was the 
perilous state of Carillion’s finances that accountancy firms EY and PwC rejected offers 
 
662 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper: The Collapse of Carillion, (2018) No. 8206 at 4 
663 House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions 
Committees, Carillion: Second Joint Report from the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
and Work and Pensions Committees of Session 2017–19, (2018) HC 769 at 37-38 
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to become administrators664 owing to the lack of assets and fears their fees would go 
unpaid665.  
 
The collapse of Carillion was problematic owing to the debts incurred and the work it 
carried out. To the private sector Carillion provided facilities management services, 
including cleaning, construction and project management services. However, more 
impactful were its public sector contracts, including school meals, hospital maintenance 
and construction666, defence accommodation for 50,000 families and track renewals on 
the rail network. Even though Carillion had global business operations, its primary 
business was located in the UK, and its entrance into liquidation required the Government 
to cover the Official Receiver’s costs to maintain the operation of its public sector 
contracts, with an initial cost projected to be £150 million667. 
 
This section will therefore briefly outline Carillion’s history and the reasons for 
Carillion’s eventual failure. It will then analyse and illustrate how the existing anti-
deprivation and personal liability provisions have failed to protect creditors.  
 
Section 1: Carillion and its Entry into Insolvency  
 
Section 1.1 The Origins of Carillion 
 
Carillion Plc was created in 1999 as a consequence of its demerger from the Tarmac 
Group668, covering the group’s former construction and maintenance subcontractor 
businesses - Tarmac Construction and Tarmac Professional Services. Tarmac was 
required to spin off these businesses into a new entity owing to a period of rapid expansion 
through acquisitions, which led to substantial losses669. Thus, Carillion, a company that 
 
664 In rejecting the opportunity to be appointed administrators, and Carillion being forced to enter 
liquidation, any going concern value became impossible to achieve – thereby worsening the 
outcome for unsecured creditors event further.  
665 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42710795; see also Sarah Albon, Chief Executive of 
Insolvency Service, who echoed this to the House of Common Select Committees - HC Deb 15 
January 2018, Col 624  
666 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/16/how-carillion-collapse-stymied-two-
state-of-the-art-hospitals  
667 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 7 
668 https://www.insider.co.uk/news/what-is-carillion-construction-firm-11853236  
669 Carillion: Second Joint report, (No.663) 
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would experience financial pressures 19 years later, would come into existence on the 
back of financial trouble as a result of short-term acquisitions.  
 
Following on from its previous existence within the Tarmac Group, Carillion, under its 
Chief Executive Officers670, elected to expand its facilities maintenance business through 
a number of takeovers671. These acquisitions included672: 
 
- GT Rail Maintenance (2001: £34 million) 
- Citex Management Services (2002: £11.5 million) 
- Entreprenad (2003: £6.2 million) 
- Planned Maintenance Group (2005: £51.5 million) 
- Mowlem (2006: £350 million)673 
- Alfred McAlpine (2007: £565 million)674 
- Vanbots (2008: £14.3 million) 
- Eaga (2011: £298 million)675 
- The Bouchier Group (2011: £24 Million) 
- Facilities Management business of John Laing (2013) 
- Rokstad Power Corporation (2014: £33 million) 
 
As seen immediately above, the majority of Carillion’s outlay was on three companies: 
Mowlem, Alfred McAlpine and Eaga for a combined £1.213 billion. Hence, although 
Carillion had become one of the major construction and facilities management companies 
 
670 Initially John McDonough and later Richard Howson, 
671 Chapman R, Ineffective Risk Management and the Collapse of Carillion, (2018) 8(12) PM 
World Journal 3; Bhaskar K and Flower F, Financial Failures and Scandals: From Enron to 
Carillion, (London: Routledge, 2019) at 178 
672 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090605180251/http://www.ukbusinesspark.co.uk/can92223.htm  
673 Carillion, Annual Report and Accounts (2006); Making Tomorrow a Better Place:  
http://www.annualreports.co.uk/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/c/LSE_CLLN_2006.pdf  
674 Carillion, Annual Report and Accounts (2008); Making Tomorrow a Better Place: 
http://www.annualreports.co.uk/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/c/LSE_CLLN_2008.pdf  
675 Carillion, Annual Report and Accounts (2011): Making Tomorrow a Better Place: 
http://www.annualreports.co.uk/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/c/LSE_CLLN_2011.pdf  
 136 
in the United Kingdom, such growth had not been organic, and instead had been as a 
result of costly and short-term acquisitions.  
 
The reason and need to engage in such a flurry of acquisition, according to Chapman676 
and the House of Commons Select Committee inquiry677, was the board’s business model. 
By operating in low margin and highly competitive markets, there were inherent risks of 
losing out to rival bids and incurring even further squeezed profit margins. By removing 
competitors, Carillion was able to acquire pre-existing contracts and lock out rival bids, 
protecting its access to revenue and business at the cost of high acquisition prices. 
 
Section 1.2 The Rise of Debt in Carillion  
 
Coupled with Carillion’s adoption of a business model requiring the acquisition of rival 
firms, the company also experienced an exponential growth in its debts. Carillion’s 
borrowing increased from £242 million in 2009 to £689 million in 2016, reaching an 
estimated £1.3 billion in 2018678. This steady increase is set out in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: Carillion’s Total Borrowing: 2009-2018679 
 
 
676 Chapman R, Ineffective Risk, (No.671)  
677 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 13 
678 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, (No.662) at 15-17; Carillion: Second Joint 
Report, (No.663) at 36-44 





In addition to its traditional forms of debt, Carillion was also able to acquire further debt 
through increasing the length of time taken to pay supplier invoices. Despite signing up 
to the Prompt Payment Code680, which requires 95% of invoices to be paid within 60 days 
and that steps be taken to adopt payment within 30 days, Carillion was well known for 
taking much longer, with some suppliers having to wait 126 days to have invoices paid681. 
Although the effect on suppliers is analysed below, for Carillion itself the use of ‘reverse 
factoring’682 meant it had further access to cheap credit, with the amounts owed under the 
scheme rising from £212 million in 2009 to £761 million in 2016683.  
 
The size of Carillion’s debts was further exacerbated by the board’s rejection of the 
opportunity to inject equity into the company as it was seeking to expand684. Instead, they 
 
680 Letter from FSB to the Chairs of the House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, Carillion: Second Joint report from the Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees of Session 2017–19, (2018) 
HC 769 - https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/Letter-from-Chairman-of-FSB-to-the-Chairs-relating-to-Carillion-
inquiry-31-January-2018.pdf  
681 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, (No.662) at 2 
682 Although not in itself illegal, creditors are to some extent protected from delays to payment by 
the Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 2002, which permits creditors to charge 
interest on unpaid debts after 30 days  
683 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, (No.662) at 16 
684 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 14 
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focused solely on financing the expansion through debt, and although some directors 
would later acknowledge the flawed nature of the policy685, the policy meant that should 
it become impossible to meet the repayments, as occurred in January 2018, the company 
had no fall-back position and many would go unpaid.  
 
Section 1.3: Failed Projects  
 
As noted, Carillion engaged in a number of high profile and costly acquisitions in order 
to grow the business quickly. The three costliest acquisitions were all for figures 
substantially above the value of their tangible net assets686. The difference between the 
tangible net value and purchase price was accounted for as ‘goodwill’ – the intangible 
assets of the company being purchased. This includes the brand, the skills and experience 
of the workforce, and any ‘synergies’ that might be achieved by combining the two 
companies687. However, owing to the intangible nature of the ‘asset’ being acquired, it is 
extremely difficult to ascribe the correct value to any goodwill.  
 
In acquiring Mowlem, Alfred McAlpine and Eaga, Carillion purchased £431 million, 
£615 million and £329 million of goodwill receptively688. Thus, Carillion’s acquisition of 
a number of its important rivals came at a large premium that had no tangible hold in 
reality689. Indeed, by 2016, the goodwill value of its acquisitions accounted for £1.6 
billion, or 35% of the company’s gross assets and double its net assets of £730 million690.  
 
The goodwill value, although clearly inflated at the time of the purchases, was also never 
impaired in its annual accounts. As noted, Carillion and its auditors, KPMG, never 
reduced the balance-sheet value of the goodwill despite some its acquisitions performing 
poorly. Eaga was recorded as having a goodwill value of £330 million691. Whilst this may, 
 
685 Letter from Philip Green, non-executive director and later Chairman of BHS, to the House of 
Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, 20th 
February 2018 - https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Carillion%20report/Letter-from-Philip-Green-to-the-Committee-re-Carillion-20-02-
18.pdf  
686 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 13 
687 Ibid, at 13 
688 Ibid, at 13 
689 Chapman R, Ineffective Risk, (No.671) 
690 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 52 
691 Ibid, at 53 
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theoretically, have been correct at the time of the purchase owing to the company making 
£31 million in profits, in the five subsequent years692 it made losses totalling £260 
million693 - meaning any goodwill value had almost entirely evaporated. Hence, 
Carillion’s refusal to appropriately update the goodwill value of its acquisitions meant 
that its accounts drastically overstated the value of its assets, and thereby allowed it to 
acquire levels of credit well above what it should have had access to – ensuring that when 
it entered liquidation there would not be enough residual value to pay creditors as the 
stated asset values were illusory.  
 
In addition, Carillion also encountered costly and loss-making contracts both 
domestically and overseas. Considering its overseas operations first, contracts such as 
those with Msheireb Properties in Qatar, were hugely unprofitable and cost the company 
£100s million. The Msheireb contract was for the building of residential, hotel and office 
buildings but ended in the two companies suing and countersuing each other for £200 
million, and Carillion had to eventually write off the £200 million allegedly owed694. 
 
The domestic contracts were also unprofitable for Carillion. As Richard Howson 
confirmed, after 2012 Carillion “did not have any money to buy competitors, as we had 
done in the past. We had to win our work organically. We had to bid and we had to win 
[...]”695. This need for business meant that Carillion was required to bid for and win 
contracts at a price that did not cover the costs of carrying out the contracts. Furthermore, 
by bidding at such low prices, should it encounter any issues with those contracts, it would 
not have the margins necessary to cover any financial hits. Such was Carillion’s parlous 
financial position that it was required to deliberately bid for contracts at low prices to 
create the impression that it was a business with good prospects, rather than one that was 
experiencing cash flow problems696. 
 
 
692 After being renamed Carillion Energy Services 
693 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 13  
694 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 15 
695 Richard Howson, former Chief Executive, Carillion, giving oral evidence to the House of 




696 Bhaskar K and Flower F, Financial Failures, (No.671) at 179 
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The impact of this policy was evidenced in the company’s revenue. Between 2009 and 
2016, when revenues should have been increasing, revenue actually fell 2%697. At 
Carillion’s lowest point in 2014, revenue was actually 26% lower than what was achieved 
in 2009, whilst its debt levels continued to rise.  
 




Carillion’s failed business models of firstly acquiring its rivals for inflated prices, and 
secondly bidding for contracts at below cost price, were a recipe for disaster699. Although 
the policies enabled Carillion to create the appearance of possessing substantial assets, 
through entering into contracts that brought in less than they cost to carry out, Carillion 
was also in a position where it did not have enough revenue to cover costs, ensuring that 
it was always increasing its debt levels. Hence, the Carillion business model was bound 
to fail700.  
 
Section 1.4: Dividends  
 
Carillion, throughout its near 20-year history, had an established record of increasing the 
dividend paid to shareholders year after year. In its final annual report, it proudly noted 
 
697 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, (No.662) 16 
698 Ibid, at 17 
699 Bhaskar K and Flower F, Financial Failures, (No.671) at 179 
700 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 16 
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that “the board has increased the dividend in each of the 16 years since the formation of 
the Company in 1999”701.  
 
However, as seen immediately above, Carillion’s ability to declare an ever-increasing 
dividend diminished as its failed business models increased its debt levels whilst also 
decreasing its revenue702. As the Select Committee powerfully put it, “In reality, 
Carillion’s dividend payments bore little relation to its volatile corporate performance.” 
703. This included three quarters of its revenue paid out as dividends from 2009-2016 
(£554 million704), and in the period 2012-2017 £333 million more in dividends was paid 
out than it generated in revenue705.  
 
So wedded were the Carillion board to the policy that it continued until the July 2017 
profit warning was issued, and the final dividend of £55 million was paid a month 
beforehand. The justification provided for adopting such a policy was “balancing the 
needs of many stakeholders”, including pensioners, staff and shareholders.706 However, 
when it was proposed in January 2017 that the last dividend should not be paid so as to 
conserve cash and pay down debt, there was severe opposition707. Other board members 
argued that instead it was better to maintain market confidence and deal with debt 




701 Carillion, Annual Report and Accounts (2016): Making Tomorrow a Better Place: 
http://www.annualreports.co.uk/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/LSE_CLLN_2016.pdf  
702 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 18 
703 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 17 
704 The House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, (No.662) at 19 
705 This potentially amounts to a breach of s830 Companies Act 2006, which states a company 
may only pay dividends out of realised profits. The dividend may, therefore, have been unlawful 
and ultra vires. Although it may result in the directors having to repay the dividend (Bairstow v 
Queens Moat Houses Plc [2001] EWCA Civ 712; Re Exchange Baking Co, Flitcroft’s Case 
(1882) LR 21 Ch D 519), this issue is outside of the scope of this thesis.  
706 Richard Adam, Finance Director, Carillion, giving oral evidence to the House of Commons 




707 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 17 
708 Keither Cochrane, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Carillion%20report/Carillion-Board-minutes-26.1.17.pdf  
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Figure 3: Carillion’s Dividend Payments709   
 
Section 1.5: Pension Scheme Obligations  
 
The final cause of Carillion’s entry into liquidation, as with BHS in this chapter’s second 
case study, was its pensions deficit. This accounted for 13 separate pension schemes that 
had 27,000 members710.  
 
The size of Carillion’s pension scheme deficits was not unreasonable for the majority of 
the company’s history, with the Select Committee’s analysis concluding the deficits were 
not ‘unusually high’ and ‘may well have been manageable’711. The policy of acquiring 
rival firms, however, led to a sharp increase in the size of the pension scheme deficits. In 
acquiring Mowlem and Alfred McAlpine, Carillion took on pension deficits of £156 
million712. By 2011, these two pension schemes’ deficits had increased to a combined 
£424 million713. When added to the deficits of the other schemes, by 2018 Carillion’s 
total pensions deficit totalled close to £800 million714.  
 
Part of the reason for the deficit was Carillion’s reluctance in, and active attempts to 
avoid, meeting its statutory funding obligation715. It was found that in 2011, whilst the 
 
709 The House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, (No.663) at 19 
710 Ibid, at 15  
711 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 19 
712 Ibid, at 20 
713 Ibid, at 20 
714 Letter to the House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and 
Pensions Committees from Oliver Morley MBE, Chief Executive of Pension Protection Fund 
one 3rd April 2018 - https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Carillion%20report/Letter-from-PPF-to-Chair-3-April-2018.pdf  
715 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 21 
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pension Trustee calculated that the deficit was £770 million and required recovery 
payments of £65 million a year for 14 years to rectify, Carillion argued that the deficit 
was only £620 million and that payments of £33.4 million for 15 years were necessary – 
contributions at nearly half the level suggested. This led the independent adviser to the 
Trustee to conclude that Carillion had an “aversion to pension scheme deficit repair 
funding”716. Furthermore, in 2017, following the July profit warning, Carillion was 
permitted to defer pension contributions amounting to £25.3 million in the period 
September 2017 and April 2018 on the basis that otherwise it would enter insolvency.  
Figure 4717: 
 
Carillion’s policy towards its pension schemes was to actively contribute the minimum 
necessary to keep them operational, and as a consequence a large deficit was run up. 
Compounding this desire to contribute the bare minimum, by engaging in prolific 








717 The House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, (No.662) at 22  
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the time of Carillion’s entry into insolvency, the pension deficits would make up a large 
proportion of the debts owed.  
 
Section 1.6: Conclusions on Carillion’s Failure 
 
From the above, it is apparent that the demise of Carillion was as a consequence of a 
number of interconnecting factors. By adopting a policy of acquiring rivals to gain market 
share, Carillion was required to pay inflated acquisition prices that did not reflect the true 
value of the companies being acquired. This in turn required Carillion to drastically 
increase its debt levels, and upon acquiring its rivals, meant it was obliged to take on 
board their pre-existing pension deficits. Once the acquisitions had been made, Carillion 
was then required to guarantee income through obtaining contracts, but to ensure it 
acquired the contracts, it was necessary in many instances to bid at levels below the value 
of the contract, ensuring decreased revenue levels. Finally, by prioritising dividend 
payments, Carillion would never have the assets available to pay creditors should it be 
discovered that its business model was unsustainable. This is evidenced by the debt levels 
upon Carillion’s entrance into liquidation – it had £7 billion in liabilities but only £29 
million in assets718. 
 
Despite the undoubted effect of Carillion’s business model and decisions, much of the 
blame must also be attributed to the management culture and objectives of the Carillion 
board719. As concluded by the Select Committee: “Carillion’s rise and spectacular fall 
was a story of recklessness, hubris and greed. Its business model was a relentless dash for 
cash, driven by acquisitions, rising debt, expansion into new markets and exploitation of 
suppliers…Carillion was unsustainable. The mystery is not that it collapsed, but that it 
lasted so long.”720 
 
Consequently, Carillion’s demise was a result of two primary reasons – an unstable 
business model and poisonous corporate culture that was unwilling to identify and address 
the problems facing the company.  
 
718 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 7 
719 Chapman R, Ineffective Risk Management and the Collapse of Carillion, (2018) 8(12) PM 
World Journal 1 at 1 
720 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 3 
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The impact of the liquidation has been especially harsh on Carillion’s unsecured creditors. 
Whilst the pension schemes had a deficit of nearly £800 million, this was covered by the 
Pension Protection Fund, ensuring that the majority of payees would be protected721. 
However, suppliers, Carillion’s largest body of unsecured creditors, were not so fortunate. 
At the time of Carillion’s collapse, 30,000 suppliers were unpaid, being owed a combined 
£2 billion722. Whilst insurers paid out close to £30 million to some suppliers723, this 
equates to only 1.5% of total sums owed. 
 
The cause of creditors being owed so much, as outlined above, was Carillion’s use of 
‘reverse-factoring’, whereby Carillion would agree to pay suppliers on a reduced 
timeframe, in return for accepting a reduction in the contract price. The extended 
timeframes utilised by Carillion, although not illegal in themselves, were protected by the 
Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 2002724, which permits creditors to 
claim 8% interest after 30 days of non-payment. However, unsecured creditors are 
generally unwilling to use the mechanisms available as claiming interest from client’s 
would be ‘commercial suicide’ due to the souring of business relationships and ‘involve 
too much hassle’725. This was particularly the case for the creditors of Carillion owing to 
its dominant market position. Consequently, ‘reverse factoring’, and increasing a 
company’s level of debts at their creditor’s expense, was relatively easy to achieve for 
Carillion.   
 
In “abusing its dominant market position by making small suppliers wait for payment”726, 
and owing almost £500 million as result of reverse factoring alone727, some suppliers, 
who were unable to recover the amounts owed, were forced to enter insolvency 
themselves. This is seen in the example of Vaughan Engineering Ltd, which was required 




722 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 7 
723 BBC, Carillion collapse: Insurers pay out £30m to suppliers, (2018) 25 January; 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-42811707  
724 See also the Late Payment of Commercial Debts Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/1674)  
725 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 137 
726 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 24 
727 Bhaskar K and Flower F, Financial Failures, (No.671) at 197 
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not recover £830,000 owed by Carillion. This was cited as a substantial reason for them 
entering insolvency728. Hence, along with the other companies the Select Committee took 
evidence from, it is apparent that Carillion’s suppliers took the brunt of the side effect of 
the company’s collapse.   
 
Section 2: Application of the Anti-Deprivation and Personal Liability Provisions  
 
Given the actions of Carillion and its board members outlined above, it is necessary to 
consider whether any of the remedies outlined in Chapter 3 – the anti-deprivation and 
personality liability provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 – offer a mechanism through 
which the impact may be minimised. As the remedies were outlined and analysed in detail 
in Chapter 3, this section will only briefly summarise the requirements of the statutory 
provisions before applying them to the factual matrix of Carillion.  
 
Section 2.1: Preferences 
 
The first potential remedy that may be applicable to Carillion’s insolvency is the existence 
of a preference. According to s239(4), a preference occurs whenever a company does 
anything or suffers anything to be done which has the effect of putting a creditor in a 
position which, in the event of the company’s liquidation, will be better than had that 
thing not been done. However, as concluded in Chapter 3, s239 is hamstrung by the 
requirement that the now insolvent creditor ‘desired’ the preference and the subjectivity 
incorporated by Millet J729 - especially should a creditor be forceful in their demands for 
repayment730, which would prevent the ‘desire’ from being present.  
 
Given the limitations of s239, it is unlikely that any of the reported acts by Carillion 
constitute a preference.  
 
The first set of potential acts to constitute a preference, the policy of declaring excessive 
dividends, cannot constitute a preference for two fundamental reasons. First of all, as the 
final dividends were declared to the company’s shareholders, who are not (in that capacity 
 
728 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 25 
729 Re MC Bacon, (No.429) at 86 
730 Ibid, at 86 
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at least) creditors of the company, the fundamental requirement of the necessary 
relationship between the parties is not met. Secondly, from the evidence available, it is 
apparent that Carillion’s intention behind declaring the dividend was not to prefer the 
shareholders, and was instead to maintain market confidence in the company and the 
share price in order to allow the company to continue trading. Whilst the competence of 
adopting such a policy is open to question, the fact that it was adopted by the Carillion’s 
board is not731. Hence, should any of the shareholders have been creditors to Carillion, 
and have benefited from the declaration of the dividend, then no preference would have 
occurred as there was no subjective desire to prefer and merely an intention to keep the 
company trading732.  
 
The second potential set of acts are the payment of contractors and suppliers in the 6 
months before Carillion entered liquidation. As stated above, Carillion continued to pay 
them up until it entered insolvency. Notwithstanding that the Select Committee did not 
expressly deal with this issue, it strongly appears from the evidence that there was no 
attempt to prefer any creditors. It seems that Carillion, in continuing to pay its creditors, 
was merely attempting to meet its contractual obligations and maintain the company’s 
operations, rather than prefer those creditors who were paid in the six months prior to 
Carillion’s entry into insolvency. Indeed, the report makes no reference to any creditors 
receiving individual or special treatment, and so it is extremely unlikely that as preference 
was given to any of the creditors.   
 
Section 2.2: Transactions at an Undervalue  
 
The second potential remedy available to Carillion’s creditors is s238 Insolvency Act 
1986, which prohibits the disgorgement of the company’s assets at an undervalue either 
when the company has entered insolvency or disgorgements that cause the company to 
 
731 Richard Adam, Finance Director, Carillion giving oral evidence to the  House of Commons 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, 6th February 2017- 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/work-and-
pensions-committee/carillion/oral/78103.pdf  
732 See Keay A and Walton P, Insolvency Law, (No.222) at 630 
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become insolvent as a result of the transaction733. This typically involves transactions for 
little or no consideration734. 
 
It was concluded in Chapter 3 that the primary issue with establishing that a transaction 
was at an undervalue was proving that any consideration received was ‘significantly 
below market value’735. As confirmed in Brewin Dolphin, this means that it is “what a 
reasonably well-informed purchaser is prepared” to pay736, and is usually the market value 
where there is one or expert evidence where a market does not exist. However, it is only 
the value that the company ascribes to the transaction that is relevant for the purposes of 
s238737. Hence, should the asset have an inherent market value, but no value to the 
company738, there will be no transaction at an undervalue. Moreover, the defence 
provided for under s238(5)(a) undermines the objectivity of s238 as it means that the 
company can defend the transaction so long as it can show that there were sufficient 
ground for believing the transaction was in the company’s interests – bringing a subjective 
element to s238 claims. 
 
Within the context of Carillion, similarly to the potential for preference claims, it is 
unlikely that a successful s238 claim could be initiated. The first set of actions, the 
dividend, is unlikely to be viewed as a transaction at an undervalue. Firstly, it is 
unforeseeable that the courts, even with the help of expert evidence, could ascribe the 
correct value to Carillion’s dividends owing to the fact that such payments by a company 
are pure business decisions by the board, taking into account numerous and competing 
issues – preventing a ‘true value’ ever being ascribed. Secondly, even if the courts were 
to conclude that a true value could be ascribed, given the well documented policy 
underlying the board’s declaration of dividends, and the board’s belief that doing so was 
necessary to maintain market confidence in Carillion, mean that any transaction would be 
covered by the s238(5)(a) defence as there would have been reasonable ground to believe 
the transaction benefited Carillion. 
 
733 The transaction must also occur within the 6 months prior to company entering insolvency  
734 S238(4) Insolvency Act 1986 
735 Chapter 3, Section 1.3(b) 
736 Philips v Brewin Dolphin, (No.467) at 154 
737 Re Thoars (No2), Reid v Ramlort Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 800; Re M.C. Bacon Ltd (no.2) [1990] 
BCLC 324 at 340  
738 Because the company cannot make use of it – such a mining company owning the intellectual 
property to a hybrid car engine  
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The second ground on which s238 may be utilised is the active policy of bidding for, and 
acquiring, contracts at below their cost price. As outlined above, Carillion engaged in the 
policy of under-bidding for contracts so as to guarantee revenue739. Whilst a poor policy 
to adopt, and prima facie transactions at an undervalue owing to the fact that they are 
below market value, they are unlikely to be viewed as being significantly below market 
value. Whilst it is true that several were entered into at below cost price740, the difference 
between the cost and projected contract price is unlikely to be easy to be proven and 
subject to fierce challenge. Moreover, given the position Carillion was in, and its need for 
revenue to cover existing liabilities, it is probable that the s238(5)(a) defence would also 
be applicable on the ground that acquiring some revenue, even at below cost price, was 
better than not acquiring the contract in order meet the existing liabilities. Furthermore, 
it is likely that Carillion would be able to argue that although some contracts were 
unprofitable, others were, and that those profits could cover the shortfall on the loss-
leading contracts. Hence, it is unlikely any s238 claim would be successful owing to the 
procedural limitations of s238 and subjective beliefs of Carillion’s board.  
 
Section 2.3: Transactions Defrauding Creditors 
 
The final anti-deprivation provision that may be available to Carillion’s creditors is 
transactions defrauding creditors, set out in s423 Insolvency Act 1986. S423 applies 
where a transaction has been entered into that was at an undervalue and the intention 
behind the transaction was to place the asset out of the reach of any creditors who may 
have had a claim against the now insolvent company. Chapter 3 concluded, however, that 
s423’s requirement that a transaction be at an undervalue results in the same uncertainties 
as outlined in relation to s238 above741. Furthermore, by requiring that the substantial 
‘purpose’742 of the transaction was to place the asset beyond the reach of the company’s 
creditors, the claimant must prove that the company intended to place the asset beyond 
 
739 Richard Howson, former Chief Executive, Carillion, giving oral evidence to the House of 




740 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 42 
741 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 493 
742 Random House UK v Allason [2008] EWHC 2854 (Ch)  
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their reach, rather than merely achieving that result743 - which is problematic for 
liquidators to achieve owing to the evidential limitations. 
 
However, in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana744, there is potentially an example of how a 
successful s423 claim could be made out, particularly in relation to the payment of 
dividends shortly before a company enters insolvency. The facts of Sequana illustrate this 
potential. The appeal focused on the payment of two dividends in December 2008 and 
May 2009, totalling €580 million. The company declaring the dividends had ceased 
trading and the purpose of declaring them was to enable the parent company to sell the 
subsidiary declaring the dividend and remove the liability from the group’s balance sheet. 
The parent company had lent €585 million to the subsidiary, and the dividends were used 
as set off against this debt. However, the subsidiary company also had substantial, but 
undefined, liabilities relating to clean up costs over river pollution in the United States.  
 
It was held745 that the December 2008 dividend payment was not caught by s423 on the 
basis that the parent company (which was making the corporate decisions) had not settled 
on the intention to sell subsidiary at that point, and the parent company had a well-known 
policy of standing by its subsidiaries746. Thus, the requisite purpose of a s423 claim had 
not been made out. However, in relation to the May dividend, it was concluded the parent 
company had settled on the policy of selling its subsidiary, of removing the subsidiary’s 
clean-up costs liability from the group and generally wished to be free of a ‘very hair 
situation’747. It was therefore held that as the purpose of the May dividend was to enable 
the sale of the subsidiary and reduce any potential liability, the requisite purpose of 
putting the subsidiary’s assets beyond the reach of its creditors had been formulated, and 
the dividend was a transaction defrauding creditors. Moreover, it was also concluded that 
a dividend is capable of being a transaction at an undervalue on the basis that it is a 




743 IRC v Hashmi [2002] 2 BCLC 489  
744 [2019] EWCA Civ 112  
745 The Court of Appeal judgment is subject to appeal to the Supreme Court  
746 [2019] EWCA Civ 112 at 68 
747 Ibid, at 70 
748 Ibid, at 58  
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In the context of Carillion, Sequana potentially puts the last dividend payment in June 
2017 within the remit of s423. As seen in Sequana, where a dividend payment is made 
shortly before the company enters liquidation, it is potentially a transaction defrauding 
creditors. However, it must be noted that it is possible to distinguish between Carillion 
and Sequana. As noted above, Carillion issued the dividend as a result of a fixed and 
unwavering general policy that was intended to maintain confidence in the company and 
portray the company as being financially solid. Hence, its intention was overwhelmingly 
concerned with the preservation of the company. However, in Sequana, the intention was 
to minimise liability to the parent company and ensure that it, and not any potential 
creditors, would have access to the subsidiary’s assets. It can therefore be seen that whilst 
Sequana’s May dividend was concerned with ensuring access to the subsidiary’s assets, 
Carillion merely intended the June dividend to maintain the appearance of financial 
security. Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that any court would conclude that 
Carillion’s dividend intended to defraud it creditors, and instead was merely the biproduct 
of an unfeasible business strategy to keep the company operating.  
 
Section 2.4: Personal Liability of Carillion’s Directors  
 
In addition to the anti-deprivation provisions, the personal liability provisions of the 
Insolvency Act may be applicable. Given the conduct of Carillion’s directors, it is 
possible that Carillion’s liquidator749 could potentially initiate proceedings to increase the 
size of the asset pool that is eventually made available to the unsecured creditors. Indeed, 
such was the nature of the conduct of Carillion’s board that the Select Committee 
expressly raised the possibility of Carillion’s directors having breached the wrongful 
trading provision750. 
 
Section 2.4(a): Fraudulent Trading 
 
As set out in Chapter 3, under s213 Insolvency 1986, should the business of the now 
insolvent company have been carried on with the intent to defraud creditors, or for any 
fraudulent purpose, the court can declare that any individuals who were knowing 
 
749 S213 Insolvency Act 1986 
750 S214 Insolvency Act 1986 
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participants to the fraudulent trading must make a contribution to the company’s assets751. 
However, following Morphitis, the liquidator must prove the intention to defraud and the 
fraud separately. This means that the mere fact that the transaction did defraud is 
insufficient752, and instead the liquidator must also prove that the defendant actively 
intended to defraud. Given the issues associated with proving a defendant’s subjective 
intention, s213 has an almost impossible evidential barrier to be effectively litigated.  
 
Within the context of Carillion, it is unlikely that the board’s actions amounted to 
fraudulent trading. As concluded above, although the policy of declaring large and 
unsustainable dividends was a poor business policy, it was not intended to fraudulently 
place assets beyond the reach of creditors and neither had the board turned a ‘blind 
eye’753. Moreover, given that Carillion continued to pay its creditors as the debts became 
due, it is unlikely that Carillion would be found to have acted fraudulently as they did not 
realise that the debts could not be paid as they fell due until they had insufficient assets 
to pay them, thereby not falling within the R v Grantham754 ground of fraudulent conduct 
that they had realised debts could not be paid as they came in. Hence, it is unlikely that 
the board of Carillion would be liable for breaching s213. 
 
Section 2.4(b): Wrongful Trading 
 
The final possible protection for Carillion’s unsecured creditors is wrongful trading, a 
potential liability the Select Committee raised in its report755. Set out in s214 Insolvency 
Act 1986, wrongful trading occurs where prior to the company entering insolvency, the 
director(s) of the company knew or ought to have concluded that there was no prospect 
of the company avoiding liquidation, and continued to trade at the expense of the 
company’s creditors. The liquidator is thereby required to prove the ‘moment of truth’756 
– that the defendant realised, or ought to have realised, the company was beyond rescue 
and thus ceased trading.  
 
 
751 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 758 
752 R v Woolin [1998] 3 WLR 382 at 389 
753 Manifest Shipping v Uni-Polaris Shipping [2003] 1 AC 469 
754 [1984] 2 All ER 166 
755 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 66-67 
756 Fletcher I, The Law of Insolvency, (No.62) at 836 
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In determining whether the ‘moment of truth’ has occurred, the easiest factor, as seen in 
Rubin757 and Roberts758, indicating that the director should be aware that there was no 
prospect of the company avoiding liquidation is should the company repeatedly fail to 
find the necessary funds to discharge debts as they become due759. Where there is no clear 
trigger for directors having the requisite knowledge, liquidators will be compelled to 
analyse the available evidence, including cash flow forecasts, the loss of employees, 
contracts and denials of credit760. This is in tandem with having to prove that the directors 
had no legitimate grounds for believing that the company may have a turn in fortunes761. 
Consequently, proving that the moment of truth has occurred, in all but the clearest of 
cases, is extremely difficult for liquidators to achieve. 
 
In the context of Carillion, the Select Committee report considered that the ‘moment of 
truth’ potentially occurred in January 2018, when the Government refused to provide the 
guarantees necessary to keep Carillion operating762. They reasoned that despite Carillion 
having negotiations with the Cabinet Office, the board could not have realistically relied 
on the Government providing the necessary guarantees, given that it was clear 
Government policy that they would not provide private sector bailouts. They therefore 
concluded that the directors were aware that ‘only a bailout from Government could save 
the company’763 from January 2018. Given this, they proffered that necessary ingredients 
for wrongful trading could have been present.  
 
It is submitted that whilst they were correct to acknowledge that Carillion’s board became 
aware that the company could not survive after January 2018, this was insufficient to 
constitute wrongful trading. The first reason is that the board could argue that they had a 
genuine belief that the Government would provide the necessary guarantees. This is 
founded on the basis that given Carillion operated a large number of key public sector 
contracts – contracts that were vital to providing public services – it is plausible that the 
Government would provide some assistance to ensure their continued operation. Whilst 
 
757 Rubin v Gunner and another [2004] BCC 684 
758 Roberts (Liquidator of Onslow Ditching Ltd) v Fröhlich [2011] EWHC 257 (Ch) 
759 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 599 
760 Katz and Mumford, Making Creditor Protection Effective, Centre for Business Performance, 
ICAEW, 2010) Chapter 5;  
761 S214(2) Insolvency Act 1986; Singla v Hedman [2010] EWHC 902 (Ch)  
762 Carillion: Second Joint Report, (No.663) at 66-67 
763 Ibid, at 67 
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this might not have been a full bailout, it may have been enough to satisfy the existing 
lenders. Given that the Government were engaged in talks for several days764 with 
Carillion, the directors had valid, objective grounds to believe that continued financial 
support may have been provided765. It was only after these negotiations came to nothing 
that it would have been unreasonable to truly believe financial relief would not have been 
available. Secondly, it is also unlikely that wrongful trading occurred as Carillion did, on 
the day that it entered liquidation, have £29 million in cash766. Hence, when it entered 
insolvency it could still (for a very brief time period) continue to pay its debts as they 
became due, and so the ‘moment of truth’, unlike in Rubin and Roberts, did not occur. 
Instead, Carillion entered liquidation and ceased trading when it reached this stage, 
thereby ensuring that creditors did not suffer any avoidable losses and that wrongful 




Case Study 2: British Homes Stores (BHS) 
 
Section 3: BHS and its Entry into Insolvency 
 
This chapter’s second case study is of British Homes Stores (BHS), a company that 
infamously stopped trading in August 2016 when it entered insolvency as a result of 
mounting debts and poor trading performance. Its collapse led to 11,000 jobs being lost 
and £1.3 billion being owed to creditors767. One in four stores also remain vacant, 4 years 
after its collapse768.  
 
 
764 Davies R, Carillion Crisis: UK Government Locked in Last-Ditch Rescue Talks, The Guardian 
14th January 2018 - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/14/carillion-crisis-
government-locked-last-ditch-rescue-talks  
765 Simmons M, Wrongful Trading, [2001] Insolvency Intelligence 12 at 13 
766 The House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, (No.662) at 9 
767 Hudson A, BHS and the Reform of Company Law, (2016) 37 Company Lawyer 364 
768 Simpson E, One in Four BHS Stores Remain Vacant Four Years After Collapse, BBC News 
30 August 2020 - https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-53918891  
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This section will therefore briefly outline BHS’ history and the reasons for BHS’ eventual 
failure. It will then analyse and illustrate how the existing anti-deprivation and personal 
liability provisions have failed to protect creditors.  
 
Section 3.1: BHS’ Early History and Purchase by Sir Philip Green 
 
British Home Stores (BHS) was founded in 1928 by US entrepreneurs. Despite initially 
wishing to replicate Woolworth’s six-pence business model769, the price ceiling was 
doubled to one shilling, and subsequently to five shillings770. This permitted the company 
to branch out and offer goods Woolworths could not, such as home furnishings.  
 
Following the Second World War, the company abandoned its strict price business model 
and adopted a looser relationship with cost, permitting the five-shilling price limit to be 
ignored where pertinent. Such was the success of this strategy, that by the end of 1960s, 
BHS had 94 stores and 12,000 employees. In the 1970s BHS established itself as a true 
department store, and by 1980, the company had managed to increase revenues and 
income to £366.4 million and £41.8 million respectively771. This increase was primarily 
attributed to contained costs, rather than by growing actual sales, however. 
 
By the 1980s, sales began to slump, and to safeguard the business it merged with 
Habitat/Mothercare plc in 1986, to create Storehouse plc772. Using the expertise of 
Habitat’s founder, Sir Terence Conran, BHS once again remodelled its image to appeal 
to younger consumers. However, this was not successful, and alienated its core and older 
consumer base, resulting in a fall in sales, with profits plummeting to £11.3 million by 
1989773. During the 1990s, a number of CEOs were appointed in short succession, 
however, profits substantially increased, rising to £77.4 million by 1996.  
 
From BHS’ early history, it is apparent that despite being buffeted by the prevailing 
economic climate, and occasionally pursuing misdirected business strategies, the 
 
769 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36436576  
770 Warnby G, Storehouse, [1993] 21(3) International Journal of Retail Distribution and 
Management 27 at 27 
771 http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/bhs-plc-history/ 
772 Warnby G, Storehouse, (No.770) at 29 
773 Ibid, at 32 
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company enjoyed a prolonged period of economic stability. Even in the company’s least 
successful period at the end of the 1980s, it was still able to declare a profit of £11.3 
million. Moreover, BHS was able to reinvent itself on a number of occasions, meaning it 
continually met the shopping habits of consumers and remain a fixture, if not spectacular 
household brand, on the high-street as a public company774.  
 
BHS’ trajectory and management culture would radically change with Philip Green’s 
acquisition of the company in 2000. Sir Philip, as he would later become, was able to 
acquire BHS and make it part of his sprawling retail group for £200 million, although this 
headline figure belied the fact that the company had £44.78 million in cash reserves, 
meaning the true cost was just over £150 million775.  
 
Section 3.2: The Performance of BHS under Sir Philip Green’s Ownership  
 
Initially, it appeared that the takeover of BHS by Sir Philip Green had led to a turnaround 
for the company, revitalising its profitability776. Indeed, in the early years following the 
takeover (2002-2004), profits were £208 million777. This led the Select Committee 
investigating the eventual collapse of BHS to conclude that “The improvement in BHS’s 
profitability in the early years of Sir Philip’s tenure is indisputable.”778 
 
However, despite the increase in profits, turnover stagnated. As seen in Figure 5, apart 
from a small increase in 2009, BHS’ turnover did not increase. Instead of increasing 
turnover, the increase in profits was achieved through cost-cutting measures and 
squeezing suppliers779. Consequently, rather than BHS growing organically during Sir 
Philip Green’s tenure, the company’s size and resources remained the similar to those 




774 Hudson A, BHS, (No.767) at 365 
775 Ibid, at 367 
776 House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Innovation and Skills Committees, BHS, 
(2016) HC 54 at 5 
777 Ibid, at 5  
778 Ibid, at 6 
779 Ibid, at 6; Hudson A, BHS, (No.767) at 367 





Exacerbating this stagnation was the policy concerning dividend payments781. Whilst 
BHS did make a profit of £208 million during 2002-2004, it declared dividends of £414 
million for the same period782 – almost double the level of profit. Although Sir Philip 
defended the dividends by suggesting that they be viewed in the context of 2002-2004 
(when BHS was profitable), which must be acknowledged is a legitimate consideration, 
by removing more money than the company was making in profit, it was ensured that 
BHS’ cash reserves were being depleted783. The knock-on effect was that when BHS 
entered a sustained period of decline in the early 2010s, it did not have the financial 
resources to fund or implement a turnaround strategy. This is illustrated in Figure 6, which 
evidences that in the 13 years between Sir Philip’s takeover and BHS’ eventual sale in 
2014, net assets swung from a net positive of £228.8 million in 2001 to a net deficit of 
£323.0 by 2014.  
 
Figure 6784: BHS’ Balance Sheet 2001-2014  
 
 
781 This potentially amount to a breach of s830 Companies Act 2006, which states a company may 
only pay dividends out of realised profits. The dividend may, therefore, have been unlawful and 
ultra vires.  
782 Ibid, at 5  
783 Ibid, at 5  
784 Ibid, at 6 
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Section 3.3: Divestment of Property from BHS s 
 
Other than through the declaration of dividends, longer term mechanisms for divesting 
BHS of assets included the charging of ‘fees’ for services785. This involved companies 
ultimately owned by the Green family charging BHS for services including 
administration and distribution. In 2013, for example, companies owned by the Greens 
received £58 million in payment786. The Green family were also able to divest assets 
through bonds, with one bond of £19.5 million and paying out 8% interest per annum787 
ultimately being held by Sir Philip’s wife788. This was later redeemed for £28,975,000 
and resulted in a profit of £9,475,000. In total, the process of charging fees to BHS 
extracted £595 million from the company789 – assets that were extracted through 
legitimate, but ultimately injurious, means and indirectly received by Sir Philip Green 
and his family and not available to creditors.  
 
The final substantial means utilised to divest assets from BHS was through the outright 
sale of property790. This was demonstrated by the sale of several BHS stores to Carmen 
 
785 Hudson A, BHS, (No.767) at 368 
786 Financial Times, 28 April 2016, How Much Money Did The Greens Make?: 
https://www.ft.com/content/0e291562-0d52-11e6-b41f-0beb7e589515  
787 BHS, (No.776) at 40 
788 The bond was held by Tacomer Ltd, which was also ultimately owned by Lady Green 
789 Financial Times, 28 April 2016, How Much Money Did The Greens Make?: 
https://www.ft.com/content/0e291562-0d52-11e6-b41f-0beb7e589515  
790 Letter from Lady Green to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 





Properties Ltd – a company owned ultimately by Lady Green. Ten stores were included 
in the transaction, and BHS received £106 million. Whilst the moneys received were 
accounted for as profit, BHS continued to operate from those stores, and thereby paying 
rent to Carmen. By the time the properties were resold to BHS in 2014 for £70 million as 
part of BHS’ overall sale, it had paid £153 million in rent. In another transaction, land 
was sold to another company ultimately owned by Lady Green, Mildenhall Holdings 
Ltd791. Between 2005 and 2012, as BHS was still making use of the property, £2.7 million 
was paid to Mildenhall in rent. Consequently, whilst BHS may have received the market 
value of the its assets, by charging it rent for the continued use of stores sold, the Green 
family were eventually able to extract more from BHS than they provided in purchase 
moneys.  
 
Section 3.4: The Sale of BHS 
 
By 2014, the financial position of BHS made it undesirable for Sir Philip to keep it as part 
of his retail empire792. One reason, explored in detail below, was the pension deficit of 
£139 million793. Adding to this undesirability, BHS “had been loss making for a number 
of years, and suffered from a poor market position, expensive lease arrangements…”794 
This meant that by 2014 BHS was, at best, a going concern that credible buyers would be 
wary of taking on.  
 
The perilous state of BHS is indicated in the parties who seriously considered purchasing 
the company. The first serious buyer was Paul Sutton. However, despite drawing up a 
business plan entitled ‘Project Albion’, Mr Sutton’s history of bankruptcy and fraud 
conviction795, and use of Sir Philip’s name ‘as a reference in Monaco’ – a personal affront 
that risked his personal reputation – meant that ‘Project Albion’ was aborted796. 
 
 
791BHS, (No.776) at 39 
792 This had been renamed as Arcadia in 2009 
793 Hudson A, BHS, (No.767) at 369 
794 BHS, (No.776) at 22 
795 BHS, (No.776) at 22 
796 Ibid, at 22 
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On Mr Sutton becoming an unviable candidate, a new candidate, Dominic Chappell – Mr 
Sutton’s former driver and later associate797 - was able to come to the fore798. Mr Chappell 
presented a business plan to Sir Philip that would involve purchasing BHS for £1 without 
any debt or pension liabilities. However, Mr Chappell “had scarcely, if any, more 
credibility than Paul Sutton as a suitable buyer for BHS”799 due to having been declared 
bankrupt (which Sir Philip was aware of), having no retail experience and, as later 
reported, having been compelled to leave a venture after it was found he had divested the 
company of £315,000 for his personal use800. Mr Chappell did, however, have two key 
characteristics: he had not been found guilty of a crime and had not attempted to use Sir 
Philip’s name for personal advantage in Monaco801.  
 
As part of Mr Chappell’s proposal for purchasing BHS from Sir Philip Green, it was 
stated that Retail Acquisitions Limited802 (RAL) would provide £120 million of working 
capital and £35 million of equity803. The working capital, rather than being a “£120 
million term loan facility” secured on BHS property, was later established as being merely 
3, £40 million tranches, that were available once the previous tranche had been repaid. 
Hence, it was fundamentally a £40 million rolling loan – three times smaller than actually 
proposed. Even more problematic, however, were the conditions imposed on the rolling 
credit arrangements – conditions that meant “no one reading those letters…would believe 
that finance was available [...] the conditions could not be met”.804 Thus, in reality, the 
proposed working capital that RAL was to rely on was never truly available, and was 
indeed merely a mirage to cloak a lack of funding.  
 
Section 3.5: Revised Terms of Sale 
 
In addition to the illusory nature of the working capital, Mr Chappell was also unable to 
acquire the £35 million of equity needed to meet the terms of the takeover, despite 
 
797 Ibid, at 23 
798 Ibid, 23: “as Mr Sutton “stepped back” from BHS, “Dominic stepped forward” 
880 BHS, (No.776) at 23 
800 Ibid, at 23 
801 Ibid, at 24 
802 The company set up by Mr Chappell to purchase BHS 
803 Ibid, at 31  
804 Stephen Bourne, former director of RAL; Work and Pensions Committee & Business 
Innovation and Skills Committee, Oral Evidence: Pension Protection Fund and Pensions 
Regulator HC 55, Wednesday 8 June 2016  
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‘frantically looking for it’805. To surmount the lack of funding, it was proposed that 
Marylebone House, which was owned by Wilton Equity Ltd806, should be purchased by 
Mr Chappell for £35 million and be immediately sold for £45 million807 – ensuring that 
there would at least be £10 million in equity. However, even this imaginative financing 
method failed to come to fruition owing to Marylebone House eventually being sold to 
the Arcadia group for £53 million808. Instead, Sir Philip was compelled to organise the 
finance himself, and involved a loan from HSBC guaranteed by Arcadia809.  
 
Even more problematic was the reality of BHS’ and RAL’s financial position on ‘day 
one’ of the takeover being completed. Officially810, BHS was to have £94 million in ‘cash 
and facilities’811, including the £24 million loan facility arranged with HSBC. Sir Philip 
also agreed to write off the majority of inter-company debt between BHS and Arcadia812 
in return for a £40 million secured loan813. However, as established, this too was illusory 
owing to substantial liabilities shortly coming due814. From the revised terms of RAL’s 
takeover and the ‘true’ financial position of BHS on ‘day one’ of the takeover, it is clear 
that RAL did not have the necessary financial resources to purchase BHS – let alone have 
sufficient resources to prop up a going concern that was in a parlous financial position. 
Hence, given this financial blackhole, it was guaranteed that once RAL became the 
owners of BHS, it would be necessary to sell assets and incur debts to keep the company 
operating – a strategy that would assure BHS’ demise.   
 
Section 3.6: BHS under RAL and the Disposal of BHS’ Assets  
 
As outlined above, Sir Philip Green’s primary motivation for selling BHS was its poor 
financial performance and greatly diminished asset pool. Given these factors, and that 
 
805 Ibid 
806 A company controlled by the Green family 
807 BHS, (No.776) at 33 
808 Ibid, at 33 
809 Ibid, at 33 
810 The ultimate owners of the Arcadia Group 
811 BHS, (No.776) at 34 
812 £216 million - The Pensions Regulator, Regulatory Intervention Report: Issued under section 
89 of the Pensions Act 2004 in Relation to the BHS Pension Schemes, June 2017 at 20 
813 BHS, (No.776) at 36 
814 BHS, (No.776) at 36 
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BHS was a clear going concern, RAL needed to implement a far ranging and 
comprehensive turnaround strategy to return it to sustainable profitability.  
 
The main threat to sustainability was the uncompetitive rents it was paying for its stores, 
making a number of stores wholly unprofitable815. Prior to the takeover by RAL, Sir 
Philip Green’s high-profile personal wealth acted as a strong deterrent in negotiations 
with landlords perturbed that they, rather than Sir Philip, should make economic 
sacrifices. In divesting BHS from the Arcadia group, it was hoped that RAL’s ownership 
would enable these rent negotiations to become successful. 
 
To return BHS to profitability, £26.7 million in savings related to stores and a further 
£23.9 million increase in revenues from ‘trade initiatives’ were required816. To achieve 
the required increases from the trade initiatives it was necessary to increase like-for-like 
sales by 1% and improve margins by a further 1%. However, rather than increasing sales, 
like-for-like sales fell by 0.2%817 - further increasing the pressure to achieve property 
related savings.  
 
The most high-profile property disposal was BHS’ flagship Oxford Street store, which 
RAL were advised needed to be disposed of by September 2015 to provide a vital increase 
in working capital. However, even though the store was eventually sold in April 2016, it 
failed to provide the expected income – despite claims it had been sold for between £70-
90 million, it was eventually sold for a mere £50 million, which was further reduced by 
£600,000 paid to RAL as a ‘fee’ for completing the transaction. Even more problematic, 
owing to the fact that the store had been used to secure a loan, none of the proceeds were 
received by BHS and were instead used to partly discharge the secured debt818. 
Consequently, the flagship policy of providing BHS with the necessary working funds – 
the sale of its flagship store – failed to provide the company with any income. 
 
815 Ibid, at 47 
816 BHS Business Plan, March 2015: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/work-and-pensions/Correspondence/BHS-plan-presentation-redacted.pdf  
817 House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Innovation and Skills Committees, BHS, 
(2016) HC 54 at 48 
818 Letter from Michael Hitchcock to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 





Further property sales also occurred819. Stores in Carlisle and Colchester were sold in 
February and June 2016 respectively, and a store in Liverpool was sold for £17 million 
in November 2015. However, the Liverpool store had previously been used to secure a 
credit facility, and so none of the proceeds were made available to BHS itself. A further 
sale of the Southampton store in February 2016 for £7 million was also used to discharge 
a credit facility, and the sale of the Sunderland store for £2.4 million likewise saw the 
proceeds being used to partly discharge a secured loan. More alarming, however, were 
RAL’s attempts to subtract £400,000 from the transaction in fees – although they were 
later returned upon challenge. Adding to financial problems was RAL’s decision to 
purchase the Darlington store from its landlord for £2.4 million, substantially depleting 
RAL’s already limited asset pool.  
 
RAL was, however, able to successfully sell the Atherstone warehouse for £15 million. 
However, as RAL had secured £5 million to fund its takeover of BHS against the 
warehouse, £5 million, plus a further £2.2 million in interest and fees, was used to 
discharge RAL’s secured loan. RAL also took a further £200,000 from the transaction in 
‘fees’. Thus, only £7.2 million (representing all of the profit made from the property 
disposals) was received by BHS to contribute to the working capital820. It must also be 
noted that although BHS was eventually able to reduce the rents on its retained stores by 
around £30 million through a CVA821, owing to the late date at which this occurred 
(March 2016), it was unable to affect BHS’ hopes for survival.  
 
Continuing with the policy adopted under Sir Philip’s tenure as BHS’ owner, RAL also 
extracted assets from the company by charging it fees for services provided. As seen 
immediately above, RAL charged fees relating the disposal of BHS’ stores, although in a 
number of instances they were compelled to return the fees charged after pressure was 
applied. Other fees and salaries levied on BHS by RAL included £7 million to cover the 
payment of RAL’s advisers and board members’ transaction fees through the form of a 
 
819 Ibid.  
820 BHS, (No.776) at 49 
821 Letter from Mike Sherwood to House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 




loan. Such was RAL’s abuse of levying fees and taking out loans, it was estimated that 
£11 million in fees and £12 million in loans were levied against BHS, with only £6 million 
being repaid by the time of BHS’ entrance into insolvency822. Hence, RAL was able to 
remove £17 million from BHS – further weakening its already precarious financial 
position and removing much needed working capital. 
 
Examples of the fees charged by RAL can be seen in transactions involving Mr Chappell 
directly. He personally received a total of £2.6 million in salary and fees823, and also 
benefited from a £1.5 million interest free loan that was never repaid824 and a further 
£90,000 personal loan825. Further activity included an attempted transfer of £1.5 million 
to BHS Sweden (not part of the actual BHS Group), which was owned by Mr Chappell’s 
long-term friend. This attempted transaction occurred the day before BHS would 
eventually enter insolvency. Notwithstanding the moneys’ eventual return after 
intervention, £50,000 was not returned, and again illustrates RAL’s policy of depleting 
BHS’ assets through fees and loans, leaving it with little in the way of working capital or 
substantial assets. 
 
From RAL’s actions as owners of BHS it is apparent that their business ‘plans’ failed to 
alter the company’s performance and ultimately led to its demise. Firstly, despite plans 
to increase sales by 1%, sales in fact fell by 0.2% - 1.2% below the growth forecasted as 
being necessary to sustain BHS has a viable business. Moreover, by decreasing, rather 
than increasing sales, greater pressure was placed on plans to dispose of BHS’ property 
to generate the necessary working capital. However, the properties sold, apart from one 
 
822 Letter from Michael Hitchcock, (No.818) 
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exception, failed to provide BHS with any increase in working capital as the proceeds 
were almost exclusively used to discharge secured loans. Whilst these disposals did 
thereby minimise any impact on BHS’ secured creditors, it failed to increase its working 
capital – indeed the purchase of the Darlington store actually decreased BHS’ working 
capital. This decrease was compounded by the continuation of the policy adopted by Sir 
Philip Green of charging BHS fees and requiring the company to grant loans that 
personally benefited members of RAL – removing £17 million from BHS in the process. 
Through these actions RAL ensured that BHS would eventually enter into a position 
where it would have insufficient assets to continue trading and would be compelled to 
enter insolvency826.  
 
Section 3.7: BHS Pension Scheme  
 
Finally, BHS’ pension schemes were also problematic – issues that neither Sir Philip nor 
RAL sought to effectively remedy. BHS’ pension schemes had 19,000 members827 and 
were managed by a board of trustees that was separate from the company’s commercial 
operations828. As illustrated in Figure 7, in 2000, when Sir Philip completed his takeover 
of BHS, the pensions schemes had a combined surplus of £43 million. However, within 
6 years, this had become a net deficit of £7 million. By the time of BHS’ eventual sale to 
RAL, the pension deficit stood at £345 million.  
 
Figure 7: Trends in BHS Pension Surplus/Deficits829 
 
826 BHS, (No.776) at 51, 53  
827 The Pensions Regulator, Regulatory Intervention Report: Issued under section 89 of the 
Pensions Act 2004 in Relation to the BHS Pension Schemes, June 2017 at 7 
828 BHS, (No.776) at 51, 10 
829 Ibid, at 10 
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The Select Committee concluded that the cause of BHS’ pension schemes deficit was Sir 
Philip’s refusal to make the necessary contributions to maintain the schemes’ 
sustainability830. This was despite a written request from the chair of the board of trustees 
for assurance of long-term commitments to the pension schemes831. In reply, it was stated 
that rather than make contributions to the pension scheme, it was more lucrative to invest 
in the business832. Given the conclusions reached above that rather than invest in BHS, 
Sir Philip removed BHS’ assets through dividends and the charging of fees, necessary 
pension scheme contributions were not made so as to increase the assets that could be 
removed from BHS. This ensured that should BHS enter into financial difficulties, the 
pension scheme would be unable to pay its members’ promised returns. Indeed, the level 
of Sir Philip’s wish not to contribute sufficient amounts to the pension schemes is seen in 
his lobbying of the then Pensions Minister, where he put his desire to reduce his pension 
liabilities in a “rather aggressive manner”833. Although attempts were made to address the 
 
830 Ibid, at 11; see also BHS Pension Trustee Minutes, 11th June 2002, 24th November 2006, 13th 
February 2007, 26th August 2009 - https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-
committees/work-and-pensions/BHS-pension-scheme-minutes-27-September-2000.pdf  
831 Letter from Dr Margaret Downes to Paul Coackley, 29th August 2005 - 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/BHS-trustee-minutes-15022006-incl-Downes-letter-29082005.pdf 
832 BHS Pension Trustee Minutes, 20th November 2007 - 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/BHS-trustee-minutes-15022006-incl-Downes-letter-29082005.pdf ; 
25th November 2008 - https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/BHS-trustee-minutes-15022006-incl-Downes-letter-29082005.pdf  
833 Letter from Rt Hon Steve Webb to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 




deficit834, these were insufficient835 and were eventually called off as it was concluded 
that that making the pension schemes self-sufficient was too costly and that a sale of BHS 
was preferable836. 
 
Upon the eventual sale of BHS to RAL, the annual £10 million contributions agreed in 
2012 were to be guaranteed for 3 years, with Taveta and RAL meeting the obligation 
equally837. However, no plan or promise was made for the period following the initial 
three years, although RAL were, along with plans for raising sufficient working capital, 
unable to competently draw up a rescue plan for the pension schemes838 – resulting in the 
eventual deficit of £345 million.  
 
Section 3.8: Overall Conclusion: 
 
From the above analysis it is clear that BHS entered insolvency as a consequence of 
prolonged mismanagement, with the primary issue being the adoption of several poor 
business strategies. Under the ownership of both Sir Philip Green and RAL, BHS failed 
to increase turnover to a level necessary to sustain its viability and cover its expenditure. 
Whilst in the early years of Sir Philip’s tenure of ownership profitability was achieved 
through reducing costs, revenues actually decreased – resulting in less money flowing 
through the business and making it harder to cover liabilities. Under RAL, although they 
sought to instigate a turnaround plan, this required them to increase sales by 1% - 
something they failed miserably to achieve, and instead caused sales to decrease by 0.2%. 
This in turn resulted in additional pressure on the company’s working capital, and 
precipitated an urgency to dispose of more of BHS’ assets to enable it to continue 
covering liabilities.  
 
As noted above, the declaration of dividends that exceeded BHS’ profits during Sir 
Philip’s ownership exacerbated the issue of flatlining revenue, as it stripped cash reserves 
 
834 BHS, (No.776) at 11-12 
835 “This was an extraordinary length of time to recover a scheme in distress.” BHS, (No.776) at 
12 
836 BHS, (No.776) at 13 
837 Ibid, at 16 
838 Ibid, at 17-19; Safari N, Gelter M, British Home Stores Collapse: The Case for an Employee 
Derivative Claim, (2019) 19(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 43 at 49 
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from BHS, further reducing its working capital.839 Moreover, the fees and rents charged 
to BHS by companies controlled by both the Green family and RAL added to this, 
removing additional assets from BHS’ working capital and weighing down profits. 
Finally, RAL’s failure to dispose of stores in a prompt enough manner ensured they were 
compelled to pay unsustainable rents on unprofitable stores, and by disposing of stores 
that had been provided as security for loans, very little of the proceeds were actually 
received by BHS to improve its working capital position.  
 
Whilst much of the blame for BHS’ demise must be placed on the failed business model 
that resulted in insufficient revenue coming into BHS and assets being stripped from the 
company, blame must also be attributed to the owners of BHS from 2000-2015. It was 
Sir Philip Green who instigated the policies of removing assets from BHS through 
excessive dividends and the charging of fees which, as noted above, ensured that BHS 
did not have sufficient working capital to be self-sufficient. Moreover, it was Sir Philip 
who elected not to fund BHS’ pension schemes to a sufficient level, and it was Sir Philip 
who, in a desperation to dispose of BHS, did all in his power to facilitate its sale to an 
unsuitable purchaser – RAL and Dominic Chappell. Whilst RAL failed to turn around 
BHS and were also a large cause of BHS’ demise, for the most part they merely continued 
and expanded upon policies instigated by Sir Philip.   
 
Hence, through the accumulated effect of these actions by BHS’ successive owners, the 
company was allowed to gradually decline both financially and as a retail brand, and 
when it eventually entered a period of crisis, had insufficient resources to initiate and 
sustain a turnaround strategy – evidenced by its eventual entry into insolvency shortly 
after agreeing a CVA with its creditors.  
 
The impact of BHS’ entry into insolvency has been stark. The immediate effect was the 
loss of 11,000 jobs in BHS itself840, and although harder to quantify, the job losses in the 
supply chain will have been just as impactful841. However, the impact on the pension 
scheme has been minimised by the actions of the Pension Regulator following their 
 
839 This potentially amounts to a breach of s830 Companies Act 2006, although this issue is 
outside of the scope of this thesis.  
840 BHS, (No.776) at 4 
841 Hudson A, BHS, (No.767) at 369 
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investigations into the pension schemes, with Sir Philip Green agreeing to contribute £364 
million to the pension schemes842, and Dominic Chappell being ordered to contribute £9.6 
million843. This ensures contributors will receive 88% of the value of their scheme 
benefits844.  
 
However, it is BHS’ unsecured creditors who have been most impacted by BHS’ 
insolvency. Owing to the substantial debts incurred by BHS (£998 million845) to its 
creditors and, as seen above, the majority of BHS’ properties being subject to charges, 
very little has been made available. Although the insolvency practitioners have been able 
to increase the size of the asset pool by agreeing with Sir Philip that a floating charge held 
by him over BHS’ assets should be released846, this only increased the assets by £36 
million – a very small increase considering the size of the amounts owed. Indeed, this 
equates to a 3.63p interim dividend for unsecured creditors. Given that there will be no 
dividend from the Prescribed Part owing to BHS not having any floating charges over its 
assets847, it is unlikely the final dividends will be bigger than the interim dividend given 
the limited assets being disposed of by the liquidators848.  
 
Section 4: Application of Anti-Deprivation and Personal Liability Provisions 
 
Owing to the conclusions reached in Section 3 of this chapter, and the clear impact that 
the actions of Sir Philip Green and RAL have had on BHS’ creditors, as with Carillion, it 
is necessary to consider whether any of the remedies outlined in Chapter 3 offer 
mechanisms through which this impact could be reduced. Due to Sir Philip owning BHS 
through his control of Taveta within the two-year period (the relevant time) before BHS 
entered insolvency849, although he did not own BHS at the time of its insolvency, it is 
 




844 The Pensions Regulator, Regulatory Intervention Report: Issued under section 89 of the 
Pensions Act 2004 in Relation to the BHS Pension Schemes, June 2017 at 35 
845 Kleinman M, 28th January 2018 - https://news.sky.com/story/bhs-creditors-get-36m-payout-
two-years-after-chains-collapse-11226790 
846 Ibid.  
847 Notice of Progress Report in Voluntary Winding Up, SHB Realisations Ltd (Formerly BHS 
Limited), January 2020 at 4 
848 Ibid, at 3 
849 Within the “relevant time” period for connected parties after a transaction was entered into 
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possible he may be liable under the Insolvency Act 1986 provisions850. As the remedies 
have been set out in detail in Chapter 3, and have been summarised by Section 2 in relation 
to Carillion, this section will merely analyse their applicability to BHS, and will not 
summarise the Insolvency Act 1986 provisions themselves. The Select Committee report 
itself called for the Insolvency Service to investigate, requesting that it look at the ‘loans 
and fees removed from the company as well as questionable decisions…’851  
 
Section 4.1: Preferences  
 
The first set of actions by RAL that may constitute a preference are the sale of stores to 
third parties. It may be argued that because some of the stores were sold in the 6-month 
period before BHS entered insolvency, they constituted a preference. However, two 
factors prevent these sales from being preferences. Firstly, as these sales were entered 
into with unconnected parties852 in order to try and raise working capital and limit 
liabilities on unprofitable stores, it is apparent that there was no desire to prefer the 
eventual purchasers of the properties853. Additionally, owing to all of the properties 
disposed of being subject to security interests, and the majority of the disposals only being 
used to cover existing liabilities, the recipients – the secured lenders - merely received 
the assets they would have been entitled to once BHS entered insolvency, as so were not 
placed in a better position than had the disposals not occurred.   
 
Secondly, the fees by charged by RAL to BHS (excluding those relating to the disposal 
of BHS’ properties) could also potentially constitute a preference. This primarily is 
because it is apparent, as the Select Committee concluded854, that RAL sought to 
withdraw as many assets from BHS as possible, and ensure that their own position was 
improved. Hence, the requisite desire was present. However, in the context of 
preferences, it is unlikely that the fees charged would constitute a preference as they were 
charged for services provided – they were for services855 that had RAL not provided them, 
they would have been provided by other parties. Given the contractual nature of the fees, 
 
850 S240(1)(a) Insolvency Act 1986 
851 BHS, (No.776) at 52 
852 Parties who were not creditors of BHS 
853 Re MC Bacon, (No.429) at 86 
854 BHS, (No.776) at 55 
855 It is likely that the need for these services would be deemed a commercial decision 
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and the need for the services provided, proving that RAL were placed in a better position 
than had the transaction not occurred would not be possible. This analysis would also 
apply to the fees charged by Sir Philip and his controlled companies, both prior, and 
subsequent, to the sale of BHS. Given that Sir Philip and his companies were providing 
services integral to BHS’ operation (payroll, IT services etc), they were mere contractual 
agreements for services that would need to have been paid for, irrespective of the 
provider. 
 
The fees charged by RAL for the disposal of BHS’ properties cannot, however, be 
justified on the same grounds. As concluded by the Insolvency Service, RAL did not have 
the authority to legitimately charge BHS for these services, and the moneys (£1 million) 
rightfully belonged to BHS856. Notwithstanding the illegitimate nature of RAL charging 
the fees though, the charging of these fees, when not authorised to do, would not 
constitute a preference. Although RAL did have an intention to maximise their financial 
position from their ownership of BHS, as they are likely to have believed (even if 
negligently or recklessly) that they were entitled to the ‘fees’ when they imposed them 
on a BHS, it is probable that the requisite desire was not present for them to constitute a 
preference.  
 
Also potentially constituting a preference is the attempted transfer of £1.5 million of 
BHS’ assets to BHS Sweden. The Insolvency Service, as with fees charged for disposing 
of BHS’ properties, concluded that RAL did not have the right to transfer the assets857. 
Prima facie, given the timing of the transfer - the day after BHS’ board discussed entering 
administration – it is apparent it was an attempt to place a party in a better position had 
the transfer not occurred. However, neither the Select Committee nor the Insolvency 
service concluded that BHS Sweden was a creditor of BHS. Hence, given they were not 
creditors of BHS, s239 would not be applicable to this transaction as it limited to transfers 
made to creditors.  
 
856 Insolvency Service, 5th November 2019 - https://www.gov.uk/government/news/former-bhs-
director-disqualified-for-10-years; Jonathan Eley, Financial Times, 5th November 2019 - 
https://www.ft.com/content/e3fc8742-ffd3-11e9-be59-e49b2a136b8d   
857 Insolvency Service, 5th November 2019 - https://www.gov.uk/government/news/former-bhs-
director-disqualified-for-10-years; Jonathan Eley, Financial Times, 5th November 2019 - 
https://www.ft.com/content/e3fc8742-ffd3-11e9-be59-e49b2a136b8d; Jonathan Eley, Financial 
Times, 29th January 2019 - https://www.ft.com/content/ccf3222c-42a4-11ea-abea-0c7a29cd66fe    
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The final potential preference was the £7 million loan to cover the fees payable to RAL’s 
board members and advisers. However, whilst this too may prima facie appear to be a 
preference, as the loan enabled the advisers and board members to be paid with assets that 
would otherwise not be available, it could be submitted that the purchase of BHS could 
not have proceeded without the services provided by these parties. Given the need for 
BHS’ sale and the removal of Sir Philip’s personal wealth to enable rent renegotiations 
with its landlords, it may be submitted that BHS lacked the desire to prefer these creditors 
as the services provided fees charged were necessary to enable the transaction to be 
concluded. Hence, that loan is unlikely to constitute a preference.  
 
Finally, in relation to the actions of Sir Philip, as with Carillion, it is unlikely the 
declaration of the dividends between 2002-2004 would constitute a preference. As with 
Carillion, given that the dividends were not declared to Sir Philip in his position as a 
creditor, they would not constitute a preference.  
 
Section 4.2: Transactions at an Undervalue  
 
Also potentially applicable to the actions of RAL and Sir Philip is s238 Insolvency Act 
1986, and the transaction at an under-value provisions. Within the context of RAL’s 
ownership, the set of actions that would prima facie be caught by s238 is the disposal of 
BHS’ stores and the Atherstone warehouse. As noted in Section 3.6, this involved the sale 
of several BHS stores, including the flagship Oxford Street store – which was sold for 
between £20-40 million less than projected858. Notwithstanding the appearance of a large 
disparity between the originally stated and the actual sale price, it is unlikely that this 
transaction or the other disposals would fall foul of s238. The reasoning is that although 
the actual sale price was below the originally stated price, the delay in completing the 
transaction, and the known worsening of BHS’ financial position, would have enabled 
the purchaser to negotiate on the price, thereby meaning that the true market value for a 
company in BHS’ position859 was closer to the £50 million eventually received. 
 
858 Letter from Michael Hitchcock to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committees, 12th June 2016: 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/From-Michael-Hitchcock-1206216.pdf  
859 A company desperately in need of funds to continue trading 
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Moreover, neither the Select Committee, the witnesses nor the Insolvency Service raised 
any concerns as to the value received for the other properties disposed of. Hence, subject 
to having detailed valuation reports for the property disposals, which are unavailable, it 
is unlikely the property disposals were at an undervalue.  
 
However, the transfer of property to BHS Sweden would likely constitute a transaction at 
an undervalue. Given the lack of authority to transfer the £1.5 million, and BHS Sweden 
not providing any consideration for the assets, it is apparent that it would constitute a 
transaction at an undervalue given that BHS had discussed entering insolvency the day 
before the transaction was completed – meaning the company was already technically 
insolvent860. Despite the apparent breach of s238, given that all of the moneys transferred 
were recovered (minus £50,000)861, any revestment of assets is likely to be small 
(£50,000), and be outweighed by the litigation costs.  
 
Similarly, the disposal of BHS’ properties under the tenure of Sir Philip Green may also 
have constituted transactions at an undervalue. Although the Select Committee report did 
not query the value received for the properties and whether they were below market value, 
it did raise concerns over the subsequent leaseback agreements that were entered into. 
Given that Brewin Dolphin confirmed that interconnected contracts should be considered 
as one for the purposes of determining whether market value was acquired862, the 
leaseback agreements may have meant the transactions were at an undervalue. However, 
as with the disposal of property by RAL, it is unlikely that the disposal of property by Sir 
Philip constituted a transaction at an undervalue. This is primarily because although the 
sale and leaseback scheme may have been disadvantageous to BHS, and led to higher 
costs in the long-term863, the transactions themselves appear prima facie to have been at 
commercially representative terms, with the Select Committee not criticising the terms of 
the transaction, and instead focussing on their long-term effects. Hence, it is probable that 
the transactions were at market value. Moreover, owing to the time of the transactions, 
which occurred in the early years of Sir Philip’s tenure, even if the transactions were not 
at market value, they were outside the 2-year time limit for s238 to apply864. 
 
860 See also Section 4.1(b) of this Chapter  
861 BHS, (No.776) at 51 
862 Philips v Brewin Dolphin, (No.467) 
863 As rent is generally higher than mortgage payments  
864 Ss239(2) and 240(1)(b) Insolvency Act 1986  
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Consequently, it is unlikely that any disposals of property undertaken by RAL or Sir 
Philip constituted a transaction at an undervalue.  
 
The final possible transactions at an undervalue, the dividends declared by Sir Philip 
between 2002-2004, are unlikely to be a transaction at an undervalue. As with the 
dividends declared by Carillion, it is unforeseeable that the courts, even with the help of 
expert evidence, could correctly ascribe the correct value to the dividends owing them 
being pure business decisions and a true value being impossible to ascribe.  
 
Section 4.3: Transactions Defrauding Creditors  
 
More likely to be applicable is transactions defrauding creditors under s423.  
 
Dealing first with RAL’s actions, it is unlikely that the property disposals undertaken by 
RAL will constitute transactions defrauding creditors. Firstly, as concluded in Section 
4.2, it appears that RAL was able acquire the market value of the properties that were 
disposed of, thereby preventing the transactions being at an undervalue. Secondly, owing 
to proceeds being distributed to secured creditors (minus any fees successfully charged 
by RAL), it is also apparent that as the assets were made available to creditors, there was 
no intention to defeat the claims of creditors.  
 
Similarly, it is unlikely that the fees charged by RAL for services provided will constitute 
a transaction at an undervalue. As concluded in Section 4.1, it is probable, should 
additional evidence be obtained, that fees charged by RAL, owing to BHS’ need for them 
to operate, were at, or reasonably close to, market value. Moreover, owing to BHS’ need 
for the services provided, it is arguable that there was no intention of defeating the claims 
of creditors. Whilst it may be argued BHS could have acquired the services from 
alternative suppliers, and through RAL providing the services they were ensuring that 
they, and not other creditors, had access to BHS’ assets, owing to the legitimate nature of 
the contract to provide the services865 (even if undesirable from a business sense), it is 
unlikely that it could be successfully argued that they constituted an intention to defeat 
the claims of other creditors as they too were legitimate creditors.   
 
865 Excluding the fees charged for the disposal of BHS’ properties  
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As acknowledged in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the two exceptions to the analysis immediately 
above are the fees charged by RAL for the disposal of BHS’ assets and the transfer to 
BHS Sweden. Given the timing of the transfer to BHS Sweden – the day after discussions 
occurred to place BHS into insolvency – and the lack of consideration from BHS Sweden, 
it is almost unquestionable that the primary purpose of the transaction was to remove 
assets that would otherwise have been available to BHS’ creditors, and so was a 
transaction defrauding creditors. Nonetheless, given that RAL are likely to have believed, 
even if mistakenly or negligently, that they were entitled to charge BHS for services in 
disposing of its properties, the requisite desire to defraud creditors, as opposed to 
maximising RAL’s position, is unlikely to be present in regard to these fees.  
 
Finally, it is also apparent that the actions of Sir Philip Green will not have constituted 
transactions defrauding creditors. As with RAL, given that the Green family companies 
were able to, prima facie, acquire the properties purchased from BHS at market price, and 
the subsequently entered into lease agreements for the properties sold also appear prima 
facie to have been for market value, it is unlikely that they constituted a transaction at an 
undervalue. Furthermore, given that BHS was solvent at the times of the transactions, it 
is also improbable that there was an intention of defeating the claims of legitimate 
creditors as they could have their debts adequately discharged. Moreover, as with the fees 
levied by RAL, owing to BHS requiring the services provided, and Sir Philip thereby 
being a legitimate creditor, it is unlikely the fees charged by Philip will constitute 
transactions defrauding creditors.  
 
Section 4.4: Personal Liability of BHS’ Directors  
 
As with Carillion, the directors of BHS may be personally liable under the Insolvency 
Act for failing to act appropriately in the interests of creditors shortly before the company 
entered insolvency. Similarly to the directors of Carillion, given the conduct of Sir Philip 
Green during his tenure as a BHS director866, and RAL’s conduct867 during their tenure 
as owners of BHS, it is possible that BHS’ liquidator868 may initiate proceedings against 
 
866 Appointment of Director, 288a Form, Mr Philip Nigel Ross Green, 14/03/2000 
867 Appointment of Director, AP01 Form, Mr Dominic Joseph Andrew Chappell, 11/03/2015 
868 S213 Insolvency Act 1986 
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these the former directors to compel them to make personal contributions to BHS’ asset 
pool.  
 
Section 4.4(a): Fraudulent Trading 
  
Under s213, should the business of the now insolvent company have been carried on with 
the intent to defraud creditors, or for any fraudulent purpose, the court can declare that 
any individuals who were knowing participants to the fraudulent trading must make a 
contribution to the company’s assets869. 
 
Dealing first with Sir Philip, it is necessary to divide their actions into two time periods: 
those in the early years of his tenure of ownership (2000-2014), and those in the lead up 
to the sale of BHS to RAL (2014-2015). The tenure of Sir Philip’s ownership of BHS can 
be split into these two periods as, under the first, Sir Philip was actively involved in the 
fortunes of BHS and intended for it to remain a part of his retail group through his 
continued and almost unwavering support, whereas in the second he was seeking to 
actively sell the company and limit any liabilities. 
 
Analysing the conduct between 2000-2014, it is unlikely that Sir Philip and the other 
directors’ actions amounted to fraudulent trading as there was no intention to defraud. As 
concluded above in Section 3, Sir Philip was able to withdraw many of BHS’ assets 
through the declaration of large dividends, the sale of BHS’ properties and the charging 
of fees. However, whilst these actions undoubtably placed BHS in a poorer financial 
position with fewer assets, and greatly improved the financial position of the Green 
family, they were not intended to defraud creditors as when the actions occurred, and for 
a long period afterwards, BHS was still able to pay its creditors. Indeed, no evidence was 
submitted to the Select Committee to rebut the view that Sir Philip intended to honour 
BHS’ debts during this period. Moreover, the loans made available to BHS by the wider 
Taveta group were primarily to enable BHS to continue meetings its liabilities – 
illustrating the continued intention of Sir Philip to meet BHS’ liabilities.  
 
 
869 Van Zwieten K, Goode, (No.13) at 758 
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The second period of Sir Philip’s tenure, 2014-2015, is also unlikely to be deemed as an 
instance of fraudulent trading. This is because, although, as concluded in Section 3, Sir 
Philip was fixed on his desire to dispose of BHS, it appears he never intended for BHS to 
fail to meet its liabilities. For whilst he sought to minimise his liability to BHS’ debts by 
selling BHS, he attempted to ensure its continued survival under new ownership. 
Furthermore, given the actions of Sir Philip in personally facilitating RAL’s acquisition 
of (some) working capital, and guaranteeing to make pension contributions for three years 
after ceasing to be BHS’ owner, it is apparent that whilst he was not willing to continue 
taking liability for BHS’ debts nor willing to continue providing all of the working capital 
required by BHS, there was no intention to defraud creditors. Moreover, the sale (and the 
removal of Sir Philip’s assistance) was necessary to enable the renegotiation of BHS’ 
rents to occur – the biggest liability for BHS and stumbling block to it achieving 
sustainability.  
 
The actions of RAL during their tenure of ownership may, however, constitute fraudulent 
trading. Taking the disposal of BHS’ properties first, as with the preference and 
transaction defrauding creditors provisions, it is unlikely that these actions constituted 
fraudulent trading. As concluded above, owing to the proceeds from the property 
disposals being (for the most part) used to partially discharge secured debt, and so 
consequently the proceeds going to creditors, it is apparent that there was no intention to 
defraud BHS’ creditors.  
 
However, RAL’s actions in regards the charging of fees to BHS, and the imposition of 
loans on BHS, are more problematic in regards fraudulent trading. Concerning the 
imposition of fees, it could be argued the by imposing fees on BHS, and using their 
position as directors to ensure payment, RAL were defrauding BHS’ other creditors. 
However, as noted above, given that the fees can, to some degree, be argued as being for 
legitimate services provided, and so made RAL a genuine creditor, they are unlikely to 
be seen as defrauding creditors.  
 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the loans imposed on BHS by RAL, and Dominic 
Chappell in particular, could arguably be deemed as fraudulent trading. In particular, this 
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relates to the £1.5 million interest free loan that was never repaid by Mr Chappell870, and 
the £12 million in loans levied against BHS by RAL, of which only £6 million was 
repaid871. Despite it being noted that other loans were taken out872, these were repaid, and 
so cannot constitute fraudulent trading. However, the other unpaid and partially repaid 
loans could be argued to constitute fraudulent trading if, when they were taken out, 
RAL/Dominic Chappell knew the loans would never be repaid, as this would knowingly 
divest BHS of assets – assets that diligent creditors may have relied on for repayment. 
Given the high evidential barrier required for fraudulent trading, and possibility that RAL 
did not realise that BHS could not continue to pay its debts as a consequence of these 
transactions, it is impossible for this thesis to provide a confident conclusion without 
further evidence as to RAL’s intentions with regards these loans. 
 
Section 4.4(b): Wrongful Trading 
 
The final possible remedy for BHS’ unsecured creditors is the wrongful trading 
provisions set out in s214 Insolvency Act 1986. Given the time period between Sir 
Philip’s sale of BHS and its eventual entry into insolvency, and the fact that BHS 
continued to pay its debts during his tenure of ownership873, s214 will not apply to the 
actions of Sir Philip as the ‘moment of truth’ could not have occurred.  
 
Notwithstanding the inapplicability to Sir Philip Green, s214 does potentially apply to 
RAL as there are several occasions in which the ‘moment of truth’ may have occurred. 
 
 
870 Letter from Dominic Chappell to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committees, 10th June 2016: 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/Dominic-Chappell-to-BIS-and-Work-and-Pensions-Committees-10-
June-2016.pdf; Letter from Edward Parladorio to House of Commons Work and Pensions and 
Business, 14th July 2016: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-
and-pensions/Correspondence/From-Edward-Parladorio-14-07-2016.pdf  
871 Letter from Michael Hitchcock to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committees, 12th June 2016: 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/From-Michael-Hitchcock-1206216.pdf 
872 Letter from Darren Topp to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committees, 21st June 2016: 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/business-innovation-and-
skills/Correspondence/2015-20-Parliament/From-Darren-Topp-re-BHs-collapse-21-06-2016.pdf  
873 Meaning there was not real prospect of BHS entering insolvency at that moment in time 
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The first occasion at which RAL may have identified that the moment of truth had 
occurred is upon their acquisition of BHS. Owing to BHS being a going concern, and the 
large pension deficit, it maybe be arguable that they should have realised BHS could not 
avoid insolvency. However, as stated in evidence submitted to the Select Committee by 
Edward Parladorio874, RAL did not consider BHS to be technically insolvency owing to 
the following factors: 
 
a) £200 million of inter-company debt to was to be written off875 by Arcadia; 
b) Support had been promised to resolve the pension deficit;  
c) Support had also been promised to resolve issues with trade credit insurance;  
d) The available cash resources upon purchasing BHS; 
e) The property that could be disposed of to raise working capital; 
f) The devised turnaround plan for BHS.  
 
Given these factors, and the likelihood that, in experienced and competent hands, BHS’ 
fortunes could have been ‘turned around’, it is unlikely that the moment of truth would 
have occurred upon RAL’s acquisition of BHS as it was still a viable business that could 
continue to pay its creditors from its assets.  
 
The second occasion at which RAL may have breached s214 is after the 2015-16 
Christmas trading period, on account of poor trading conditions. However, given that 
BHS/RAL sought legal advice from Weil Gotshal concerning the possibility of BHS 
having become insolvent876, and no recommendations were forthcoming from this legal 
advice to place BHS into insolvency, it is again unlikely that RAL had reached the 
moment of truth as the legal advice had not yet advocated that course of action.  
 
 
874 Letter from Edward Parladorio to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committees, 14th July 2016; 
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/work-and-
pensions/Correspondence/From-Edward-Parladorio-14-07-2016.pdf  
875 £216 million out of £256 million owed - The Pensions Regulator, Regulatory Intervention 
Report: Issued under section 89 of the Pensions Act 2004 in Relation to the BHS Pension Schemes, 
June 2017 at 20 
876 Letter from Edward Parladorio to the House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, 




The final occasion may have been shortly after BHS had successfully negotiated its CVA, 
as the cash flow forecasts had deteriorated. In particular, there was877:  
 
- A £7 million shortfall over the Easter trading period;  
- The expectation of continued poor trading until September 2016, leading to another £7 
million loss;  
- A £10 million shortfall from the property disposals; and  
- The inability to obtain trade credit, resulting in a further shortfall of £10 million.  
 
Moreover, on 18th April 2016, RAL’s belief that Arcadia would continue to support BHS 
was disabused, when they were informed that Arcadia would no longer continue to 
support the struggling business. It is submitted that, although the poor Easter and 
projected trading performance (combined with BHS’ already precarious financial 
position) were sufficient for RAL to realise that BHS could no longer avoid insolvency, 
the removal of Arcadia’s support meant that the realisation was unavoidable. Indeed, the 
board agreed on 21st April for BHS to enter insolvency after attempts to find new sources 
of credit failed878. However, BHS did not actually enter insolvency until 25th April, owing 
to last minute attempts to sell the company to a trade buyer.  
 
It is submitted that the delay between Arcadia’s confirmed withdrawal of support on 18th 
April, and the agreement to enter into insolvency on 21st April, may not be enough to 
constitute a breach of s214 owing to the attempts to acquire new sources of credit that 
could have provided enough working capital and ensured BHS’ immediate future – 
sources that BHS were indeed advised to seek from Arcadia879. However, given RAL’s 
attempts to transfer £1.5 million to BHS Sweden in the period between agreeing to enter 
insolvency on 21st April and its eventual entry on 25th, it is submitted that despite attempts 
to sell BHS to a trade buyer, RAL knew these did not have any probability of success; 
hence the attempted transfer of the property to BHS Sweden. Consequently, it is 
submitted that the moment of truth occurred on 21st and RAL’s refusal to place BHS into 
 
877 Ibid.  
878 Ibid. 
879 Ibid.  
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insolvency on 21st constitutes a breach of s214 as they knew that BHS had no prospect of 
avoiding insolvency.  
 
Section 5: Conclusions 
 
This chapter has, by analysing Carillion and BHS in two case studies, provided empirical 
evidence as to the effectiveness of the Insolvency Act 1986’s anti-deprivation and 
personal liability provisions. In doing so, this chapter has sought to interrogate the 
conclusions reached in Chapter 3 that these provisions, both singularly and collectively, 
do not provide effective or efficient remedies to unsecured creditors, thereby leaving them 
without sufficient protection.  
 
In case study 1, it was concluded that none of the Insolvency Act’s provisions were 
applicable to the actions of Carillion itself or its directors. With regards the preference 
provisions, it was concluded that the requisite, subjective desire to prefer was not present. 
It was also concluded that there were no instances of a transaction at an undervalue owing 
to either the market value having been received, it being impossible to determine the true 
market value of the transaction or the defence available under s238(5)(a) Insolvency Act 
being applicable. Similarly, owing to the lack of transactions at an undervalue, there were 
no instances of transactions defrauding creditors. Finally, it was also concluded that 
Carillion’s directors did not have an intention to defraud creditors owing to their actions 
being attributable to their dogmatic policy of declaring dividends, and that there was no 
instance of wrongful trading owing to the board placing Carillion into insolvency at the 
same time that the ‘moment of truth’ occurred.  
 
These conclusions come despite, as set out in Section 1, that the actions of Carillion’s 
directors, and the policies adopted and implemented by them, were responsible for 
Carillion’s eventual collapse – reckless policies whose outcome were apparent. 
Consequently, the Insolvency Act provisions are unable to provide Carillion’s unsecured 
creditors with any protection from the acts of its directors. This is as a result of the 
provisions’ inherent restrictions identified in Chapter 3.  
 
In case study 2, concerning BHS, it was concluded that unlike Carillion, it is possible that 
some of the Act’s provisions were applicable to the actions of RAL. Notwithstanding the 
 182 
inapplicability of the preference provisions owing to BHS Sweden not being a creditor, it 
was concluded the transfer to BHS Sweden was potentially a transaction at an undervalue, 
a transaction defrauding creditors, and would also evidence a possible instance of 
wrongful trading.  
 
However, two issues arise from what, prima facie, appears to be an effective application 
of the Insolvency Act’s provisions.  
 
The first issue is that even though several of the provisions appear to be applicable, they 
all apply to a small number of RAL’s actions, meaning that there is substantial overlap 
and repetition in their coverage. For example, as concluded above, the attempted transfer 
of £1.5 million to BHS Sweden is likely to constitute a transaction at an undervalue, a 
transaction defrauding creditors and will also be relevant in proving wrongful trading. 
Hence, despite the appearance of the provisions having broad applicability, only a small 
number of RAL’s actions were caught by them.  
 
Moreover, as also concluded, the provisions have no applicability to Sir Philip Green’s 
actions. This is even though, as also concluded above, Sir Philip engaged in many of the 
same actions as RAL. Additionally, it was also noted that it was Sir Philip’s actions – 
primarily the wholesale removal of BHS’ assets through dividends and fees – that were 
the predominant and long-term causes of BHS’ collapse. Consequently, it is once again 
highlighted that the provisions have limited applicability and failed to adequately protect 
BHS’ creditors.  
 
Finally, it must also be noted that the amounts recovered from any litigation are likely to 
be small. Given nearly all the £1.5 million transferred to BHS Sweden was returned, it 
would not be possible to recover a substantial amount from that transaction. Moreover, 
whilst it would be possible to recover the unpaid loans and fees wrongly charged for the 
disposal of BHS’ properties, the amounts recoverable (a combined £8.5 million), are 
unlikely to substantially improve the creditors’ final dividend owing to near £1 billion 
owed to creditors. Also relevant are the litigation expenses necessary to recover the 
assets880 and the fact that, owing to RAL and Dominic Chappell’s precarious financial 
 
880 Which this thesis is unable to estimate, but are likely to be substantial  
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positions, the likelihood that very little would actually be recoverable from RAL or its 
directors as the liquidator would not have priority to any of RAL’s assets. Indeed, given 
these factors, it may transpire that any litigation costs would outweigh any sums revested 
in BHS. In regard to liability for wrongful trading, as a result of the discretionary nature 
of the court’s powers, it is difficult to predict what, if any, award the court would make. 
Given these factors, it would potentially be difficult for the liquidators to acquire the 
necessary funding owing to the inherent lack of uncertainty as to how much could actually 
be recovered.  
 
From these two case studies, it becomes apparent that the anti-deprivation and personal 
liability provisions are only operable in ‘clear cut’ instances of unacceptable company 
and director behaviour. As demonstrated by Carillion, despite it being clear that its 
directors’ actions actively led to the unsecured creditors not having their debts discharged, 
the Insolvency Act’s provisions had no applicability. As also demonstrated by BHS, 
although RAL were clearly in in breach of the provisions, it is unlikely that any 
meaningful amounts will be recovered. Indeed, the primary and long-term causes of BHS’ 
collapse – the poor business strategy and removal of assets instigated by Sir Philip Green 
– are outside of the scope of the Insolvency Act provisions altogether.  
 
The case studies also make clear that two predominant issues affect unsecured creditors 
in the event of insolvency. First, the use of delayed payments and reverse factoring, 
enables companies to substantially increase the credit that can be made available to them, 
and thereby place a greater risk of non-payment on to the shoulders of unsecured 
creditors. As noted, whilst there are statutory provisions to enable unsecured creditors to 
charge interest after 30 days of non-payment881, they are largely ineffective. Moreover, 
whilst there may be instances of wrongful trading should debts be incurred after the 
‘moment of truth’, such instances are likely to extremely infrequent. The Insolvency Act 
provisions also do not otherwise provide any means of protecting unsecured creditors 
from such practices. Hence, should a company engage in the widespread use of delayed 
payments and then enter insolvency, it is the unsecured creditors who will take the brunt 
of any shortfall in distributable assets.  
 
881 Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998; Late Payment of Commercial Debts 
Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/1674) 
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The second issue, the excessive declaration of dividends, ensures that should such a policy 
be adopted by a company that eventually enters insolvency, the consequential a depletion 
of assets will result in there being insufficient assets to discharge unsecured creditor debts 
– compounding the use of delayed payments. As noted, although such a policy may be a 
breach of s830 Companies Act 2006, such policies are not caught by the Insolvency Act 
1986 provisions unless there is substantial evidence that the dividend was a transaction 
defrauding creditors, as occurred in Sequana. Owing to the high evidential barrier to 
establishing that a dividend amounted to a transaction defrauding creditors, as seen in the 
two case studies, it is unlikely that the Insolvency Act’s provisions will be able to protect 
unsecured creditors from such policies.  
 
It is therefore apparent that the conclusions reached in Chapter 3 have been substantiated 
by the empirical evidence gathered in this chapter.  
 
It can be seen that the conclusions on the remedial limitations of provisions – the reliance 
on court judgments to revest property in the now insolvent company – are proven in the 
empirical data. In the case of Carillion, no remedies are available. Moreover, although 
RAL and Dominic Chappell are likely to be in breach of the provisions, it is unlikely any 
substantial amounts will be recoverable due to their limited assets and the liquidator’s 
lack of priority to those already insubstantial assets. Hence, the liquidator faces the 
prospect of succeeding and being unable to enforce any successful judgments.  
 
It is also apparent that the substantive limitations of the provisions are also evidenced in 
the empirical evidence. As seen with Carillion, it was the lack of a relevant subjective 
intention – or the difficulties in proving the relevant intention – which resulted in the 
preference, transaction defrauding creditors and fraudulent trading provisions being 
inapplicable. Moreover, despite intention not preventing the transaction defrauding 
creditors and fraudulent trading provisions being applicable to BHS, this is only because 
the evidence available for the actions of RAL was readily available and clearly 
demonstrated the relevant intentions. Thus, as with the remedial limitations, the 
conclusions of Chapter 3 have been borne out in the empirical evidence of this chapter.  
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Finally, the evidential limitations have also been proven. As seen with both Carillion and 
BHS, proving that a transaction was at an undervalue is extremely difficult to do so. 
Taking the dividends declared by both companies as an example, although these 
transactions were extremely detrimental to both companies, and no consideration was 
received, it is likely to be impossible to prove that they were at an undervalue either 
because the defence under s238(5)(a) is available, or because it is impossible to determine 
if there was an undervalue. Similarly, the sale of BHS’ properties to Sir Philip and their 
subsequent leaseback, despite being disadvantageous and costing BHS more in the long-
term, do not fall within the definition of a transaction at an undervalue – evidencing the 
limitation identified in Chapter 3. 
 
Consequently, given the limitations of the Insolvency Act, Chapters 5 and 6 will analyse 
how the resulting trust may provide a mechanism through which creditors may increase 
the size of the asset pool, and thereby minimise the impact of any losses. 
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Chapter 5: The Potential Uses of the Resulting Trust in 
Liquidation  
 
The resulting trust is a category of trust whereby property transferred from one party (the 
transferor) to another party (the recipient) ‘jumps back’ to the party that transferred the 
property882. This is achieved through the recipient holding the property on trust for the 
transferor, who can then order the recipient – who is now a trustee – to transfer the 
property back to himself. Thus, the resulting trust is an equitable mechanism that returns 
the legal interest in property to the party who owned the property before it came into the 
recipient’s hands. This occurs where the transferor gratuitously transferred the property 
to the recipient or provided the means through which the recipient was able to acquire the 
property883. 
 
According to many commentators884, resulting trusts fall into the two classes identified 
by Megarry J in Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No2)885: the ‘automatic’ and ‘presumed’ resulting 
trusts886. Under the ‘automatic’ resulting trust, a trust arises where there is a failure of an 
express trust887 or there is an excess of trust assets after the terms of the trust are carried 
out and no gift over is present. Under the ‘presumed’ resulting trust, a trust arises 
whenever a party gratuitously transfers property to another or provides the necessary 
funds for another party to purchase property. In both of these contexts, should it be proven 
that the transfer of property or purchase moneys were intended to be a gift or loan then 
the presumptions will be rebutted, and no trust imposed888.  
 
 
882 Gardner S, An Introduction to the Law of Trusts, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2011) at 288; Millett 
P, Restitution and Constructive Trusts, (1998) LQR 399 at 401. Alternatively, it is treating the 
parties’ relationship at an earlier time - Worthington S, Back Door Security Devices, (1999) IL 
153 at 153 
883 Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees, 19th edn (London: LexisNexis, 
2016) at 431  
884 Rickett C and Grantham R, Resulting Trusts: The Trust Nature of the Failing Trust Cases, 
(2000) LQR 15 at 15; Gardner S, An Introduction, (No.882); Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton: 
(No.883); Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) 
885 [1973] 3 WLR 744 
886 Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No2) (1974) Ch 269 at 289 
887 Such as one of the three certainties being absent 
888 Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq 92 
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Megarry J’s classification of the resulting trust faces two issues: Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s criticism in Westdeutsche889, where his Lordship concluded that no 
distinction should be drawn between trusts arising from the failure of an express trust and 
transfer of property, and the consequential effect that Megarry J’s classification is no 
longer the official parlance for classifying the resulting trust. Notwithstanding these 
issues, it nevertheless remains a useful mechanism for describing and understanding the 
two categories of resulting trust890 - even if it is not conceptually correct. The 
categorisation will therefore be adopted by this thesis for merely classifying the various 
forms of the resulting trust. The alternative, and more authoritative, classification put 
forward by Lord Browne-Wilkinson likewise identifies the two ‘circumstances’ in which 
the resulting trust arises, but refuses to label them in the same manner - making it more 
challenging to effectively discuss the resulting trust and distinguish their uses891. 
However, through this classification it can be discerned that the resulting trust is a 
mechanism through which property can be recovered from the possession of another and 
returned to its original owner. This is as a consequence of the beneficial interest in the 
property being ‘retained’ by the transferor892 and not being transferred to the recipient. 
 
As identified in Chapters 1 and 3, this thesis is analysing whether there is an alternative 
and more effective means of protecting the unsecured creditor from the ill effects of the 
liquidation process than those set out under the Insolvency Act 1986. It is submitted that 
the resulting trust may provide a mechanism through which property can either be 
returned to the company’s asset pool for distribution through the liquidator893, or by 
segregating property that would otherwise constitute part of the company’s asset pool and 
then returning the property directly to what would otherwise be an unsecured creditor. 
This latter use of the resulting trust would prevent assets falling into the clutches of any 
floating charges created over the company’s general assets by segregating them from the 
company’s asset pool. In either form, the retention of a beneficial interest allows for the 
 
889 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 708 
890 See Section 3.2 of this chapter. Gardner S, An Introduction, (No.882) at 288; Hayton D, 
Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 434 
891 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 708 
892 Calnan R, Proprietary Rights, (No.71) at 83; Glister J and Lee J, Hanbury & Martin’s Modern 
Equity, 21st edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) at 228; Lavelle v Lavelle [2004] 2 FCR 418 
at 13-14; Loi K, Quistclose Trusts and Romalpa Clauses: Substance and Nemo Dat in Corporate 
Insolvency, (2012) LQR 412 at 416, 417 
893 This distribution would be in accordance with the statutory priority of distribution 
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reacquisition of property. As concluded in Chapter 2, the unsecured creditors of a 
company in liquidation are justified in receiving such protection, and whilst the resulting 
trust may not operate as a true unsecured creditor protection894, it does have the potential 
to increase the asset return rates to creditors. It is also concluded in Chapter 6 that the 
resulting trust is capable of meeting the three requirements for an improved creditor 
protection set out in Chapter 3: returning assets to the company, having clear and 
predictable rules, and being attractive to third party litigation funders895. 
 
The primary justification for analysing the resulting trust in this thesis, as opposed to the 
express or constructive trust, is that little analysis has been undertaken into the potential 
use of the resulting trust in the context of liquidation. Indeed, the existing literature is 
limited to reviewing the negative impact of the resulting trust896, as opposed to the 
potential positive outcomes it may provide for the unsecured creditors. This was best seen 
in the analysis of Tribe897 and Tarling898, both of whom limited their analysis to the 
potential negative impacts of the resulting trust. This thesis’ analysis of the resulting trust 
is therefore seeking to fill a lacuna in the existing literature.  
 
The Potential Impact of the Trust in Insolvency 
 
The potential use of the trust generally within the context of insolvency is well 
documented. First of all, as noted above, the trust grants the beneficiary a right in rem899. 
The beneficiary is thus able to assert their rights to property against the world at large, 
and obtain priority over all others who may have a claim to the property. Within the 
resulting trust this is because the beneficial interest was retained by the transferor900. 
Furthermore, with the resulting trust arising upon the occurrence of the transfer, rather 
 
894 See Chapter 6 Section 4 
895 See Chapter 6 Section 3.1  
896 McCormack G, Proprietary Claims and Insolvency, (No.188); Tribe J, Who Would be a 
Creditor? Prest in the Supreme Court and the Effects of Trusts on Insolvency, (2013) 3 CRI 91; 
Tarling R, The Resulting Trust and the Unsecured Creditor, (2016) CL 299 
897 Tribe J, Who Would be a Creditor?, (No.896) 
898 Ibid; Tarling R, The Resulting Trust and the Unsecured Creditor, (2016) CL 299 
899 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 705; Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74; 
Moffatt G, Trusts Law, 5th edn (Cambridge: CUP, 2009) at 796; McCormack G, Proprietary 
Claims and Insolvency, (No.188) at 2; Virgo G, The Principles of Equity and Trusts, 3rd edn 
(Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 212 
900 Calnan R, Proprietary Rights, (No.71) at 83 
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than from the date that judgment is given901, there is no gap in time in which the resulting 
trust is not imposed, and will have priority over all subsequent events902. This is in marked 
contrast to the anti-deprivation provisions analysed in Chapter 3, where it was concluded 
that the available remedies are greatly undermined by the need for a judgment to give 
them effect – thereby preventing them from having priority should claims arise between 
the relevant act and the handing down of the court’s judgment.  
 
Consequently, assets subject to a resulting trust will have priority over any subsequent 
security interests created by the recipient, and so will be made available to the beneficiary 
and not any secured creditors903. Indeed, s283(3)(a) Insolvency Act 1986 explicitly 
acknowledges that assets subject to a valid trust do not form part of the company’s asset 
pool904, and the onset of insolvency can never form the basis of querying the beneficial 
interest of the beneficiary905. Moreover, the transferred property is not available to any 
individuals other than the transferor906. Finally, the priority afforded beneficiaries can be 
justified by the lack of discretion afforded to the judiciary907. All forms of trust recognised 
in England arise upon the occurrence of identifiable facts, which is in contrast to the 
remedial constructive trust908, which arises at the discretion of the court. The 
beneficiaries’ priority can thereby be justified as an operation of law, rather than the 
discretionary whims of the judiciary, and so is both predictable and morally 
permissible909. Thus, the trust generally has previously been used, or attempted to be used, 
as a device to assist unsecured creditors who would otherwise lose out under the 
insolvency regime by not having the privileged position as a secured or preferential 
creditor910. The resulting trust, however, has not been analysed in such a context.  
  
 
901 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 731-732; Evans S, Property, Proprietary Remedies 
and Insolvency: Conceptualism or Candour, (2000) 5 Deakin LR 31 at 35. However, this is 
questioned at 36.  
902 Except for the restrictions imposed by the rules of tracing 
903 Tribe J, Who Would be a Creditor?, (No.896) at 93 
904 McCormack G, Proprietary Claims and Insolvency, (No.188) at 7; s283(3)(a) Insolvency Act 
1986 and Heritable Reversionary Company Ltd v Millar [1892] AC 588 at 614:  
905 Oakley A, Proprietary Claims and Their Priority in Insolvency, (1995) 54 CLJ 377 at 379 
906 Moffatt G, Trusts Law, (No.899) at 795; Cork K, Report, (No.2) at para 1045 
907 Allton N, The Boundaries of Proprietary Claims, (1997) 13 QUTLJ 276 at 277; Oakley A, 
Proprietary Claims, (No.905) at 380 
908 Re Polly Peck No2 [1998] 3 All ER 812 
909 See Chapter 6 Section 4  
910 Moffatt G, Trusts Law, (No.899) at 796 
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It must also be noted, however, that the use of the trust is not always beneficial for 
unsecured creditors in instances of insolvency, as a consequence of the trust not only 
returning property in one direction. As stated above, the trust can be used to return 
property transferred by an insolvent company, which can then be distributed to the 
unsecured creditors911. However, should the resulting trust arise over property that would 
otherwise form part of the asset pool, that property would no longer be available to the 
general body of creditors912. Whilst it is argued that this can be justified in many instances 
as it merely prevents parties from becoming unsecured creditors in the first place, it is 
undeniable that it has potentially negative impacts upon the general body of creditors and 
other interested, innocent third parties913.  
 
Given this potential of the resulting trust to both help and hinder the position of unsecured 
creditors, and the lack of previous analysis, this chapter will examine how the resulting 
trust can be utilised within the liquidation process for the benefit of the unsecured 
creditors914. Following from this introduction, it will examine both how property can be 
returned to the insolvent company and how it can be returned directly to potential 
unsecured creditors. Due to the large amount of analysis required, it will focus solely on 
the potential uses and whether or not the resulting trust can provide liquidators or third 
parties with a predictable and easy to establish mechanism of assisting unsecured creditor. 
Chapter 6 will then examine the limitations and effectiveness of these possibilities, and 
conclude whether or not it meets the requirements set out in Chapter 3 for an alternative 
mechanism for protecting unsecured creditors.  
 
This chapter adopts the following structure. Section 1.1 analyses the theoretical 
underpinning of the resulting trust and concludes that it relies upon Equity ‘imputing’ an 
intention to the transfer of property. Section 2 then analyses the purchase price and 
gratuitous resulting trusts, concluding how and when they might be utilised in the context 
of liquidation. Section 3 considers the automatic and Quistclose trust.  
 
 
911 Evans S, Property, (No.901) at 42 
912 McCormack G, Proprietary Claims and Insolvency, (No.188) at 14-15;  
913 Watt G, Trusts and Equity, 8th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 145;  
914 Worthington S, Back Door, (No.882) at 161 
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Section 1 - Defining the Resulting Trust915 
 
Section 1.1 - The Role of Presumptions 
 
It is unquestionable, when reviewing the authorities and commentary, that the resulting 
trust is predicated upon on a number of legal presumptions916. These applicable 
presumptions were originally developed by the Courts of Equity to resolve quarrels over 
the ownership of property, and have survived the fusion of the Common Law and 
Chancery Courts through the Judicature Acts917.  
 
These presumptions formed, and continue to form, the method by which Equity is able to 
supplement and navigate a clear way through any uncertain factual matrices the judiciary 
encounter, and provide for a default resolution to a dispute918. This role of the resulting 
trust presumptions was recognised by Lord Upjohn919, where his Lordship commented 
that “in reality the so-called presumption of a resulting trust is no more than a long stop 
to provide an answer where the relevant facts and circumstances fail to reach a solution.”  
 
Thus, the resulting trust operates as the default mechanism for determining who is the 
correct owner of transferred property, and does so through a series of presumptions. In 
doing so, it plays a fundamental role in determining property rights, and who is entitled 
to property. In the context of this thesis this is the determination of what will, and what 
will not, form part of the insolvent company’s asset pool.  
 
It must be acknowledged at this stage, however, that the presumptions can be rebutted 
provided that a party, usually (but not always) the recipient, adduces sufficient evidence 
to rebut the presumption that the transferor retains a beneficial interest in the property920. 
 
915 Although some have sought to redefine the resulting trust as arising to prevent unjust 
enrichment, this has been almost universally rejected by the English judiciary 
916 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53; Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432; Westdeutsche (No.186); 
Chin J, Rabinowitz A and Quinn A, The Presumptions of Resulting Trust and Beneficiary 
Designations; What’s Intention Got to Do with it?, (2016) 54 Alta LR 41 at 44 
917 Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875 
918 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 755 
919 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291 at 313; see also Re Cochrane's Settlement Trusts [1955] 1 
All E.R. 222 
920 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 708 
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Although analysed fully in Chapter 6, it can briefly be stated that this thesis’ submission 
is that merely casting doubt over the transferor’s intentions, rather than proving an ulterior 
intention, is insufficient to rebut the presumption. Instead there must be actual evidence 
of a loan or gift921.  
 
The theoretical foundations of the presumptions made by Equity are two key conceptions 
over transfers of property. Under the first, the presumption against gifts, it is presumed 
that outside of the relationships that form the doctrine of advancement922, an owner of 
property does not intend a transfer of property to form a gift923. Alternatively, Equity 
concludes that the transferor must have intended to keep the property for himself unless 
he has received consideration in return for the transfer of the property924. One of the 
reasons for Equity making this conclusion is to prevent property being misappropriated 
against the owner’s consent, and providing a mechanism for him to recover it should this 
occur925. Equity’s conclusion can be justified when contrasted with the doctrine of 
advancement, where the law presumes a gift rather than retention of an equitable 
interest926. It is submitted that as advancement applies to transfers between close family 
members, it is correct for Equity to presume such transfers of property are gifts because 
of the obligations and emotional connections between the parties. However, once a 
transfer occurs between more distantly connected parties without the same obligations or 
emotional connections, Equity cannot presume that a gift took place as very few 
individuals are of a sufficiently generous personality to make such transfers927.     
 
Similarly, under the second conception, Equity also presumes that should a transferor 
provide the purchase moneys for the acquisition of property, he intends to take a 
beneficial interest in the property acquired, with the property being beneficially owned in 
 
921 Standing v Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282; Aveling v Knipe (1815) 19 Ves 441 
922 See Bennett v Bennett (1879) 10 ChD 474; Tinker v Tinker [1970]; Collier v Collier [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1095  
923 Pearce R and Warren B, Pearce and Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations, 7th edn 
(Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 154; Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (Oxford: OUP, 1997) at 12. See also 
Megarry VC in Re Sick and Funeral Society of St John’s Sunday School, [1973] Ch 51; Hackney 
J, Understanding Equity and Trusts, (London: Fontana Press, 1989) at 148-149 
924 Ali v Khan [2002] EWCA Civ 974  
925 Lynch v Burke [1995] 2 IR 159 
926 Collier v Collier [2002] EWCA Civ 1095  
927 Stubbins M, The Gratuitous Transfer and Petrodel: Reform or no Reform?, [2016] 22 (5) 
Trusts and Trustees 516   
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proportion to the contributions made928. As with the first conception, this too can be 
justified on the basis that not all parties are of a generous spirit.  
 
Having established the centrality of the presumptions to the resulting trust, it remains 
necessary to consider exactly what is being presumed by Equity. Despite consensus 
existing over the presumptions, debate rages both in the authorities and scholarly 
commentary about what form the presumptions take, with the nature of the presumptions 
affecting the applicability and utility of the resulting trust. There are two predominant 
formulations being available for how the presumptions underpinning the resulting trust 
should be conceptualised929: the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ formulations930.  
 
The first, the ‘positive’ formulation, is that the transferor intended to retain a beneficial 
interest, and so the recipient holds on trust until the transferor demands the return of the 
property. This version of the presumptions was authoritatively adopted by Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Westdeutsche931, where he referred to the ‘common intention’ of the parties 
that the recipient should not benefit from the transfer of property932. As his Lordship 
stated, the presumption is “giving effect to the common intention of the parties. A 
resulting trust is not imposed by law against the intentions of the trustee (as is a 
constructive trust) but gives effect to his presumed intention.”933 This formulation has a 
large degree of academic support934, most notably from Mee935, who concludes that it fits 
best within the understanding the courts have historically adopted.  
 
Alternatively, and in stark contrast, Lord Millett has put forward that the presumption 
arises as a result of the lack of intention to benefit the recipient – the ‘negative’ 
formulation. Lord Millett’s view states that the transferor must have not intended the 
 
928 Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq Cas 92 at 93  
929 Gardner S, An Introduction, (No.882) at 65; see also Rickett C and Grantham R, Resulting 
Trusts, (No.884) at 16 
930 A third formulation, the ‘factual’ formulation, has been proffered by Swadling W, Explaining 
Resulting Trusts, (2008) 124 LQR. However, this was resoundingly rejected by Mee J, Presumed 
Resulting Trusts, Intention and Declaration, (2014) CLJ 86 and so will not be considered by this 
thesis.  
931 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 708 
932 Standing v. Bowring (1885) 31 Ch.D. 282 at 289 
933 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 708 
934 Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 288; Rickett CEF and Grantham R, Resulting Trusts 
(No.884) at 18-19 
935 Mee J, Presumed Resulting Trusts, Intention and Declaration, (2014) CLJ 86 
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recipient to benefit from the transfer. This means there is no need for the presumption to 
conclude that the transferor intended to retain a beneficial interest. In setting out this 
formulation936, his Lordship adopted Chambers’937 thesis that there is an absence of 
intention for the recipient to benefit - “It is equity’s response to the receipt of property by 
someone who was not intended to have the benefit of the that property.”938 Under this 
formulation, the imposition of the resulting trust therefore responds to, and prevents, the 
potential unjust enrichment of the recipient939. According to its advocates, adopting a 
negative formulation corresponds best with the conclusions reached by the courts and 
accounts for instances in which the transferor neither intended, nor were in a position to 
actively intend, the retention of beneficial interest940.   
 
Both formulations of the presumption, notwithstanding their respective appeal, can be 
criticised as failing to adequately describe what is occurring within the resulting trust. 
The ‘positive’ formulation can be questioned on the basis that it is ascribing intentions to 
the recipient of the property that do not exist941. This is because whilst it can, in the 
majority of cases, be correct to presume that the transferor of property will have intended 
on retaining a beneficial interest in the property, as it is in their clear interests to do so as 
a result of the value contained in the beneficial interest, the same cannot be said for the 
recipient942. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely, considering the non-altruistic nature of the 
majority of individuals, that they would intend to deprive themselves of the asset and its 
value943. Instead, it is far more likely that they would perceive the transfer as a gift or loan, 
and so intend to take the beneficial title to the property.  
 
Equally as problematic, resulting trusts have been found to arise even where the transferor 
did not intend to retain a beneficial interest944. For example, in Vandervell v IRC945, Mr 
Vandervell thought that he had disposed of the beneficial interest in the property when he 
 
936 Air Jamaica v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399; Twinsectra v Yardley [2000] WTLR 527 
937 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) 
938 Ibid, at 33 
939 Mee J, Presumed, (No.935) at 86 
940 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 21 
941 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 714; Virgo G, The Principles (No.899) at 213; 
Millett P, Restitution, (No.882) at 401 
942 Gardner S, An Introduction, (No.882) at 293 
943 Virgo G, The Principles of Equity and Trusts, 4th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2020) at 243 
944 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291; Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 435 
945 [1967] 2 AC 291 
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made a gift of 100,000 shares. Had he retained an interest in the shares, then he would 
have been liable for stamp duty. Despite the protestations of Mr Vandervell that there was 
no was intention to retain a beneficial interest, the House of Lords held the property was 
subject to a resulting trust. Similarly in Re Vinogradoff946, the transferor could not have 
intended to retain a beneficial interest in the property as the transfer was between a 
grandmother and 7-year-old granddaughter – meaning that the granddaughter was too 
young to be a trustee. Thus, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s formulation fails to adequately 
deal with the parties involved in the transfer of property, and leaves a large number of 
factual matrices to fall outside the theoretical framework adopted.  
 
Chambers’ formulation, although it overcomes the issues of the recipients’ intentions by 
stating that only the transferor’s lack of intention to benefit is relevant947, also fails to 
accord with reality. For all the faults associated with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
formulation, it is submitted that should the transferor be asked subsequently to the transfer 
occurring what their intentions were, they would respond that they had a right to the 
property because ‘it is still mine’ – that they would frame their intention positively and 
have intended to retain an interest in the property. It is submitted unlikely, as individuals 
normally identify property ownership positively, that the transferor would, on their own 
initiative, formulate their response along the terms of ‘I did not want them to benefit from 
the property’. Thus, they would state ‘it is mine’ rather than ‘it is not theirs’.  
 
Mee also notes that the negative formulation of intention fails to adopt the language 
utilised by the courts948. He submits that Chambers is incorrect when he concludes that 
the courts are confused on the issue, and flipflop between inconsistent statements on 
nature of the presumption. Instead, he states that the courts’ inconsistent language is as a 
consequence of them having to choose between two options: whether there is a retention 
of beneficial interest or a gift/loan949. In electing between these two options, they must 
use language in both a positive and negative formulation without necessarily being 
confused on the issue. As seen in Lavelle v Lavelle950, where Lord Phillips MR used both 
 
946 [1935] WN 68 
947 Mee J, Presumed, (No.935) at 100 
948 Ibid, at 102 
949 Ibid, at 102-103 
950 [2004] 2 FCR 418  
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a negative and positive formulation in two consecutive paragraphs951, his Lordship still 
concluded that the positive formulation was correct. Thus, the negative formulation fails 
to accord with the historical view set out by judiciary. 
 
Given the fundamental issues facing the alternative formulations of the presumptions 
underpinning the resulting trust, it is submitted that an alternative formulation is required 
and should be adopted by this thesis. Consequently, the formulation adopted is that 
acknowledged by Virgo952 and adopted by the House of Lords/Supreme Court in relation 
to the common intention constructive trust953: imputed intention. Instead of the courts 
attempting to determine what the party actually intended through an inference, imputing 
an intention involves the court determining what a party would have intended had they 
considered the matter954. In imputing an intention, the courts are assisted by not requiring 
any evidence of the transferor’s actions or statements, other than that the property was 
transferred, to establish the existence of a resulting trust955, although evidence will still 
be required to rebut the presumption.    
 
In the words of Lord Neuberger, the difference between an inference and imputation can 
be described thus: 
 
“An inferred intention is one which is objectively deduced to be the 
subjective actual intention of the parties, in the light of their actions and 
statements. An imputed intention is one which is attributed to the parties, 
even though no such actual intention can be deduced from their actions 
and statements, and even though they had no such intention. Imputation 
involves concluding what the parties would have intended, whereas 




951 Ibid, at [13] and [14] 
952 Virgo G, The Principles of Equity and Trusts, 4th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2020) at 245; see also 
Rickett CEF and Grantham R, Resulting Trusts, (No.884) at 19 
953 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17; Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 
954 Pawlowski M, Imputing a Common Intention in Single Ownership Cases, (2015) 1 TL 3 at 4  
955 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, per Lord Neuberger at 126 
956  Ibid, at 126 
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Hence, by imputing an intention, the courts are able to sidestep many of the issues 
outlined above with the traditional formulations, even if in practice, rather than theory, 
the difference may only be minor957. Firstly, the imputed intention would be that of the 
transferor and the transferor alone958. It would be that had the transferor considered where 
the beneficial interest was to go, it would remain with himself, and so the recipient’s 
intentions are no longer relevant. Thus, a realistic presumption is used to establish the 
resulting trust, rather than the unrealistic intentions ascribed to recipients under the 
Westdeutsche formulation.  In doing so, a greater level of predictability would also be 
provided, as the transferor’s imputed intention will always be the same – the retention of 
the beneficial interest.  
 
Secondly, the shortcomings associated with Chambers’ negative formulation too are 
avoided. As noted above, Chambers’ formulation can be criticised as attributing 
intentions to the transferor that are unlikely, and for failing to formulate the presumption 
in a positive manner. The imputed form of intention would do away with the need theorise 
the presumption in a negative form, and would instead be a positive intention to retain the 
beneficial interest – a formulation of intention that better accords with the actual thoughts 
of transferors and also fits within the long history of authorities that have categorised the 
intention positively.    
 
Finally, imputation of intention would assist in explaining the imposition of the resulting 
trust where the transferor has failed to effectively dispose of the beneficial interest. As set 
out above, in Vandervell v IRC, Mr Vandervell intended to dispose of his beneficial 
interest so as not to be liable for stamp duty. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence 
to rebut the presumption of resulting trust as his intentions were known. However, what 
was not known were his intentions once it was established that he had failed to effectively 
dispose of the property. By imputing the intention that he would have intended to retain 
the beneficial interest (as the value of the asset outweighed the amount due under stamp 
duty, it would have been illogical to presume Mr Vandervell would wish to compound 
 
957 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 per at 34, 58. see also Piska N, Intention, Fairness and the 
Presumption of Resulting Trust after Stack v Dowden, [2008] 71(1) Modern Law Review 120 at 
128 
958 This is in keeping with the common intention constructive cases where the relevant intention 
is that of the legal owner of the property.  
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his losses by giving up the asset), a justification for the resulting trust can be established 
that does not fall foul of contradictory evidence.  
 
Thus, the imputation of intention would fulfil the resulting trust’s role as a “default 
mechanism, whose function it is to fill in evidential lacunae as to the location of the 
beneficial interest…”959 by “filling in the missing elements.”960 This is done because in 
the absence of any indication from the parties' own words or conduct as to their intentions 
regarding the quantum of their beneficial ownership, the only recourse left to the court 
was to undertake its own assessment of what the parties must have intended961, subject to 
contrary evidence. As the only evidence may be the existence of the transfer, the standard 
imputed intention of a retention of a beneficial interest will apply to these situations.  
 
Once the presumption has arisen, and an intention for the transferor to retain the beneficial 
interest is imputed, then provided the intention is not successfully rebutted962, Equity 
responds by imposing a resulting trust by operation of law. Therefore, the presumptions 
do not themselves lead to the imposition of a resulting trust – it is merely a fact pattern to 
which Equity responds through the imposition of a resulting trust963. Even Swadling, who 
rejects the notion that the resulting trust presumptions are based upon intention, has 
accepted964 that the presumptions have an extremely limited role, and do not themselves 
give rise to a resulting trust. 
 
Notwithstanding the advantages of imputing an intention, neither it, nor any of the 
alternative formulations, can overcome one fundamental criticism: that presumptions 
never truly resemble the actual intentions of the transferor965. For obvious reasons, a 
presumption of intention, as it is not based upon evidence, as the evidence is unavailable, 
cannot represent the transferor’s true intentions.  
 
 
959 Rickett CEF and Grantham R, Resulting Trusts, (No.884) at 20 
960 Pawlowski M, Imputing, (No.954) at 4  
961 Oxley v Hiscox [2004] EWCA Civ 546 
962 See Chapter 6  
963 Mee J, (No.935); Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 288; Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, 
(No.923) at 33 and 38-39; Penner J, Resulting Trusts and Unjust Enrichment: Three 
Controversies, in Mitchell C, Constructive and Resulting Trusts, (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 237, at 
255 
964 Swadling W, A New Role for the Resulting Trust?, (1996) 16 LS 110 at 115 
965  Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 760 
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Gardner has criticised the adequacy of the presumptions, and suggests that they originally 
accorded with the intentions of Medieval landowners, who did not intend to transfer land 
as a gift but as a means of keeping it safe whilst they were crusading, and who also had 
the overarching intention of creating or retaining their dynastic estates. However, this no 
longer accords with the intentions of the general population966. It is claimed that in 
modern society the presumption that giving away property in the absence of consideration 
is indicative of there not being a gift is ‘counter-facilitative’ and ‘wrong’967. This is 
particularly the case since the adoption of fairer inheritance practices, where females and 
younger sons can now expect to inherit in equal shares with the eldest male child.  
 
This thesis submits that this argument is wrong, however968. For whilst it is true there has 
been some evolution in the priorities of owners of land that have seen a liberalising of 
intentions, the majority of individuals, particularly when transferring property to 
strangers, do not intend to freely give away their property. Instead, the default position of 
most people is to retain ownership of the property. Furthermore, even where people do in 
contemporary society give property away gratuitously, such as their personal data, they 
expect something in return, such access to a social media platform or search engine. 
People have not yet evolved into entirely altruistic beings. Finally, although Gardner is 
correct that there has been a change in how property is distributed upon death, the law 
has (to a limited extent) already responded to this through the presumption of 
advancement, and the presumption that transfer by fathers to children are gifts969. Hence, 
the existing presumptions, including the law of advancement, are correct and continue to 
reflect society’s attitudes to property transfers.  
 
It has also been suggested by Chambers that rather than rely on presumptions, the courts 
should infer the intentions of the transferor on a case by case basis from the available 
facts970. Problematically, however, in many cases, as is shown in Section 2, it is 
impossible to interpret or establish the intentions of the transferor from the little evidence 
 
966 Chin J, Rabinowitz A and Quinn A, The Presumptions (No.916) at 46 
967 Gardner S, An Introduction, (No.882) at 65-66 
968 Rickett C and Grantham R, Resulting Trusts, (No.884) at 17 - the presumption “remains 
eminently sensible today." 
969 Re Roberts [1946] Ch 1.  
970 Chambers R, Is There a Presumption of Resulting Trust? In Mitchell C, Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts, (Oxford, OUP, 2010) 267 at 270-271 
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available. Should the judiciary be empowered to arbitrarily infer the intentions of the 
transferor in each individual case with insufficient evidence, it would become impossible 
for the parties to presume where the beneficial interest in the property would rest, and 
litigation would become an extremely risky roll of the dice. By utilising the presumptions, 
even if they are imperfect, parties to the transfer are able to know who shall have the 
beneficial interest by default, and then make an assessment of whether there is sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption. This is especially necessary in commercial contexts, 
where the intentions of the parties are kept purposefully vague and unknown so as to 
obtain a competitive advantage over rivals and suppliers.  
 
Section 2 - The Purchase Price and Gratuitous Transfers Resulting Trusts and Their 
Potential Use  
 
Section 2 of this chapter analyses two of the three forms of resulting trust - the purchase 
price resulting trust and gratuitous transfer resulting trust - and how they can be utilised 
by the liquidator or potential creditor to increase return rates. Section 3 analyses the 
automatic resulting trust separately. In doing so, this section will also examine how 
imputing an intention to the transferor’s actions, rather than implying an intention, 
simplifies the process of imposing a resulting trust. It will also identify how the resulting 
trust may be utilised by a liquidator to increase the size of an insolvent company’s asset 
pool, and how third parties may use it to prevent themselves becoming unsecured 
creditors, thereby reducing the company’s asset pool.  
 
Section 2.1 - Purchase Price Resulting Trusts 
 
Equity presumes that when one party makes a contribution towards the purchase price of 
property, the contributor of the moneys intends to retain a beneficial interest in the 
property. Thus, it is presumed that the provider does not intend the recipients to take the 
property beneficially, as they provided the moneys in the character of a purchaser as 
opposed to a lender971. In Dyer v Dyer972 the Court of Chancery were explicit that if one 
 
971 Wray v Steele (1814) 2 Ves and B 388; Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196.; see also 
Cullen E, Stack v Dowden: an End to Uncertainty?, (2008) Insolvency Intelligence 43 at 43 
972 Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox EQ Cas 92; Ebrand v Dancer (1880) 2 Cas in Ch 26; Wheeler v 
Smith (1860) 1 Giff 300. 
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party supplies some or all of the purchase moneys, which is then used to purchase 
property in the name of a third party, the provider of the purchase moneys obtains an 
equitable interest in proportion to their contribution. The principle set out in Dyer v Dyer 
was reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Westdeutsche973. 
 
Purchase price resulting trusts, unlike gratuitous transfer resulting trusts974, apply to all 
forms of property975, including land976. Within the scope of this thesis, as the provision of 
the purchase price will be in the form of liquid assets (i.e. money), rather than illiquid 
assets such as land or machinery, there will be no security interest over the purchase 
moneys. At most they will be subject to an unsecured loan, which does not grant the 
provider of the moneys an interest in the assets acquired with the loan moneys977. Should 
the insolvent company have provided the purchase moneys to property purchased in the 
name of a third party, then for the unsecured creditors, assets subject to the purchase price 
resulting trust will not be available to fixed charge holders or mortgagees978, and so will 
be available to the liquidator for distribution. Equally, should the insolvent company have 
purchased property with purchase moneys from a third party, the assets would be subject 
to a purchase price resulting trust in favour of the third party. These assets would 
consequently not be available to the insolvent company’s liquidator or unsecured 
creditors, but would prevent the third party from becoming an unsecured creditor.  
 
Before analysing in detail how such trusts can be applicable to instances of insolvency, it 
is first necessary to set out the law pertaining to this form of trust and resolve a number 
of uncertainties in the authorities to adequately identify in what matrices it is applicable.  
 
There are many examples from the authorities illustrating when a purchase price resulting 
trust will arise. This includes Abrahams v Trustee in Bankruptcy of Abrahams979, which 
was concerned with the purchase of a winning lottery ticket. The wife had paid for both 
her own share and the share of her estranged husband when she purchased the winning 
 
973 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 708. 
974 See below in Section 2.2 
975 Re Vandervell’s Trusts (no2) [1974] Ch 269 
976 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 at 794  
977 Hoare v Hoare (1982) 13 Fam Law 142 
978 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 752 
979 [2000] WTLR 593 
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ticket. It was held that because she was the sole provider of the purchase moneys, and had 
not loaned her estranged husband his contribution to the lottery ticket, the winnings were 
solely held on trust for Mrs Abrahams.   
 
Other factual matrices in which the purchase price resulting trust has arisen include Lane 
v Dighton980. Here a husband was able to persuade the trustees of his marriage settlement 
to make half of the trust’s assets available to himself, even though he was only entitled to 
the benefit of the assets for life. In acquiring the legal title to half of the assets, there was 
a breach of trust and the assets remained the property of the marriage settlement, and the 
husband held the assets on resulting trust. A similar occurrence happened in Ryall v 
Ryall981, where an administrator received assets from an estate he was administering to 
purchase land in his own name. After he died, the testator’s legatees claimed the land 
belonged to the estate, and it was held that as the estate had provided the purchase moneys, 
it was the beneficial owner. Finally, in Foskett v McKeown982, the resulting trust was 
utilised to grant victims of an investment scam a beneficial interest in the pay out of a life 
insurance policy in which the premiums had been paid with the victims’ assets.   
 
From the examples immediately above, it is clear that the purchase price resulting trust 
has a wide application to any instances where property is purchased in the name of a third 
party with contributions to the purchase price from persons other than the purchaser – 
although it must be remembered the presumptions can be rebutted by providing evidence 
that a loan or gift was intended983. 
 
Obviously, should there be only one provider of the purchase moneys, the property will 
be the sole beneficial interest of the provider of the purchase moneys984. However, should 
there be two contributors in equal shares, unless a contrary intention can be proven, they 
will take as joint tenants985, and if there is a tenancy in common, then the equitable interest 
will be in proportion to their contribution986.  
 
980 (1762) Amb 409 
981 (1739) 1 Atk 59 
982 [2001] 1 AC 102 
983 Rider v Kidder (1805) 10 Ves 360; Seldon v Davidson [1968] 2 All ER 755, CA  
984 Abrahams v Abrahams [2000] WTLR 593. 
985 Robinson v Preston (1858) 4 K and J 505; Edwards v Fashion (1712) Prec Ch 332 
986 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777; Finch v Finch (1975) 119 Sol Jo 793.  
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Should there be two or more contributors to the purchase price, then the point at which 
the respective shares are calculated is potentially problematic. Under a resulting trust, the 
interests of the contributors are fixed at the time the property was purchased987. This 
means that subsequent payments are irrelevant to calculating the beneficial interest, and 
a purely arithmetic process is undertaken - which may potentially both help and hinder 
the provider of the purchase moneys. From an optimistic perspective, the provider is 
protected because there is certainty over the percentage of beneficial ownership, and they 
will be able to benefit from any increase in the price of the assets in this respective 
share988. However, should the provider only make a small contribution, then unlike under 
a common intention constructive trust989, there is no mechanism available to the courts to 
increase the size of the beneficial interest. Although not problematic in commercial 
contexts, as it is unlikely the provider could realistically intend to have a greater share of 
the beneficial interest than that which they have provided, within the family home this 
lack of flexibility has led to the abandonment of the resulting trust in favour of the more 
malleable common intention constructive trust990. Thus, an insolvent company, should it 
have a beneficial interest in property, would be unable to increase its ownership 
percentage in the asset, but would be guaranteed of its ownership share.  
 
It is also necessary for the provider to have made a contribution to the direct acquisition 
of property991. This requirement is illustrated best in Winkworth v Edward Barron, where 
a residential property was purchased for £70,000 by a company under the sole control of 
a husband and his wife, who had the intention of purchasing it from the company at a 
later date. After selling their former matrimonial home for £8,600, they used the proceeds 
to pay down the company’s overdraft. The company then sought funds (£70,000) from 
the claimant, and as part of the agreement for the funds, the husband and wife provided a 
letter stating that they only occupied the house on a bare licence from the company and 
had no proprietary interest in the property. The company later became insolvent and the 
 
987 Browne-Wilkinson N, Constructive Trusts and Unjust Enrichment, (1996) 10 Tru LI 98 at 100 
988 Glister J and Lee J, Hanbury & Martin’s Modern Equity, 21st edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2018) at 721 
989 Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432; Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 
990 Ibid, at 31 
991 Winkworth v Edward Baron [1986] 1 WLR 1512; Drake v Whipp [1996] 1 FLR 826 (cost of 
renovations), Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 (household expenses) and Ivin v Blake (1994) 67 P 
and CR 263 (working for low wage) were all held not to be sufficient for a direct contribution.  
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wife sought a resulting trust over the ‘matrimonial’ home due to the £8,600 paid to the 
company to reduce its overdraft, alleging that the reduction in the company’s debts 
constituted a contribution to the purchase price. 
 
It was held that no purchase price resulting trust had arisen as there had been no 
contribution to the acquisition of the property992. 
 
The consequence of Edward Barron is that any money being claimed as forming part of 
the purchase price of an asset must be provided with the identifiable intention of 
purchasing the eventual asset – if no intention is present, then the courts will conclude 
that the funds were provided for a more general purpose, not as a contribution to the 
purchase993.  
 
Another problematic example of establishing whether there was a relationship between 
the provision of funds and the subsequent purchase of property is Prest v Petrodel994. 
Here moneys were provided to Petrodel Resources Limited by Mr Prest. These were then 
used for the purposes of purchasing several residential properties. Moneys were also 
provided from Petrodel Resources Limited to a subsidiary known as Vermont, which too 
were used to purchase land. It was held that the properties purchased were held on 
purchase price resulting trust for Mr Prest as he was the ‘provider’ of the funds. Accepting 
for the moment that the purchase moneys were indeed from Mr Prest995, it is argued that 
the moneys were not provided for the purpose of purchasing the properties, and that there 
is sufficient evidence to prove it996.  
 
It is submitted that although the moneys were eventually used to purchase the properties, 
they were not initially provided for this purpose, and instead more general uses were 
intended. Within the facts of the appeal997, there is no evidence establishing a link between 
the provision of the moneys by Mr Prest and the subsequent purchase of the properties by 
 
992 Ibid, at 1515. The rest of the House of Lord concurred with Lord Templeman’s judgment  
993 Stubbins M, Petrodel and the Purchase Price Resulting Trust: Another Interpretation?, (2017) 
23 T&T 383 at 387. See also Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 753 
994 [2013] UKSC 34. Stubbins M, Petrodel, (No.993) 
995 See below for doubt that this was the case  
996 Stubbins M, Petrodel, (No.993) at 387 
997 Petrodel Resources Ltd v Prest [2012] EWCA 1395  
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the companies. Equally as plausible, if not more given the conduct of Mr Prest, the funds 
were provided to give the company sufficient assets to establish itself and begin 
operations. This would be a general intention to give the company a financial history with 
assets, enabling it to better attract credit in the future. Such an interpretation is possible 
because when the properties were purchased, the companies were not yet trading.  
 
It could be argued that an intention to provide general working capital is similar to an 
intention to purchase the properties outright, in that it is intended property will eventually 
be purchased. However, the intention put forward in this thesis can be differentiated as 
the end purchase would be uncertain — it may have been the properties that were 
purchased or any other. Indeed, it may have seen Petrodel purchasing an office block, 
stocks, gold, or any other valuable asset (even monogrammed headed paper). 
Alternatively, the company could also have used the moneys to pay utility bills or 
suppliers. Thus, the two can be distinguished.  
 
It is therefore submitted that no link should have been established between the funds and 
the purchase, and that no resulting trust should have been found998, because the link 
between the provision of the funds and the purchases cannot be proven. It is further 
asserted that Petrodel illustrates the issue and difficulty of establishing a connection 
between the provision of moneys and the purchase of property - particularly where the 
facts and circumstances are unclear. Hence, as seen from Petrodel and Edward Barron, 
should a claim be made for a purchase price resulting trust, the claimant may face the 
uphill challenge of establishing a factual link between the purchase moneys and the 
acquisition of the asset. It must also be noted that in requiring such a connection, the 
courts are implicitly adopting a positive form of presumption, rather than Chambers’ 
negative formulation.  
 
Another, wider, issue raised by Petrodel and Winkworth is how Equity treats the provision 
of funds to companies by shareholders, which are then used to purchase property. The 
correct conclusion to draw, as seen in Winkworth, is that the funds become the legal and 
 
998 See also Virgo G, The Principles, (No.899) at 222  
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beneficial property of company, with the shareholder retaining no interest unless explicit 
provision is made. This view is also adopted in Stockholm Finance v Garden Holdings999:  
 
“…a wholly-owned company cannot be seen by its shareholder either 
as a potential rival to him in claims of ownership of property, or as a 
potential recipient of bounty from him…What goes out of one 
economic pocket comes straight out the other.”  
 
Similarly, in Nightingale Mayfair Ltd v Mehta1000, it was held:  
 
“…the proper and natural inference from the decision by an individual 
to purchase a property in the name of a company and to provide it with 
the funds to do so, especially where the company is controlled by the 
individual, is that the company should be the beneficial as well as the 
legal owner of the money and then the property.”  
 
Consequently, should the corporate form be used by its members as a ‘one-man 
company’, and be used as a conduit for the member’s activities, any moneys put into the 
company that are used to purchase property, unless there is an express statement to 
contrary, become the sole property of the company, with the member retaining no interest 
in the moneys. Any property purchased by the company in these circumstances will 
remain the company’s, and if the company becomes the provider of funds for a third party 
to purchase property, it is the company and not the member who will acquire the 
beneficial interest under a purchase price resulting trust.  
 
These limitations are to some degree offset by the diverse forms a contribution to the 
purchase price can take. Indeed, there is no need for a direct payment to occur, and 
indirect contributions have been allowed. One example is Springette v Defoe1001, where a 
house was purchased from the local council by cohabitees. One of the cohabitees, owing 
to their status as a sitting tenant, was entitled to a 41% discount to the purchase price. It 
was held that the discount amounted to a contribution to the purchase price. Similarly in 
 
999 [1995] NPC 162 
1000 [2000] WTLR 901 
1001 (1992) 24 HLR 552 
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Laskar v Laskar1002, although one of the purchasers did not provide any direct financial 
support for the purchase of a house from the council, it was again held that the discount 
made available to the purchaser through being a sitting tenant was a contribution to the 
purchase price, and a resulting trust was found to have arisen giving them 33% of the 
property.  
 
A similar conclusion has been reached in Calverley v Green1003 in relation to 
circumstances where a party accepts liability to pay the purchase price. This usually 
occurs where a party takes on the obligation to pay a mortgage and adopts the position of 
a mortgagor. In Calverley itself, although the defendant had paid a third of the purchase 
price through a deposit and all of the mortgage instalments, the claimant was held to have 
contributed to the purchase price by entering into an undertaking to repay the mortgage. 
However, the court also emphasised that payment of the mortgage instalments alone 
would have been insufficient, as this was merely discharging a debt1004, rather than taking 
on the obligation to repay1005.  
 
The Court also held that whilst the payment of the mortgage does not alter the quantum 
of their beneficial interests under the mortgage, the defendant may be entitled to demand 
payment of half the mortgage instalments before the claimant could enforce their 
beneficial share. Thus, although a resulting trust may be imposed should the obligation 
to repay a mortgage be incurred, it is unlikely to enable the mortgagor to claim a free 
share of the property. Resulting trusts arising in such contexts would therefore only be of 
use to parties claiming actual occupation, who require a beneficial interest in the property 
to defeat the claims of parties seeking possession. It also means that should a company 
undertake to pay the mortgage instalments of another party – such as a subsidiary – then 
this would not entitle them to a beneficial interest unless a contribution to the mortgage 
is made. If, however, the parent company were to contribute to any repairs or renovations 
of the property of a subsidiary that results in an increase in the value of the property, they 
 
1002 [2008] 2 AC 432 
1003 (1984) 155 CLR 242; Curley v Parkes [2004] EWCA Civ 1515  
1004 See also Laskar v Laskar [2008] 2 AC 432; Barrett v Barrett [2008] EWHC 1061 (Ch) at 6-
7; Cowcher v Cowcher [1972] 1 WLR 425; Gallarotti v Sebastianelli [2012] EWCA 865 
1005 Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242 at 257 
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would be entitled to a proportionate share in the increase of the property’s value via a 
resulting trust1006.  
 
The final issue to address is whether or not the resulting trust is still applicable to the 
domestic home. In recent judgments concerning the family home, it has emphatically 
been held that the common intention constructive trust should be utilised rather than the 
resulting trust1007. Despite this, in Laskar v Laskar1008 Lord Neuberger noted that the 
resulting trust is still applicable “where the parties primarily purchased the property as an 
investment for rental income and capital appreciation, even where their relationship is a 
familial one.” The resulting trust therefore applies in all circumstances other than the 
family home – and even applies to residential property purchased for the purposes of 
investment. Hence, where there is close connection between the parties, such as second 
wife and stepdaughter, the resulting trust will be applicable1009. Thus, such trusts still have 
a role in determining the ownership of residential property – meaning should commercial 
entities purchase residential property, a beneficial interest may be acquired through a 
resulting trust.   
 
In conclusion, the purchase price resulting trust potentially enables a beneficial interest 
to be acquired in multiple ways. Provided that the moneys were provided for the purchase 
of purchasing the property then a resulting trust is possible where direct contributions 
were made, discounts to the purchase price are used in order to purchase the property, or 
a party accepts/takes on mortgage obligations. 
 
Section 2.2 - Application of the Purchase Price Resulting Trust in Liquidation  
 
As set out above, the primary application of the purchase price resulting trust has been 
the traditional provision of purchase moneys by party A to party B with the purchased 
property registered in the name of party B. Within this thesis, therefore, the most apparent 
application of this trust is where the company or third party has provided some or all of 
 
1006 Drake v Whipp [1996] 1 FLR 826 
1007 Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 at 31, 60 
1008 [2008] 2 AC 432 at 110. See also Geary v Rankine [2012] EWCA Civ 555; Favor Easy 
Management v Wu [2012] EWCA Civ 1464.; Pawlowski M, Beneficial Ownership of the Family 
Home: Where Now for the Resulting Trust?, (2017) 23(7) T&T 757 at 758 
1009 Wodzicki v Wodzicki [2017] EWCA Civ 95.  
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the purchase moneys to property. This would provide them with a beneficial share of the 
purchased property in proportion to their contribution.  
 
An example of such an occurrence would be as follows: Company A provides Company 
B with £5 million to purchase an office block from which it will operate. Company B 
uses that £5 million to purchase that office block as agreed and begins operating from it. 
As the provider of the purchase moneys, Company A would be the full beneficial owner 
of the office block. Should Company A then become insolvent, and enter liquidation, as 
the beneficial property of the company, the office block forms part of the company’s 
general assets (as no fixed charge or mortgage would be present), and so could be utilised 
by the liquidator for distribution within the statutory priority of distribution. Were 
Company A to accept liability for any mortgage over the office block and make payments 
towards the mortgage, then this would also give rise to a resulting trust in favour of 
Company A.  
 
Equally, should Company A provide Company B with £5.67 to purchase a new notebook, 
then Company A would be the full beneficial owner of the notebook, and so should 
Company B enter liquidation, it would be available for distribution to Company A and 
prevent them from becoming unsecured creditors.  
 
Although of general applicability, the purchase price resulting trust would be particularly 
effective in two factual matrices: the corporate group formed of a parent company and 
subsidiaries, and the ‘one man’ company.  
 
Within the corporate group, the most probable operation would be where the parent 
company, with superior financial resources, provided funds to its subsidiary to purchase 
property. The same would apply should the reverse be true, and the subsidiary be in a 
superior financial position and provide funds to the parent company. In both scenarios, 
the provider of the funds would be able to acquire all or part of the purchased property 
for themselves.  
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A reported similar factual matrix is the well-known DHN Food Distributors v Tower 
Hamlets LBC1010. Despite this case being concerned with piercing the corporate veil, 
rather than the resulting trust, it is an indicative example of how corporate structures and 
ownership models are used in practice, and how the resulting trust would be applicable 
in these circumstances. The facts of DHN itself involved a parent company (DHN) and 
two subsidiaries, Bronze and DHN Food Transport. The business was owned by the 
parent company DHN. The warehouse from which it operated was owned by the Bronze 
subsidiary, and the delivery vehicles were owned by DHN Transport.  
 
Supposing for the moment that DHN had provided the purchase moneys for the purchase 
of the assets by the subsidiaries1011, DHN would have been the beneficial owner of the 
warehouse and delivery vehicles. Given that DHN had entered into liquidation, acquiring 
the beneficial ownership of these assets would have made them available to its liquidator. 
Furthermore, owing to the doctrine of separate legal personality1012, the liquidators of the 
subsidiaries would not have access to the assets, so boosting the available assets for 
DHN’s creditors.   
 
The potential outcomes of such a resulting trust are not limited to increasing the 
transferor’s assets. Indeed, the availability of such a resulting trust could potentially 
incentivise corporate groups to look to, and use, internal funding arrangement to purchase 
property, rather than external debt options. This would particularly be the case if the 
parent company were cash rich and did not wish the group to incur interest payments. 
However, should a trust be imposed within a corporate group, it would lead to a ‘robbing 
Peter to pay Paul’ scenario for the group creditors, with those of the contributing company 
benefiting, whilst those of the recipient losing out. Notwithstanding this apparent 
unfairness, it may have the effect of allowing parts of the corporate group to survive by 
providing them with a new source of assets with minimal risk.  
 
The alternative context in which the purchase price resulting trust would be of application 
is within ‘one man’ companies, where the shareholders have utilised the corporate form 
 
1010 [1976] 1 WLR 852 
1011 In fact, the assets had been purchased in a complicated arrangement with the Palestine British 
Bank – see ibid, at 854-855h 
1012 Salomon v Salomon [1896] UKHL 1  
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as a front for their own personal activities. Should the company enter liquidation, and the 
company be the provider of the purchase moneys to the shareholder or other party, then 
it would be the beneficial owner of the property.    
 
The application to this context is best seen in a re-examination of Petrodel, which makes 
it possible to conclude that rather than the properties being the beneficial property of Mr 
Prest, they should have been the beneficial property of Petrodel itself. The case also 
illustrates the difficulties that arise in establishing such trusts, with accurate record 
keeping not be a priority.   
 
In his leading judgment, Lord Sumption concluded three properties were purchased with 
funds that were provided directly by Petrodel Resources itself, and not by Mr Prest. In 
the case of two of the flats1013, which were purchased by the subsidiary company Vermont, 
the funds came directly from Petrodel after it had begun trading operations. In the case of 
the third property, it was also held to have been purchased with funds provided by 
Petrodel, but who had acquired the funds itself from Mr Prest as it had not yet begun its 
operations1014. Mr Prest was also found to have placed additional financial resources in 
Petrodel over an extended period of time.  
 
It is submitted that although Mr Prest indirectly provided the funds to purchase these 
properties, the doctrine of separate legal personality enunciated in Salomon v Salomon 
should have resulted in those funds being found to be the property of Petrodel Resources 
rather than remaining the assets of Mr Prest. In recognising that Petrodel was not a mere 
conduit for the provision of the funds, and was in fact the true legal and beneficial owner 
of the funds with autonomy over their use, Mr Prest could not have been the provider of 
the purchase moneys. Notwithstanding that Mr Prest must have been the one to elect that 
Petrodel would provide the funds to purchase the properties, owing to the fact that he was 
acting in his position of director and not owner of the funds, the moneys were no longer 
his property, and so he could not have acted in the capacity of provider. For this to have 
occurred, Petrodel itself would have had to acknowledge or accept Mr Prest’s retention 
of beneficial ownership over the funds, which did not occur. 
 
1013 Prest v Prest [2011] EWHC 2956 (Fam) per Moylan J at 85  
1014 Ibid, at 85.  
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This interpretation of the ownership of the funds in Petrodel has received support from 
the judiciary. As outlined above, in Stockholm Finance1015 and Mehta1016, it was 
concluded that where a member transfers property to the company, or provides the funds 
to purchase property, the natural inference is that the property or funds now belong to the 
company. Additionally, Chadwick J emphasised that “If land is purchased in the name of 
a company” it would be “perverse” to not think the company holds the beneficial 
interest1017.  
 
Thus, the courts have been clear – where there is a provision of funds in order to enable 
a company to purchase property, those funds and the assets purchased are the property of 
the company and not the member. It is additionally submitted that, as set out above, even 
if Mr Prest was the true provider of the purchase moneys, no relationship between the 
moneys and the asset purchased can be established. In the case of Petrodel, this means 
the properties should have been held on resulting trust for it. If it had subsequently entered 
liquidation, the valuable properties could then have been made available to the liquidator 
and the statutory priority of distribution.  
 
This reinterpretation of Petrodel has, however, been rejected by Pawlowski1018. He 
contends that in Petrodel and similar cases of purchase price resulting trusts, the courts 
have been correct to impose a resulting trust in favour of original provider of the funds 
(nearly always a member of the company) as there has been sufficient evidence to indicate 
that they were the true providers of the funds. The evidence for such a conclusion is that 
the companies had yet to engage in commercial operations, and no rent was paid for 
occupation of the properties. As Mr Prest elected to provide no evidence to the court, and 
actively sought to obfuscate the courts’ attempts to establish the true factual matrix, 
Pawlowski further contends the Supreme Court was correct to find against Mr Prest and 
that he was the provider of the funds.  
 
 
1015 [1995] NPC 162 
1016 [2000] WTLR 901 
1017 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (15th June 1994, unreported), Ch D per Chadwick J. It was 
followed in Trade Credit Finance No(1) Ltd v Bilgin [2004] EWHC 2732 (Comm); United 
Overseas Bank ltd v Iwuanynwu [2001] All ER (D) 40 
1018 Pawlowski M, A Fair Result?, (2017) 189 Trusts and Estates Law and Tax Journal 4 
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Dealing with the first element, the available evidence rather than the adverse inference, it 
is submitted that as outlined above, Pawlowski’s analysis does not accord with the fact 
pattern of Petrodel. As concluded by Lord Sumption himself, the moneys were eventually 
provided by Petrodel Resources Limited, and not Mr Prest. Even though Mr Prest may 
have been the original source, it was Petrodel Resources, an autonomous and separately 
legal entity, that provided the crucial funds for the purchase of the properties. As set out 
above, the courts in Stockholm Finance and Mehta both held that moneys provided to a 
company by a member were both legally and beneficially the company’s. Consequently, 
because it was an autonomous and independent entity that provided the funds, the actual 
intentions of Mr Prest were irrelevant unless the company had expressly agreed to 
limitations on the use of the moneys. The only true provider of the funds could therefore 
have been Petrodel Resources1019.   
 
Turning to the second element, the role of the adverse inferences, it is also contended that 
Pawlowski’s assertions are subject to criticism. Pawlowski contends, relying on Lord 
Sumption’s comments1020, that a refusal by the defendant to provide evidence entitles the 
courts to draw an adverse inference against them. Whilst this is undoubtably correct, and 
the ability to do so was categorically set out by Lord Lowry1021, Pawlowski takes this 
further and submits that adverse inferences themselves are sufficient evidence for dealing 
with the presumptions of resulting trust.  
 
It is submitted that adverse inferences in themselves are insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of resulting trust though. Instead, it is proffered that direct evidence as to the 
parties’ intentions is necessary. As concluded in Chapter 6, where a full analysis of the 
requirements is undertaken, it is only once direct evidence is adduced that the 
presumptions can be rebutted. Instead, the adverse inference is only applicable once there 
is direct evidence, which then allows the courts to interpret any ambiguities against the 
party. Given that in Petrodel was there no evidence – even ambiguous evidence - of an 
alternative intention, a rebuttal of the presumption was precluded.  
 
 
1019 See also Virgo G, The Principles of Equity and Trusts, 4th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2020) 236-237 
1020 Prest v Petrodel, (No.997)   
1021 R v Inland Revenue Comrs, Ex p TC Coombs & Co [1991] 2 AC 283 at 300; see also 
Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR P324, at 340 
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Within the context of this thesis, this is applicable where a shareholder pumps his money 
into a ‘one man’ company and uses that company to purchase property. Given the analysis 
above, as the company would be the provider of the purchase moneys, it is they who 
would acquire a beneficial interest rather than the shareholder. This is in-keeping with the 
dicta of Arab Monetary Fund and Mehta and could potentially result in substantial assets 
being made available. Taking Petrodel as an example, had the conclusions of this chapter 
been applied, roughly £17 million would have been accredited to the company’s asset 
pool.  
 
The final point to consider in relation to this potential factual matrix is the need for a 
relationship between the provision of funds and the purchased asset, as required by 
Edward Barron. Given that the shareholder may not provide the funds with a single, 
identifiable asset in mind, even if it can be established that the shareholder was the true 
provider of the funds, it may not be possible to establish that the relationship between the 
property and the funds. This is similar to the analysis of Petrodel above.  
 
Should a resulting trust be found in favour of the company, and that it is the beneficial 
owner of property it provided the purchase moneys for, such trusts could undo potential 
damage to the unsecured creditors of these companies and see the liquidator provided 
with assets that can be sold and the returns used for distribution to the unsecured creditors.  
 
The analysis of the purchase price resulting trust undertaken in this section has so far 
worked upon the basis that company A has provided party X with funds to purchase 
property, or party X has provided company A with funds. In doing so, there has been the 
presumption that this has taken the form of cash. However, as set out above, there is no 
requirement for the provision of the purchase price to take such form, and instead 
contributions can take a variety of forms.  
 
Application of this freedom to companies can be seen in the examples of Springette v 
Defoe and Laskar v Laskar, the ‘council house discount’ cases. For, should a company 
within the corporate group, or a ‘one man’ company, have access to a discount to purchase 
property (such as a negotiated contractual right or statutory option to purchase), and 
another company within the corporate group/the shareholder provide the remaining 
necessary funds to purchase the property, then the company entitled to the discount would 
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acquire a beneficial interest to the property in proportion to the discount’s size. As with 
all other purchase price resulting trusts, this beneficial interest would be made available 
to liquidators upon the onset of liquidation.  
 
Similarly, as seen in Calverley v Green, should a company assent to be bound by the 
obligations of a mortgage, then they too would be deemed to have contributed to the 
purchase price. Within a corporate group, this would occur should a parent company agree 
to guarantee/be a party to a subsidiary’s mortgage to ensure confidence from the bank. 
Within a one-man company, it would be where the company guarantees the shareholder’s 
mortgage. In both instances, by guaranteeing the mortgage a share of the beneficial 
interest would be available for distribution should the guarantor be liquidated. However, 
as also recognised, the company would not be entitled to claim their beneficial share 
unless they also made a contribution to the mortgage instalments. Although it may make 
abstract financial sense for the company to subsequently1022 contribute to the mortgage 
payments if the property has greatly increased in value, owing to this thesis’ analysis of 
companies in liquidation, this will not be a viable possibility as such companies would 
not have sufficient assets to contribute to the mortgage payments in the first place. As 
seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the majority of liquidations fail to provide the liquidator with 
sufficient resources to undertake even simple litigation. Thus, this form of purchase price 
resulting trust is unlikely to be of any benefit to unsecured creditors in practice.   
 
Thus, the resulting trust can be used to place assets back into the hands of the provider of 
the purchase moneys, which can then be distribute to unsecured creditors or prevent third 
parties becoming unsecured creditors. This can either be through the company being the 
provider of the purchase moneys, or the company purchasing assets with moneys 
provided by a third party. Whilst it may be argued that companies are unlikely to not 
specify the nature of the transfer, as implicitly evidenced in this chapter and Chapter 6, 
transactions regularly occur without this clarification being provided. Thus, in either 
circumstance, should the asset be land or other high value item, then the potential value 
being returned to the transferor may be substantial.  
 
Section 2.3 - Gratuitous Transfer Resulting Trusts  
 
1022 Meaning shortly before the company entered liquidation 
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Equity also presumes that where a transferor has transferred property gratuitously, and 
there is an absence of a contrary intention, there is no intention on the part of the transferor 
for the recipient to acquire a beneficial interest in the property1023. Instead, it is presumed 
that a bargain, rather than a gift, was created, and so the transferred property is held on 
trust for the transferor1024. As with the purchase price resulting trust, before analysing in 
detail how they can be applicable to instances of insolvency it is first necessary to set out 
the law pertaining to this form of trust and resolve a number of uncertainties in the 
authorities to adequately identify in what matrices it is applicable.  
 
The application of the presumption in relation to the gratuitous transfer resulting trust has 
been illustrated in numerous examples, primarily involving transfers of personal property. 
The best known is Re Vinogradoff1025, where a grandmother transferred £800 of War Loan 
Stock to a bank account set up in the joint names of herself and her infant granddaughter. 
Farwell J held that the granddaughter was a resulting trustee for her grandmother as there 
was no evidence of an intention for her to benefit - particularly as it was the grandmother 
alone who received the dividend payments. Similarly in Thavorn1026, a woman opened a 
bank account in favour of her nephew containing £20,0001027. She also directed that she 
alone was to be allowed to operate the account, and so it was held that the moneys were 
held on resulting trust for herself as there clearly was no intention for the nephew to 
benefit.  
 
The gratuitous transfer resulting trust not only protects transferors who have failed to 
adequately express their intentions over transfers of property, but also protects those who 
do not have the capacity to adequately transfer property. In Goodfellow v Robertson1028 
for example, property was transferred while the owner was of ‘unsound mind’. It was 
held that the transferor, because of his lack of capacity, could not have intended to part 
with his property, and so the recipient held it on resulting trust.  
 
1023 Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 495; Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 
356 
1024 Chin J, Rabinowitz A and Quinn A, The Presumptions, (No.916) at 43 
1025 [1935] WN 68. See also Re Howes (1905) 21 TLR 501; Re Müller [1953] NZLR 879 
1026 Thavorn v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 259 
1027 See also Aroso v Coutts [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 241  
1028 (1871) 18 Gr 572 
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From the examples, it can be seen that the gratuitous transfer resulting trust plays an 
important role in English property law. Not only does it provide a mechanism by which 
the ownership of property can be determined in the absence of evidence indicating the 
intentions of the transferor, but it also assists in protecting vulnerable individuals. In the 
context of this thesis, it is unlikely that vulnerable individuals will be involved given its 
commercial focus. It will be applicable where there is a lack of evidence as to the parties’ 
intentions concerning the transfer of property, however. As is illustrated below, the 
gratuitous transfer resulting trust is of assistance where there has been a transfer of 
property by a company and it is unclear what the intentions behind the transfer were. In 
such circumstances, it is possible for the company to recover the property and make it 
available to unsecured creditors.  
 
Section 2.3 (a) - Gratuitous Transfers of Land  
 
The clarity of the law relating to personal property is not reflected in the law relating to 
gratuitous transfers of land, with much confusion reining over its current position1029.  
 
The root of the confusion is s60(3) Law of Property Act 1925, which prima facie appears 
to abolish the presumption of a gratuitous transfer of land. The provision states that:  
 
“In a voluntary conveyance a resulting trust for the grantor shall not be 
implied merely by reason that the property is not expressed to be 
conveyed for the use or benefit of the grantee.’ 
A literal reading of s60(3) thus implies that should there be a gratuitous transfer 
of land by a transferor, no resulting trust will be presumed merely because 
consideration was absent. If this literal interpretation is correct, then the gratuitous 
transfer resulting trust would be applicable only to personal property, whilst land 
would require the presentation of additional evidence for a trust to be imposed1030.  
 
1029 Stubbins M, The Gratuitous, (No.927), where this section draws its conclusions   
1030 Ibid. 
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The response from the judiciary in interpreting s60(3) has been muddled. Upon the 
issue first being raised, Russell LJ in Hodgson v Marks1031 refused to conclude how 
s60(3) should be interpreted, commenting that there was a “debatable question whether 
on a voluntary transfer of land by A to stranger B there is a presumption of a resulting 
trust”.1032 In the subsequent appeal of Tinsley v Milligan1033, although unwilling to 
provide a definitive interpretation, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluded that conceivably 
a change had occurred: “…it is arguable, however, that the position has been altered by 
the 1925 property legislation.” Despite not being a categorical statement on the issue, it 
does indicate that the courts are receptive to the notion that s60(3) has in fact reformed 
the law.   
 
In Lohia v Lohia1034 HH Nicholas Strauss QC built upon Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
conclusion and held “that the purpose of section 60(3) was accordingly to do away with 
the presumption of a resulting trust in the cases of voluntary conveyance and to make it 
necessary for the person seeking to establish a resulting trust to prove it.”1035 He therefore 
concluded that “Accordingly, I hold that a voluntary conveyance does not give rise to a 
presumption of a resulting trust”1036. Despite the case being appealed1037, the Court of 
Appeal refused to discuss the issue1038.  
 
The Court of Appeal did, however, examine Lohia in obiter in Ali v Khan1039, with Sir 
Andrew Morritt VC commenting that Lohia “establishes that the presumption of a 
resulting trust on a voluntary conveyance of land has been abolished by s60(3) Law of 
Property Act 1925”1040. Whether it can confidently be concluded that the presumption has 
been abolished is up for debate, though, owing to the Court of Appeal’s refusal to tackle 
the issue head on.  
 
 
1031 Hodgson v Marks [1971] 2 WLR 1263  
1032 Ibid, at 1269 
1033 [1994] 1 AC 340.  
1034 [2001] 3 ITLELR 101  
1035 Ibid, at 130 
1036 Ibid, at 130  
1037 Lohia v Lohia [2001] EWCA Civ 1691 
1038 See the judgments of Mummery LJ (ibid, at para 26) and Sir Christopher Slade (ibid, at para 
34) 
1039 [2002] EWCA Civ 974 
1040 Ibid, at para 24. 
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The academic community have not been as hesitant though1041. Thomas and Hudson have 
categorically rejected the possibility of the presumption surviving1042, and also put 
forward persuasive policy justifications for the presumption’s abolition1043. They submit 
that due to the strict formalities that exist in regard to conveyances of land in contrast to 
the transfer of personal property, there is a higher probability the transferor will have 
analysed the consequences of the transfer1044. Consequently, there is no need for the law 
to provide a safety net for transferors in such circumstances.  
 
Thus, although not definitive, it is likely that the presumption has been abolished1045, and 
there is no resulting trust should land be gratuitously transferred unless additional 
evidence is adduced.  
 
Section 2.3 (b) - Does Petrodel Alter the Equation?1046  
 
In Petrodel, Lord Sumption held that three properties transferred to Petrodel for £1 were 
held on gratuitous transfer resulting trust for Mr Prest, the company’s sole shareholder. 
The reasoning was that since Mr Prest had not provided an explanation for the transfers, 
there had been “nothing to rebut the ordinary presumption of equity that PRL was not 
intended to acquire a beneficial interest in them”1047. 
 
It is submitted that there a several fundamental issues with Lord Sumption’s judgment 
and reasoning. The main issue is the existence of £1 consideration for the transfer of the 
three properties, which runs counter to the restriction that gratuitous transfer resulting 
trusts can only arise in response to transfers where there is an absence of consideration1048. 
As has been made clear, when considering the issue of consideration in relation to 
 
1041 See: G Kodilyne and T Carmichael, Commonwealth Caribbean Law of Trusts (3rd edn, 
Routledge 2013) 84; Mee J, Resulting Trusts and Voluntary Conveyances of Land, [2012] Conv 
307; Mee J, Resulting Trusts and Voluntary Conveyances of Land: 1674-1925, (2011) 32 JLH 
215; Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 360.  
1042 G Thomas and A Hudson, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 75 
1043 See also Chambers R, Constructive Trusts in Canada, (2001) 15 Tru LI 214-32; Chambers R, 
Resulting Trusts in Canada, (2000) 38 Alberta LR 378 
1044 See also D Hayton, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 486 
1045 Stubbins M, The Gratuitous, (No.927); Mee J, Resulting Trusts and Voluntary Conveyances 
of Land, (2012) 4 Conv. 307-326  
1046 Stubbins M, The Gratuitous, (No.927) 
1047 Petrodel, (No.997) at 49 
1048 Pawlowski M, A Fair Result?, (2017) 189 Trusts and Estates Law and Tax Journal 4 at 5 
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transfers of property, the courts are concerned only with the existence of consideration, 
and not its amount1049. Similarly, with the ancient use, the existence of any consideration 
was enough to prevent a resulting trust arising1050. Owing to the discrepancy between Lord 
Sumption’s conclusions in the Supreme Court and the settled law, prima facie the doctrine 
of precedent would result in the law being reformed, and the existence of consideration 
would not prevent a gratuitous transfer resulting trust from arising – a clear contradiction.  
 
It is proffered though that there has been no change to the established law. Firstly, there 
was no acknowledgment by Lord Sumption, or the Supreme Court as a whole, that they 
intended on altering the law1051. Instead, it is only possible to infer that reform has 
occurred from the inconsistencies with the settled law. Secondly, it is submitted that 
adopting Lord Sumption’s amendment would be unworkable, as it is unknown what level 
of consideration is permissible. Is it only nominal consideration? Consideration well 
below the true market value? Lord Sumption’s judgment simply does not provide any 
advice on where the appropriate level should be set, and so adopting any such reform 
would create unnecessary confusion within the gratuitous transfer resulting trust.  
 
Finally, adopting any such reform would also negatively affect families in the domestic 
context, where family members gratuitously transfer property to assist one another or 
avoid the payment of death duties. On such occurrences, it is unlikely the intentions of 
the parties would be expressed, and that the intentions of the parties might change over 
time1052. In such circumstances, it is therefore justified for Equity to interfere with the 
imposition of a resulting trust. However, where consideration is present, there is usually 
a thought out or well-expressed domestic justification for the transfer. There is 
consequently a much weaker justification for Equity interfering with such transactions. 
 
Equally problematic though is Lord Sumption’s treatment of s60(3) Law of Property Act 
1925, where in relation to the three ‘gratuitous transfers’, it was concluded that the 
 
1049 Sturlyn v Albany (1587) Cro Eliz 756; see also Thomas v Thomas (1842) 2 QB 859. 
1050 Rivington H, Snell’s Principles of Equity (19th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1925) at 113. 
1051 Stubbins M, The Gratuitous (No.927) at 522. See also Virgo G, The Principles of Equity and 
Trusts, (No.899) at 222; D Hayton, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 497; Mee J, Voluntary 
Conveyances of Land: the Presumption of Resulting Trust Redux?, (2018) CPL 184 at 187 
1052 Stubbins M, The Gratuitous, (No.927) at 522 
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‘ordinary presumption of equity’1053 applied – the presumption of a resulting trust upon 
the gratuitous transfer of land. As outlined above, in doing so, Lord Sumption’s judgment 
runs counter to established law. As with the issue of what constitutes a gratuitous transfer, 
His Lordship does not explicitly refer to any reform, nor does he reference s60(3) at all. 
To therefore conclude that Petrodel overrules judgments of the High Court, Court of 
Appeal and the majority of the academic commentary without reference to the issues or 
the statutory language is problematic1054.  
 
Therefore, it is submitted that despite the appearance of reform to the gratuitous transfer 
resulting trust, it should be concluded that Petrodel has not altered the law.  
Section 2.3 (c) - Mistaken Transfers 
 
One final area in which the gratuitous transfer maybe applicable to the liquidation process 
is mistaken transfers. Controversially, in Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel British 
Bank1055 Goulding J held that where the claimant had mistakenly paid the defendant the 
same amount of money twice - $2 million each time - the claimant retained equitable title 
over the mistakenly paid moneys. The judgment was controversial for two aspects; the 
first was the reasoning for their being an equitable interest in the mistaken property, and 
the second was the priority it afforded the claimant, given that the defendant had entered 
insolvency.  
 
In coming to his conclusion, Goulding J held that where a person pays money under a 
factual mistake, they retain an equitable interest in the mistakenly transferred property, 
and the conscience of the recipient is bound by a fiduciary duty to respect the transferor’s 
proprietary right1056. This was grounded on an interpretation of Re Diplock1057 and Re 
Berry1058, the latter being an American authority. Considering Re Berry first, he held that 
notwithstanding it being American precedent, the principles stated were the same as those 
in the English legal system1059. Re Berry itself stated that “On no possible theory could 
 
1053 Petrodel, (No.997) at 49 
1054 Stubbins M, The Gratuitous, (No.927) at 523 
1055 [1981] Ch 105 
1056 Ibid, at 119 
1057 [1948] Ch 465  
1058 (1906) 147 Fed 208 at 210 
1059 Chase Manhattan Bank v Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105 at 118 
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the retention of the money by [the recipient] be justified; it was paid to them and received 
by them under mistaken…the money in dispute never belonged to [the recipient]”1060. 
Secondly, Goulding J concluded that Re Diplock had not imposed the requirement of an 
initial fiduciary relation for the recipient to be bound by the transferor’s proprietary 
interest – “the payment into wrong hands itself gave rise to a fiduciary relationship.”1061 
 
Complicating matters, Goulding J did not elucidate under which equitable mechanism the 
property was to be returned to the claimant1062 – meaning it is unknown whether the 
mistaken transfer was subject to a constructive trust or resulting trust. 
 
Notwithstanding Goulding J’s equivocation, attempts have subsequently been made to 
identify the relevant equitable mechanism. In Westdeutsche1063, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
implied that Goulding J had given effect to his judgment through a constructive trust1064. 
However, His Lordship also concluded that Goulding J was incorrect in imposing a 
constructive trust, as there was no existing equitable interest1065. In regard to a constructive 
trust, it was held that a mistaken transfer itself was insufficient grounds for binding the 
conscience of the recipient. Instead, knowledge of the mistake could bind the recipient’s 
conscience and then give rise to a constructive trust once the mistake became known1066. 
Within the factual matrix of Chase Manhattan, the recipient became aware of the 
transaction two days after the event, and so before they were petitioned for winding up, 
but in many cases the recipient will not acquire the necessary knowledge before the onset 
of insolvency. Consequently, should Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s formulation be adopted, 
it is unlikely that mistaken payments will be a useful mechanism for liquidators to acquire 
property from the recipient owing to their lack of knowledge.  
 
Similarly, Lord Millett has extra-judicially concluded that Chase Manhattan was wrongly 
decided1067. He agreed that a mistaken payment in itself was insufficient to bind the 
 
1060 Re Berry (1906) 147 Fed 208, per Judge Coxe at 210 
1061 Chase Manhattan, (No.1059) at 119 
1062 Ibid, at 119 
1063 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 715 
1064 See Virgo G, The Principle, (No.899) at 258; Calnan R, Proprietary Rights (No.71) at 142 
1065 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 714-715 
1066 Ibid, at 715. His Lordship did express support for Goulding J’s conclusion, if not his 
reasoning. See also Metall and Rohstoff v. Donaldson Inc. [1990] 1 Q.B. 391 at 473-474 
1067 Millett P, (No.882) at 411-413 
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conscience of the recipient1068. However, His Lordship concluded that Chase Manhattan 
was incorrect because the recipient was not a fiduciary, and so there was no proprietary 
interest at all1069. Thus, according to Lord Millett, the imposition of a constructive trust is 
not possible in instances of a mistaken transfer.  
 
Given the rejection and criticism of Goulding J’s reasoning for the transferor retaining a 
beneficial interest in mistaken property, and the issues with utilising the constructive trust, 
it is submitted that an alternative interpretation is required1070. Calnan has recognised, 
although does not accept, that there is a need for the transferor to retain a proprietary 
interest in the property where there has been a mistaken transfer to ensure that policy 
concerns are given effect to1071. Similarly in Papamichael, it was commented that the 
general public would expect the moneys to remain the transferor’s1072.  
 
It is therefore submitted that rather than founding mistaken payments upon a constructive 
trust analysis, it should be interpreted as being a gratuitous transfer resulting trust. Such 
a possibility was contemplated by Lord Goff in Westdeutsche. Speaking strictly in obiter, 
His Lordship, when considering if a mistaken transfer should give rise to a proprietary 
interest, commented that “It is true that the doctrine of mistake might be invoked where 
the mistake is fundamental in the orthodox sense of that word.”1073 In the context of His 
Lordship’s judgement he was considering the availability of the resulting trust in cases of 
mistaken transfer – thereby meaning His Lordship was in favour of there being a resulting 
trust in such circumstances. He did, however, conclude that the resulting trust should not 
be available merely because the underlying contract had been held to be ultra vires, as it 
was clear that transferor intended (even if incorrectly) to part with the beneficial interest.  
 
Though a reinterpretation is undoubtably necessary, it is important to clarify in which 
circumstances a gratuitous transfer resulting trust could be applicable. This is necessary 
 
1068 Ibid, at 411 
1069 Ibid, at 412-413 
1070 Jaffey P, Proprietary Claims to Recover Mistaken Payments or Unauthorised Payments in 
Devonshire P and Havelock R, The Impact of Equity and Restitution, (Oxford: Hart, 2019) at 82 
1071 Calnan R, Proprietary Rights, (No.71) at 147 
1072 Papamichael v National Westminster Bank [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 341 at 372-3. See also 
Goodhart and Jones, Infiltration of Equitable Doctrine (1980) 43 MLR 489 at 494 
1073 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 690 
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because, as set out above, such resulting trusts are only possible if there is a transfer of 
property in the absence of consideration, and if there is no intention to make a gift or loan.  
 
As recognised by Lord Goff, the resulting trust will have no applicability where the 
underlying contract was merely ultra vires, as the transferor intended on transferring 
equitable title to the recipient1074. Equally, as Webb acknowledged, in many other cases 
of mistaken transfer, the transferor also actively intended the recipient to take the property 
outright - such as where they mistakenly believe a debt has not been discharged, where 
there was a mistake of identity, where there was a mistake as to which property is to be 
transferred, or that a debt is owed in the first place1075. In all of these instances the 
transferor, although incorrect in their assumptions, did intend to transfer beneficial 
ownership of the property or received consideration for the property, and so there is a 
rebuttal to the presumption of a resulting trust1076.  
 
Hence, where there is an active mistake of law (i.e. the debt is not owed) or fact (i.e. the 
debt is paid to the wrong individual or a fraud is committed), then the gratuitous transfer 
resulting trust will not be applicable, as there cannot be a resulting trust because of the 
intention on the part of the transferor to pass the beneficial interest in the property1077. 
 
However, it is submitted that in the case of accidental, ‘genuine’, mistaken payments - 
where the transfer is made without the intention to transfer equitable title – then it is 
possible to reinterpret the transaction as being a gratuitous transfer resulting trust1078. As 
noted by Lord Goff, these are instances where “the mistake is fundamental in the orthodox 
sense of the word.”1079  
 
 
1074 See also His Lordship’s previous comments in Barclays Bank v W.J. Simms Sons & Cooke 
(Southern) Ltd [1980] 2 WLR 218 at 232 
1075 Webb C, Intention, Mistakes and Resulting Trusts in Mitchell C, Constructive and Resulting 
Trusts, (Oxford, OUP, 2010) at 315; Salmons D, The Availability of Proprietary Restitution in 
Cases of Mistaken Payments, (2015) 72 CLJ 534 at 536 
1076 See Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M and W 54 for an example matrix.  
1077 This interpretation is raised by Bridge M et al in The Law of Personal Property, 2nd edn 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) at 310. They conclude however that the cases historically are 
concerned with apparent gifts rather than mistaken payments.  
1078 See Re Goldcorp Exchange [1994] 2 All ER 806 e 
1079 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 690 
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In Chase Manhattan itself, a series of administrative mistakes led to the mistaken 
payment1080. The second payment occurred as a result of a clerical error by an employee 
of the bank, which caused fellow employees to wrongly (and passively) believe that 
instructions from another bank had been received. The employees then partially acted 
upon these instructions, and made negligent attempts to stop the payment which were 
only partially successful. Hence, owing to the origins of transfer being a clerical error, 
the transferring bank never formed the intention to part with the beneficial interest in the 
moneys at any stage of the transfer – especially given the attempts to prevent the transfer 
from occurring.  
Given this lack of intention, it is proffered that a gratuitous transfer resulting trust should 
have arisen in Chase Manhattan. Firstly, there was a transfer of property in the absence 
of consideration as the recipient had never contracted for the second payment to be made. 
Consequently, the mistaken transfer was gratuitous, and a presumption of a resulting trust 
should be imputed due to the transfer being of personal property and not land. This is also 
compatible with the theoretical foundations of the gratuitous transfer resulting trust – that 
the overwhelming number of individuals would not transfer property to a third party 
gratuitously without retaining a beneficial interest, even more so if the transfer had only 
occurred in genuine error. It is further proffered that given the transfer was founded up 
upon a clerical error and the subsequent attempts by Chase Manhattan to stop the transfer 
from occurring, there was insufficient evidence to rebut the imputed intention and argue 
that bank intended to part with the beneficial interest. Thereby, the moneys should have 
been held on a gratuitous transfer resulting trust for the transferor.   
 
A fundamentally similar occurrence happened in Williams v Williams1081, although with 
a very different fact pattern. In Williams a father purchased an estate and, without his 
knowledge, the conveyance was in his son’s name. The purchase was with the father’s 
moneys, and he also collected the rents from the estate. The conveyancing solicitor had 
erroneously concluded that as previous transactions had been in the son’s name, this 
transaction should also be in the son’s. It was held that as it was clear the father intended 
to retain the beneficial interest in the property, the son held it on trust for the father. Thus, 
where there is a true mistaken transfer that prevents the transferor from forming the 
 
1080 [1981] Ch 105 at 114.  
1081 (1863) 32 Beav 370 
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intention that the recipient should receive the beneficial interest, that property will be 
subject to a trust1082. 
 
In his extra-judicial writings, Lord Millett obliquely questions the reinterpretation of 
Chase Manhattan set out above. His Lordship, in commenting on Chase Manhattan, 
concluded that “…The plaintiff had intentionally though mistakenly parted with all 
beneficial interest in the money…The fact that the transferor intended to part with the 
beneficial interest was inconsistent with the existence of a resulting trust.”1083 
Notwithstanding that Lord Millett’s second conclusion, that the existence of an intention 
to part with the beneficial interest precludes the existence of a resulting trust, is correct, 
it is submitted that his initial observation as to the intentions of the transferor in the case 
were mistaken. As outlined above, on the facts the transferring bank did not intend to part 
with the beneficial interest, and in fact tried, if incompetently, to row back on the 
transaction. Given this, it is submitted that his Lordship was mistaken in ruling out the 
possibility of a resulting trust in these circumstances.  
 
Finally, in addition to being theoretically sound1084, one further advantage to this 
reinterpretation is, unlike with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s constructive trust analysis, 
there is no need for the recipient to have knowledge of the mistake, as their knowledge 
and intentions are irrelevant under a resulting trust. Indeed, by imputing an intention to 
the transferor, the resulting trust would arise as the result of an objective reading of the 
facts, only not arising should there be sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. In the 
alternative formulations of mistaken payments, the recipient’s knowledge is fundamental, 
and troublesome to prove1085. The impact of removing the requirement for the defendant 
to have knowledge of the transfer is illustrated in Chase Manhattan – under Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s formulation the transferor would initially have had no priority owing to the 
two days it took for the recipient to realise the mistake had been made, whilst under the 
 
1082 See also Bainbridge & Anor v Bainbridge [2016] EWHC 898 (Ch)  
1083 Millett P, Restitution and Constructive Trusts, (No.882) 
1084 Support for such as interpretation comes from G Thomas and A Hudson, The Law of Trusts, 
(No.185) at 543. See also Leuty v Hillas (1858) 2 De GF and J; Craddock Brothers v Hunt [1923] 
2 Ch 136, CA; Blacklocks v JB Developments (Godalming) Ltd [1982] Ch 183; Salmons D, The 
Availability of Proprietary Restitution in Cases of Mistaken Payments, (2015) 72 CLJ 534 at 555; 
Seldon v Davidson [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1083 
1085 Salmons D, The Availability of Proprietary Restitution in Cases of Mistaken Payments, (2015) 
72 CLJ 534  
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reinterpretation the transferor would have had priority the moment the transfer occurred 
as the recipient’s knowledge was irrelevant. Consequently, the reinterpretation protects 
those transferors when there is a delay in becoming aware of the mistake. Finally, given 
the limited nature of the resulting trust, and its limitation to genuine, accidental mistakes, 
there is no issue of the mechanism being utilised to an excessive extent1086, as is the 
concern should any unjust enrichment analysis be utilised.   
 
Section 2.4 - Application of the Gratuitous Transfer Resulting Trust in Liquidation  
 
Given the above discussion of the gratuitous transfer resulting trust, it is clear that, within 
context of liquidation, such trusts are of greatest applicability to instances where an 
insolvent company has transferred personal property to another company gratuitously. In 
such circumstances this would include both transfers with external parties but also the 
corporate group, whereby property is transferred gratuitously between members of the 
group. Should such transfers occur, then obviously the transferor would able to recover 
the property, and either prevent the property from entering the insolvency asset pool or 
return the property to the company’s asset pool and make it available for distribution.  
 
One hypothetical matrix might be the creation by a corporate group of a new company to 
undertake a new business opportunity. In such a matrix, to take advantage of the 
opportunity, and as a consequence of the group’s existing subsidiaries having excess 
resources, the property is transferred from these subsidiaries to the new company 
gratuitously. In this situation such an occurrence might be rationalised on the basis that 
because they are effectively one economic unit1087, it makes little business sense to 
transfer moneys around the group – especially if the newly formed subsidiary has 
insufficient assets to purchase the property or is not in a position to acquire credit to make 
the purchase. Should the recipient company become insolvent, then owing to the 
gratuitous nature of the transaction, and the lack of intention to transfer legal title to the 
recipient company, the pre-existing subsidiaries could enforce their resulting trust and 
take possession of the asset. Again, this can be rationalised on the basis that the 
 
1086 A. Burrows, The Relationship between Unjust Enrichment and Property in S. Degeling and 
J. Edelman (eds.), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Sydney 2008) at 333-34; P. Birks, 
Unjust Enrichment, (Oxford: OUP 2005); P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, 
revised ed. (Oxford: OUP 1989) 
1087 Such has been seen previously in DHN Foods v Tower Hamlets LBC [1976] 1 WLR 852 
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transferring company could be said to have not intended to the transfer beneficial title as 
a means of hedging its bets – the transfer would therefore be an unofficial ‘loan’ of the 
asset. This too would be beneficial should the transferring subsidiary, as opposed to the 
recipient, enter insolvency, as the subsidiary’s liquidator could also enforce the resulting 
trust and distribute the assets among the unsecured creditors.  
 
Although the above matrix could operate ‘accidentally’ – i.e. without the corporate group 
actually intending the to create such relationship – it may also be used by a corporate 
group ‘intentionally’. In transferring property gratuitously, it could be used as a way of 
increasing the balance sheet of one of the subsidiaries and acquiring confidence in its 
financial position from lenders - thereby making it possible to acquire credit. 
Furthermore, because trusts are not required to be registered1088, as the resulting trust is 
an operation of law and so is impossible to be registered1089, it could operate as a quasi-
security interest, ensuring the corporate group/transferring companies do not have to act 
as traditional creditors. An obvious downside of such a scheme would be the 
misrepresentation of the subsidiary’s financial position to creditors, and such concerns 
are thoroughly addressed in Chapter 6.  
 
Notwithstanding the above applying to personal property, as concluded previously in this 
section, the presumption of a gratuitous transfer resulting trust does not apply to land. 
Hence, should companies attempt such schemes as outlined immediately above with real 
property, there would be no presumption that the transferring company would retain a 
beneficial interest. Albeit that the transferor could adduce evidence of an intention to 
retain a beneficial interest, doing so could prove problematic and unavailable1090.  
 
Finally, it is submitted that in instances of mistaken transfer, where there was never an 
intention to benefit the recipient, a resulting trust can be imposed. This is where the 
transferor did not think that there was an obligation to pay - either legal or factual - and 
did not intend for the beneficial ownership to move to the recipient. In such 
circumstances, as opposed to mistakes as to identify or legal obligation, there is a genuine 
mistaken payment and no intention to benefit was ever formed. Such instances may 
 
1088 See Chapter 6 Section 4 
1089 See Chapter 6 Section 4 
1090 Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 
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include human error, or computer error. Should the company have mistakenly transferred 
the assets then these would be recoverable by the liquidator and be distributable to 
unsecured creditors, whereas should the company be the recipient of mistaken funds, they 
would be segregated from the asset pool and prevent the third-party transferor from 
becoming a creditor.  
 
Section 3 – The Automatic and Quistclose Trusts  
 
Section 3.1 - The Automatic Resulting Trust  
 
In contrast to the ‘presumed’ resulting trust analysed in Section 2 of this chapter, Megarry 
J in Re Vandervell (No2)1091 held that there is a second type of trust not based upon the 
presumed intentions of the parties: the ‘automatic resulting trust’. In his Lordship’s view, 
this arises ‘automatically’ whenever there has been a failed attempt at disposing of 
property, and operates to restore the beneficial interest in the property to its original owner 
unless some alternative provision has been made. The function of such trusts is to prevent 
there being a ‘gap’ in the equitable title1092, and ensure that there is a recognised beneficial 
owner to the property. This is important as, otherwise, the property ends up going to the 
Crown bona vacantia1093, and all parties are denied the benefit of it.   
  
Historically, automatic resulting trusts appeared to run counter to those of the presumed 
resulting trust. As noted above in Section 1, Megarry J’s classification of there being two 
distinct categories, the ‘automatic’ and ‘presumed’ resulting trusts. It was concluded there 
was no difference between the two classes identified by Megarry J1094, as both are founded 
upon intention. It was therefore incorrect to identify them as being distinct from one 
another.   
 
 
1091 [1974] Ch 269 
1092 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 734; Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 315; 
Mee J, The Past, Present and Future of the Resulting Trusts, (2017) 70 Current Legal Problems 
189 
1093 Re West Sussex Constabulary Widows, Children and Benevolent (1930) Fund Trusts [1971] 
Ch 1 
1094 Browne-Wilkinson N, Constructive Trusts and Unjust Enrichment, (1996) 10 Tru LI 98 at 
100 
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Notwithstanding the issues surrounding the distinction, there is some merit in suggesting 
that the two categories operate differently. As noted by Underhill and Hayton, unlike 
presumed resulting trusts, where there is usually some vague but unexpressed idea as to 
what should occur to the beneficial ownership of the property, under an automatic 
resulting trust there is normally no consideration of where the ownership should lay1095. 
Given this, it is unlikely that the presumption will be rebutted, and so in practice (if not 
theory) the resulting trust will operate ‘automatically’ without the transferor having 
played an active or passive. Hence the distinction relates to the trust’s operation, rather 
than its theoretical foundations.  
 
Given the competing arguments, the preferred view taken by this thesis is that there is no 
theoretical difference between the presumed and automatic resulting trust, and instead 
there is merely one form of trust founded upon the imputed intentions of the transferor1096. 
This is because, as acknowledged by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, both forms of resulting 
trust arise as a result of the presumed intentions of the transferor, and although the 
‘automatic’ resulting trust may operate as such in practice, it does not operate such in 
theory. Alternatively, the distinction is valuable for assisting in explaining how the 
different forms of resulting trust operate rather than their theoretical bases, and thus is 
merely a descriptive tool.  
 
It is further submitted that the automatic resulting trust accords with the theoretical 
position taken in this thesis. As outlined above, this thesis’ proffers that Equity imputes 
an intention that the transferor of property intended to retain1097 a beneficial interest in 
property if it is transferred gratuitously or if they contributed to the purchase price. It is 
submitted that the automatic resulting trust accords with this interpretation because of the 
matrices it is applicable to. The automatic resulting arises where there has been a failure 
of trust or the trust has surplus assets after its purpose has been achieved. Should the 
settlor have failed to provide a gift-over for the property, then Equity is confronted with 
a situation where there is no evidence as to how the settlor intended to deal with the trust 
 
1095 Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 448; Mee J, ‘Automatic’ Resulting Trusts: 
Retention, Restitution or Reposing Trust?, in Mitchell C Constructive and Resulting Trusts, (Hart: 
Oxford, 2010) at 232 
1096 Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 449 
1097 Mee J, ‘Automatic’ Resulting Trusts: Retention, Restitution or Reposing Trust?, in Mitchell 
C Constructive and Resulting Trusts, (Hart: Oxford, 2010) at 207.  
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assets. In such circumstances, Equity must take the initiative and impute what the settlor’s 
most likely intention would have been if they had set their minds to the issue – that they 
would have intended to retain beneficial ownership of the property1098. By retaining the 
beneficial interest, the settlor is then free to either create another trust or utilise the 
property for this own benefit. Hence, the automatic resulting trust involves the imputation 
of an intention that the settlor intended to retain a beneficial interest, and provides an 
objective means of determining the beneficial ownership of property.  
 
Section 3.2 – Application of the Automatic Resulting Trust in Liquidation  
 
The primary matrix in which the automatic resulting trust arises is upon the failure of an 
express trust, such as where the company is the settlor of a trust. An express trust may 
fail because of a non-existent beneficiary1099, a failure to meet the ‘three certainties’1100, 
or some other subsequent failure1101. Should the trust fail1102, the property would result 
back to the company, who would then enjoy beneficial ownership over the property. 
Obviously, this would apply to any instances in which a company sought to, but failed to, 
create an express trust. However, this may in particularly be of use should the company 
have attempted to engage in tax efficiency schemes1103 that are later declared void1104. 
This may be because the transactions have no commercial or business purpose other than 
to avoid tax1105. Although there is insufficient scope within this thesis to analyse such 
schemes1106, this form of corporate behaviour has become infamous through multiple 
headlines concerning multinational companies1107. Should an express trust be utilised in 
such schemes1108, and that scheme subsequently fail, then the assets would be returned to 
 
1098 Ibid, at 235. See also Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 734 
1099 Omojole v HSBC Bank Plc [2012] EWHC 3102 (HC) 
1100 Knight v Knight (1840) 49 ER 58 
1101 Re Ames’ Settlement [1946] Ch 217 
1102 Such as in Tinker v Tinker [1970] P 136  
1103 IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1 per Lord Tomlin. See also Thomas G, The Law of 
Trusts, (No.185) at 38-40 
1104 Rudkin v Dolman (1876) 35 LT 791; Re Boyes (1884) 25 Ch D 531; Re Pugh’s WT [1967] 3 
All ER 337.  
1105 McNiven (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments [2003] 1 AC 311; Countess 
Fitzwilliam v IRC [1992] STC 185  
1106 Which is likely - for full analysis see Loutzenhiser G, Tiley’s Revenue Law, 8th edn (Oxford: 
Hart, 2016) at 624-642 and 767-787 
1107 It includes both the use of discretionary trusts with a number of ‘straw’ beneficiaries and 
extra-jurisdictional trusts in well known ‘tax havens’.  
1108 See Loutzenhiser G, Tiley’s Revenue Law, 8th edn (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 
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the company should no gift over be provided. In doing so, the resulting trust would be 
giving effect to commercial logical as companies very rarely intend to part with property 
without receiving something in return in order to protect the interests of their members. 
This is especially true should a tax efficiency scheme have failed. A prime example of 
such an intention to retain the beneficial interest in property after a failed attempt to 
minimise tax liabilities, and the effects of such a resulting trust, is Re Vandervell, where 
after an attempted tax efficiency scheme was declared void the property resulted back to 
Mr Vandervell1109.  
 
Furthermore, should the company set up a trust for distressed individuals, and that fund 
no longer be required, it too will result to the settlor company1110. Such instances, 
although not directly involving companies, include Re Gillingham Bus Disaster Fund1111, 
where the contributions were unnecessary owing to insurance payments, and Re 
Abbott1112, where the death of the beneficiaries (two elderly women) meant the donated 
funds were no longer needed. Within a corporate context, it is unlikely that companies 
would regularly engage in such philanthropic activities. However, they may engage in 
such activities if it is part of the overall company image (such as the Ronald McDonald 
House Charities1113) or if they are involved in an unfortunate event (Primark with the Raza 
Plaza disaster)1114. Should these schemes fail or become unnecessary, then the surplus 
would be held on resulting trust for the company and could become a company asset. This 
would then form part of the asset pool and be available to the liquidator for distribution 
to the unsecured creditors.  
 
 
1109 Pearce R and Barr W in Pearce & Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligation, 7th edn (Oxford: 
OUP, 2018) at 153 submit that it is likely Mr Vandervell would have denied any beneficial interest 
in the property owing to the tax bill that became due. However, it is submitted that although there 
may be negative tax implications, reacquiring the asset would outweigh any such negative tax 
effects.  
1110 Abbott Fund Trusts, Re Smith v Abbott [1900] 2 Ch 236; Re Ames’ Settlement [1946] Ch 217; 
Re Cochrane [1955] Ch 309 
1111 [1958] Ch 300 
1112 Abbott Fund Trusts, Re Smith v Abbott [1900] 2 Ch 236 
1113 See https://www.rmhc.org.uk  
1114 Here Primark agreed to provide emergency aid and compensation to the victims of the 
collapsed factory: Butler S, Primark to Pay £6m more to Victims of Rana Plaza Factory in 
Bangladesh, 16th Match 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/primark-
payout-victims-rana-plaza-bangladesh   
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Consequently, should an insolvent company have created, or have attempted to create, an 
express trust that that fails or completes its purpose with a surplus of assets, then these 
assets will be available for the liquidator to acquire and then make them available for 
distribution. Owing to the probability that such express trusts will have been created by 
deed or trust document, rather than orally, the liquidator will usually have knowledge of 
the trust from the company’s records. Despite this, proving that the trust has failed may 
prove problematic, with the potential beneficiaries seeking argue the trust is still valid. 
Consequently, this may involve costly litigation to establish the trust’s failure1115. 
Although such issues largely lay outside the scope of this thesis, the degree of clarity 
surrounding this area of law, if not the factual matrices, may make it easier for liquidators 
to establish a potential claim – if not enforce it.  
 
Section 3.3 - Quistclose Trust  
 
The Quistclose trust has sparked, and continues to spark, heated debate concerning the 
possibility of lenders retaining a beneficial interest in property. Such trusts arise whenever 
property has been transferred for a specific purpose that subsequently fails and there was 
an intention that the property should therefore be held on trust for the provider of the 
asset. Usually, but not always, this arises in the context of banks lending funds to 
struggling businesses in the hope that the emergency funding will enable the company to 
trade its way out of trouble1116. This mechanism is now regularly used as a means of 
protecting lenders when there has been insufficient time to draw up more detailed and 
comprehensive arrangements1117 - i.e. when the loan takes the form of emergency finance. 
By finding a proprietary interest over the assets in favour of the provider, they acquire 
priority should the company be unable to turn around its fortunes. This granting of lenders 
priority over the moneys has meant that the Quistclose trust has become a controversial 
mechanism as the provider’s priority to the company’s assets regularly comes at the 
expense of the unsecured creditors, who no longer have access to the moneys1118.  
 
 
1115 This is considered in more depth in Chapter 6 
1116 For example, see the seminal case of Barclays Bank v Quistclose Investments [1970] AC 567 
1117 McKendrick E, Commerce in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, (Oxford: 
Hart, 2004) at 145 
1118 McCormack G, Reservation of Title, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) at 29 
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The policy debate surrounding the Quistclose trust, analysed fully in Chapter 6, has 
primarily focused on the issue of fraud and misrepresentation of the company’s financial 
position to potential investors. At one end of the spectrum, Goodhart and Jones1119 have 
commented that the existence of such trusts is acceptable because the unsecured creditor 
could not have been relying on the company to use such assets to discharge their debts. 
This is as a consequence of Quistclose moneys usually being provided only as emergency 
funding towards the end of the life of a company, and shortly before the company 
eventually enters an insolvency regime. As such, existing creditors would have provided 
the credit before these assets were made available to the company, and so they could not 
have contemplated having access to these assets. In effect, the loan moneys were never 
available to the unsecured creditors, and so it is not unjust to grant priority to the lender. 
Indeed, they go so far as to claim that Quistclose trusts are ‘just and commendable’.  
 
At the other end, Moffatt1120 retorts that this may not always prove to be true. He submits 
that whilst parties who provided credit prior to the specific loan being granted may not 
be defrauded, this does not prevent the company from trying to create a false image of 
commercial solidity with the loan moneys. The company could then, either intentionally 
or unintentionally, use this false image to acquire further credit that will not be, and could 
never have been, repaid. Hence, the Quistclose trust may be used as an instrument of 
fraud, and fall foul of public policy concerns.  
 
From this brief outline of the debate surrounding the Quistclose trust, it is apparent that 
such trusts straddle this thesis’ analysis of the resulting trust. This is because such trusts 
can either increase an insolvent company’s asset pool by returning assets to the company 
if it took on the position of lender, or it can decrease the size of the company’s asset pool 
by segregating assets for lenders if it took on the position of borrower. It has also shown 
that such trusts are highly controversial, and these policy concerns are addressed fully in 
Chapter 6. This section will therefore briefly set out the historical background to the 
Quistclose trust, then seek to determine its theoretical foundations, before the next section 
identifies how and when such trusts might be applicable to instances of insolvency.  
 
 
1119 Infiltration of Equitable Doctrine (1980) 43 MLR 489 at 494 
1120 Moffatt G, Trusts Law, (No.899) at 804. See Re Northern Development (Holdings) Ltd, 6th 
October, unreported as an example provided.  
 235 
Section 3.3 (a) - Historical Foundations of the Quistclose Trust 
 
What would eventually be termed the Quistclose trust can be traced back to Hassall v 
Smither1121, where it was held that if moneys were made available for a particular purpose, 
they must be used for that expressed purpose or they will be held on trust for the provider 
of the moneys. Similarly, in the subsequent case of Toovey v Milne1122, it was held that if 
there is an advance of moneys and the expressed purpose of the loan fails, it must be 
repaid to the lender, and no proprietary interest in the loan moneys passes to the borrower. 
This principle was subsequently applied1123 to the misapplication of funds intended to 
purchase a business1124 and the return of investors’ moneys upon the non-completion of 
a railway1125. 
 
Hence, from this brief outline of the Quistclose trust’s history, it is apparent that it forms 
an integral part of English law, and has become a key component of modern property and 
commercial law. This is best illustrated in the seminal case of Barclays Bank v Quistclose 
Investments Ltd1126. Rolls had previously declared a dividend, and so Quistclose 
Investments agreed to loan it £209,719 on the written condition that it would be used for 
the purpose of paying the dividend and would also be placed in a separate account. Prior 
to paying the dividend, however, Rolls entered liquidation. Barclays then informed Rolls 
that as the loan moneys were placed in an account Rolls had with them, it was exercising 
its right to combine the accounts to pay down pre-existing debts. However, Quistclose 
claimed that the loan moneys were held on trust for itself. As set out fully below, it was 
held that the parties had a mutual intention that the moneys should not become part of 
Rolls’ assets, and that if the dividend could not be paid, the moneys should be returned to 
Quistclose. 
 
However, in the historical cases running from Hassall to Wilson, although the courts were 
clear that a trust would be imposed, they did not identify which form of trust was being 
 
1121 (1806) 12 Ves 119 
1122 (1819) 2 B & Ald 683 
1123 McCormack G, Proprietary Claims and Insolvency, (No.188) at 64. See also Re Rogers 
(1891) 8 Morr 243 
1124 Gilbert v Gonard (1884) 54 LJ Ch 439 
1125 National Bolivian Navigation Co. V Wilson (1880) 5 App Cas 176 
1126 [1970] A.C 567 
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imposed, nor the policy reasons for doing so. Whilst Quistclose did attempt to provide a 
theoretical foundation1127, as acknowledged immediately below, this has come in for 
heavy criticism, and cannot adequately explain the imposition of lender priority. 
Furthermore, the authoritative reasoning for the Quistclose trust has drastically changed 
from being along express trust foundations to resulting trust foundations, with the 
resulting trust analysis still receiving criticism. Hence, it is necessary to try and provide 
some modicum of clarity to the Quistclose trust’s theoretical foundations to ensure it falls 
within this thesis’ analysis of the resulting trust. The thesis concludes that of the three 
rival interpretations, the Quistclose trust is a form of automatic resulting trust arising upon 
the default exercise of a power.  
 
Section 3.3 (b) - The Possible Interpretations 
 
1. Express Trust Analysis 
 
The first detailed interpretation of the theoretical foundation of the Quistclose trust was 
provided by Lord Wilberforce in Quistclose. His Lordship stated that such trusts are 
founded upon express trust lines, and involve two trusts: a primary trust over the account 
in which the loan moneys are placed upon receipt, and a secondary trust to return the 
moneys to the lender1128. To justify such a conclusion, Lord Wilberforce relied heavily on 
Toovey v Milne1129 and Re Rogers1130. However, neither of these judgments, as with the 
other historical cases, set out the theoretical foundations of the trusts imposed, and Lord 
Wilberforce did not seek to identify the reasoning adopted in these cases. Hence, His 
Lordship adopted an express trust foundation.  
 
Utilising the express trust is, however, problematic. As concluded below, identifying who 
is the beneficiary of the trust is not always possible. In many cases, rather than there being 
an identifiable human or legal beneficiary, there is an abstract purpose. These include 
 
1127 Although only one reasoned judgment was provided by the House of Lords, that of Lord 
Wilberforce.  
1128 Barclays Bank v Quistclose Investments [1970] A.C. 567 at 580 
1129 (1819) 2 B&A 683 
1130 Re Roger, ex parte Holland and Hannen (1891) 8 Morr 243 – this extended the application of 
the Quistclose trust to instances of money having been provided to pay an individuals’ creditors 
before entering bankruptcy. 
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Moore v Barthrop1131 (the reduction of an overdraft), Re Vautin1132 (the discharge of debts) 
and Re EVTR1133 (the purchase of audio equipment). In Twinsectra v Yardley1134 for 
instance, the loan was provided not for a beneficiary, and instead was provided solely to 
be ‘applied in the acquisition of property’. As expounded in Morice v Bishop of 
Durham1135, all express trusts must have a human or legal beneficiary, and cannot be for 
abstract purposes unless they fall within one of the three exceptions set out in Re 
Endacott1136. In Twinsectra, Lord Millett therefore held that solely relying on the purpose 
the moneys were provided for would have conflicted with the beneficiary principle, and 
there was a need to also identify a human beneficiary1137. Hence, should the loan at the 
centre of a Quistclose case be made for an abstract purpose – which is a distinct possibility 
– it would run counter to the beneficiary principle.  
 
The existence of Quistclose trusts for purposes also precludes the analysis adopted in Re 
Northern Development (Holdings)1138 that the intended recipients of the loan moneys 
could be interpreted as being the beneficiaries1139. In doing so, the trust is no longer for 
an abstract purpose, and instead becomes one for human beneficiaries. Adopting such an 
interpretation is not free of issues, however1140. Firstly, even though there may eventually 
be identifiable parties who benefit from the trust, it is difficult to argue that the trust is 
truly in their favour when it is unequivocal that it was created to carry out a purpose rather 
than benefit those individuals. Secondly, it can be difficult to identify a beneficiary/group 
of beneficiaries either because they are no clearly identified, or because they cannot be 
known at the creation of the trust (such as if the moneys are to be used to pay future 
suppliers). In Re Northern Developments1141 for example, the loan moneys were intended 
 
1131 (1822) 1 B&C 5 
1132 [1900] 2 QB 325 
1133 [1987] BCLC 646  
1134 [2002] UKHL 12 
1135 (1804) 9 Ves 399 
1136 [1960] Ch 232, which held they are limited to trusts for the upkeep of particular animals, 
graves and monuments and the saying of private masses. None of these apply to instances of 
Quistclose trusts  
1137 [2002] UKHL 12 at 79 and 89 
1138 (Unreported) 6th October 1978 
1139 Such an interpretation relies upon Re Denley [1969] 1 Ch 373, thereby avoiding the issues 
associated with the beneficiary principle.  
1140 See Swadling W, Orthodoxy in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, (Oxford: 
Hart, 2004) at 29 
1141 (Unreported) 6th October 1978 
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to pay a subsidiary’s unsecured creditors – both those who existed at the time of the 
transfer and those who became creditors subsequently. Given that the subsequent 
creditors could not be identified at the time of the trust being created, certainty of object 
could not have existed at the creation of the trust.  
 
Furthermore, should the express trustee refuse to carry out the purpose, as the context has 
changed and the need for the money is no longer there (i.e. the rescue of the company is 
now impossible), then the beneficiaries would be free to overrule them and utilise the rule 
in Saunders v Vautier1142 to bring the trust to an end. This would enable the intended 
recipients to compel the borrower to transfer the moneys and allow them to be distributed 
amongst themselves. Both the lender and borrower would be powerless to prevent such 
an occurrence. As is apparent, should this occur, the moneys could not be returned to the 
lender, and would instead fulfil the purpose of being transferred to the third parties1143. 
 
From this, it is apparent that adopting an express trust basis as the theoretical foundations 
of the Quistclose trust is problematic and subject to a number of fundamental flaws.  
 
2. Constructive Trust Analysis 
 
An alternative formulation of the Quistclose trust was put forward in Carreras Rothmans 
Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd1144. Although not explicit in his categorisation of 
the Quistclose trust, Peter Gibson J appears to justify it along constructive trust grounds 
by referring to the role of the borrower’s conscience in the imposition of such trusts, and 
Equity binding their conscience to prevent them acquiring the beneficial interest to the 
loan moneys – the fundamental elements of the constructive trust. Specifically, his 
Honour stated that: 
 
“equity fastens on the conscience of the person who receives from another 
property transferred for a specific purpose only...so that the person will not 
 
1142 (1841) 4 Beav 115 
1143 Virgo G, The Principles, (No.899) at 243 
1144 [1985] Ch 207 
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be permitted to treat the property as his own or to use it for other than the 
stated purpose.”1145 
 
Hence, under such a formulation, the Quistclose trust would arise as a consequence of the 
borrower being unable to retain the moneys beneficially because, to do so, would be 
unconscionable owing to the limitations imposed as to the use of loan amounts. This 
obviously contrasts with the express trust, where the Quistclose trust is imposed as a 
consequence of the parties’ express intentions.  
 
Academic adoption of such a position is seen from Smolyansky1146, who insists that the 
Quistclose trust can be rationalised along constructive trust lines. This is necessary, 
according to Smolyansky, because of the flaws in adopting the alternative rationales. 
These flaws can be overcome, firstly, because as the constructive trust is imposed 
irrespective of the parties’ intentions1147, there is no need for the lender or the borrower to 
have expressly indicated that the moneys were to be held on trust, and there is no need to 
“do violence to the proper manner by which the law ought to construe the intention of the 
parties in a commercial context”1148 – which is necessary to impose a resulting trust in 
such matrices. Moreover, it is submitted that owing to the constructive trust’s flexibility, 
with the categories of such trusts never being closed, it would be possible to easily extend 
the constructive trust to such circumstances. Finally, it is argued by Smolyansky that it is 
justified to impose a constructive trust in these circumstances as it would be 
unconscionable to allow the insolvent company’s unsecured creditors access to the loan 
moneys when they themselves did not contribute towards them and, had the emergency 
finance been successful, would have benefited without providing any consideration.  
 
Notwithstanding the attractiveness and simplicity of these submissions, categorising the 
Quistclose trust along the lines of the constructive trust is questionable. First and 
foremost, despite the extended opportunity the higher courts have had in adopting such a 
framework, no such adoption has taken place. Indeed, in Twinsectra the House of Lords 
demurred the opportunity to adopt a constructive trust foundation. Furthermore, in Lord 
 
1145 Ibid, at 222 
1146 Smolyansky M, Reigning in the Quistclose Trust: A Response to Twinsectra v Yardley, (2010) 
16(7) Trusts and Trustees 558 at 567-568 
1147 Muschinski v Dodds (1984) 160 CLR 583 at 615 
1148 Smolyansky M, (No.1146) at 567 
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Millett’s rejection of Smolyansky’s submissions, it was noted that Smolyansky was 
mistaken as to the possible unconscionable conduct of the unsecured creditors1149. This 
was because the unsecured creditors had no rights over the loan moneys. Instead, whilst 
they may have had an indirect interest as a result of any liquidation dividend paid by the 
liquidator, the beneficial interest in the moneys rested either in the lender or insolvency 
practitioner (on behalf of the now insolvency borrower). Consequently, the 
unconscionability of the unsecured creditors receiving the loan moneys is not a relevant 
consideration1150, and so the Quistclose trust cannot be rationalised along constructive 
trust lines as there is no unconscionability.  
 
3.   Resulting Trust Analysis  
 
The final interpretation, and the most authoritative theoretical foundation, is that of a 
resulting trust. Notwithstanding Twinsectra’s role in the adoption of a resulting trust 
analysis, such an interpretation was first put forward by Lord Millett (Peter Millett QC as 
he was then) in a highly influential extra-judicial article1151. His Lordship proffered that 
Lord Wilberforce’s formulation of the Quistclose trust was incorrect, and that rather than 
being an unorthodox dual-trust mechanism, such trusts were in fact orthodox applications 
of trust principles to commercial activities1152.  
 
In putting forward this ‘orthodox’ interpretation, Lord Millett argued that the beneficial 
interest rests with the lender throughout the arrangement, and does not pass to either the 
final recipient or the borrower. With legal title passing to the borrower and the beneficial 
interest remaining with the lender, the lender retains control over the borrower by 
subjecting the borrower to a restriction – revocable at any time – to apply the loan moneys 
for the stated purpose1153. Only the lender would acquire this right, and the final recipients 
of the moneys would have no right to enforce the obligation1154.  
 
 
1149 Millett P, The Quistclose Trust – A Reply, (2011) 17 (1) Trusts and Trustees 7 at 15-16 
1150 See also Hudson E, A Normative Approach to the Quistclose Trust, (2017) 80(5) MLR 775 at 
796-7 
1151 Millett P, The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?, (1985) 101 LQR 269.  
1152 Ibid, at 283 
1153 Ibid, at 284 
1154 Ibid, at 285 
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Hence, the moneys are held on trust for the lender until they are applied for the stated 
purpose, and should the purpose become impossible to carry out, the lender would 
therefore be entitled to demand the return of the loan moneys. This was justified, using 
Toovey v Milne and Carreras Rothmans as examples, on the basis that it is very difficult 
to prove that the lender would have intended to benefit the final recipient. Such trusts 
were therefore described as ‘illusory trusts’1155, owing to the fact the apparent 
beneficiaries, contrary to appearances, do not in fact receive the beneficial interest to the 
property. Notwithstanding its ‘illusory’ nature, should the lender express some alternative 
intention, such that the final recipient was to benefit, then it is possible for there to be a 
trust for the benefit of the third party1156, and the ‘illusion’ disappear. In proposing such 
a formulation, although not using the specific language, Lord Millett was clearly 
advocating the adoption of the resulting trust. 
 
Building upon his extra-judicial publication, His Lordship in Twinsectra1157 
authoritatively1158 adopted his previous submissions and, discarding the classification of 
‘illusory’ trusts, openly theorised the Quistclose trust as an orthodox resulting trust. In 
doing so, His Lordship also in obiter endorsed Chambers’ negative formulation of the 
resulting trust1159, if not his interpretation of the Quistclose trust1160. Notwithstanding 
Lord Millett advocating an alternative formulation of the role of presumptions within the 
resulting trust to that adopted by this thesis1161, as set out below, there is no practical 
impact upon the use of the Quistclose trust irrespective of which formulation is 
adopted1162. Moreover, as explored immediately below, the imputed formulation adopted 
by this thesis is more than capable of explaining and justifying the imposition of a 
resulting trust in Quistclose circumstances.  
 
 
1155 Ibid, at 288 
1156 Ibid, at 285 
1157 Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] AC 164 
1158 Although Lord Millett gave a minority judgment, his fellow Law Lords concurred with his 
analysis of the Quistclose trust 
1159 Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] AC 164 at 184 
1160 Ibid, at 190-191. See also Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 461 
1161 Penner J, Lord Millett’s Analysis in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, 
(Oxford: Hart, 2004) at 52 
1162 Parmar D, The Uncertainty Surrounding the Quistclose Trust – Part One, (2012) ICR 137 at 
138 
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In setting out his interpretation for the Quistclose trust, Lord Millett summarised his view 
as the following: 
 
“I would reject all the alternative analyses, which I find 
unconvincing…and hold the Quistclose trust to be an entirely orthodox 
example of the kind of default trust known as a resulting trust. The lender 
pays the money to the borrower by way of loan, but he does not part with 
the entire beneficial interest in the money, and in so far as he does not it is 
held on a resulting trust for the lender from the outset….[the borrower] has 
no beneficial interest in the money, which remains throughout in the lender 
subject only to the borrower’s power or duty to apply the money in 
accordance with the lender’s instructions. When the purpose fails, the 
money is returnable to the lender, not under some new trust in his favour 
which only comes into being on the failure of the purpose, but because the 
resulting trust in his favour is no longer subject to any power on the part 
of the borrower to make use of the money.”1163   
 
Consequently, it was concluded that the beneficial interest in the loan moneys remained 
with the lender through a resulting trust up and until they were used for their intended 
purpose. Should the purpose become impossible to carry out, the moneys would be 
returned to the lender under the resulting trust. In coming to this conclusion, the 
Quistclose trust was described as being akin to a retention of title clause – the beneficial 
interest remains with the provider until the necessary action (either the carrying out of the 
intended purpose or payment for goods) is carried out1164.  
 
Lord Millett also expanded upon the restrictions imposed upon the borrower1165. It was 
held that upon the moneys being made available, the lender acquires an equitable right1166 
to compel the borrower to carry out the intended propose or prevent the misapplication 
of the loan moneys. According to Tucker, the borrower therefore receives a power to 
 
1163 Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] AC 164 at 193  
1164 Ibid, at 187 
1165 Ibid, at 184 
1166 Smith L, Understanding the Power in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, 
(Oxford: Hart, 2004) at 67 makes it clear that although Lord Millett refers to a duty, the borrower 
only receives a power  
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carry out the purpose if desired, but if it is concluded that this is no longer expedient, they 
are prevented from utilising the moneys for any other purpose1167. In imposing such an 
obligation, the borrower is thereby prevented from acquiring a beneficial interest as they 
do not acquire free use of the moneys.  
 
The primary benefit of adopting the resulting trust is the resolution of the need for an 
identifiable human beneficiary. As outlined above, the adoption of an express trust 
framework is problematic given that many Quistclose trusts are made for an abstract 
purpose, and so do not have an identifiable beneficiary. Utilising the resulting trust, 
however, negates this issue by ensuring that there is always an identifiable beneficiary in 
the form of the lender retaining the beneficial interest throughout the transaction1168.  
 
Three further issues are also resolved by adopting the resulting trust. Firstly, by retaining 
a beneficial interest in clearly demarcated assets (the loan moneys in segregated bank 
accounts), it is easy to identify the relevant property and so certainty of subject matter 
does not become an issue1169. Secondly, by adopting the resulting trust, rather than 
engaging in convoluted and imaginative interpretations of the factual matrices, Lord 
Millett’s concern with respecting legal orthodoxy is achieved and the Quistclose trust 
merely becomes “an application of ordinary principles of property law.”1170 Finally, by 
ensuring that the lender retains the beneficial interest throughout, rather than acquiring an 
interest at a later date, they are assured of having priority over other creditors1171. 
 
Subsequently to Twinsectra, Lord Millett’s formulation has received support and further 
clarification. In Challinor v Juliet Bellis1172, Briggs LJ wholeheartedly adopted Lord 
Millett’s resulting formulation, noting that the difficulties associated with Lord 
 
1167 Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 339 
1168 Clarke R, The Quistclose Trust: A Welcome Facilitator of Corporate Rescue, (2017) 26 
Nottingham LJ 130 at 134 
1169 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts and Romalpa Clauses: Substance and Nemo Dat in Corporate 
Insolvency, (2012) LQR 412 at 419 
1170 Hackney, Understanding Equity and Trusts, (London: Fontana Press, 1987) at 148-153 
1171 Penner J, Lord Millett’s Analysis in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, 
(Oxford: Hart, 2004) at 43; see also Chapter 6 Section 4 
1172 [2015] EWCA Civ 59 at paras 58-60 
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Wilberforce’s interpretation were ‘authoritatively resolved’ by Twinsectra1173 and that 
“Quistclose trusts are a species of resulting trust…”1174.  
 
However, in seeking to provide additional exposition, Briggs LJ appears to advocate the 
need for elements that are anathema to the resulting trust. Indeed, he states that “There 
must be an intention to create a trust on the part of the transferor…It means the transferor 
must have intended to enter into arrangements which, viewed objectively, have the effects 
in law of creating a trust…”1175 As set out in Section 1, this is problematic as within the 
resulting trust there is no need for an ‘intention to create a trust’, and instead an intention 
is ascribed to the transferor of property so long as certain predetermined acts have 
occurred. In fact, prima facie, such a requirement would correspond best with an express 
trust formulation, as such trusts do require the settlor to formulate the intention to create 
a trust1176. Moreover, Briggs LJ stated that “they [resulting trusts] are not presumed to 
exist unless a contrary intention be proved”1177. Again, this too is anathema to a resulting 
trust analysis owing to the fact there is no need for an express intention for a resulting 
trust to arise, as the intention to retain the beneficial interest is either inferred or imputed. 
In point of fact, contrary intentions are only necessary should there be evidence that the 
transferor intended that the recipient should receive the beneficial interest of the property 
and so rebut the presumption of a resulting trust1178. 
 
Notwithstanding Briggs LJ’s incompatible statements, it is apparent that he viewed the 
Quistclose trust as being a compliant and orthodox resulting trust. His Lordship, in 
contradiction of his previous references, recognised that no such intention was necessary, 
and that the Quistclose trust arises as a result of the lender’s actions and the intention 
subsequently imputed; “A person creates a trust by his words or conduct, not by his 
innermost thoughts.”1179 Quite how these contradictory statements can, or should, be 
reconciled is unclear. However, from Briggs LJ’s overall statements it is apparent that he 
adopted Lord Millett’s resulting trust formulation and the use of orthodox resulting trusts.  
 
1173 Ibid, at para 55 
1174 Ibid, at para 56  
1175 Ibid, at para 57 
1176 See Knight v Knight (1840) 49 ER 58 
1177 Ibid, at 58 
1178 See Chapter 6 Section 1  
1179 Challinor v Juliet Bellis [2015] EWCA Civ 59 at para 59 
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Further, and non-contradictory, adoption can be seen in Raymond Bieber v Teathers1180, 
where Patten LJ endorsed Lord Millett’s judgment1181 by concluding that the beneficial 
interest in the assets remains with the lender, and Templeton Insurance v Pennington 
Solicitors1182, where Lewison LJ repeated his support and adopted the resulting trust - 
“The terms of the trust were the classic Quistclose type of trust, namely, a resulting 
trust…subject to a power…”1183. What has therefore become clear is that the resulting 
trust has been accepted by the judiciary as the foundation of the Quistclose trust.  
 
The resulting trust formulation has not been free of reproof, however, with Thomas and 
Hudson1184 arguing that it fails to explain certain cases of Quistclose trust. They proffer 
that where the loan contract clearly states that the moneys are to be placed into a separate 
bank account, an express trust, rather than a resulting trust, would arise. In segregating 
the assets, there is now an express statement as to intention, and so the imputed intention 
of the resulting trust is rebutted.  
 
Whilst this argument does superficially carry some weight, there are a number of 
objections to it. Firstly, even if the loan agreement does contain a segregation clause, this 
is unlikely to be sufficient to prove an intention to create a trust, as whilst it indicates an 
intention to place some form of control over the loan moneys and restrict their usage, it 
is does not indicate an intention to separate the beneficial and legal interests in the 
moneys. In contrast with Paul v Constance1185, where Mr Constance repeatedly stated 
that the ‘money is as much yours as mine’ without understanding the full legal effects of 
his statements, but demonstrated a clear (if misplaced) intention to a grant beneficial 
interest in the property, a mere segregation clause does not indicate that any party other 
than the lender will be able to treat the moneys as their own. Instead, it merely indicates 
that the borrower is restricted in what the money can be used for. Furthermore, as 
illustrated below, it is possible for a Quistclose trust to arise even if there is no express 
 
1180 [2012] EWCA Civ 1466 
1181 Ibid, at 15 
1182 [2006] EWHC 685. See also Cooper v PRG Powerhouse LTD [2008] EWHC 498; Kingate 
Global Fund v Knightsbridge (USD) (2010) 12 ITELR 850 (Bermuda CA); Re EVTR [1987] 
BCLC 646 at 650 
1183Templeton Insurance v Pennington Solicitors [2006] EWHC 685 
1184 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 750 
1185 [1976] 1 WLR 527 
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segregation clause, meaning that such clauses cannot be central to the establishment of 
such trusts.  
 
Thomas and Hudson moreover submit that should Lord Millett’s formulation be adopted, 
there could be no trust in Quistclose circumstances1186. They argue Lord Millett’s use of 
the words ‘the money remains with the lender’ requires both the legal and equitable title 
to remain with the lender – thereby preventing the necessary division of legal and 
beneficial title and turning the borrower merely into a bailee of the lender. They instead 
argue that the beneficial interest in the property should rest with the lender, and the 
borrower instead acquire a right to be vested automatically with the absolute interest in 
the money so as to enable them to give effect to the identified purpose. In doing so, the 
lender retains the equitable interest in the property barring the elements needed by the 
borrower to give effect to the intended purpose. Although such a reinterpretation does 
provide an explanation for the location of the beneficial interest in the property, arguably 
it is too convoluted and based upon an incorrect reading of Lord Millett’s comments.  
 
It is submitted that rather than requiring both the legal and beneficial title to remain with 
the lender, Lord Millett’s comments require only the beneficial title to remain in order to 
protect the lender, and the statement that the ‘money remains with the lender’ was making 
the untechnical or real world reference to the fact that the lender retained control over the 
money rather than a purely legal statement that both legal and beneficial title rested with 
the borrower. This interpretation is possible owing to the purpose of the Quistclose trust 
– it is utilised to return the loan moneys to the lender, and only a beneficial interest is 
necessary to provide the lender with priority. Once this realisation is acknowledged, 
Thomas and Hudson’s elaborate reinterpretation becomes unnecessary.  
 
The suitability of utilising presumptions to establish the existence of a Quistclose trust 
has been criticised by both Chambers1187 and Emily Hudson1188. Taking Chambers’ 
criticism first, he argues that the presumptions underlying the resulting trust apply only 
to apparent gifts, and that the presence of consideration (i.e. interest payments) for the 
 
1186 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 1379 
1187 Chambers R, Restriction on the Use of Money in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical 
Essay, (Oxford: Hart, 2004) at 84 
1188 Hudson E, A Normative (No.1150) 
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loan would rebut the presumptions, and the borrower would take the full beneficial 
interest subject to the restrictions imposed by the lender. He also submits that the 
existence of a restriction on the loan’s use reveals the lender’s intention. It is submitted 
that whilst Chambers’ analysis is correct if consideration has already been paid, it is not 
so if consideration has yet to be paid until some later date, and instead there is merely a 
gratuitous transfer. Hence, until the purpose is given effect to the ‘loan’ element of the 
arrangement is not operative. In instances of failed loans for a specific purpose, it is 
extremely likely (unless the parties have agreed upon an upfront payment for making the 
loan available, which is remote given the emergency nature of the loan) that no 
consideration/interest payment has been paid to the lender. Consequently, the purpose of 
the transfer has failed, and the presumption of resulting trust is not rebutted because there 
has yet to be any consideration – merely the intention to provide consideration that has 
failed. Moreover, it is submitted that the existence of the restriction is insufficient to rebut 
the presumption of resulting trust. It is proffered that whilst it may assist in not rebutting 
the presumption, it is not enough to discard the resulting trust entirely as it is evidence of 
control and use of the moneys, rather than where the beneficial interest of the moneys 
should lie – for this to occur, the loan contract would have to provide evidence of the 
borrower/eventual recipient receiving the beneficial interest such as a statement 
recognising either party as being the true owner of the property.  
 
Emily Hudson also questions the use of presumptions, and argues that Lord Millett’s 
formulation now requires lenders to provide evidence of their actual intentions, rather 
than merely rely upon the presumptions of resulting trust1189. It is therefore proffered that 
in needing to do so, and because there is regularly evidence of an intention, there is an 
express rather than resulting trust1190. Hudson’s submissions can be questioned on two 
points, however. Firstly, there is no need within a Quistclose trust for the parties to have 
expressly stated their intention to retain a beneficial interest in the loan moneys, and so 
sole reliance on expressed intentions to justify such trusts is not a viable possibility. 
Secondly, it is submitted that this misstates the role of resulting trust presumptions. As 
set out in Section 1.1, the presumptions arise where there is a lack of evidence regarding 
the transferor’s intentions – where there is no express statement. In instances of 
 
1189 Ibid, at 782 
1190 Ibid, at 783. See also Bridge M, The Law of Personal Property, 2nd edn (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2018) at 301 
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Quistclose trusts there is usually no such statement, and instead at most there is a 
segregation clause, meaning there is insufficient evidence to properly establish the 
intentions of the transferor or create an express trust1191. Even if there is a segregation 
clause or restrictive obligations over the potential uses of the moneys, it is submitted that 
they are still insufficient to form a declaration of express trust, as they merely seek to 
limit the use of the moneys, rather than impose trustee obligations. Instead, the existence 
of this evidence merely fails to rebut the presumption, rather than actually bring about the 
creation of an express trust, or, if sufficiently strong, replaces the use of the presumption 
with actual evidence that the beneficial interest is to be retained1192. 
 
The final contention with the Twinsectra formulation is the form of resulting trust that 
was adopted. Despite the detail provided by Lord Millett in his judgment, it was not stated 
which form of the resulting trust had been adopted beyond the notion that it abided by 
orthodox principles.  
 
As set out above, there are three forms of resulting trust. Classification as a purchase price 
resulting trust is not possible owing to the fact that the loan moneys are (until used for 
their intended purpose) in their same form, and have not been used to purchase any 
substitute property. It is submitted that if consideration has yet to be paid, it is possible 
for there to be a gratuitous transfer resulting trust as the loan moneys will not take the 
form of real property. The problem is if the borrower has provided consideration prior to, 
or on the event of, the loan moneys being transferred. Whilst this is again unlikely owing 
to the emergency finance nature of Quistclose trusts, such a possibility cannot be ruled 
out in other contexts, and so the gratuitous transfer formulation would only be applicable 
to some, and not all, Quistclose trusts.  
 
Having dispensed with the alternatives, the final possibility is the automatic resulting 
trust. As set out in the previous section, such trusts arise upon the ineffective disposition 
of property – either where there is a surplus after the terms of an express trust have been 
carried out or an attempted express trust has failed. Given that Quistclose trusts arise upon 
 
1191 Penner J, Lord Millett’s Analysis in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, 
(Oxford: Hart, 2004) at 62; Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 337 
1192 See Pettit v Pettit [1970] AC 777 at 823; Hodgson v Marks [1971] 1 Ch 892; see also 
Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 32 
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the intended purpose of the loan failing, it is clear that such trusts fall within the remit of 
the automatic resulting trust, and that Equity imputes the intention that the lender intended 
the property to return to him upon this failure.  
 
Whilst this formulation is attractive in its simplicity, Virgo has however found two 
primary issues with this analysis1193. He submits that Lord Millett’s analysis is defective 
with the orthodox law in two aspects: firstly, there is no initial express trust or attempt at 
creating an express trust, and secondly that there was no failure of purpose in the majority 
of instances in which a Quistclose trust has been identified. To sidestep these issues, it is 
proffered that Quistclose and Twinsectra should be reinterpreted as instances as where 
the creation of a private purpose trust was attempted and failed owing to being void due 
to the beneficiary principle1194. As a consequence, it is concluded that an orthodox 
automatic resulting trust arises to return the property to the lender.  
 
There is much to commend about Virgo’s simple interpretation. However, the notion that 
previous cases can be reinterpreted as attempts to intentionally create void purpose trusts 
must be rejected on the basis that it is apparent from even a cursory reading of the facts 
that this was not attempted. It is apparent, for example, from the actions of the parties in 
Quistclose itself that no express trust was attempted or contemplated. Instead, Tucker 
submits that rather than rely on a void express trust, the automatic resulting trust arises as 
a consequence of a non-exercised power1195. This is because in default of the power being 
exercised owing to the change in circumstances, an automatic resulting trust arises to 
return the loan moneys to the lender – much like upon the failure of an express trust. It is 
submitted that utilising the simple defaulted exercise of the power, rather than a fictitious 
reinterpretation of there being an attempted private purpose trust, is both more in keeping 
with legal orthodoxy and more factually sound. Virgo himself attempts to address the 
shortcomings of his interpretation by admitting that it may prove problematic to identify 
the necessary intention to create an express trust1196. Given that the power is 
indistinguishable from the loan agreement, no such evidential problem exists in Tucker’s 
formulation. Finally, given that there only need to be a default in use of the power, rather 
 
1193 Virgo G, The Principles (No.899) at 245  
1194 Ibid, at 246 
1195 Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 338 
1196 Virgo G, The Principles (No.899) at 248 
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than a failure of purpose, Virgo’s second objection becomes irrelevant. Hence, it is 
submitted that whilst Quistclose trusts are orthodox automatic resulting trusts, they arise 
in default of exercise of a power rather than an attempt to create a private purpose trust.   
 
Thus, the Quistclose trust, for the purposes of this chapter, and despite the continued 
controversy, will be seen as an automatic resulting trust, applying orthodox principles.  
 
Section 3.5 - The Requirements  
 
Having ascertained the theoretical foundations of the Quistclose trust, it is now necessary 
to identify the relevant requirements of these trusts in order to determine how they impact 
upon the actual, and potential, unsecured creditors of insolvent companies and lenders. 
As already noted, certainty of object and subject matter will be relevant 
considerations1197, but for the most part are not contentious issues given the clearly 
demarcated nature of the loan moneys (or their substitutes1198) and the lender being the 
continuous beneficiary.   
 
The fundamental requirements of a Quistclose trust are that there is a provision of assets, 
for a specific purpose, with sufficiently certain terms that allow the court to determine 
whether or not that purpose has been carried out, and that the recipient of the loan moneys 
is not to receive beneficial title to the moneys and must instead keep them separate. It is 
important to acknowledge, however, that whilst the majority of cases involve a loan, this 
is not a requirement1199. Instead, there must merely be the provision of assets to one party 
by another. Historically, these requirements were succinctly set out in Henry v 
Hammond1200: 
 
“It is clear that if the terms upon which the person receives the money are 
that he is bound to keep it separate...and to [treat it] as a separate fund to 
the person entitled to it, then he is a trustee of that money and must hand 
it over to the person who is his cestui que trust. If on the other hand he is 
 
1197 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts, (No.892) at 419 
1198 See Re Golcorp Exchange [1994] UKPC 3; Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452 for discussions 
of the certainty of subject matter 
1199 Cooper v PRG Power [2008] EWHC 498 
1200 [1913] 2 KB 515 at 521 
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not bound to keep the money separate, but is entitled to mix it with his own 
money and deal with it as he pleases...he is not a trustee of the money, but 
merely a debtor.” 
 
Whilst they have been restated more contemporaneously in Bieber v Teathers1201 and 
Bellis v Challinor1202, the only crucial change has been an emphasis on the need for there 
to be a clear and distinct purpose. From these statements of the criteria it appears that 
there are two elements that require further elaboration to determine their precise meaning; 
the need for the moneys to be segregated and the need for a specific purpose.  
 
Section 3.5(a) - Need for Segregation 
 
From the authorities it appears that whilst there is no need for the moneys to actually have 
been segregated, there must be a term in the transfer that prevents them from becoming 
part of the borrower’s general assets. As stated in Bieber, there must be a “mutual 
intention of payer and recipient…that the funds transferred should not be part of the 
general assets of the recipient…”1203 
 
Examples of what will constitute the requisite intention to segregate include Re Nanwa 
Gold Mines1204, where money had been advanced on the promise that it would be kept in 
a separate account. Here the company, Nanwa Gold, had attempted to acquire 
subscriptions to the issue of new shares on the promise that the moneys would be held in 
a separate account and returned should the company be unable to raise enough funds to 
continue operations. It was held that as the moneys were intended to be, and actually 
were, segregated, they were not available to the company’s insolvency practitioners.  
 
This clear and sufficient intention can be contrasted with Moseley v Cressey’s Co1205, 
which Harman J did so in Re Nanwa. Here the company invited investors to purchase 
shares by means of a prospectus that stated that should the sale not proceed, the moneys 
would be returned. It was held that, unlike in Re Nanwa where there was an undertaking 
 
1201 [2012] EWCA Civ 1466 at 14 and 15 
1202 [2015] EWCA Civ 59 at 56 
1203 Bieber v Teathers [2012] EWCA Civ 1466 at 14 
1204 [1955] 1 WLR 1080 
1205 (1865) LR 1 EQ 405 
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to segregate the assets into a separate account, a mere promise to return (and not 
segregate) the investors’ moneys was insufficient to create a Quistclose trust as the 
company had obtained an unrestricted access to the moneys legal and beneficial title. 
Similarly in Gabriel v Little Ors1206, the requisite intention was found lacking in a loan to 
develop property. Although the loan was made available for the express purpose of 
property development, no restrictions as to the loan moneys’ use or segregation from the 
borrower’s general assets was included1207. Hence, the money was as the free disposal of 
the of the borrower and not subject to any trust.  
 
Hence, it is incontrovertible that the moneys must be subject to a term that they are to be 
segregated and not form part of the borrower’s general assets. It is furthermore apparent 
that whilst such a term is necessary, it does not need to be carried out and the moneys 
actually be segregated. In none of the referred to authorities is it stated that the borrower 
must carry out the segregation – merely that it must have been the parties’ intention that 
this would occur as an enforceable restriction over the moneys was created1208. In Bellis v 
Challinor it was stated, for example, the requirement is merely that the “property is 
transferred on terms that do not leave it at the free disposal of the transferee”1209 – not that 
segregation actually occur1210. This is important as if the lender fails to do so – which 
given the frantic and confusing circumstances in which the Quistclose trust is utilised is 
foreseeable – the lender will still be protected and granted priority. Instead, a failure to 
segregate will merely require the location of the loan moneys or their substitute through 
the rules of tracing.  
 
Section 3.5(b) - Need for a specific purpose  
 
Directly linked with the need for segregation is the requirement that there must be a 
specific purpose to the loan. This has been seen in Quistclose itself (the payment of a 
declared dividend), Twinsectra (the purchase of land) and Carreras Rothmans (the 
 
1206 [2013] EWCA Civ 1513. See also Guardian Ocean Cargoes Ltd v Banco de Brasil [1994] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 152 per Savile LJ at 159-160 and Tuthill v Equine FX Ltd [2013] EWHC 1207 QBD 
1207 Ibid, at 43 
1208 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 150 
1209 [2015] EWCA Civ 59 at 63 
1210 Tucker L, Lewin on Trusts, (No.185) at 334; see also Parmar D, The Uncertainty Surrounding 
the Quistclose Trust – Part One, (2012) ICR 137 at 140 
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discharge of the debts of a supplier). In all of these cases identifying the purpose of the 
loan was not problematic as the available evidence – primarily the loan contract – made 
it explicitly clear what the purpose was, and so an in-depth enquiry into locating the 
purpose was unnecessary.  
 
Notwithstanding the requirement that there be a ‘specific’ or ‘particular’ purpose1211, the 
courts have not adopted a restrictive approach in identifying the requisite purpose1212. 
Indeed, the courts appear willing to engage in the process of finding a specific purpose 
and infer an intention to the parties from facts if necessary, rather than rely upon their 
express statements1213. As noted by Briggs LJ, the court must construe the words in the 
loan agreement and the parties’ conduct (including a third party) to determine whether 
the loan was for a specific purpose1214, rather than merely rely on the wording in the loan 
contract itself.   
 
This willingness, although recently affirmed in Bellis, has been central since the 
Quistclose trust’s inception. In Toovey v Milne1215, Abbot CJ rejected the need for clear 
evidence to be provided to indicate that a specific purpose was present. His Lordship 
instead allowed the court to infer from the facts that “…the fair inference from the facts 
proved was that this money was advanced for a specific purpose….” 
 
An example of the courts utilising this ability to infer a specific purpose from the facts 
can be seen in Edwards v Glyn1216. Here a bank that was expected to be subject to a run 
was provided £3,000 in return for a guarantee. The guarantee stated that the moneys were 
to be returned if the bank was unable to withstand the run. When the run could not be 
withstood the guarantor repaid the moneys on the basis that the loan was for the purpose 
of preventing the run on the bank – something that had clearly not been achieved.  
 
 
1211 Bieber v Teathers [2012] EWCA Civ 1466 at 14 
1212 Zhuang W, Resulting Trusts as a Response to Unjust Enrichment, (2014) 26 SAcLJ 649 at 
653 
1213 See Clarke R, The Quistclose Trust: A Welcome Facilitator of Corporate Rescue, (2017) 26 
Nottingham LJ 130 at 136; Beglan W and Belcher A, Jumping the Queue, (1997) JBL 1 at 5 
1214 Bellis v Challinor [2015] EWCA Civ 59 at [59]-[61]  
1215 (1819) 2 B&A 683 at 684 
1216 (1859) 2 E&E 29 
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Furthermore, the courts have not limited themselves to identifying a purpose, but also 
reinterpreting and redefining existing purposes. This can be seen in Lord Millett’s 
interpretation of Quistclose itself1217. Prima facie the purpose of the loan central to 
Quistclose was to pay the declared dividend. However, to justify his argument that the 
purpose of the loan had failed, it was instead proffered that rather than merely being for 
the purpose of paying the dividend (which could still have been paid), the loan was to 
preserve Rolls Razor as a going concern. Given that this was no longer possible owing to 
the company’s liquidation, it was apparent that the purpose had failed. In redefining and 
reinterpreting the nature of the specific purpose, it shows that the courts are willing to use 
their discretion to find a Quistclose trust and thereby provide lenders with the trust’s 
protections.  
 
The final step the courts have taken in assisting the locating of a specific purpose is 
relaxing the degree of precision any stated purpose is expressed in. In Twinsectra, for 
example, the purpose was expressed and broadly stated as being the ‘acquisition of 
property’. Whilst Carnwath J found this too imprecise at first instance, Lord Millett found 
it to be sufficiently certain as the court could still “determine whether it is still capable of 
being carried out or whether the money has been misapplied…”1218 Hence, from the 
courts’ willingness to infer, reinterpret and allow for very broadly stated purposes greatly 
extends the possibilities for lenders acquiring the protections afforded by the Quistclose 
trust – particularly if the loan agreement is ambiguously drafted.  
 
However, there are clear limits to the degree that a specific purpose can be inferred – 
namely that there is a lack of any evidence. In Holiday Promotions (Europe) Ltd1219, no 
Quistclose trust was found owing to the lack of a specific purpose. Here the customer had 
paid to the company a refundable deposit of £150 in the hopes of winning a free holiday. 
It was held that only a contractual, and not proprietary, relationship existed between the 
two parties for two reasons: firstly the moneys were not segregated and were placed in a 
general account, and secondly the moneys were not intended to be used for any specific 
purpose – they were to be used by the company for its general purposes. Therefore, the 
 
1217 Millett P, The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?, (1985) 101 LQR 271 at 275/76 
1218 Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] 2 All ER 377 at 101  
1219 [1996] 2 BCC 618 
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court was unable to ascribe a specific purpose to the moneys, and the lender failed to gain 
the protections provided by the Quistclose trust because of a clear lack of evidence.  
 
Similarly, allowing the recipient free rein with the use of the moneys will prevent a 
purpose being inferred. In Neste Oy v Lloyd's Bank Plc1220, a shipowner employed a 
company to run its port services. In enable it to do, it sometimes provided it with the 
necessary funds. The payments were titled ‘advances’, but were paid in advance and in 
arrears. Moreover, the moneys did not have to be used specifically for the purposes of 
providing the port services – they could be applied to any business the company engaged 
in – and there was also no separate bank account in which they were to be held. 
Consequently, no Quistclose trust was found.  
 
Neste and Holiday Promotions therefore illustrate that whilst the courts have a large 
degree of discretion to find a specific purpose, there is a limit, and if the facts provide no 
evidence of there being one purpose, no Quistclose trust can be present. Given the lengths 
the courts have gone to locate a purpose, it is probable that this is unlikely to present too 
much of an issue in the majority of Quistclose claims, and it is only in the most the 
extreme cases that no purpose will be identified1221.   
 
Section 3.6 - The Potential uses of the Quistclose Trust in Liquidation  
 
As acknowledged in Section 3.5, the Quistclose trust potentially has a direct and 
significant impact upon unsecured creditors should liquidation occur. It was noted that 
such trusts can increase the payable liquidation dividend by returning assets to the now 
insolvent company (if the company took on the position of a lender) or they can prevent 
providers of credit becoming creditors. Hence, this section will now outline in detail 
precisely how the Quistclose trust achieves these outcomes and whether they are 
beneficial of negative for unsecured creditors.  
 
Section 3.6 (a) – Traditional Quistclose Trusts  
 
 
1220 [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 658 
1221 Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 462 
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Given the discussion set out immediately above, and the seminal nature of Barclays Bank 
v Quistclose, the obvious and simplest utilisation of such trusts for the benefit of 
unsecured creditors is if the now insolvent company provided a loan to another party for 
a specific purpose that has failed – that the insolvent company was a creditor and is now 
owed repayment of the loan moneys. Such a Quistclose trust would be an entirely 
orthodox use of the mechanism, and would fall squarely in the previous fact patterns such 
as Quistclose itself, Hassall and Toovey v Milne.  
 
Regardless of such a fact pattern’s orthodox and theoretical possibility, the prospect of 
this occurring in the real world is very limited. Owing to the emergency finance nature of 
the overwhelming number of Quistclose trusts, the majority of companies, if they are 
facing the imminent prospect of insolvency, would not realistically be in a position to 
make such loans available. It is submitted that there would only be two noticeable 
exceptions to this practical limitation. First, should the insolvent company be a bank who 
is made insolvent without any forewarning1222. In such circumstances, the bank would 
have been operating its usual business model and so made the emergency finance 
available to the third party. The insolvency would not have been predicted and lending 
would not be restricted. The second once again concerns corporate groups. Should a 
parent make a loan available to its subsidiary, or the subsidiary make a loan available to 
its parent, primarily for the purpose of rescuing the company or for the purchase of new 
equipment, then the provider of the moneys would be able to reclaim them. As opposed 
to unconnected companies, there is a greater probability that the closer relationship will 
cause lenders to take more risks and so make the moneys available. This is particularly 
so if the failure of one company threatened the entire group.  
 
An example of such loans being made available is Carreras Rothmans Ltd. Although not 
involving a direct parent/subsidiary relationship (instead it was client and supplier), the 
case did share many of the same features outlined above. The client (Carreras) made 
emergency financing available to its advertising agency (Freeman Mathews) to ensure its 
continued operation and already negotiated discounts. Specifically, the loan moneys were 
made available to enable Freeman Mathews to pay third parties and so were placed in a 
 
1222 Such as happened at the height of the finance crisis in 2008 when major banks such as 
Northern Rock and Royal Bank of Scotland.   
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separate account. Prior to actually paying the third parties, Freeman Mathews entered 
liquidation. Carreras paid the third parties directly to discharge the outstanding debts and 
then sought to recover the loan amounts provided. It was held that the loan moneys were 
held on trust as the specific purpose had failed and segregation was intended. Despite 
there being a few differences between Carreras and the fact pattern outlined above, the 
case does illustrate the potential – and willingness – for companies with a close 
relationship to minimise the risks of emergency finance by retaining the beneficial interest 
to the moneys until the successful carrying out of the purpose. Moreover, it also illustrates 
the potential for unsecured creditors to leverage immediate discharging of debts in return 
for not pursuing any claim to the loan moneys themselves.   
 
As is also illustrated in Carreras, the more likely outcome is that Quistclose trusts in the 
context of emergency finance will be used to reduce the insolvent company’s asset pool 
and cause harm to the unsecured creditors. As occurred in Quistclose, Re Northern 
Development and Carreras, a company in financial distress acquired emergency funding 
and upon that funding no longer being required, parties other than the now insolvency 
company had a beneficial interest in the property. Consequently, the unsecured creditors 
had no access to the moneys, and so could not be made available to the unsecured 
creditors. Although Chapter 6 submits that this priority for the lender can be justified on 
the basis that the property was always theirs and it would be unjust to allow third parties 
access to loan moneys that were provided for a failed specific purpose, it is undeniable 
that by granting the lender priority the unsecured creditors lose out by having fewer assets 
available to discharge their debts. Furthermore, as recognised by McKendrick1223, the 
Quistclose trust is infrequently utilised by the traditional lenders of secured credit – major 
financial institutions – and so if it is utilised, it is likely that smaller, much weaker lenders 
will benefit – those who would otherwise have become unsecured creditors.  
 
Notwithstanding these issues, as acknowledged above, it is possible to grant the intended 
eventual third-party recipient of the moneys a beneficial interest in the loan moneys. 
Thereby, rather than the lender acquiring priority, creditors - such as in Re Northern 
Developments – would have access to the moneys directly.  
 
1223 McKendrick E, Commerce in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, (Oxford: 
Hart, 2004) at 150 
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In Re Margaretta Ltd1224, Michael Crystal QC held that third parties could acquire a 
beneficial interest of the loan moneys in two circumstances1225:  
 
1) Where the obvious intention would be frustrated if the donor retained a power of 
revocation of the trust; 
2) Where the existence of the trust arrangements is communicated to the intended payee 
and the latter gains a beneficial interest in the money either because of the creation of 
an estoppel in his favour or because communication perfects an assignment for the 
donor’s equitable interest to him.  
 
Of these two scenarios, the second is more likely given the difficulty associated with the 
courts identifying the intention that the third party was to have the beneficial interest in 
the loan moneys without written evidence. This is borne out in the reported cases, which 
focus on type 2 claims. In Re Margaretta itself, moneys were set aside in a solicitor’s 
account so that VAT obligations on the sale of land in London could be paid. The money 
was then misappropriated, and the company entered insolvency. It was held that the 
solicitor had not received the beneficial interest in the moneys and was under a fiduciary 
obligation not to apply the moneys for any purpose other than paying the VAT, and 
because the Treasury had been informed of the fund and the intention to use the moneys 
for that singular purpose, they now held the beneficial interest in the moneys. Hence the 
Treasury, an unsecured creditor of Margaretta, was able to prevent itself incurring a loss 
by obtaining the beneficial interest as a consequence of the communication and falling 
within category two. Similarly in Re Northern Developments, unsecured creditors were 
able to acquire a beneficial interest in loan moneys when they were paid into an account 
for the for the express purpose of “providing moneys for Kelly's unsecured creditors over 
the ensuing weeks”, and such an action was communicated to them.  
 
As acknowledged above, there is strong judicial support for unsecured creditors obtaining 
a beneficial interest in loan moneys if the intention to do so is communicated to them, 
thereby increasing such an outcome’s predictability. Lord Millett, extra-judicially, has 
 
1224 [2005] EWHC 582 (Ch)  
1225 Ibid, at 24 
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stated “If A's intention was to benefit C, or his object would be frustrated if he were to 
retain a power of revocation, the transaction will create an irrevocable trust in favour of 
C, enforceable by C but not by A. The beneficial interest in the trust property will be in 
C.”1226 
 
Hence, should it be communicated to a third party that they are to benefit from the loan 
moneys that have been provided for a specific purpose and been segregated, it is the third 
party (and likely unsecured creditor) rather than the lender who will have the beneficial 
interest to the loan moneys. In turn, this will allow them to at least partially escape the 
negative impact of the borrower entering insolvency and allow for the discharge of the 
debt owed. As stated above, relying upon ground 1 (the obvious intention) is likely to fail 
owing to the lack of evidence, however, should there be written evidence (ground 2) that 
is sufficiently precise, the third party will acquire the beneficial interest. However, given 
the potential size of the loan amounts, although there may be sufficient evidence, the 
lender is likely to change the existence of the evidence, giving rise to large prospective 
legal fees.   
 
As the creditors obtain a right to the money by the lender communicating the transfer of 
the interest to them, they have a coexisting interest, which is ‘one in favour of the lender 
and another in favour of the creditors’1227. 
 
Section 3.6(b) - Priority of Employees 
 
The Quistclose trust can also arise between employee and employer in two specific 
circumstances: either the employee has provided funds to the employer to be used for a 
specific purpose, or should the employer have taken out an insurance policy for the benefit 
of the employees. In both scenarios, as the moneys are held on trust for the employees, 
they acquire priority and the funds do not form part of the company’s asset pool – thereby 
preventing their distribution to other creditors.  
 
 
1226 Millett PJ, The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It? (1985) 101 LQR 269 at 290. See also 
ibid, at 278 
1227 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 82; See also Moffatt G, Trusts Law, 5th edn 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2009) at 814: 
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In Cooper v PRG Powerhouse1228, an employee purchased a car in order for him to 
perform his duties, however the company paid all the sums due on it. Eventually the 
employee left his job but wished to keep the car, and for this to occur, the employee was 
required to pay the remaining amount due on the car to the company, who would then 
complete the purchase of the car. In between the employee transferring the funds and the 
company completing the purchase, the employer entered insolvency. It was held that as 
the moneys had been provided for a particular purpose (the purchase of the car) and there 
was an intention for the moneys to have been kept separate from the company’s general 
assets, the moneys were held on trust – granting the employee priority over other creditors 
of the company.   
 
Cooper has been criticised on two bases, however: there was no loan, and there was no 
express direction by the employee that the moneys should be segregated. In answering 
the second issue first, although there was no express direction, it was unequivocal that the 
moneys were to be used for a single purpose (the purchase of the car) and were not to 
form part of the company’s asset pool. Secondly, in neither Quistclose nor Twinsectra 
was it held that a loan was necessary – instead it was merely stated that moneys must be 
provided for a specific purpose. Whether that be a loan or some other purpose, it is 
irrelevant. Therefore, Cooper is an orthodox application of Quistclose principles and 
opens up the possibilities for granting employees priority in the event of their employer 
entering liquidation by preventing them from becoming unsecured creditors. This 
prevention of them becoming unsecured creditors is important as transferring moneys to 
the company for a specific purpose – unlike unpaid wages1229 – does not allow employees 
to take on the position of preferential creditors. Thus, the Quistclose trust can be used as 
a mechanism to provide employees with similar protections to those granted under the 
Insolvency Act and expand their applicability.  
 
Secondly, employees can use the Quistclose trust should their employer enter insolvency 
and an insurance policy taken out for their benefit pays out. If there is a payment, those 
moneys do not become part of the employer’s asset pool. In Re Independent Air Travel1230, 
an airline pilot was involved in a fatal airline crash. As part of their employment contract, 
 
1228 [2008] EWHC 498  
1229 Sch 6 para 9 Insolvency Act 1986 
1230 [1961] 1 Lloyds Rep 604 
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an insurance policy was taken out by in their name which paid out upon their death. The 
moneys were paid to the company. Upon the company entering liquidation before 
transferring the moneys, it was held they were held on trust for the pilot’s executor on the 
grounds that although there was no express words, it was clear that the moneys were to 
be used for the sole purpose of providing for the pilot’s family. In doing so, the moneys 
did not form part of the company’s asset pool and so were not available to the liquidator.  
 
The advantage of employees utilising the Quistclose trust in these two scenarios is, as 
noted, that they acquire priority over the company’s other creditors and avoid the status 
of unsecured creditor. Although this decreases the size of the company’s asset pool, given 
the relatively small sums involved however (£34,239 and £4,000 respectively), and that 
the moneys should never have formed part of the asset pool, the impact on these 
unsecured creditors is likely to minimal and fully justified. 
 
Section 3.6(c) - Misapplication of Client Funds by Agents  
 
One of the growing uses of the Quistclose trust has been for the reclamation of 
misappropriated assets by agents. In a string of judgments beginning with Twinsectra, but 
also including Templeton Insurance1231 and Global Marine1232, it has been held that if 
funds are transferred to a solicitor with an express purpose, then should they be 
misappropriated, they will be subject to a trust and traceable. The misappropriation is not 
limited to theft but also includes misapplication of the moneys for other purposes1233.  
 
The use of Quistclose trusts in these circumstances has become more commonplace as a 
result of the nature of modern commercial activity. With companies having to rely on 
intermediaries to conduct business, the opportunity for misapplication or 
misappropriation has also increased, requiring new forms of protection for clients. In 
utilising the Quistclose trust, it allows the client to retain a beneficial interest over the 
moneys and enforce this interest against either the agent or third-party recipients. Should 
the client have become insolvent, the liquidator too would be able to enforce the beneficial 
 
1231 Templeton Insurance v Pennington Solicitors [2007] WTLR 1103 
1232 Global Marine Drillships v Landmark Solicitors [2011] EWHC 2685 
1233 See Templeton Insurance v Pennington Solicitors [2007] WTLR 1103 and Global Marine 
Drillships v Landmark Solicitors [2011] EWHC 2685  
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interest, reclaim the property, and increase the size of the asset pool for the benefit of the 
unsecured creditors. Given that these arrangements, unlike with traditional Quistclose 
trusts, do not involve a loan, it is much more likely that now insolvent companies would 
be involved in their use – particularly if the purpose of the transfer has been frustrated by 
the onset of insolvency. Hence, such trusts could provide a means of reclaiming assets 
for distribution to unsecured creditors.  
 
Section 3.6(d) - Purchase of Equipment  
 
The final potential utilisation of the Quistclose trust is where moneys have been made 
available with purpose of the purchasing equipment, where should the purchase of 
equipment not go through, the moneys are held on trust for the provider. As is also stated 
below, if the purchase actually occurs, it is possible to interpret that a purchase price 
resulting trust arises. This further trust is beneficial should the purchase occur shortly 
before a company enters insolvency, as the asset can then be claimed by the provider and 
sold to recoup some, or all, of the moneys provided.   
 
The best example1234 of the use of the Quistclose trust in this manner is Re EVTR1235. It 
involved a company (EVTR) that was in financial difficulties and required additional 
funds. The owner persuaded his friend, Mr Barber, to provide financial assistance, and it 
was agreed that he would procure equipment worth £60,000 to enable new business to be 
taken on. This sum was paid to the company’s solicitors who placed it in the client 
account, and an order was placed for the new equipment. It was agreed that the new 
equipment would be delivered in 7 months, and in the meantime temporary equipment 
would be leased. The £60,000 was then transferred to the manufacturer to enable them to 
proceed with the purchase and acquisition of the temporary equipment, which was then 
put to this use. However, before the equipment could be delivered, EVTR was placed into 
receivership and the majority of the £60,000 was repaid to the receiver for not completing 
the purchase of the equipment.  
 
 
1234 Clayton N, Resulting Trusts and Failure of Purpose, (1987) 2(3) JIBL 189 
1235 [1987] BCLC 646  
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It was held that the returned moneys were on trust for Mr Barber as they had been 
provided for a specific purpose (the purchase of new equipment) and had been segregated 
from the company’s other assets in the solicitors’ client account1236. This is an orthodox 
use of the Quistclose trust, and can be taken advantage of by the corporate group or 
individuals closely associated with the recipient company. The most likely use is in the 
corporate group though, where one company within the group makes moneys available 
for the purchase of property that subsequently does not occur and the recipient enters 
insolvency, or where two companies work closely together and moneys are made 
available. A hypothetical example of the latter might include outsourcing companies such 
a Kier and its contractors, whereby the larger company (Kier) makes funds available to 
the smaller company (the contractor) to enable it to purchase equipment to carry out its 
functions. Hence, should the insolvent company be the provider then the liquidator will 
be able to recover the moneys from the recipient (provided the purchase has not occurred), 
but should the insolvent company be the recipient the moneys will not form part of the 
company’s asset pool and instead the provider will escape taking on the position of an 
unsecured creditor. Should the latter occur then the insolvent company’s unsecured 
creditors would suffer as the moneys would not be available to the liquidator.  
 
The need for the purchase not to have occurred though could prove problematic should 
the recipient enter insolvency shortly after the purchase. Should this occur, as the purpose 
of purchasing the equipment has occurred, no Quistclose trust would be possible. Instead, 
it is submitted that provided the provision of the money was gratuitous, then a purchase 
price resulting trust would become operative. This is based on the arguments of Section 
2 – that where property is purchased by one party with assets provided by another, and 
there is a clear link between the provision of the moneys and the property purchased, the 
provider acquires all or part of the beneficial interest in the acquired property. 
 
One fundamental issue in establishing a purchase price resulting trust is the argument that 
rather than being gratuitous, the provision of the moneys was intended to be a loan. In 
EVTR1237, however, it is clear that the provision of the moneys was not intended to be a 
loan. Originally, Mr Barber intended to provide EVTR with the moneys unconditionally, 
 
1236 Ibid, at 650 
1237 Ibid, at 647 
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and only did not do so on advice from his accountant. Instead it was agreed that he would 
purchase the shares in the holding company and assist EVTR under the agreement to 
purchase the holding company’s shares. Hence, from the original intention to provide the 
moneys with no restrictions, and the subsequent intention for Mr Barber to then procure 
the equipment for the company, it is clear firstly that no loan was intended, and secondly 
that he intended to retain the beneficial interest in the moneys and its substitute property. 
Put bluntly, Mr Barber was providing a comprehensive rescue package rather than mere 
rescue finance. The presumption of a resulting trust would not, therefore, have been 
rebutted if in the case of EVTR the purchase actually occurred, and Mr Barber would 
have retained a beneficial interest in the equipment should EVTR have entered 
insolvency. 
 
Another hypothetical example is helpful in illustrating how the purchase price resulting 
trust might arise. Company A makes £5 million available to Company B to purchase 
office space. Although made available, and the purpose for the moneys being made 
available are clear, it is not explicit on what basis the money is being made available, only 
that the beneficial title is not to be taken by Company B, and is to only be used for the 
office space. At this point a standard Quistclose trust exists if the company enters 
insolvency1238, as it is clear there is the provision of moneys for a specific purpose and the 
beneficial interest is to remain with the provider.  
 
Should the transaction go through, and because of changes in the economy (such as a 
worldwide pandemic) Company B struggles and enters into insolvency, no Quistclose 
would exist as the purpose has been fulfilled. However, owing to the fact that the 
transaction was ambiguous and not expressed to be a loan, the office would be subject to 
a purchase price resulting trust and thereby not form part of Company B’s asset pool. 
Given the ambiguous nature of the arrangement, and the extremely unlikely scenario that 
a company would freely give away its assets, it is justified to impute the intention that 
Company A would retain a beneficial interest in the moneys. Obviously, should the 




1238 See EVTR [1987] BCLC 646 at 651 
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Consequently, providers of moneys for the purchase of equipment would benefit doubly 
if they do not express the transaction as being a loan. Firstly, prior to the purchase they 
are protected by a Quistclose trust should the recipient enter insolvency. Secondly, should 
the purchase occur, then they are protected by a purchase price resulting trust. In either 
circumstance, the provider has priority of the assets and does not take on the position of 
unsecured creditor – a useful security device for providers of finance.   
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the resulting trust is capable of increasing the size of a 
company’s asset pool by making the company a beneficiary of assets held on trust by 
recipients, and thereby increase the assets that can be made available to unsecured 
creditors of a company that has entered liquidation. It has also shown that it can prevent 
assets from forming part of the company’s asset pool, with the company taking on the 
position of trustee. Should this latter matrix occur, then the party entitled to the property 
will be prevented from becoming an unsecured creditor of the company, and consequently 
the asset cannot be made available for distribution to the company’s actual unsecured 
creditors1239. Irrespective of whether the resulting trust increases the size of the asset pool 
or prevents a party becoming a creditor, it is capable of assisting affected by a company’s 
insolvency.  
 
Dealing with the different forms of trust individually, the purchase price resulting trust is 
able to assist should the now insolvent company have contributed to all or some of the 
purchase price of property. This is the case even should the moneys have initially been 
made available to a ‘one company’ by its shareholder, and the company then makes the 
purchase moneys available. As also concluded, the company would be the beneficiary of 
a purchase price resulting trust should it agree to take on mortgage obligations and make 
contributions. This would provide the company with a rateable share of the purchased 
asset. Furthermore, as also seen, should a company purchase property with moneys 
directly provided from a third party for the purpose of purchasing that property, then the 
property would be held on trust for the third-party provider.  
 
1239 Whilst this would negate the need for party to engage in the liquidation regimes, such trusts 
are inherently linked to the issue of insolvency.  
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One key advantage of utilising the purchase price resulting trust is that, as illustrated 
above, such trusts are well established in law with clear requirements – although 
complicated fact patterns such as in Petrodel may have evidential issues. This legal clarity 
thereby provides liquidators with a large degree of predictability in regard to likely 
outcomes, provided that the presumption of resulting trust is not rebutted1240. One 
potential evidential complication is the need for a direct link between the purchase and 
the provided moneys. However, given that in the majority of cases this is unlikely to be 
an issue owing to there being a clear connection between the provision of funds and the 
eventual property purchased, it is unlikely to create impactful levels of uncertainty.  
 
Similarly, the gratuitous transfer resulting trust is also able to assist unsecured creditors 
should the now insolvent company have transferred personal property in the absence of 
the consideration – including where the transfer was a genuine mistake. However, should 
the gratuitous transfer be of land, it is submitted that no resulting trust will arise, and the 
recipient will retain the property. Whilst there has been no guidance from the senior courts 
as to the correct interpretation of s60(3) Law of Property Act 1925, should the analysis 
of this thesis not be accepted by the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court, then any company 
would retain a beneficial interest in the property and the land would now form part of the 
asset pool. As with the purchase price resulting, whilst there are areas of uncertainty 
within the gratuitous transfer resulting trust, they do not unduly hinder the utilisation of 
such trusts. Consequently, the possibility of unsecured creditors benefiting from the 
liquidator reacquiring the assets is unaffected, and the liquidator can pursue litigation with 
fair level of certainty.  
 
The most predictable of all the forms of resulting trust, the automatic resulting trust, is of 
use should the company have sought to create a beneficial fund for distressed individuals 
that failed or is no longer of any use, or should the company have taken part in a tax 
‘efficiency’ scheme that is later declared void. Unlike with the gratuitous transfer and 
purchase price forms of trust, the is very little in the way of theoretical uncertainty with 
the automatic resulting trust, and so liquidators can be fairly confident of the applicable 
law in commencing claims for such trusts. 
 
1240 Chapter 6 Section 1 
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Finally, this chapter has shown that the Quistclose trust is of assistance should the 
company have provided moneys for a specific purpose on the understanding they are to 
be segregated, or the company receives moneys in the same context, and that purpose is 
not carried out, then the recipient will be prevented from acquiring the beneficial interest 
in the property. As noted above, however, the prospect of the insolvent company being 
the provider of the moneys, and therefore being in a position to recover them, is extremely 
unlikely1241, and so the majority of Quistclose trusts will be used to prevent the loan 
moneys forming part of the company’s asset pool will primarily be used to prevent the 
transferor becoming an unsecured creditor themselves. Such trusts are not limited to these 
matrices, and is also of use should the lender have expressed that a third party is to have 
the beneficial interest over the moneys, where employees have provided moneys to their 
employers for a specific purpose, where there has been a misapplication of moneys by an 
agent, and if moneys have been provided for the purpose of acquiring equipment. As with 
mistaken payments, although there is a vociferous debate surrounding the correct 
theoretical foundation of the Quistclose trust, this does not impact upon the legal 
requirements, and so once again the resulting trust could provide the liquidator or 
potential creditors with a predictable and useful mechanism to improve their positions. 
  
 
1241 Unless the provider of the moneys is a parent company  
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Chapter 6: The Efficacy of Utilising the Resulting Trust in 
Liquidation  
 
This chapter builds directly on the analysis conducted in Chapter 5, which analysed the 
underpinnings of the resulting trust and concluded that they arise as a consequence of an 
imputed intention that a transferor of property does not give away the beneficial interest 
in the property unless there is consideration, a gift or loan. It also established that, within 
the context of liquidation, the resulting trust can be used in a number of scenarios to 
increase the size of a company’s asset pool by ‘returning’ property to the company. This 
‘returned’ property can then be made available to unsecured creditors by the liquidator 
through a liquidation dividend. However, it also concluded that the resulting trust is 
capable of removing assets from the company’s asset pool, ‘returning’ property to the 
original, third party transferor, and thereby preventing these parties becoming unsecured 
creditors at all. 
 
Given this potential usage of the resulting trust, this chapter will assess how feasible it is 
to actually utilise such trusts and conclude as to their overall effect. This is necessary as 
although it was proven in Chapter 5 that it may be theoretically possible for resulting 
trusts to be used by liquidators or third parties, practical considerations may make 
enforcing the resulting trust, and commencing the necessary litigation, unsustainable and 
treacherous1242. Should this be the case, it would prevent the resulting trust from being a 
potential mechanism of assisting these parties.  
 
As identified in Chapter 5, in order for the resulting trust to offer greater levels of 
assistance than those provided by the anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions of 
the Insolvency Act 1986, it must meet three criteria: 1) Be capable of increasing the size 
of the company’s asset pool to return assets to the unsecured creditors, or prevent parties 
from becoming unsecured creditors; 2) Possess clear and easy to identify provisions that 
offer the liquidator or third party the possibility of predicting the likely outcome of 
 
1242 See McCormack G, Proprietary Claims and Insolvency, (No.188); Finch V and Milman D, 
Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6); Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays, (Oxford: 
Hart, 2004) 
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litigation; and 3) Be attractive to third party litigation financiers, owing to the lack of 
financial resources available to commence litigation.  
 
This chapter will consequently conclude as to whether the resulting trust is able meet 
these three criteria. Chapter 5 proved that, theoretically at least, the resulting trust is able 
to increase the size of the company’s asset pool1243, thereby partially meeting Criteria 1, 
and does possess relatively clear and identifiable provisions that can provide a high level 
of predictability, again partially meeting Criteria 21244. In Section 3 of this chapter it is 
concluded that the resulting trust does, in certain instances, fulfil all the criteria and is 
able to provide effective assistance.  
 
As noted, whilst the resulting trust is theoretically able to increase the size of the asset 
pool, there are a number of factors that possibly hinder these theoretical outcomes. These 
factors include the ability to rebut the presumptions of resulting trust1245, the lack of an 
available asset to be returned1246, the limited nature of resulting trustee liability1247, and 
finally the lack of funds required to commence litigation. This chapter therefore analyses 
whether these issues undermine the use of the resulting trust as a means of unsecured 
creditor protection.  
 
This chapter takes the following structure. Section 1 analyses how the resulting trust can 
be rebutted and the level of evidence necessary to rebut the imputed intention ascribed to 
the transferor. This will establish the grounds on which the presumptions can be rebutted, 
and the quality of evidence needed to successfully rebut the imputation. Section 2 
analyses the practical limitations in commencing litigation. These include the rules of 
tracing, the extent of resulting trustee liability, the costs of enforcing a claim of resulting 
trust, and whether a resulting trust over an insolvent company’s assets constitutes a 
preference. Section 3 then concludes on the effectiveness of the resulting trust and 
whether is it a viable mechanism to be used in the context of insolvency. Section 4 finishes 
 
1243 Or prevent parties becoming creditors  
1244 Chapter 5 only partially meets Criteria 2 as Chapter 6 must analyse whether the other practical 
factors are equally clear    
1245 Fawkes v Pascoe (1875) LR 10 Ch App 343; Fung E, The Scope of the Rule in Shephard v 
Cartwright, (2006) LQR 651  
1246 See Re Diplock [1951] AC 251 for example 
1247 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) 
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the analysis by looking at the policy arguments that arise from the utilisation of the 
resulting trust and whether its use is fair on other parties who are affected by the restriction 
of access to the assets.  
 
Section 1: Rebutting the Imputed Intentions of the Transferor and the Imposition of a 
Resulting Trust 
 
As recognised in the introduction to this chapter, notwithstanding the analysis that the 
resulting trust can be utilised by liquidators and third parties in a wide ranging and novel 
set of matrices, sustaining a claim is impossible should the recipient be able to rebut the 
presumption of resulting trust and show that the transferor did not intend to retain a 
beneficial interest in the transferred asset1248. As seen in Sections 2 and 3.3 of Chapter 5, 
evidence that the transferor had alternative intentions to those imputed by the 
presumptions will prevent a resulting trust arising and the property remaining with the 
recipient.  
 
Section 1.1: The Doctrine of Advancement 
 
Before analysing when and how the presumptions can be rebutted, it is necessary to 
briefly acknowledge that owing to the context of this thesis – the use of resulting trusts in 
corporate liquidation – the doctrine of advancement will not apply. This doctrine states 
that where certain relationships exist – such as father and child1249 and husband and 
wife1250 - the presumption that the transferor retains a beneficial interest in the property 
is reversed, and instead it is presumed a gift was intended. This reversal of the 
presumption does not apply to transfers from mothers to children1251 or to transfers 
between wives and husbands1252 however. Although the doctrine has been abolished by 
s199 Equality Act 2010, this section has yet to become active law, and so the reversal 
currently survives and is applicable. However, given that this thesis is concerned solely 
with the use of the resulting trust in a corporate context – meaning involving at least one 
 
1248 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 708; Rickett C and Grantham R, Resulting Trust, (No.884) 15 at 
17 
1249 Bennet v Bennet (1879) 10 ChD 474; McGrath v Wallis [1995] 2 FLR 114 
1250 Tinker v Tinker [1970] P 136 
1251 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 756 
1252 Abrahams v Abrahams [2000] WTLR 593 
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company as either transferor or recipient – none of the specific, domestic relationships of 
advancement are applicable, and so the doctrine has no application to this thesis’ analysis.  
 
Section 1.2: Rebutting Through a Gift or a Loan 
 
Beyond the doctrine of advancement, there are two ways of rebutting the presumptions 
of resulting trust: either by establishing that the transfer was a gift, or establishing that the 
transfer was a loan. Both methods of rebuttal are well established with a substantial body 
of precedent. Examples of establishing there was a gift include Fawkes v Pascoe1253, Re 
Young1254, and also Aroso v Coutts1255, where the transfer of moneys clearly stated the 
beneficial interest was to be shared. Similarly, with establishing that there was a loan 
there is also a large body of authority, including Re Sharpe (a Bankrupt)1256 and Vajpeyi 
v Yijaf1257, where the provision of £10,000 to purchase a house was interpreted as being 
a loan. Consequently, the exceptions are well documented and delineated.  
 
The courts have moreover set limits on the evidence that can be relied upon in rebutting 
the presumption. In Shephard v Cartwright1258 a restriction was placed upon subsequent 
acts being adduced as evidence of an intention by the transferor. It was held, citing with 
approval a passage from Snell’s Equity, that only evidence of the “acts and declarations 
of the parties before or at the time of the purchase, or so immediately after it as to 
constitute a part of the transaction, are admissible in evidence either for or against the 
party who did the act or made the declaration…”1259. Hence, whilst the recipient can 
adduce evidence of subsequent actions against the transferor, the transferor is barred from 
doing so1260.  
 
This restriction has been heavily criticised, not only for the apparent unfairness towards 
the transferor, but also because it fails to draw an important distinction. As noted by 
 
1253 (1875) LR 10 Ch App 343 
1254 (1885) 28 Ch D 705; see also Standing v Bowring (1885) 31 Ch D 282. 
1255 [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 241 
1256 [1980] 1 WLR; See also Aveling v Knipe (1815) 19 Ves 441; Hussey v Palmer [1972] 3 All 
ER 744 (although only in Cairns’ LJ dissenting judgment) 
1257 [2003] EWHC 2339 
1258 [1955] AC 431 
1259 Ibid, at 445-446, which Viscount Simonds quoting Snell’s Equity (24th edn) at 153 
1260 See Crabb v Crabb (1834) 1 Myl. & K. 511 at 519 
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Fung1261, Shephard v Cartwright does not distinguish between acts that evidence post-
transfer intention, and those that illustrate the intention of the transferor at the time of the 
transfer – those that have no relevance to the imposition of a resulting trust and those that 
evidence the actual intention1262. Instead, they argue that subsequent evidence 
establishing the transferor’s intentions at the time of the transfer – rather than evidence 
that merely establishes subsequent intention - should be made admissible. However, 
despite the self-evident logic in reforming the rule, the Privy Council in Antoni v 
Antoni1263 applied the rule, making reform of the restriction seem uncertain unless the 
issue comes before the Supreme Court.  
 
Consequently, it is uncertain whether the evidential restriction applies. If it does, then it 
is potentially problematic for claimants intending on bringing litigation as any evidence 
of subsequent conduct can only be used against the transferor, and not in their favour. 
Should the company or third party have subsequently acted as if there was meant to be a 
gift or loan it could be used against them, whilst any subsequent conduct indicating that 
there was no loan or gift could not be used in the transferor’s favour. However, this is 
applicable only if there is subsequent, adverse evidence, which is not guaranteed, and in 
the majority of commercial cases is likely to be irrelevant as the transferor’s intention will 
be sufficiently established at the time of the transaction. Any subsequent actions would 
likely go towards illustrating later intentions rather than those at the time of the transfer. 
Should the rule not be applicable, which it is submitted it should not, then clearly no such 
issues would arise. Hence, the evidential restriction is unlikely to cause a major headache 
to the majority of liquidators or third parties bringing resulting trust claims, nor prevent 
the initiation of litigation.   
 
Despite the clarity of when the presumptions can be rebutted, and the slightly murkier 
limits of relying on subsequent conduct, the quality of evidence needed to prove that there 
was a gift or a loan remains ambiguous. This is because there has been no conclusive 
statement as to exactly what evidence, or what quality of evidence, is required to rebut 
the presumptions. In Finch v Finch1264, Lord Eldon suggested that the presumptions could 
 
1261 Fung E, The Scope of the Rule in Shephard v Cartwright, (2006) LQR 651 at 653 
1262 See A W.L., Transferor’s Intention, Trustees’ Undertaking and the Scope of Fiduciary 
Liability, (2018) 32(1) TLI 50; M v M [2013] EWHC 2534 (Fam), per King J 
1263 [2007] UKPC 10 
1264 (1808) 15 Ves JR 43 
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be rebutted if there was ‘sufficient evidence’. However, despite acknowledging the 
possibility, no assistance was provided to determine what was meant by ‘sufficient 
evidence’.  
 
Similarly in Fowkes v Pascoe1265, Mellish LJ held that the evidence required to rebut the 
presumptions “must, beyond all question, be of very different weight in different cases.” 
As with Lord Eldon’s statement, this does not clarify the standard of evidence required, 
and instead clouds the issue further by stating that each case must be dealt on its own 
terms – meaning that it is impossible to predict what evidence would or would not be able 
to rebut the presumption in any given case. Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche1266 
did provide some assistance by stating that “If the settlor has expressly, or by necessary 
implication, abandoned any beneficial interest in the trust property, there is in my view 
no resulting trust.” Thereby, if there is an express statement or sufficiently clear conduct 
that the transferor no longer intended to retain a beneficial interest the presumption will 
be rebutted. However, no guidance was yet again provided about the conduct that was 
necessary to rebut the presumption. Hence, beyond clarification that express statements 
will rebut the presumptions, little judicial guidance from the higher courts has been 
provided on the quality of evidence required to rebut the presumptions.  
 
Despite the dearth of judicial guidance, Rickett and Grantham have proffered that there 
is a minimum threshold must be met1267. They argue that ‘sufficient evidence’ should be 
interpreted as being evidence of the transferor’s ‘actual intention’1268. They clarify this 
further by stating that the presumption of resulting trust “will give way to clear evidence 
of a different intention”1269 (emphasis added) and that this clear “evidence establishes that 
A intended to make an outright gift to B…”1270 Accordingly, evidence merely casting 
doubt on the transferor’s intention is insufficient. Instead, evidence must be adduced that 
proves the transferor did intend a gift or loan to be made – that there must be actual 
evidence, rather than merely aspersions. This has been reinforced by Fung1271, who notes 
 
1265 (1875) LR 10 Ch App 343 at 352 
1266 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 708 
1267 Rickett C and Grantham R, Resulting Trusts, (No.884) 
1268 Ibid, at 17 
1269 Ibid, at 17 
1270 Ibid, at 18 
1271 Fung E, The Scope of the Rule in Shephard v Cartwright, (2006) LQR 651 
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that “This presumption of resulting trust can be rebutted either by direct evidence that A 
intended to benefit B…”1272 Thus, there is a minimum bar that evidence must meet to 
rebut the presumptions, and that is actual evidence of intention.  
 
Notwithstanding this clarification, it has also been proffered that no minimum standard 
has been set for the level of evidence needed to be rebut the presumptions. In McGrath v 
Wallis1273, Norse LJ took the opposite view and concluded that the presumptions could 
be rebutted with evidence that was ‘markedly more than slight’. Similarly, Chambers has 
argued that the presumptions can be rebutted with ‘the slimmest of evidence’1274, relying 
on Mummery LJ’s comments in Lohia v Lohia1275.  
 
However, it is submitted that the adoption of such a reduced standard would be deeply 
flawed. Firstly, Chambers’ reliance on Lohia as proof that very little evidence is necessary 
is challengeable. Upon a cursory reading of Mummery LJ’s judgment it becomes apparent 
that whilst in that particular case there was limited available evidence, there was still some 
substantial evidence that was enough to rebut the presumption, and that a “reasonable 
court could have made” the conclusion that the presumption had been rebutted in those 
circumstances. Hence, the trial judge was not relying on ‘the slimmest of evidence’. 
Secondly, if the lower standard of evidence were to be adopted, the resulting trust would 
be plagued by issues of uncertainty. Should the ‘slight’ evidence or ‘slimmest of 
evidence’ be adopted as the evidential standard, it would become impossible for 
practitioners to advise clients on the likelihood that a resulting trust claim would be 
successful, and would furthermore make the establishment of the resulting trust next to 
impossible achieve. This is because should any recipient could successfully adduce 
tangential information, the presumptions would be become irrelevant and unusable. Thus, 
it is submitted that for the resulting trust to be a viable mechanism for protecting property 
rights, a higher standard of evidence – evidence of actual intention – is necessary. 
 
 
1272 Ibid, at 651 
1273 [1995] 2 FLR 114 at 122 
1274 Chambers R, Is There a Presumption of Resulting Trust? in Mitchell C, Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts, (Oxford, OUP, 2010) at 267 
1275 [2001] EWCA Civ 1691 at 20-21 
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The effect of adopting this higher evidential standard can be seen clearest in relation to 
Petrodel1276, although this case involved the unique situation of the transferor trying to 
counter claims that they remained the beneficial owner of the transferred property. As 
noted in Chapter 5, the Supreme Court held that there was a series of resulting trusts, 
despite there being evidence to the contrary, as a consequence of Mr Prest refusing to 
cooperate with the litigation and the Court therefore drawing an adverse inference to his 
conduct. However, it is submitted that the Supreme Court’s reliance on this adverse 
inference should have been insufficient evidence. Indeed, there was much evidence – 
equally, if not more, persuasive than the adverse inference - to rebut the claim that Mr 
Prest had retained a beneficial interest. This is particularly the case as the properties were 
purchased by Mr Prest’s companies and the remaining properties were transferred for 
consideration – both acts that strongly indicate that there was no intention to retain a 
beneficial interest. In effect, Mr Prest was found to be the beneficial owner of the 
properties, at the expense of the companies Petrodel and Vermont, on nothing more than 
the lack of available evidence – a finding that severely weakened the latter’s financial 
position with no justification. By comparison, in Aroso and Re Sharpe, the presumptions 
were rebutted on the basis of actual evidence of the transferor’s intentions – thereby it 
being fully justified to remove the transferor’s beneficial interest. It is therefore submitted 
that to ensure a justifiable outcome, reliance upon an adverse inference/slight evidence is 
insufficient, and actual evidence should be adduced.  
 
In setting this standard of evidence, practitioners are able to adequately advise clients on 
the likely outcome and the strength of any resulting trust claim. In the context of 
liquidation this will be beneficial to liquidators and third parties, and encourage resulting 
trust claims, as the probability of success (provided they themselves can provide 
sufficient evidence to establish a resulting trust claim) can be determined at the outset, 
and ‘safe’ litigation likely to result in the return of property commenced and ‘risky’ 
litigation that is unlikely to lead to the return of property and merely incur costly legal 
fees be avoided. Thereby, the liquidator or third party are potentially protected by the 
return of property from successful litigation or by not having the limited funds in the asset 
pool wasted on unviable litigation.  
 
 
1276 Prest, (No.997) at 47 
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Section 2: Practical Limitations of Utilising the Resulting Trust 
 
Should the beneficiary of the resulting trust – in the context of this thesis the liquidator 
or a third party – be able to prove that they fall within one of the categories of resulting 
trust, and the recipient is unable rebut the presumption of resulting trust, then they face a 
number of factors they must consider before litigation is commenced. These factors, 
although not directly related to each other, all converge to potentially make pursuing 
litigation, despite being possible and likely to succeed, undesirable. It is therefore 
necessary to analyse how likely these factors are to inhibit the willingness to commence 
litigation. The relevant factors include: a) the ability to trace and its limitations; b) the 
potential liability of resulting trustees should there have been a dissipation or 
misappropriation of trust assets; c) the potential costs of litigation; and d) the possibility 
of the resulting trust being a preference. This section will therefore analyse their potential 
impact.  
 
Section 2.1: The Ability to Trace 
 
Tracing is a fundamental mechanism in the enforcement of proprietary rights1277. Tracing 
is not limited to enforcing the beneficial interest against the original property – the 
beneficial owner is also free to enforce their interest over all substitute property that has 
been obtained with the proceeds of the original asset. Although fundamental to enforcing 
proprietary rights, it is important to note that it is not a method of determining them1278 - 
meaning it is neither a claim nor remedy in itself. Instead, it is merely a mechanism for 
identifying what has happened to the property and which persons now have possession of 
the property or its substitutions1279. Put another way, it is a means of ‘following’ the 
property into the possession of persons other than the original trustee, or ‘tracing’ into 
substitute property1280.   
 
 
1277 Oakley A, Proprietary Claims, (No.905) at 404 
1278 Millett P, Restitution, (No.882) at 403 
1279 Foskett v McKeown [2001] AC 102 at 128 
1280 Ibid, at 127; Stevens, Vindicating the Proprietary Nature of Tracing, [2001] Conv 94; 
Grantham and Rickett, Tracing and Property Rights: The Categorical Truth, [2000] 63 MLR 905; 
Walker Sir R, Tracing After Foskett v McKeown, [2000] RLR 573 
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In order to utilise the tracing mechanism, it is necessary to prove that there is firstly a 
proprietary base1281, and secondly identifiable property1282. Given that the resulting trust 
is a mechanism for transferors of property to retain rights over property, and there is 
nearly always identifiable property in some form, tracing potentially plays an important 
role in resulting trust litigation. The need to be able to trace is imperative in cases of 
resulting trust owing to the potential that the resulting trustee will be unaware of the trust 
until the commencement of litigation, and so may dissipate the assets believing that they 
are both legally and beneficially theirs. This is exacerbated further by the limited liability 
of resulting trustees1283, who are unlikely to be personally liable for any shortfall in trust 
assets that occurred before they became aware of their fiduciary position – thereby 
making the reclamation of dissipated trust assets through tracing the only feasible method 
of limiting transferor losses.  
 
Notwithstanding the potentially important role tracing may play in any resulting trust 
claim brought by a liquidator or third party, as seen in Chapter 5, many resulting trusts 
consist of clearly identifiable property that is easy to locate - such as land or substantial 
personal property. In these circumstances, the rules of tracing are unlikely to be relevant, 
but there remains the possibility of dissipation. However, in instances of Quistclose trusts 
and mistaken payment claims, where the moneys are more easily dissipated due to them 
being in easily accessible bank accounts, the need to be able to trace is likely to be much 
greater. Therefore, this section will analyse and establish when resulting trust assets can 
be traced, and whether there is a substantial impediment for liquidators to commence 
litigation.  
 
Where resulting trust assets have been used to purchase tangible property, there are very 
few limitations placed upon the beneficiary’s ability to trace. The beneficiary is firstly 
able to trace through clean substitutions. In Taylor v Plumer1284 for example, a 
stockbroker misappropriated client funds intended for an investment and instead 
purchased bullion and American stocks. The client was able to trace into the purchased 
bullion and stocks. Furthermore, the beneficiary is also able to trace into a mixed bulk – 
 
1281 The retention of proprietary rights over an asset in the possession of another: Re Diplock 
[1948] Ch 465; Westdeutsche, (No.186) 
1282 Yugraneft v Abramovich [2008] EWHC 2613 (QBD) 
1283 See below in Section 2(b)  
1284 (1815) 3 M&S 562 
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where two parties’ property has been mixed together. In Indian Oil Copn v 
Greenstone1285, this involved the mixing of two parties’ crude oil, and both parties could 
trace rateably into the combined mixture. This has, moreover, been extended to include 
where a new but similar item is created1286. However, it is not possible should a 
completely new item, that has no relationship to the previous item, be created from the 
mixture1287. Hence, on a basic level, should the tangible trust assets be disbursed by the 
trustee, and new ones purchased as their replacement, or new but similar assets be created, 
the new assets will replace the disbursed ones and be made available to the claimant 
without issue. Although there is a limitation should a completely new asset be created, 
this is unlikely to overly impact the reclamation of resulting trust property in a negative 
manner owing to the form of asset that regularly constitutes the basis of a resulting trust 
– money and land, which are difficult to transform in to unrelated and brand new property. 
The final positive is that, should the property increase in value, then the beneficiary is 
permitted to keep the increase in value in the property1288 – potentially providing a 
windfall for unsecured creditors should the asset be claimed.  
 
In addition to being able to successfully trace into tangible property, it is also possible for 
the liquidator to trace moneys through the banking system and into bank accounts1289. 
Thus, should resulting trust moneys be mixed with the trustee’s or third parties’ personal 
assets, it is possible to trace into this mixture of moneys. Within the context of this thesis, 
this is again most likely to be applicable in instances of mistaken transfers and Quistclose 
trusts owing to the assets taking the form of easily transferable moneys1290. However, 
should tangible assets subject to a purchase price or gratuitous transfer resulting trust be 
sold and their proceeds then transferred, it would also be necessary to trace through the 
banking system. As set out below, the rules of tracing go a long way to protecting 
resulting trust beneficiaries by permitting recovery in all but a few contexts.  
 
 
1285 [1988] QB 345 
1286 Glencore International AG v Metro Trading International Inc (No2) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
284 
1287 Borden v Scottish Timber Products [1981] Ch 25 
1288 Re Tilley’s WT [1967] Ch 1197; See also Jones v De Marchant [1916] 28 DLR 561 where it 
was held that if property is mixed that cannot be separated, the original owner will be entitled to 
the entire bulk 
1289 Foskett, (No.1279) 
1290 Chase Manhattan, (No.1059); Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1994] 2 All ER 806; Bainbridge 
v Bainbridge [2016] EWHC 898 (Ch) 
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The ability for a beneficiary to trace money into a ‘mixed fund’ is well documented. 
Whilst it is not possible for the beneficiary to claim the entirety of the fund, they are able 
to trace into the fund and any subsequently purchased property rateable to their 
contribution. In Foskett v McKeown1291, the trustee misappropriated assets from his 
beneficiaries to pay some of the premiums on his life insurance policy. After the trustee’s 
suicide, it was held that as the beneficiaries had contributed to 40% of the paid premiums, 
they were entitled to trace into the proceeds of the policy and recover £400,000 – covering 
some of the losses sustained by the trustee’s breach of duty.  
 
However, what becomes more difficult is when the trustee and trust moneys are mixed 
and some of the money is dissipated rather than used to purchase new assets – even though 
the tracing rules do operate harshly again the trustee. Should the trustee make a 
distribution from the mixed fund, there is a presumption that he spends his own moneys 
first, rather than the beneficiary’s1292. In the words of Lord Walker1293, trustee money 
“sinks to the bottom [of the bank account] in the sense that…it is treated as withdrawing 
its own money from a mixed funds before it touches trust money”. However, should the 
application of this presumption be unfair – such as where the trustee makes initial 
payments to purchase valuable assets and later payments are merely dissipated – then the 
presumption can be reversed, and it be found that trust money was spent first and not 
dissipated1294. Under the latter reversal of the presumption in Re Oatway, it is presumed 
that the assets have been purchased with trust moneys, meaning that they can be traced 
into.  
 
This ability of ‘cherry picking’1295, and the impact for liquidators and third parties 
pursuing a resulting trust claim, is clear – should the mixing of trust and trustee property 
occur, and an asset be purchased, then the beneficiary will have access to the asset which 
can then form part of the company’s asset pool and be distributed to the unsecured 
creditors. The flexibility of the presumptions means that Equity and the rules of tracing 
 
1291 [2001] 1 AC 102 
1292 Re Hallett (1880) 13 Ch D 696 
1293 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe [2012] 3 All ER 1 at 65 
1294 Re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch 356  
1295 Dyson Technology Ltd v Curtis [2010] EWHC 3289 (Ch) at 20; Nair A, Claims to Traceable 
Proceeds: Law, Equity and the Control of Assets, (Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 20 
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do all in their power to ensure that the beneficiary does not lose out – and if the property 
has increased in value, even make a profit1296.  
 
Less generous are the rules regarding mixtures of trust moneys and other innocent 
volunteers. This would occur should resulting trust assets be mixed not with trustee 
moneys but with moneys from other trusts. Given the equal position of the two parties, it 
is not possible to utilise the harsh rules associated with mixtures of trust and trustee 
moneys. Instead, there are three possible outcomes1297: 1) recovery of identifiable assets 
by the beneficiary who provided the funds1298; 2) pari passu allocation of the remaining 
funds amongst the innocent parties; and 3) the rule in Clayton’s Case1299 may be 
applicable, whereby moneys first paid into the account are presumed to have been the 
first paid out. However, the last possibility is rarely used due to its apparent unfairness to 
those whose money was misappropriated first1300, and so has become an exception rather 
than its historical position as the rule1301. 
 
Owing to the limitations of this thesis it is not possible to analyse the correctness of any 
of the three approaches or which is the most justifiable1302. However, the effect that any 
of the options would result in is clear should the liquidator or third party bring a resulting 
trust claim. Should there be identifiable assets that were purchased with trust moneys then 
obviously the most desirable outcome would be recovery of that asset at the expense of 
the other innocent volunteers. However, the likelihood of there being sufficient evidence 
to prove a link between the trust moneys and any purchased asset, due to the mixture of 
innocent volunteer moneys, is unlikely1303, and so this is not a foreseeable outcome. 
Instead, the most likely outcome is rateable distribution of the remaining assets with the 
other the innocent volunteers. This outcome, as seen in Chapter 1 with pari passu in the 
context of liquidation, would likely result in substantial losses for the beneficiary. 
 
1296 Turner v Jacob [2006] EWHC 1317 (Ch)  
1297 Madoff Securities International v Raven [2011] EWHC 3102 (Comm)  
1298 Russell-Cooke v Prentis [2003] 2 All ER 478 – where the trust moneys were linked to specific 
mortgage loans  
1299 (1816) 1 Mer 572 
1300 Barlow Clowes International v Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22 at 46; Re Walter J. Schmidt & 
Co (1925) 298 F. 314 at 316 
1301 Russell-Cooke v Prentis [2003] 2 All ER 478, per Lindsay J at 55 
1302 Nair A, Claims to Traceable Proceeds, (No.1295) 
1303 See Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465 for an example of the limited applicability of Russell-Cooke v 
Prentis 
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However, the small crumb of comfort is that they would at least recover something. 
Furthermore, should Clayton’s Case apply (as unlikely as that is), there is the possibility 
that should the resulting trust moneys be the first paid in, then nothing would be 
recovered. Should they be paid in later, then there is a greater chance of recovering assets. 
Although it is not possible to predict with certainty the applicable rule to a mixture of 
trust and innocent volunteer moneys, the most likely outcome is that pari passu 
distribution will occur. Therefore, should the liquidator be faced with a resulting trust 
claim involving such a circumstance, there is a likelihood that limited trust assets will be 
recoverable – potentially making it desirable and feasible for the liquidator to commence 
litigation.  
 
Moreover, there are a few further, but minor, limitations to the right to trace that 
potentially affect the feasibility of commencing litigation to enforce a resulting trust. The 
first is the rules concerning the ‘lowest intermediate balance’. This states that where there 
is a mixture of trust and trustee moneys in a bank account, and the account as a whole is 
dissipated below the level of the trust’s contribution, then any subsequent payments into 
the account, unless expressly intended to replenish the trust assets, cannot be traced 
into1304. Similarly, should the account be overdrawn, and trust moneys be paid in 
subsequently, then the beneficiary is prevented from tracing into those moneys as they 
have been used to discharge an unsecured debt1305 and ‘thereupon ceased to exist’1306. 
Should either of these events occur, then the beneficiary will be precluded from tracing. 
Although this is a possibility for all forms of resulting trust, this is particularly likely with 
mistaken transfers and Quistclose trusts when the moneys have been placed in an active, 
general account1307 that has a fluctuating credit balance and even enters an overdraft. If 
the recipient is a bank – such as in Chase Manhattan itself – or other financially resource 
rich party, then the prospect of accounts going overdrawn is remote due to the lack of 
need for such unsecured credit. However, should either event occur, then despite having 
a valid claim, the liquidator or third party would be unable to reacquire the assets.  
 
 
1304 Roscoe v Winder [1915] 1 Ch 62; Bishopsgate Investment Management v Homan [1995] 1 All 
ER 347 
1305 James Roscoe (Bolton) v Winder [1915] 1 Ch 62 
1306 Re Goldcorp [1995] 1 AC 74 at 105; Moriarty v Atkinson [2008] EWCA Civ 104  
1307 In the latter case in breach of the terms of the loan  
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These limitations are potentially offset should the trustee use the moneys to discharge 
secured debts1308. In this event the beneficiary is free to subrogate themselves into the 
into the position of the secured creditor and recover any amount of trust assets used to 
discharge the debt1309. In effect, the beneficiary becomes the secured creditor. Hence, 
should a secured asset be discharge with trust assets, there is the possibility for the 
liquidator to recover the amounts dissipated – however, the limitation to secured assets 
potentially restricts the applicability of this rule as the majority of debt is unsecured, and 
also restricts the feasibility of relying on reclamation of assets.  
 
The penultimate considerations in regard to tracing is the possibility of dissipation and 
the recipient being a bona fide purchaser for value. Dissipation is the use of trust moneys 
to pay for things that do not result in the acquisition of an asset1310, whilst the bona fide 
purchaser for value is anyone who purchases assets for their market value without notice 
that of the breach of trust1311. Moreover, should the recipient be in a position that would 
render it inequitable to trace1312, the beneficiary would be barred from tracing1313. 
Fortunately, given the commercial context of this thesis, it is unlikely that assets will be 
distributed to parties from whom it would be inequitable to trace1314 – meaning it is 
unlikely to affect liquidators or third parties. It is, though, much more foreseeable that 
assets may be transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value because of the distance 
involved in two companies, or company and consumer, contracting for the sale of an 
asset. Notwithstanding the limited effect of it being inequitable to trace, should 
dissipation occur or there be a bona fide purchaser for value - all foreseeable occurrences 
- then as with the other restrictions to tracing, the unsecured creditors would lose out.  
 
To summarise on the relationship between tracing and the enforcement of resulting trusts, 
it is apparent that tracing is potentially a very useful feature of utilising the resulting trust. 
 
1308 Pawlowski M, Overdrawn Accounts and Backward Tracing, (2017) 188 Trusts and Estates 
Law and Tax Journal at 12-13 
1309 Boscawen v Bajwa [1995] 4 All ER 769; Banque Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) 
[1999] 1 A.C 221 
1310 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, at 521; Oakley A, Proprietary Claims and Their Priority in 
Insolvency, (1995) 54 CLJ 377 at 420 
1311 Sinclair Investments v Versailles Trade Finance [2011] 4 All ER 335; Oakley A, Proprietary 
Claims, (No.905) 
1312 Such as if the recipient is a hospital or school  
1313 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465; Lipkin Gorman Ltd v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548 
1314 Such as charities, hospitals or schools  
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As seen above, the rules of tracing generally work in the liquidator or third party’s favour 
should the original property be substituted, with the rules for tangible property and the 
mixing of trust and trustee moneys all providing a means for the liquidator to recover the 
asset in the majority of situations. Although there are restrictions concerning mixtures of 
volunteer assets and dissipation, these are unlikely to overly hinder the commencement 
of litigation in the majority of cases. The primary issue of dissipation cannot effectively 
be addressed and is a real possibility, but the restriction on the lowest intermediate balance 
is likely only to affect a minority of Quistclose and mistaken transfer claims. Further, 
should one of the other restrictions apply, then the claimant will be able to establish this 
early on in the litigation process and minimise the dissipation of their meagre resources 
by perusing pointless litigation. As was also seen in the analysis, the two primary forms 
of trust affected by the restrictions to tracing are mistaken transfers and Quistclose trusts 
– meaning the majority of resulting trusts are not unduly affected as the asset is either in 
its original form or is an identifiable substitute. This is in contrast with the remedies 
available under the Insolvency Act 1986 set out in Chapter 5. These limit the liquidator 
to pursuing personal actions that fail in a practical sense should the defendant have 
insufficient resources to give effect to any judgments given in favour of the liquidator. 
Hence, the resulting trust’s ability to pursue identifiable assets in the majority of claims 
provides a useful tool for liquidators in increasing the company’s asset pool and third 
parties from avoiding becoming unsecured creditors – one that is not available under the 
traditional creditor protection mechanisms of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
 
Section 2.2: Resulting Trustee Liability 
 
Closely related to the ability to trace is the personal liability of the resulting trustee for 
breaches of trust. Should the rules of tracing prohibit the reclamation of trust property, 
then bringing a personal claim against the resulting trustee may provide a mechanism for 
addressing any shortfall in the trust assets. The liquidator or third party would 
consequently have two means of recovering dissipated trust assets and minimising 
unsecured creditor losses. Despite this potential, the position of resulting trustees has 
remained unclear, and their potential liability is up for debate. Therefore, this section will 
analyse and seek to clarify the position and liability of resulting trustees, and consequently 
their potential to make restitution for lost trust assets.  
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Trustees, irrespective of the form of trust that arises, are subject to stringent obligations 
owing to their position as fiduciaries1315. These duties regularly include the duty of loyalty 
to the trust and the beneficiaries1316; burdensome investment obligations1317; and a general 
duty to carry out their duties with reasonable care and skill1318. Moreover, should the 
trustee be working in a professional capacity, then the standard of care demanded rises in 
line with their level of professionalism1319. The duties owed by trustees were placed into 
three broad categories in AIB Group (UK) v Redler1320, which are: 1) the custodial duties 
to preserve trust assets; 2) the management and stewardship duties to manage the trust 
assets with proper care; and 3) a duty of undivided loyalty to the trust and trustees.  
 
The need to impose such duties on a trustee arises from the inherit potential for them to 
abuse their fiduciary position of trust and confidence and misappropriate trust assets1321. 
Given the control trustees have over the assets, and the plausibly limited supervision of 
them by the beneficiaries1322, the potential for them to act in their own interests is high. 
Prototypical examples of this possibility are Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale1323 and 
Bishopsgate Investment Management v Maxwell (No2)1324, where in the latter case 
directors of a company misappropriated pension fund assets to support companies within 
the group. Within the context of this thesis, and again with Quistclose and mistaken 
transfer trusts in particular1325, there is the possibility that dissipation of trust assets may 
occur, although without the same level of malicious intent.  
 
Considering the duties specific to the three forms of trust, the duties of the express trustee 
are clear, well documented in the legislation and case law1326, and can also be determined 
on an individual basis by reference to the trust deed. The position of the resulting trustee 
 
1315 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18; Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26 
1316 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46; Re Duke of Norfolk’s Settlement Trusts [1982] Ch 61 
1317 Ss 3 and 4 Trustee Act 2000 
1318 Ibid, at S1 
1319 Ibid, at S(1)(b)  
1320 [2014] UKSC 58 
1321 Pearce R, Barr W, Pearce and Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations, 7th edn (Oxford: 
OUP, 2018), at 617 
1322 Particularly if they are young children  
1323 [1987] 1 WLR 987 
1324 [1994] 1 All ER 261 
1325 This is as a consequence of both forms of trust primarily being made up of moneys in an 
active bank account  
1326 Trustee Act 2000 
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is more ambiguous and uncertain, however. This is primarily because they do not operate 
in the same manner as express trustees owing to their differing responsibilities – the 
resulting trustee is primarily there to merely hold property for the beneficiary and return 
it, rather than actively manage the property1327. In the context of this thesis, should the 
duties be onerous on resulting trustees, meaning it is more likely that liability will be 
imposed, then there is a greater likelihood that should dissipation of trust assets occur, the 
trustee will be required to make up the shortfall. On the other hand, if the duties are 
reasonably lenient, then such a possibility becomes much more remote. Consequently, 
establishing whether the resulting trustee duties are lenient or onerous may have an 
important impact should there be a shortfall in the trust assets.  
 
As noted immediately above, the majority of resulting trusts merely require the trustee to 
first hold, and then return, the property to the transferor1328. Given this limited set of 
obligations, the extent of their duties has been, and still is, rarely considered in the 
authorities as they are perceived as merely being bare trustees1329. This lack of 
consideration is problematic because as noted in the section on tracing, should there be a 
delay between the transfer of the property and the recognition of there being a trust, there 
is a distinct possibility that the assets may be misappropriated and dissipated.  
 
In some of the early authorities the courts were willing to find that resulting trustees had 
breached their duties and were liable to compensate the trust1330. However, in 
Westdeutsche1331 there was an unwillingness to find a resulting trust because of their 
Lordships’ disagreement with the imposition of obligations and liability on the 
defendants1332, who otherwise would have incurred substantial financial implications. 
This in keeping with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s previous conclusions in Lord Napier and 
Ettrick v Hunter1333, where his Lordship held that the imposition of liability on a resulting 
trustee was undesirable in that instance. In refusing to establish a resulting trust in order 
to side step the imposition of liability, it is implicit from the House of Lords’ judgments 
 
1327 Stafford v Kekatos (No3) [2008] NSWSC 1093 at 93 
1328 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 198-199 
1329 Essery v Cowland (1884) 26 Ch D 191 
1330 Matusewich v Matusewich (1978) 4 Fam LR 258 (W.A.)  
1331 [1996] 2 WLR 802 at 961, 974, 986  
1332 The potential impact of liability was one among several justifications for rejecting a resulting 
trust being present 
1333 [1993] AC 713 at 752 
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that the resulting trustee has the same obligations and level of liability as an express 
trustee1334, but that imposing the same level of liability is undesirable in instances of 
resulting trust. Whilst this is potentially understandable owing to the limited 
responsibilities of the resulting trust, it is problematic from a policy perspective. This is 
because it means that transferors face the possibility of not being able to recover assets 
that rightfully belong to them due to no fault of their own and the courts’ unwillingness 
to address the issue.   
 
Happily, a way out of this prospect has been put forward by Lord Millett. In Lonrho v 
Fayed (No2)1335, it was commented that constructive trustees are not always subjected to 
the same obligations as express trustees, and so have reduced levels of liability. In Target 
Holdings v Redferns1336, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in contrast with his earlier judgments, 
also intimated that the differing forms of trustee would not be subject to uniform levels 
of liability1337, with the detailed duties of an express trustee not necessarily applying to 
the other forms of trustee. As the resulting trustee is much closer in function to the 
constructive trustee than the express trustee, there is now doubt as to whether it is correct 
to imply that resulting trustees share the same liability as express trustees. It is submitted 
that this proximity to the constructive trustee, rather than the express trust, and Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson’s obiter comments, mean that the resulting trustee cannot be seen as 
having the same liability as the express trustee. Thus, there is no longer any justification 
for not imposing the resulting trust merely to minimise potential trustee liability. 
 
Moreover, in the majority of resulting trusts1338, they arise in the absence of a pre-existing 
fiduciary relationship, and without the now resulting trustee having any knowledge of 
their new position and responsibilities. Examples of such an occurrence are common in 
the authorities, and include Sinclair v Broughman1339 and Chase Manhattan1340. 
Chambers has concluded that as a consequence of this lack of knowledge, the resulting 
trustees’ obligations in these situations are restricted to protecting the transferor’s interest 
 
1334 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 198 
1335 [1992] 1 WLR 1 at 11  
1336 [1995] 3 All ER 785 
1337 Ibid, at 795 
1338 Those including gratuitous transfer and Quistclose trusts.  
1339 [1914] AC 398 
1340 [1981] Ch 105  
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in the property1341. Thereby, as commented above, they are merely bare trustees with 
minimal levels of obligations. Indeed, they will not be personally liable for any dissipation 
of trust assets until their conscience has been affected by knowledge of the trust1342. 
However, in certain circumstances1343, there will be the duty to collect assets from third 
parties and pass them on to the beneficiaries1344. This reduction in the obligations of 
resulting trustees has been justified on the basis of their lack of knowledge – that it would 
be remarkable to subject a trustee to obligations they had no knowledge of. This is in 
contrast to express trustees, who knowingly and voluntarily take on the position and 
responsibilities1345. Indeed, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche1346 concluded that 
liability could not be imposed should the trustee be unaware of his position. This is 
particularly the case if the trustee is a child such as in Re Vinogradoff1347, as it would be 
unconscionable to impose liability on such an individual1348.  
 
Where there is a pre-existing duty however, such as in instances where there has been the 
failure of an express trust, the trustee has stricter standards of care compared to other 
resulting trustees1349. Owing to the trustee having already agreed to being bound by 
restrictive obligations, there is a prior fiduciary relationship of trust, confidence and 
loyalty to the transferor1350. In effect, the (now) resulting trustee has the same duties as 
would have been owed if they were or still were an express trustee, plus the duty to return 
the assets. It can be said that the duties of an express trustee are ongoing for the automatic 
resulting trustee and thus higher in standard than for the presumed resulting trustee.  
 
In between these two positions are purchase price resulting trustees. As the contribution 
to the purchase price was known to the legal purchaser and now trustee1351, they are aware 
that they cannot treat the property wholly as their own1352. Although this does not result 
 
1341 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 199 
1342 Ibid, at 201 
1343 Such as where property is being rented out or dividends are declared on shares 
1344 Evans v European Bank (2004) 7 ITELR 19 at 116  
1345 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 201 
1346 [1996] WLR 802 at 988 
1347 [1935] WN 68 
1348 Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton, (No.883) at 706; Hardoon v Belilios [1901] AC 118 at 123; 
Re Rococo Developments (in liquidation), Evans v Jones [2017] Ch 1 
1349 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 116-117 
1350 Ibid, at 199 
1351 As they must have been aware that the transferor was providing them with funds  
1352 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 116 and 201 
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in them being express trustees, there will be greater obligations such as maintaining the 
property (particularly if it is land) and ensuring it does not overly depreciate in value – 
higher burdens than imposed on the gratuitous transfer resulting trustee, and potentially 
increasing the chances of them being compelled to make up any shortfalls in the trust 
assets.  
 
The effect of this distinction between the forms of resulting trust and the level of 
knowledge of the respective trustees is apparent1353. Should the resulting trustee have no 
knowledge of the trust, then according to MacFarlane, for as long as the trust property 
remains in his hands, “the beneficiary simply has a power to fix him with a duty to 
reconvey the property by bringing the existence of the trust to his attention.”1354 In this 
context, should assets subject to such a resulting trust be dissipated, and the liquidator be 
barred from tracing, then it would be impossible recover assets dissipated before the 
trustee had knowledge of their position. Obviously, should the dissipation occur after the 
trustee becomes aware of their position, then any such dissipation would be recoverable. 
Moreover, should the assets be subject to a purchase price resulting trust or automatic 
resulting trust, which means the trustee was already aware of their position, then it may 
be possible for the liquidator to recover dissipated, non-traceable assets from the trustee 
from the moment of the transfer. 
 
Liquidators and third parties who are faced with the dissipation of non-traceable resulting 
trust assets may therefore recover commensurate property to cover the dissipation. 
However, as seen above, the ability to do so is limited to instances of where the trustee 
has become aware of their position before the dissipation has occurred – a position many 
resulting trustees do not find themselves in. It should also be noted that if the trustee be 
insolvent, owing to the personal nature of trustee liability, the chances of successfully 
recovering any award are minimal, as the claimant would rank merely as an unsecured 
creditor and be subject to a pari passu distribution of the insolvent trustee’s assets. Hence, 
albeit resulting trust liability not being as encompassing as the personal liability analysed 
in Chapter 3, the availability of imposing liability in certain limited circumstances does 
 
1353 R v Chester and North Wales Legal Aid Area Office, ex parte Floods of Queensferry Ltd 
[1998] 1 WLR 1496 at 1500; Allan v Rea Brothers Trustees [2002] PLR 169 at 55. 
1354 MacFarlane B, The Structure of Property Law, (London: Bloomsbury, 2008) at 306; Allied 
Carpets Group PLC v Nethercott [2001] BCC 81; Independent Trustee Services v GP Noble 
Trustees [2012] EWCA Civ 195.  
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to some extent increase the potential of the resulting trust to be a valuable and beneficial 
mechanism of returning assets to the company’s asset pool.  
 
Section 2.3: The Costs of Enforcement  
 
Should the liquidator or third party have a valid resulting trust claim, and the trust assets 
or their substitutes be identifiable, then they face a further potential issue – funding the 
necessary litigation to reclaim the asset. As concluded in Section 3, Chapter 3, liquidators 
face a funding predicament. Whilst this section will not rehearse the arguments set out in 
Chapter 5, it is necessary to restate the fundamental position of a liquidator’s ability to 
fund litigation. Whilst the liquidator is permitted to recover litigation expenses owing to 
their ‘super priority’1355, they are limited to using the company’s asset pool to fund 
litigation. Although there is the possibility of using outside sources of litigation funding, 
the desirability to make the necessary funds available is limited should the litigation have 
a low chance of success. Consequently, it is difficult for liquidators to be in a position to 
commence litigation.  
 
However, whilst the Insolvency Act provisions are fundamentally flawed owing to 
substantive restrictions that prevent successful litigation being commenced or funded1356, 
the resulting trust is not faced with such issues. As set out both in this chapter and Chapter 
5, in instances where a resulting trust has arisen, there is usually an identifiable asset or a 
substitute asset identifiable through the rules of tracing. Furthermore, Chapter 5 and this 
chapter have proven that the law applying to the resulting trust is relatively clear. 
Notwithstanding there being issues surrounding the theoretical foundations of certain 
claims such as the Quistclose trust and mistaken payments, the practical impact of the 
claims – that property is held on trust for the transferor – is identical irrespective of the 
foundation adopted. Moreover, the requirements necessary to satisfy the majority of 
claims have been established with a high degree of certainty, and the right to trace and 
impose trustee liability ensures that it unlikely that there will not be available property to 
claim. It is therefore submitted that, should a liquidator have a viable resulting trust claim, 
owing to the existence of identifiable property and a high level of predictability as to the 
 
1355 S176ZA Insolvency Act 1986  
1356 See Chapters 3 and 4 
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result of any litigation identified in Chapter 5, creditors themselves or third-party 
financiers are more likely to make funding available. For the creditors this is primarily 
because unlike with the anti-deprivation provisions, where uncertainty causes them to be 
reticent in providing funding, the resulting trust provides much greater levels of 
predictability and a stronger guarantee that their funding will be recovered. Similarly for 
third-party funders, should the property be of substantial value, they will be able to 
reclaim their moneys and make a sizeable profit from the recovered property by charging 
fees.  
 
Moreover, unlike with the Insolvency Act provisions, given that any resulting trust claim 
would be available prior to the onset of insolvency owing to such trusts arising upon the 
transfer of property, it would belong to the company1357 and not the liquidator. Therefore, 
they are exceptions to the rule against champerty, and can safely be assigned to third-
party financiers.  
 
Whilst this use of third-party litigation funding may limit the amount that is recoverable 
by the liquidator as a consequence of fees, the reclaimed property will still be able to 
contribute to the company’s asset pool. This is seen clearest in Petrodel, where the 
property at the centre of the dispute amounted to £17 million and could have been made 
available to the unsecured creditors had Petrodel or Vermont been liquidated. In AAZ v 
BBZ1358, high value property including land, a yacht and plane were subject to a resulting 
trust. It must be noted, however, that should the reclaimable property be low in value, and 
given the high costs of commencing litigation, it is unlikely that the necessary finance 
would be forthcoming.  
 
Moreover, should the insolvent company be the resulting trustee, the cost of administering 
the trust may become problematic. As recognised by McCormack1359, the issues are who 
must cover the costs of administration, and whether the liquidator can recover their costs 
as trustee from the assets. If the costs are recoverable by the liquidator, then the value 
recovered from the property by the third party will be diminished.  
 
 
1357 Re Oasis Merchandising [1998] Ch 170  
1358 [2016] EWHC 3234 (Fam) – see also NRC Holdings Ltd v Danilitskiy [2017] EWHC 1431 
1359 McCormack G, Proprietary Claims and Insolvency, (No.188) at 37 
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Historically, the courts have been unwilling to award remuneration to trustees unless the 
trust document, and thereby the settlor, had provided for it. However, in Re Masters 
Decd1360 it was held the courts have the authority to authorise remuneration where 
appropriate, and in Re Grimthorpe1361 it was held trustees were entitled to recover 
expenses incurred in fulfilling their duties. In a series of cases the courts’ initial desire to 
see this authority used sparingly1362 became more liberal1363, with a greater willingness to 
award expenses. In Re Berkley Applegate1364 it was found that a number of assets were 
held on trust by an insolvent company, and that there were insufficient assets to cover the 
costs of establishing and verifying the various claims by the company’s customers. 
Claims made by the beneficiaries that the liquidator should not be able to recover their 
expenses in administering the trust were rejected owing to the maxim that those who seek 
Equity must do Equity, and that the liquidator should be allowed to recover the “skill and 
labour expended in connection with the administration of the property”1365. Hence, should 
a third party seek to enforce their rights to property held by an insolvent company, then 
the liquidator will be entitled to recover the costs of administering the trust either from 
the property itself or the third party.  
 
This ability of the liquidator to recover their costs could therefore minimise the positive 
impact of any resulting trust, as the assets would first have to cover any liquidator 
expenses. However, given the limited nature of resulting trustee administrative duties1366, 
it is unlikely that the expenses incurred by the liquidator will be substantial. In the 
majority of cases the resulting trust assets are relatively easy to locate as they are primarily 
land or known bank accounts. Should the asset be land, although administrative costs may 
be incurred, these can be offset should the property produce a rental income. The one 
exception to this may be resulting trusts arising as a consequence of mistaken payments, 
where the liquidator may be faced with the prospect of having to identify the location of 
the mistaken payment within the recipient’s accounts1367, leading to the incurrence of 
 
1360 [1953] 1 WLR 81 at 83 
1361 [1958] Ch. 615 at 623 
1362 Re Worthington decd [1954] 1 WLR 525 
1363 Re Duke of Norfolk’s Settlement Trusts [1979] Ch 37 
1364 Re Berkley Applegate (Investment Consultants) Ltd No2 [1989] Ch 32 – this is now codified 
in s31(1) Trustee Act 2000 
1365 Ibid, at 50 
1366 These primarily are the protection and returning of property to the transferor (see above) 
1367 Chase Manhattan, (No.1059) 
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substantial liquidator expenses. The overall effect on the creditor’s reclamation of 
transferred assets is hence likely to be minimal, and will not adversely affect the impact 
of the resulting trust.   
 
Section 2.4: Is the Resulting Trust a Preference? 
 
The final practical hurdle facing the use of the resulting trust by a liquidator or third party 
is the possibility of such trusts being a preference, and so void under s239 Insolvency Act 
19861368. This is primarily the case with Quistclose trusts, because as seen in Chapter 5, 
they only arise when a company is experiencing financial difficulties that the provision 
of the funds subject to the trust cannot successfully address. Consequently, the recipient 
company regularly enters insolvency soon after the moneys are received. This is in 
contrast with the other forms of resulting trust, which regularly occur a sizeable time 
before the company finally enters insolvency, and so cannot meet the time restrictions1369 
nor be subject to the requisite desire on the part of the insolvent company1370 necessary 
to successfully make out a preference claim.   
 
A Quistclose trust potentially is caught by the preference provisions as, should the 
company be the recipient of the moneys, there will be an agreement that one creditor (the 
transferor) will be placed into a better position than had the resulting trust over the loan 
moneys not existed. This is owing to the fact that the lender would otherwise have taken 
on the position of an unsecured creditor and been subject to rateable distribution of the 
assets.   
 
The issues surrounding trusts and the law of preferences were considered in Re 
Kayford1371, which analysed the previous, but similar, preference provisions of the 
Companies Act 19481372. Here, money was paid by customers to a mail order company. 
The company then, on the advice of its accountants, placed the moneys in a separate 
account, which were to be drawn on only once the orders were processed. Megarry J held 
that the placing of the moneys in the separate account was sufficient to create an express 
 
1368 Moffatt G, Trusts Law, (No.899) at 814 
1369 S240(1)(a) Insolvency Act 1986 s 
1370 Re M.C. Bacon, (No.429) 
1371 [1975] 1 WLR 279 
1372 S320 Companies Act 1948  
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trust, and that no issue of the company preferring the customers arose as the preference 
provisions1373 required the benefitting party to be a creditor, and the creation of the trust 
thereby prevented the customers from becoming creditors1374.  
 
The reasoning of Megarry J has however been criticised by Stevens1375. He argues that 
the decision of which classes of creditors should be given preferential status should not 
be determined by the directors but by operation of law. Although this may be true for 
express trusts, where they would arise only as a result of directors’ actions, given that the 
Quistclose trust is an automatic resulting trust1376 – and so arises by an operation of law 
– Stevens’ objection has no applicability to such trusts. This because it is not the directors 
who are dictating who has ‘preferential’ status, but equitable presumptions which 
encumbers the moneys with a trust upon receipt1377. The resulting trust is therefore 
institutional in nature and free of directorial influence.  
 
One further issue with Re Kayford is the argument that rather than the company receiving 
the customer payments already subject to a trust, the company received the moneys 
unencumbered before declaring the trust1378, so by subsequently declaring a trust over 
unencumbered assets, this may have constituted placing the customers in a better position 
than they otherwise would have been1379. Once again, whilst this is potentially applicable 
to the express trust1380, in instances of resulting trust, the recipient company receives the 
moneys already impressed with a trust1381, and so never became a debtor1382. As Stevens 
acknowledges, the resulting trust does not involve a trustee subsequently declaring a trust 
after receiving unencumbered asset, and so it is not the recipient company that is 
impressing the moneys with a trust – meaning that a creditor cannot have been ‘preferred’.  
 
1373 Which is the same under the current provisions under s239  
1374 Re Kayford [1975] 1 WLR 279 at 28. 3 
1375 Stevens R, Insolvency at 158 in Swadling S, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, (Oxford: 
Hart, 2004)  
1376 Ibid, at 159  
1377 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts, (No.892) at 423 
1378 Waters (1983) 21 Alberta Law Review 395 
1379 See also Anderson H, Trust Assets in English Insolvency Law, at 176 in McKendrick E, 
Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations, (Oxford: OUP, 1992) at 177-178, who 
refutes accusations that a Quistclose trust could give rise a preference as the trust is created by an 
operation of law 
1380 Re Chelsea Cloister Ltd (1981) 41 P&CR 98 
1381 See Chapter 5 Section 1  
1382 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts, (No.892) at 423 
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A number of reasons have also been proffered for the recipient company of Quistclose 
funds not possessing a desire to prefer. These include that the directors were intending to 
rescue the company and prevent its moving into liquidation rather than preferring specific 
creditors1383, that the lender’s priority was ‘foisted’ upon the company who had no choice 
but to accede to the priority in order to receive the moneys1384, and because resulting trusts 
“are fundamentally inconsistent with the notion of malpractice prior to the 
commencement of insolvency.”1385 In Re Branson & Gothard ltd1386 for example, a 
stockbroking company set up a client account to segregate potential surpluses from 
general corporate funds. It was held there was no preference as the company was merely 
seeking to protect client moneys and the company had been ordered to do so after being 
informed by its regulator. Hence, irrespective of which factor is applicable, all prevent 
the company from forming the requisite desire, and so even if the company is said to be 
‘preferring’ one creditor over another, the Quistclose trust will not be set aside as there is 
no desire to prefer. Whilst this may be different should the trust be an express trust in 
which the property was initially received unencumbered1387, the recipient company 
receives the trusts already encumbered under a Quistclose trust. The liquidator or third 
party will therefore not be prevented from enforcing a Quistclose trust on preference 
grounds.   
 
Section 3: The Efficacy of Utilising the Resulting Trust 
 
Section 3.1: The Forms of Resulting Trust 
 
Having analysed the practical factors that impact upon the use of the resulting trust, it is 
apparent that, generally, the resulting trust is a viable mechanism through which 
 
1383 Stevens R, Insolvency at 161 in Swadling S, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essay, (Oxford: 
Hart, 2004) 
1384 Parry R, Transaction Avoidance, (No.271) 
1385 Anderson H, Trust Assets in English Insolvency Law, at 176 in McKendrick E, Commercial 
Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 178 
1386 [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 289 
1387 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts, (No.892) at 424 
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liquidators or third parties can minimise the impact of a company entering liquidation1388. 
From the analysis of Chapter 5 it was established that the resulting trust has well-
established substantive requirements1389 that have the potential to increase the relevant 
asset pools. In having such provisions, liquidators or third parties are able to engage in 
litigation with a reasonable sense of predictability. This chapter has also established that 
although there are a number of potential practical hurdles to bringing resulting trust 
litigation in specific contexts, none applied to the majority of potential claims nor 
fundamentally undermined its use. Indeed, the ability to trace and to impose liability on 
the resulting trustee1390 means that should the assets be dissipated, there is a likelihood 
that they or their substitutes will be recovered, thereby minimising any potential losses. 
As a consequence of these characteristics, when the resulting trust is taken as a whole, it 
is possible to conclude that it is, should any of the applicable matrices occur, capable of 
meeting the criteria set out in Chapter 3 for a more effective method of minimising the 
effect of liquidation. This is because: 1) it is capable of increasing the size of the 
company’s asset pool, or preventing a party becoming a creditor; 2) it possesses relatively 
clear and easy to identify provisions; and 3) is potentially attractive to third party litigation 
financiers owing to existence of an identifiable asset or substitute asset.  
 
Specifically, the purchase price resulting trust is capable of assisting in instances where 
either the insolvent company or a third party has provided all or some of the purchase 
moneys to an asset. The use of such trusts is practically viable as although resulting trusts 
can be rebutted by showing that the transfer was a gift or a loan, this is unlikely to occur 
with purchase price trusts in the context of corporate liquidation1391. Given that any 
purchase would involve at least one party being a company – either being the provider or 
purchaser – it is doubtful that in the majority of matrices there would be sufficient 
evidence that the provider of the funds intended for the moneys to be a loan or gift. This 
is because should the company be the provider, it is unforeseeable that it would willingly 
give away valuable assets to a third party and minimise its net value – the sole purpose of 
 
1388 See Millett P, Proprietary Restitution in Degeling S and Edelman J, Equity in Commercial 
Law, (Sydney: Thomson, 2005), 309 at 318 for succinct summary of the advantages of utilising 
the resulting trust. 
1389 See also Smith L, Equity is Not a Single Thing, at 144 in Klimchuk D, Samet I and Smith E, 
Philosophical Foundations of The Law of Equity, (Oxford: OUP, 2020) at 145 
1390 For breaches of trust after they have become aware of their fiduciary position  
1391 See Chapter 5 
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a company being to maximise its net value1392. Similarly, it is unlikely that a third-party 
provider would intend the recipient company to take the property beneficially, unless the 
moneys were provided by the sole shareholder of a company1393. An exception may occur 
if there is a parent/subsidiary relationship between two companies, but given that the two 
companies are separate legal persons1394, a high level of evidence would have to adduced 
to evidence that a gift or loan was intended. Moreover, given that an identifiable and 
potentially valuable asset or substitute will be recovered1395, and a strong expectation of 
successful litigation, there is a strong probability that such claims will be attractive to 
third party litigation funders, and so the necessary finance will be acquirable.  
 
Similarly, the gratuitous transfer also offers a viable mechanism through which to 
reacquire property should an asset be transferred in the absence of consideration. For the 
most part Chapter 5 proved that the legal provisions are evident and well established, 
providing a good degree of predictability to liquidators and third parties should they 
initiate litigation. Whilst there are issues surrounding the gratuitous transfer of land, 
should the senior courts reject this thesis’ submission, the rejection would merely provide 
an additional means to reacquire transferred property rather than provide any major 
uncertainty or restriction. Furthermore, despite the uncertainty surrounding the equitable 
mechanism utilised in instances of mistaken transfers, this debate does not affect the 
actual imposition of a trust to return the moneys to the transferor. As with the purchase 
price resulting trust, given that any claim by a liquidator or third party will involve at least 
one company, it is unforeseeable that it will be proven that a gift or a loan was present. 
Finally, as there is an identifiable and valuable asset, and an expectation of successful 
litigation, the gratuitous transfer resulting trust is likely to also be attractive to third party 
litigation funders.  
 
As also concluded, automatic resulting trusts are the securest resulting trust claim that 
liquidators can commence as a consequence of there being explicit and established rules 
that elicit little debate or controversy. Also, given that the only viable means of rebutting 
 
1392 See Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC per Nourse LJ; Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1950] 
Ch 286; Kershaw D, Company Law in Context – Texts and Materials, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 
2012) at 337 
1393 See Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (15th June 1994, unreported), Ch D per Chadwick J 
1394 Salomon v Salomon [1896] UKHL 1  
1395 In Prest, (No.997) the total value of the properties subject to a resulting trust was £17 million 
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the automatic resulting trust’s presumption is a gift over in the initial trust deed1396, it will 
be both difficult to rebut and easy to identify if a rebuttal has occurred. This predictability, 
and the identifiable assets that are subject to the resulting trust, also make acquiring the 
necessary funding to commence litigation likely.  
 
Finally, the Quistclose trust provides a workable mechanism through which lenders can 
prevent themselves from becoming unsecured creditors. Once again, and similarly to 
mistaken payments, whilst there is debate surrounding what form of trust the Quistclose 
is, this does not affect the application of the trust. Indeed, the requirements for a 
Quistclose trust are well documented, and provide for its application in a number of 
matrices other than the traditional loan for a specific purpose seen in Quistclose itself. As 
was also noted, the ability to establish such trusts will be dependent on the loan document 
and the clarity of its terms. Although Finch submits that establishing such trusts is an 
uncertain proposition owing to confusion surrounding there being a specific purpose1397, 
Chapter 5 has shown that the courts have taken a flexible and relaxed approach to 
identifying the requisite purpose. Thereby, the lender will be able to reasonably foresee 
the likelihood of there being such a trust over the loan moneys by referencing the loan 
document. Furthermore, it has also been claimed that the administrative costs of such 
trusts make them undesirable1398. However, the majority of these costs are the creation1399, 
and administration, of a separate bank account, and so these should not be over 
emphasised as being prohibitive in creating them or liquidators administering them in the 
event of insolvency. Furthermore, given that the majority of lenders providing moneys 
subject Quistclose trusts will be resource rich institutional or private parties, they will 
likely have the necessary financial resources necessary to cover any litigation costs1400. 
 
Section 3.2: Comparison with Other Creditor Protections  
 
This thesis has shown that the resulting trust, in all of its forms, is a mechanism capable 
of minimising the impact of liquidation should a company become insolvent. However, 
it must be admitted that the use of the resulting trust is limited by the need for certain 
 
1396 Smith v Cooke [1891] AC 297; King v Denison (1813) 1 Ves & B 260. 
1397 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law (No.6) at 563 
1398 Ibid, at 563 
1399 If a separate account is not already available 
1400 Barclays Bank v Quistclose itself, where the claimant was an institutional lender  
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factual matrices to occur. Whilst this is indisputable, and clearly a restrictive factor in the 
use of such trusts, similar restrictions are also applicable to all other forms of creditor 
protection. Other forms of trust such as the constructive and express trust require certain 
actions to occur1401, and the Insolvency Act 1986 provisions are also severely limited to 
the occurrence of certain actions. It should be also be noted that whilst certain factual 
matrices must occur for a resulting trust to arise, these matrices do cover a wide range of 
property transfers, including gratuitous transfers, purchases of property, failure of express 
trusts, and loans for a specific purpose. Hence, although the resulting trust is restricted in 
its application, it is no more limited than any other form of creditor and quasi-creditor 
protection – and given that there are 3 forms of resulting trust1402 that each cover a number 
of matrices, the reach of the resulting trust is large compared to each individual and 
alternative form of creditor protection.  
 
Moreover, in even a cursory comparison with the other forms of creditor protection, the 
resulting trust has many other benefits. Taking the express trust first, this form of potential 
creditor protection is limited by the requirement for the prospective settlor to have clearly 
intended to create a trust1403 and that any declaration of express trust over land must be 
made in writing1404. As established1405, there must be an intention to impose legal 
obligations on the prospective trustee, rather than purely moral obligations, and the use 
of precatory words will be insufficient to create a trust1406. Problematically, phrasing 
obligations as moral requirements, and using indirect language, is a natural method of 
communicating for many people, and so it is foreseeable that the requisite intention will 
not be properly expressed1407. This is exacerbated by the fact that using the term ‘trust’ is 
not in itself sufficient to create a trust1408, thereby removing a sure-fire method of 
establishing a trust. Consequently, expressing the requisite intention is potentially 
problematic, especially if legal advice is not sought in the creation of the trust. Expressing 
the necessary intention is particularly problematic in the commercial context, where the 
 
1401 See Thomas G, The Law of Trusts (No.185); Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton (No.883) 
1402 Presumed, Automatic and Quistclose resulting trusts  
1403 Knight v Knight (1840) 49 ER 58 
1404 S52(1) Law of Property Act 1925  
1405 Re Snowden [1979] 2 WLR 654 
1406 Re Adams and the Kensington Vestry (1884) 27 Ch D 394.  
1407 See Re Snowden for example  
1408 Re Kayford [1975] 1 WLR 279 
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courts have been reticent in finding that a trust was intended between parties1409 - limiting 
the effectiveness of such trusts1410. This was seen in regard to the Quistclose trust, but is 
also evidenced in North v Wilkinson1411, where it was held that the language used in the 
trust document merely created a personal obligation rather than a propriety obligation. 
Should creditors seek to rely on the express trust as a means of improving their position, 
then they may be beset by uncertainty and depend on the judiciary’s interpretation of 
unclear language – particularly if used in the context of consumer prepayments owing to 
consumers’ lack of legal knowledge and the probability that they will fail to express the 
necessary intention1412.  
 
An express trust can also arise by mistake, should the parties express the requisite 
intention whilst not understanding the effects of what they are doing – seen most starkly 
in Paul v Constance1413. Here the repeated use of a phrase was sufficient to unknowingly 
create a trust. Similarly in Rowe v Prance1414, the declaration that a yacht was both the 
legal owner’s and his mistress’ was sufficient to evidence the necessary intention, even 
though the legal owner did not truly intend to grant a beneficial interest to his mistress. 
Hence, it is possible to create an express trust without intending to do so – meaning that 
company assets may be tied up without realising, and so unavailable to unsecured 
creditors. 
 
The utilisation of the constructive trust can also be problematic for unsecured creditors. 
As has been extensively acknowledged, constructive trusts arise by operation of law 
where the defendant is aware of factors that attach to his conscience and thereby justify 
the imposition of a trust over property held by the defendant1415.  
 
Notwithstanding the breadth of matrices in which the constructive trust arises,1416 utilising 
these trusts is not the simplest. It is not possible to analyse the applicable matrices in the 
 
1409 Henry v Hammond [1913] 2 KB 5151 at 521; Re Multi Guarantee [1987] BCLC 257 
1410 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law (No.6) at 554, 562-567 
1411 [2018] EWCA Civ 161 
1412 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law (No.6) at 564 
1413 [1977] 1 WLR 527 
1414 [1999] 2 FLR 787  
1415 Soar v Ashwell [1893] 2 QB 390 at 393; Westdeutsche, (No.186) 
1416 See FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45; Regal 
(Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] UKHL 1; Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102; In the Estate of 
Crippen [1911] P 108 
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context of the thesis, however, taking the applicability of the constructive trust in the 
context of bribery as an rough example, it was not until 20141417, 21 years after the Privy 
Council in Attorney General v Reid1418 first acknowledged the possibility of a 
constructive trust arising upon the receipt of a bribe, that it was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court that a constructive trust do in fact arise in such circumstances1419. Hence, much 
uncertainty exists over if, and when, constructive trusts will actually be imposed, meaning 
that it is difficult to rely on their imposition. Moreover, the constructive trustee will only 
be liable once he is aware of factor that has attached to his conscience1420, potentially 
resulting in dissipation of trust assets and no liability for the constructive trustee.   
 
Finally, the explicit creditor protections of the Insolvency Act 1986 – the anti-deprivation 
and personal liability provisions – do not offer creditors effective remedies. It was 
concluded in Chapters 3 and 4 that the provisions are beset by three categories of flaw – 
remedial, substantive and evidential. It was shown that although the courts are granted 
remedial powers, they act primarily in personam rather than in rem, preventing the 
claimants from acquiring priority to the defendants’ assets. Moreover, it was also 
demonstrated that all the provisions suffer from substantive uncertainty that make 
commencing litigation extremely difficult to do, and that high evidential burdens make 
all but the clearest cut cases un-litigable.  
 
Given the limitations of these alternative creditor protections, it is apparent that the 
resulting trust offers a superior method of increasing the size of an insolvent company’s 
asset pool in certain matrices. The resulting trust’s relative clarity on its substantive 
requirements, use of presumptions rather than reliance on evidence, and right to trace into 
misappropriated assets, mean that it is a viable mechanism through which to retrieve 
company assets. As also concluded, whilst the use of the resulting trust may be limited 
by the need for certain factual matrices, these matrices still cover many instances of 
 
1417 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 
1418 Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid [1993] UKPC 2; 
1419 In Sinclair Investments (UK) LTD v Versailles Trade Finance LTD [2011] EWCA Civ 347 
the Court of Appeal originally rejected the prospect of constructive trusts arising upon the receipt 
of a bribe  
1420 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 715; Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
v Akindele [2001] Ch 437 
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property transfer, and are no more limiting than the substantive requirements of the 
alternative creditor protections.  
 
Section 4: Policy 
 
Notwithstanding the potential application of the resulting trust in instances of liquidation, 
it is necessary to also establish that the use of such trusts is justifiable – that it is fair to 
grant the transferor access to property subject to a resulting trust, and that granting such 
access does not unfairly prejudice the recipient of the property or third parties. The need 
to do so is apparent: should the use of the resulting trust not be capable of being justified, 
then although possibly beneficial to unsecured creditors and potential unsecured 
creditors, utilising the trust would be problematic owing to the unfairness created, and be 
open to question and attack by the recipients of the trust assets and their creditors. 
 
Before considering the issue of ‘justifiability’ or ‘fairness’, it is necessary to define these 
terms to ensure clarity and avoid confusion over this section’s reference points. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the terms justifiability, reasonableness and equitable have 
synonymous definitions with fairness. Whilst fairness can be defined as even 
treatment1421, it is important to stress that this meaning has not been adopted by this 
section. This is because given the nature of the resulting trust – ‘taking’ property from the 
recipient and ‘returning’ it to the transferor – it is not possible to act evenly as a judgment 
must be made over who has a better right to the property. Consequently, it is not possible 
to split the property in two, as was advocated by the judgment of King Solomon – 
potentially the ‘fairest’ outcome the court could adopt for resolving any dispute over the 
property. Indeed, in resulting trust claims, they are, in all instances, a ‘winner takes all’ 
scenario with the property returning to the transferor. Instead, this thesis, when referring 
to any of the above terms, has adopted the alternative definition of fairness – “legitimate, 
in accordance with rules or standards”1422. The need to adopt this definition again stems 
from the nature of the resulting trust: whilst it is difficult to argue that such trusts allow 
for even treatment, it is evident from the analysis in Chapter 5 and immediately below 
that the resulting trust’s usage and effect are attributable to, and as a consequence of, 
 
1421 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Volume 2 A-M, 6th edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2007) at 921 
1422 Ibid, at 920 
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delineated and identifiable legal rules not subject to judicial discretion1423. It is therefore 
necessary to analyse the resulting trust’s justifiability in relation to its use of legal rules.   
 
In analysing the justifiability of the resulting trust, two primary policy issues arise: the 
nature and cause of its redistributive effect and the lack of registration and notice for such 
trusts. The potential unfairness of the resulting trust, in the context of this thesis, is not 
limited to the recipient, but more importantly includes the creditors of the recipient. The 
obvious consequence of there being a resulting trust is should the recipient be insolvent, 
then the assets subject to the resulting trust will not be distributable to the insolvent’s 
creditors1424 - potentially causing adverse consequences and harm to these creditors, such 
as tipping them into insolvency themselves1425. Furthermore, the removal of the assets 
from the recipient’s asset pool may cause the recipient to enter liquidation itself. The 
question is therefore whether these potentially negative effects can be justified, and 
whether it is fair to grant the transferor priority to the recipient’s assets.  
 
Section 4.1: Redistributive Effect 
 
The redistributive effect of the resulting trust is apparent and well documented1426. By 
imposing a trust over property now held by the recipient and recognising a beneficial 
interest in favour of the transferor, the resulting trust is redistributive as it ‘takes’ property 
from one party and ‘grants’ it to another. Evans notes the controversial nature of this 
redistribution, submitting that such trusts are not the continuation of the transferor’s 
property rights, and are instead “new rights created to respond to particular fact 
situations.”1427 It is argued that rather than the beneficiary’s rights under a resulting trust 
arising upon the relevant ‘event’, they should be seen as being created by the judgment 
handed down by the court1428. The need to adopt this view, it is argued by Evans, revolves 
around the inability to distinguish between when the rights come into existence and the 
 
1423 Smith L, Equity is Not a Single Thing, at 144 in Klimchuk D, Samet I and Smith E, 
Philosophical Foundations of The Law of Equity, (Oxford: OUP, 2020) at 145 
1424 See Chapter 5 
1425 See Chapter 4, Section 1.6, and the example of Vaughan Engineering Ltd 
1426 Evans S, Property, (No.901) at 37 
1427 Ibid, at 37 
1428 Ibid, at 35 and 36; See also Hayton D, Underhill and Hayton (No.883) at 434 – “the imposition 
of a resulting trust leads to the creation of a new equitable property right for the transferor”; 
Chambers R, Resulting Trusts in Canada, (2000) 38 Alberta LR 379 at 389 
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courts’ decision to redistribute the trust property – they are one and the same and the trust 
merely ‘conceals’ the distributive decision of the court1429. Consequently, the use of the 
resulting trust, according to Evans, is problematic for two reasons: firstly, it involves a 
disturbance of property rights, and secondly, the granting of new rights to the transferor 
occurs against the recipient’s wishes and as a result of a decision of the court.  
 
Elaborating on his objections, Evans goes further and redefines what is meant when it is 
stated that proprietary rights ‘come into existence’ on the occurrence of particular events. 
He submits that rather than the rights actually coming into existence, it merely means the 
courts have determined that the transferor’s original rights to the property should receive 
protection from events occurring in the period between the transfer of property and the 
court’s judgment1430. The transferor consequently has no actual rights in the period 
between transferring the property and receiving judgment in his favour, and it is only 
because of the court judgment that they are able to reclaim the property. Consequently, 
all rights over property granted by the courts are open to being questioned due to them 
being imposed rather than agreed to by the parties. The effect on the defendant (or 
recipient) must, therefore, be a factor considered in the court’s granting of rights.  
 
Evans’ interpretation of the redistributive effect of the resulting trust has not been widely 
adopted1431, however, and has indeed been rejected by the House of Lords1432. In contrast 
to the idea that all property rights are created by the court through their judgments, Loi 
acknowledges that rather than creating new rights, the resulting trust instead involves the 
retention of pre-existing beneficial interests in the transferred property1433. Consequently, 
the resulting trust beneficiary is merely asserting a pre-existing right (if unknown to the 
recipient), and no new rights have been created1434. In the words of Hackney, whom Loi 
relies upon, “what I once had and have not granted away, I keep.”1435  
 
 
1429 Evans S, Property, (No.901) at 35 
1430 Ibid, at 36 
1431 Jaffey P, Explaining the Trust, (2015) 131 LQR 377  
1432 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291 
1433 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts, (No.892) at 416, 417; Godbold v Freestone (1695) 3 Lev 406 at 407 
1434 See Mee J, ‘Automatic’ Resulting Trusts: Retention, Restitution, or Reposing Trust?, in 
Mitchell C, Constructive and Resulting Trusts, (Oxford: Hart, 2010) at 207, who acknowledges 
that this is the basis adopted in the existing authorities  
1435 Hackney J, Understanding Equity and Trusts, (London: Fontana Press, 1987) at 148-153; also 
at 148. Samme’s Case (1609) 13 Co Rep 54 at 56  
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Hence, according to Loi, rather than adversely affecting the recipient through the court 
creating new, remedial rights, the resulting trust asset “remains the property of the 
[transferor] unless and until it is applied in accordance with his directions, and insofar as 
it is not so applied it must be returned to him.”1436 The beneficiary’s interest is therefore 
not created by the court, and has always existed in the property – firstly when they were 
the sole legal and beneficial owner, and secondly when they transferred the property to 
the recipient and retained the beneficial title1437. In retaining an interest, rather than being 
granted a right, it cannot, therefore, be argued that it is unfair on the recipient as they 
never had a right to the property.  
 
This view of the resulting trust is also made clear in the existing authorities. In Vandervell 
v IRC, Lord Upjohn categorically stated that the rights in the trust were retained by the 
transferor. His Lordship stated that “if the beneficial interest was in A and he fails to give 
it away effectively to another or others or on charitable trusts it must remain in him”1438. 
Lord Wilberforce reiterated this by commenting that “the equitable, or beneficial interest, 
cannot remain in the air: the consequence in law must be that it remains in the settlor”1439. 
This was also echoed in Northern v Carnegie1440, where Kindersley VC held that “[S]o 
far as [the settlor] had not parted with the beneficial interest, it remained in him as a 
resulting trust. It was not a new estate, but merely so much remaining in him as he has 
not parted with.” Thus, the adopted position within English law is that the resulting trust 
involves the retention of a beneficial interest in the property by the transferor, with the 
recipient never acquiring a beneficial right to the property1441.  
 
Chambers1442, however, proffers that Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s comments in 
Westdeutsche rejected this view, and that new rights are in fact created. His Lordship 
stated that “A person solely entitled to the full beneficial ownership of money or property, 
both at law and in equity, does not enjoy an equitable interest in that property. The legal 
title carries with it all rights. Unless and until there is a separation of the legal and 
 
1436 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 A.C. 164 at [81]  
1437 Hackney J, Understanding Equity and Trusts, (London: Fontana Press, 1987) at 148, 153 
1438 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291 at 313 
1439 Ibid, at 329; See also Shephard v Cartwright [1955] AC 431 at 454; Tribe v Tribe [1996] 1 
Ch 107 (CA) 129 at 134-135  
1440 (1859) 4 Drew 587 at 593 
1441 Jaffey P, Explaining the Trust, (2015) 131 LQR 377 at 387 
1442 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 52 
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equitable estates, there is no separate equitable title.”1443 Chambers interprets this as 
meaning that a different and new proprietary right to that originally held before the 
transfer. As stated, “The interest which the settlor has at the end of the story, as the 
beneficiary of a resulting trust, is an equitable interest which is different from the legal 
ownership he or she had at the beginning.”1444 According to Chambers, this alleged 
difference in the transferor’s equitable right before and after the transfer prevent the 
transferor from ever having ‘retained’ a set of rights1445.   
 
However, it is submitted that a new right is not in fact created. Instead, if the beneficial 
and legal interests are ‘fused’ prior to the transfer1446, then transferring the property 
merely ‘defuses’ these two forms of title and the separate equitable title is retained by the 
transferor, whilst the legal title is acquired by the recipient. Rather than a new right being 
created, the transferor is merely retaining part of their original bundle of proprietary 
rights1447, and so the comments in Vandervell that the rights are retained rather than 
created remain authoritative1448. Evans’ interpretation that new rights are created, 
therefore, cannot be sustained and neither can the objection to the resulting trust on the 
grounds of de novo rights.  
 
Furthermore, and addressing Evans’ other objections, it is important to note that 
Vandervell undermines the notion that resulting trusts are capable of causing injustice by 
accepting that they arise as a consequence of strict legal rules rather than judicial 
discretion1449. As was set out in Chapter 5, the resulting trust arises upon the occurrence 
of strictly defined events, and the courts do not themselves impose the trust - they merely 
recognise its existence.  
 
 
1443 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 707 
1444 Chambers R, Resulting Trusts, (No.923) at 52 
1445 Ibid, at 53  
1446 Wade v Paget (1784) 1 Bro CC 363 at 368  
1447 Honoré, A. M, Ownership in Guest A.G, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, (Oxford: OUP, 
1961) at 107 
1448 Mee J, ‘Automatic’ Resulting Trusts: Retention, Restitution, or Reposing Trust?, in Mitchell 
C, Constructive and Resulting Trusts, (Oxford: Hart, 2010) at 219 does accept that there is some 
truth to the idea that the transferor retains a proprietary interest in the trust assets but argues (at 
220) that additional rights are created against the trustee that did not exist previously  
1449 Evans S, Property, (No.901) at 38 
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This is confirmed by Westdeutsche1450. As set out in Chapter 5, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
held there were two categories of resulting trust: where the transferor voluntarily transfers 
property to third parties, and where they transfer property to an express trustee but where 
the whole beneficial interest is not exhausted. In setting out these categories, His Lordship 
emphasised the lack of discretion granted to the court in imposing a resulting trust. His 
Lordship repeatedly made reference to the resulting trust ‘arising’ from substantive, 
established legal rules rather than being ‘imposed’ by the court’s discretion. Moreover, 
by referring to the presumptions of resulting trust, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reinforced the 
notion that such trusts arise ‘organically’ as a consequence of the legal rules rather than 
the discretionary views of the judiciary. In dealing with these comments, Evans therefore 
acknowledges the view that the redistributive effect of the resulting trust is not intentional, 
and is instead “incidental or consequential”1451 - a result of such trusts being ‘animate’ 
and ‘explained, rather than created.’1452. Hence, it has also been established in the 
authorities that the resulting trust cannot be attacked for any intentionality in regards 
redistribution of property, and that fears about the resulting trust’s redistributive effects 
and the fears of judicial discretion are unfounded1453.    
  
Within the context of this thesis, a further justification for the resulting trust’s 
redistributive effect is that the unsecured creditors themselves have no rights to the 
property. Oakley, in reviewing proprietary claims in insolvency generally, points outs that 
irrespective of the issue of whether the transferor is retaining their rights in the trust asset, 
the general creditors never had a right to the property and so “any prejudice which they 
may suffer by reason of the disappearance of that property is more illusory than real.”1454 
Therefore, according to Oakley, as the unsecured creditors never had any rights to the 
trust assets they cannot be prejudiced – just as the recipient cannot be prejudiced by the 
transferor reclaiming the asset through their retained beneficial interest in the transferred 
property. Although the creditors may be ‘prejudiced’ by not having notice of the trust, 
 
1450 Westdeutsche, (No.186) at 707 
1451 Evans S, Property, (No.901) at 38 
1452 Ibid, at 39 
1453 Allton N, The Boundaries of Proprietary Claims, (1997) 13 QUTLJ 276 at 277; Birks P, The 
End of the Remedial Constructive Trust?, (1998) 12(4) Trust Law International 202 
1454 Oakley A, Proprietary, (No.905) at 380, 381 
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and so be expecting to eventually have access to the assets in the event of insolvency1455, 
this is a separate issue and is considered in the next section. 
 
The lack of prejudice to unsecured creditors was previously acknowledged by Lord 
Templeman in Space Investments v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust1456. His 
Lordship set out the reasoning for granting the transferor priority as “This priority is 
conferred because the ... unsecured creditors voluntarily accept the risk that the [creditor] 
might become insolvent and unable to discharge its obligations in full.” This can be 
contrasted with the transferor, who if they are not granted priority, would be deprived of 
a pre-existing proprietary right that, potentially, they were legitimately relying on1457. 
Consequently, it is the creditors’ assumption of risk, in contrast to the transferor’s lack of 
acceptance of risk, that justifies the creditor not having access to the trust asset.  
 
One final consideration in whether the resulting trust’s use can be justified is the lack of 
a uniform effect. As proven in Chapter 5, the resulting trust does not have one single 
outcome in the context of this thesis – it is both able to increase the size of a company’s 
asset pool by returning assets to the company, and also reduce the size of the asset pool 
by returning property to third parties. Thus, as also concluded, the resulting trust can both 
assist and hinder a company’s unsecured creditors. To therefore object to the imposition 
of the resulting trust in instances where it removes property from the company’s asset 
pool, whilst accepting its use in instances where it increases the size of the asset pool, is 
not feasible. This is especially so as, in instances of insolvency, the removal of the asset 
prevents the third party from becoming a creditor in the first instance. This dual faceted 
nature of the resulting trust means that it cannot be pigeonholed as being solely prejudicial 
to unsecured creditors in the context of insolvency.   
 
Thus, owing to the institutional nature of the resulting trust, and risk accepted by the 
unsecured creditors, the redistributive effect on the recipient and the recipient’s unsecured 
creditors can be justified1458. The resulting trust can be justified both should a liquidator 
of an insolvent company seek to utilise it to increase the size of the asset pool, and also 
 
1455 Ibid, at 380-381 
1456 [1986] 3 All ER 75 at 76-77 
1457 Oakley A, Proprietary, (No.905) at 410 
1458 Birks P, The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust?, (1998) 12(4) Trust Law International 
202 
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should a third party seek to remove assets from the asset pool of an insolvent company 
and prevent themselves from becoming unsecured creditors.  
 
Section 4.2: Registration  
 
Notwithstanding the justifiability of the resulting trust’s incidental redistributive effect 
on a theoretical level, one issue that was not analysed above was the lack of forewarning 
unsecured creditors have of the resulting trust’s existence1459. Whilst it may be correct 
that the unsecured creditors never had any proprietary rights over the resulting trust 
property, they will probably have been unaware of the trust, and so may have made credit 
available on the understanding that should the company become insolvent, they would 
eventually have access to the asset to discharge the outstanding debt.  
 
As resulting trusts are not true security interests, there is no requirement for them to be 
registered either by the transferor or the recipient1460, nor any need for other parties to 
have notice of them. This is in contrast to charges created by a company, which must be 
registered1461, and if not, become void should the company enter insolvency1462. It must 
be noted that the reason for this difference in treatment is fundamentally due to the fact 
that resulting trusts arise as operations of law. Hence, as they are not actively created by 
the parties, no formal documents need (or can) be drafted or executed. In many instances 
the parties will only be aware of the possibility of such a trust should legal advice be 
sought, and will only know of the trust’s existence when the court’s judgment is handed 
down. As a result of these factors, it is impossible to register such trusts in the first 
place1463.  
 
The potential knock on consequences of it not being possible to register resulting trusts 
were noted in Chapter 5. It was acknowledged that in regard to the use of the gratuitous 
transfer resulting trust, it is possible to utilise such trusts to artificially boost a subsidiary’s 
 
1459 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency Law, (No.6) at 567  
1460 McCormack G, Reservation of Title, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) at 5 
1461 Ss 859A, 859B Companies Act 2006 
1462 S859H Companies Act 2006 
1463 Clarke R, The Quistclose Trust: A Welcome Facilitator of Corporate Rescue, (2017) 26 
Nottingham LJ 130 at 139 
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appearance of creditworthiness1464 and encourage creditors to lend on the basis of this 
untrue appearance – also known as the ‘false wealth’ effect1465. The same possibility may 
occur with the Quistclose trust, which, as also noted, may also create an inaccurate 
impression of the borrowing company’s asset pool1466. This inaccurate impression may 
then be the cause for some creditors to make credit available to the company when there 
is no possibility of them having access to assets that appear to be the borrower’s. The 
potential outcome of there being an unknown Quistclose trust was neatly summarised by 
Beglan and Belcher1467:  
 
“They [Quistclose trusts] do not have to be registered and they are unlikely 
to be discoverable from the borrower's accounts. Given the short-term and 
emergency nature of most Quistclose-type loans, it may seem unlikely that 
a set of annual accounts including such a loan would be prepared and 
approved in time to influence an outsider's decision making, but they may 
be…So the loan will appear to increase the pool of assets available for 
unsecured creditors generally....However, when the unsecured creditors 
need it most, at the point when the purpose of preserving the company as a 
going concern fails, the fund must be returned to the lender rather than 
being made generally available.”1468 
 
It must be acknowledged that the resulting trust is also able to make more assets available 
to unsecured creditors than originally expected. However, although this is unquestionably 
advantageous for these creditors should it occur, it must be accepted that any increase in 
the asset pool is merely a ‘windfall’ or ‘added bonus’, and that they are not assets known 
to, and actively relied upon by, the unsecured creditors. Despite any increase being 
welcomed, it does not detract from the potential for misrepresentation of the insolvent 
company’s asset pool to occur at the time of the credit being made available.   
 
 
1464 McCormack G, Reservation of Title, (No.1459) at 5 
1465 Law Commission, Registration of Security Interests: Company Charges and Property Other 
Than Land – A Consultation Paper, Cmnd 164 at 2 
1466 Moffatt G, Trusts Law, (No.899) at 804  
1467 Beglan W and Belcher A, Jumping the Queue, (1997) JBL 1 at 9 
1468 Ibid, at 9-10 
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Whilst it is possible for all forms of resulting trust to be used as a mechanism to 
misrepresent any company’s creditworthiness1469, the prospect is particularly acute with 
Quistclose trusts owing to their regular use in attempts to prevent a company entering 
insolvency1470. Chan has even gone so far as to comment that their existence may 
encourage unsecured creditors to lend sufficient amounts under false pretences that they 
themselves may become insolvent1471 – an obviously unjust outcome.  
 
Notwithstanding the real possibility of such abuses occurring, it must also be noted that 
Quistclose trusts are created and operate in very short timeframes. Chapter 5 has shown 
that the underlying loan contracts are created ad hoc and are extremely time sensitive due 
to the imminent insolvency of the borrowing company. The authorities, such as 
Quistclose, Re Northern Development and Re Carreras Rothmans, also show that such 
trusts, should the borrower eventually enter insolvency, are not in existence for long 
periods of time. This limited window in which it is possible for unsecured creditors to rely 
on the falsity, therefore, severely limits the probability that such trusts will be used as 
instruments of misrepresentation1472. Moreover, given that the borrower will, in all 
probability, be in visible economic distress, potential creditors will likely be forewarned 
that the company is not in a healthy financial position and that making credit available 
would be an unviable venture.  
 
Furthermore, the resulting trust’s non-inclusion on the companies register can be justified. 
The companies register, through which diligent creditors might check whether there are 
restrictions on company property1473, was never intended to form a comprehensive 
account of corporate encumbrances1474. Instead it was only ever intended to provide a 
snapshot of the company’s position in regards a limited number of potential third-party 
interests. More fatally, English law has never objected to unknown third-party proprietary 
 
1469 Apart from the automatic resulting trust, as this is concerned only with the company 
reacquiring assets  
1470 Thomas G, The Law of Trusts, (No.185) at 268  
1471 Chan A, The Tree that Was Not Meant to Be - The Quistclose Trust Moving on From the 
Twinsectra Model and Why it May Never Be an Established Transactional Arrangement, (2015) 
9 HKJLS 1, 23 
1472 Bridges M, The Quistclose Trust in a World of Secured Transactions, (1992) 12 OJLS 333 
1473 Such as charges and mortgages   
1474 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts, (No.892) at 428; Davies P, Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern 
Company Law, 10th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) at 122-125 
 311 
rights that are not included on a register1475. As put by Stevens1476, if a creditor is willing 
to lend solely on the basis of the borrower purporting to own an expensive car, when that 
car is actually borrowed and the true legal owner’s title is hidden, then they themselves 
have taken on the risk of the borrower not being in a position to repay the borrowed 
moneys by not undertaking sufficient enquiries of the creditor’s circumstances.  
 
Forbye, even if the lender undertook the necessary due diligence and satisfied themselves 
of the borrower’s credit worthiness, establishing the existence of an unknown resulting 
trust would be nigh on impossible. As has been illustrated, to establish the existence of a 
resulting trust it is necessary to have a detailed knowledge of the relationship between the 
transferor and recipient and the movement of assets between the two parties. As is 
unsurprising, none of this information is available to the company’s creditors, and so for 
the overwhelming majority of creditors it is impossible to identify a resulting trust without 
being informed by one of the parties. 
 
To overcome these pitfalls, Brown and Pawlowski1477 have suggested that beneficial 
interests should be included on the land register. Although their proposal is limited to 
land and the land register, the potential suggestion could apply equally to beneficial 
interests over company property. They proffer that for purchasers (or in the context of 
this thesis, lenders) to be properly protected, proprietary interests should be included on 
the register1478. Nonetheless, whilst the inclusion of express trusts on the register may be 
practically possible due to the existence of a trust deed1479, as seen above, owing to the 
resulting trust arising as an operation of law, inclusion of such trusts on a register would 
not be possible until after litigation – thereby preventing creditors from being forewarned 
via a register. 
 
Irrespective of the small potential for abuse to occur through misrepresentation of a 
company’s assets, it must be kept in mind that the Quistclose trust – the most problematic 
form of resulting trust – does serve an important an important role in corporate 
 
1475 Loi K, Quistclose Trusts, (No.892) at 427; Cork K, Report, (No.2) at 1641 
1476 Stevens R, Insolvency, in Swadling W, The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays, (Oxford: Hart, 
2004) at 165 
1477 Brown J, Pawlowski P, Behind the Veil, (2017) 351 Property Law Journal 15  
1478 See also Edwards A, The Registration Quintennial Review, (June 2001)  
1479 S53(1)(b) Law of Property Act 1925 
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turnaround. Therefore, the ‘emergency’ nature of the Quistclose trust cannot be 
ignored1480. Although not limited to corporate rescue, the majority of Quistclose trusts are 
utilised in (sometimes vain) attempts to rescue a distressed company. The lender is 
therefore taking a great and apparent risk in making the moneys available in this scenario, 
and so needs some form of protection to mitigate their large exposure to risk. Moreover, 
the necessary finance may only be available in this form, and so the Quistclose trust may 
be the only viable method to encourage the rescue of a company1481. This is particularly 
so if the other assets have been subjected to fixed and floating charges or the overdraft 
has reached its limits1482.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that attempting to rescue companies that are not fatally flawed 
is a worthwhile endeavour that is capable of outweighing any potential prejudice to 
unsecured creditors1483. As Watt states, “A rescued company is a rescued trader and a 
rescued employer. A failed company very often results in unemployment and consequent 
social ills.”1484 Hence, the prospect of rescuing a company and saving individuals’ jobs is 
in itself enough to justify the Quistclose – even if it is not possible to register them.  
 
So, whilst creditors may lend on the mistaken basis of the recipient borrower appearing 
to ‘own’ the asset, it is not feasible to provide them with information to the contrary. 
Moreover, although they may lose out, the motivations behind the transactions involved, 
such as the protection of jobs, justifies the use of the resulting trust.  
 
Section 5: Conclusion  
 
As stated in the introduction, this chapter has built upon the conclusions reached in 
Chapter 5 that the resulting trust can assist unsecured creditors in instances of insolvency, 
either by returning assets to the now insolvent company for distribution through the 
liquidation dividend, or by preventing parties from becoming unsecured creditors in the 
 
1480 Beglan W and Belcher A, Jumping the Queue, (1997) JBL 1 at 7 
1481 Parmar D, The Uncertainty Surrounding the Quistclose Trust - Part Two, (2012) 9 Int C R, 
202. 
1482 Clarke R, The Quistclose Trust: A Welcome Facilitator of Corporate Rescue, (2017) 26 
Nottingham LJ 130 
1483 Finch V and Milman D, Corporate Insolvency, (No.6) 569; Goodhart W and Jones G, The 
Infiltration of Equitable Doctrine into English Commercial Law, (1980) 43 MLR 489 at 494 
1484 Watt G, Trusts and Equity, 8th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2018) at 164 
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first place by granting them priority to assets held by the now insolvent company. This 
chapter has built upon these conclusions by analysing whether, notwithstanding the 
theoretical possibility of the resulting trust assisting, such trusts would operate effectively 
from a practical perspective – put simply, whether the resulting trust is capable of 
providing actual, real-world assistance. It is concluded that, owing to a number of separate 
factors, the resulting trust is capable of providing actual, practical assistance to unsecured 
creditors.  
 
Specifically, it was concluded that whilst it is possible to rebut the imputed intentions of 
the transferor (and thereby defeat a resulting trust claim), this possibility is restricted to 
instances of there being sufficient evidence to rebut, rather than just the slightest evidence 
advocated by some. Similarly, although the transferor is restricted to only adducing 
evidence of actions before and up to the transfer, this is unlikely to impact commercial 
transfers of property owing to the likelihood that the requisite intentions will have been 
evidenced prior to the transfer – if they are evidenced at all. Finally, despite the rules of 
illegality being unclear and potentially extremely discretionary, due to the very small 
number of trust cases involving instances of illegality1485, the rules are unlikely to be 
applicable to claims of resulting trust, particularly owing to the contexts in which they 
are utilised. Consequently, liquidators or third parties intending on commencing litigation 
will have a sound degree of certainty as to whether there is a substantial chance that the 
presumptions will be rebutted, and so will not be placed in the position of wasting 
resources by commencing futile litigation.  
 
Secondly, it was also established that the ability of the transferor to trace is extremely 
beneficial to resulting trust claims, as it ensures that, in the majority of situations, the 
original or a substitute asset will be made available to the transferor. Moreover, it was 
concluded that given the illiquid nature of the property involved in purchase price and 
gratuitous transfer resulting trusts1486, it is unlikely that there will be a regular need for 
transferors to resort to tracing. Whilst Quistclose trusts and instances of mistaken 
transfers are more problematic owing to the more liquid nature of the assets transferred, 
the extensive rules of tracing generally favour the transferor, with only a few limitations 
 
1485 Including all three forms of trust – express, resulting and constructive trusts  
1486 Primarily land or moneys placed into a bank account to purchase property 
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imposed on the right to trace. Thus, it is probable that should there be a resulting trust 
claim available to a liquidator or third party, the transferred assets or their substitute will 
be recoverable.  
 
Notwithstanding the advantageous evidential and tracing provisions, the potential 
personal liability of resulting trustees is more problematic, with applicability very limited 
to instances of when the trustee becomes aware of their fiduciary position. As noted, 
resulting trustee liability varies depending on the form of the resulting trust. For automatic 
resulting trustees, owing to their previously known express trusteeship, they appear to 
have a high level of obligations and liabilities similar to those of express trustees. In 
respect of purchase price resulting trustees, it is probable that as they will have received 
the moneys with the knowledge that they are to be used purchase property, they will 
probably be obligated to maintain, and maintain the value of, the purchased property. 
However, given that recipients of voluntary transfers are unlikely to become aware of 
their trusteeship until the initial stages of the litigation process, their liability for 
maintaining the integrity of the trust assets will arise not until then. Hence, for the 
majority of resulting trustees, there will only be limited liability, and limited opportunities 
for transferors to recover any assets from the recipient that cannot be followed or traced 
into.  
 
In addition to the practical factors, this chapter has also shown how the resulting trust 
cannot be criticised on policy grounds. It was concluded that, as the transferor retains the 
beneficial interest in the asset throughout, rather than being granted a right to the asset by 
the court (which merely recognises the transferor’s beneficial title), the asset never 
becomes the property of the recipient. Consequently, although the resulting trust does 
prima facie have the appearance of having a redistributive effect, it merely involves the 
return of property to its beneficial owner. Moreover, it was also concluded that there was 
no prejudice to the recipient’s unsecured creditors due to two factors: 1) the unsecured 
creditors never having a right to the trust assets; and 2) the unsecured creditors voluntarily 
accepting the risk of not having their debts discharged, whereas the transferor does not 
accept any such risk in the recipient becoming insolvent. This is further supplemented by 
the resulting trust not constituting a preference, thereby ensuring it is outside the scope of 
unconscionable corporate behaviour outlined in the Insolvency Act 1986.  
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Linked to this, it was also found that the lack of registration for resulting trusts is 
justifiable. Owing to the impossibility of registering the resulting trust due to the lack of 
a trust deed, and the lack of knowledge that a resulting trust exists until the receipt of the 
court’s judgment, registration is not practicable. Equally as important, English law, and 
the companies register in particular, have never objected to third-party proprietary rights 
– meaning that the registration system on which unsecured creditors may rely on was 
never intended to incorporate the resulting trust. The short timeframe in which the 
potentially most problematic form of resulting trust – the Quistclose trust – operates, 
moreover minimises the chances that unsecured creditors will be misled into thinking that 
the creditor has greater assets that they in fact do, and making credit available based on 
this misapprehension. 
 
One caveat to the above analysis, though, is that it must be acknowledged that whilst the 
resulting trust may be of use to unsecured creditors, with its ability to revest property in 
a transferor evident, it does not provide a mechanism through which to directly address 
the issues identified in Chapter 3 and 4 in relation to the Insolvency Act 1986’s anti-
deprivation and personal liability provisions. Specifically, it is not able to address the 
most problematic factual matrices not dealt with by the Insolvency Act identified in 
Chapter 4. In relation to the excessive declaration of dividends, owing to the clear and 
unquestionable intention of the company to part with the beneficial interest in moneys, 
the resulting trust’s presumptions would not apply as there would be sufficient evidence 
to rebut them. Similarly with late payments, given that this involves the non-transfer of 
property, and the resulting trust only operates upon the transfer of property, the above 
analysis would have no applicability. Consequently, the resulting trust, instead of directly 
remedying these shortcomings, provides an effective alternative form of protection 
through the means of revesting property in different factual matrices to those of the 
Insolvency Act. In doing so, some of the Act’s pitfalls (the limited revestment of assets) 
can be covered, and the resulting trust provides for a limited alternative rather than an 
outright replacement or improvement.  
 
Returning back to the conclusions of Chapter 3, it is necessary to consider whether the 
resulting trust meets the three criteria of an alternative to the Insolvency Act – which 
Section 3 of this chapter concluded the resulting trust did meet. These three criteria are: 
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a) is it capable of increasing the size of the company’s asset pool?; b) does it possess clear 
and clear to identify provisions?; and c) is it attractive to third party litigation financiers?  
 
Addressing the first criteria, both Chapter 5 and this chapter have proven - theoretically 
and practically – that the resulting trust is capable of increasing the size of an insolvent 
company’s asset pool in certain, clearly defined matrices. However, these chapters have 
also proven that these trusts are also capable of removing assets from a company, and 
thereby prevent parties from becoming unsecured creditors in the first place. Moreover, 
the ability to trace, and to a lesser extent the liability imposed on resulting trustees, mean 
that should the assets be dissipated, there is a likelihood that they or their substitutes will 
be recovered – resulting in a minimisation of any potential losses. As a consequence of 
these factors, the resulting trust is able to reduce the impact of a company’s insolvency 
on creditors and potential creditors.  
 
Dealing with the second criteria, it has also been proven that the resulting trust possesses 
clear and easy to identify provisions. It was shown that in the three forms of resulting 
trust, although there are areas of uncertainty that unquestionably require clarification from 
the courts, these do not greatly inhibit the use of the resulting trust, and the resolution of 
these uncertainties may indeed expand the use of the gratuitous resulting trust to transfers 
of land. Furthermore, this chapter has also shown that the ‘supplemental’ provisions – 
evidential, tracing, trustee liability – also have largely clear and identifiable provisions, 
ensuring their effect is easy to determine. Both the resulting trust and the ‘supplemental’ 
provisions therefore enable liquidators and third parties to engage in litigation with a 
reasonable sense of predictability. 
 
Finally, it has also been shown that owing to the valuable assets recovered by resulting 
trusts and the relative predictability of any litigation instigated, third party litigation 
financiers and creditors are likely to be attracted to providing the necessary litigation 
funding should the liquidator or third party have insufficient access to financial resources. 
The only caveat to utilising third party litigation funding is the fees incurred to the 
financier, meaning the full value of the assets will not be recoverable. Nevertheless, 
irrespective of these fees, the resulting trust is still a far more attractive proposition to 
third party litigation financiers than the Insolvency Act 1986 provisions.  
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This chapter has therefore proven that the resulting trust is a viable mechanism through 
which unsecured creditors can minimise the impact of insolvency. This can be done 
through either returning assets to a creditor company for distribution through the 
liquidation dividend, or by segregating assets in the now insolvent company and thereby 
preventing the transferor becoming an unsecured creditor. It also shown that whilst being 
a viable mechanism, the resulting trust is not able to directly address the limitations of the 
Insolvency Act 1986’s provision that were identified in Chapter 3 and 4, and instead is 
able to assist through alternative means. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This thesis, in Chapter 1, identified that the liquidation of a company poses a number of 
substantial problems for unsecured creditors. Most impactful is the low return rate they 
receive from the liquidation process – with unsecured creditors on average only 
recovering 4% of outstanding debts from the now insolvent borrower. This is in stark 
contrast with the borrower’s secured creditors, who, on average, are able to recover 36% 
of debts owed – or 9 times that of the typical unsecured creditor. The reason for this 
disparity, as also identified in Chapter 1, is the secured creditor’s priority to the 
company’s assets as a consequence of their security interests, which removes (apart from 
a small fraction of floating charge assets) these secured assets from the company’s 
distributable asset pool. A further cause is the statutory priority of distribution, which 
results in the asset pool being first used to discharge the debts of parties1487 other than the 
unsecured creditor – ensuring the already insubstantial and stretched asset pool does not 
have the resources to discharge unsecured creditor debts. This unfavourable position has 
led to sustained calls for reform to assist these creditors and improve their return rate from 
instances of liquidation.  
 
To address these issues, this thesis posed in Chapter 1, and answered in the subsequent 
chapters, the following research questions:  
 
1. To what extent does the English law of liquidation impact upon an insolvent 
borrower’s unsecured creditors; 
2. What role can the resulting trust, in the factual matrices that it is imposed, play in 
addressing any impact on unsecured creditors by the liquidation regime;  
3. What advice can be provided, or recommendations proposed, to the relevant 
parties to provide more safeguards to unsecured creditors. 
 




1487 The liquidator and their expenses and the preferential creditors  
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In answering the posed research questions, Chapter 2 established that the predominant 
underlying theories of insolvency law – Creditor Wealth Maximisation, the Multiple 
Values Approach and Contractarianism – all support the existence and use of unsecured 
creditor protections. However, notwithstanding their universal agreement that unsecured 
creditors are deserving of protection, the level of assistance that should be afforded is 
vociferously debated.  
 
At the very minimum, all the theories necessitate an intact company asset pool upon a 
company entering insolvency. In doing do, they condone the existence of the anti-
deprivation and personal liability provisions analysed in Chapter 3, as they – theoretically 
at least – enable insolvency practitioners to revest incorrectly divested assets back into 
the company’s asset pool. 
 
Beyond this agreed minimum, the preponderant theory – Creditor Wealth Maximisation 
– merely seeks to distribute non-secured assets in accordance with the statutory priority 
of distribution according to the pari passu principle, and strictly forbids any changes to 
this scheme of distribution. The alleged benefits of adopting such a system rest with its 
predictability and reduced procedural costs – meaning any additional unsecured creditor 
protections must come from outside the law of insolvency. Whilst Creditor Wealth 
Maximisation’s antithesis – the Multiple Values Approach – does permit unsecured 
creditors receiving a greater share of the asset pool, it also permits their share being 
decreased or even reduced to nothing when judged expedient to do so – meaning there is 
no predictable outcome owing to each insolvency being judgment on its own merits.  
 
Hence, it was concluded that the theories, at a minimum, permit unsecured creditor 
protections provided they do not negatively impact upon other classes of creditor 
(particularly secured creditors), and so it is theoretically permissible to extend the 
assistance provided to these creditors by areas of the law other than insolvency law.  
 
Moreover, it was also concluded that English legal commentators have called for 
unsecured creditor protection. Both Cork and Goode, in their practical reviews of 
insolvency law, call for mechanisms including limitations to the classes of preferential 
debt, personal liability provisions, abolition of receivership, and creation of a 10% fund. 
These mechanisms are designed, along with the anti-deprivation provisions, to protect 
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unsecured creditors, and are premised as being necessary to ensure a fair and equitable 
outcome for unsecured creditors and, on a more macro level, safeguarding creditors’ 
confidence to provide credit to companies. Notwithstanding these mechanisms, both 
authors also recognised that limitations must be placed upon them, particularly respecting 
the pre-insolvency entitlements of secured creditors.  
 
These conclusions, reached by analysing both the underlying theoretical foundations of 
insolvency law and English legal commentators, proved that whilst providing additional 
creditor protections was permissible, any protection mechanisms must respect secured 
creditor interests. 
 
Chapter 3 analysed the unsecured creditors protections provided under the Insolvency Act 
1986, and concluded, along with Chapter 4, that they fail to adequately protect creditors 
and maximise return rates. It was found that the anti-deprivation provisions, which are 
intended to prevent improper divestments of a company’s asset pool and instances of 
unjust enrichment, and the personal liability provisions that impose liability on directors 
for wrongful and fraudulent trading, do not provide sufficient means to revest assets in 
the now insolvent company nor deter parties who seek to misappropriate company assets.  
 
Notwithstanding the flaws in the provisions being many, it was concluded that most fell 
into three categories: remedial, substantive and evidential. With the remedial limitations, 
although the provisions have prima facie satisfactory remedial powers, due to any 
potential orders’ reliance on the court’s judgment to become effective, unsecured 
creditors are at risk of dispositions of property to bona fide purchasers for value or 
beneficial interests being granted over assets to third parties. Moreover, the defendant 
may be sufficiently impecunious and possess insufficient assets to give effect to the 
judgment. Consequently, it is a distinct possibility that defendants will not be able to meet 
any awards made against them, and the unsecured creditors be unable to recover the sums 
awarded.  
 
In regard the substantive requirements, it was concluded, for example, the preference 
provisions’ need for the liquidator to prove that the defendant company subjectively 
‘desired’ the end result means that it is almost impossible for the liquidator to successfully 
evidentially prove this subjective element. This is mirrored in the fraudulent trading 
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provisions, where it is necessary for the liquidator to prove the defendant separately 
defrauded creditors and that they did so intentionally – something that is also 
impracticable to successfully evidence.  
 
Finally, under the many evidential limitations, the liquidator faces not only the issue of 
proving the market value of the transaction but must also disentangle many potential 
collateral contracts that could be argued to have provided the company with valuable 
consideration. Similarly, the liquidator must also establish the chain of causation in 
wrongful trading claims, and prove that the trading caused the loss – a link that many 
claimants have failed, and will fail, to adequately prove. 
 
Compounding these limitations, liquidators do not have access to large sections of the 
company’s asset pool to fund the litigation of any potential claim, and despite the attempts 
at legislative reform, owing to floating charge holders retaining the right to refuse use of 
their assets to fund litigation, limitation funding remains a substantial barrier to enforcing 
the creditor protections.  
 
These theoretical conclusions were proved empirically in Chapter 4 and the case studies 
conducted. It was found that notwithstanding the objectionable conduct of Carillion and 
BHS’ directors, the Insolvency Act’s provisions were mostly inapplicable. In the case of 
Carillion, it was concluded that none of the provisions, owing to the substantive 
limitations and the available subjective defences, were applicable, and so were unable to 
provide Carillion’s roughly 30,000 unsecured creditors any protection. Moreover, whilst 
it was concluded that some of the provisions were applicable in the case of BHS, it was 
also established that this applicability was heavily qualified. Firstly, although many of the 
provisions may be applicable, they only apply to a very few of BHS’ actions, resulting in 
duplicate applicability and the deceptive image that the Insolvency Act provides 
sufficient protection to BHS’ creditors. Secondly, given the impecunious position of RAL 
and its directors, should the liquidator elect to initiate litigation, it is foreseeable that any 
judgment would not be enforceable and the moneys due recoverable, meaning that even 
the limited applicability of the Insolvency Act would not provide any protection to the 
unsecured creditors. It was also finally concluded two issues greatly affect unsecured 
creditors – issues that the Insolvency Act provisions do not address. Firstly, the use of 
reverse factoring enables companies to increase their available credit whilst placing the 
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burden of risk on to their unsecured creditors. Secondly, the Insolvency Act also fails to 
provide any protection from the excessive declaration of dividends unless it caught by 
s423 Companies Act 2006 – an extremely unlikely possibility.  
 
Chapter 3 also set out the three features that any prospective alternative method of 
unsecured creditor protection would require if it were to address the limitations imposed 
by the underlying insolvency law theory and overcome the limitations of the anti-
deprivation and personal liability provisions. The first feature it is that revested assets 
must be available to the general body of creditors through the liquidation dividend. Owing 
to the issues of the anti-deprivation provisions, this remedy should be proprietary in 
nature to ensure priority to any assets. Secondly, the remedy should have clear and easy 
to establish provisions, enabling the liquidator or third party to be confident of initiating 
litigation. Finally, any potential remedy should be attractive to third party litigation 
financiers, as it is unlikely the transferor will have insufficient assets to fund litigation. It 
was proffered in Chapters 1, 5 and 6 that the resulting trust was the most viable 
mechanism to possess these three features.  
 
Section 2: The Potential Use of the Resulting Trust to Assist Unsecured Creditors in 
Liquidation  
 
The resulting trust was analysed in Chapter 5 as it is a mechanism through which property 
can be recovered from the possession of another and returned to its original owner – 
meaning that potentially such trusts have the capability of revesting property in an 
insolvent company for distribution to unsecured creditors, or revesting property to third 
parties and preventing them from becoming creditors in the first place. Furthermore, 
given the limited analysis of the resulting trust in the context of liquidation – and that 
limited analysis focussing exclusively on the negative impact of the resulting trust – this 
thesis’ analysis of the potential uses of the resulting trust fills a lacuna in the existing 
literature. 
 
Additionally, the resulting trust was analysed owing to its beneficial features. The priority 
afforded to resulting trust beneficiaries prevents the assets subject to the trust from 
forming part of other secured credit instruments, ensuring the assets will be made 
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available for distribution to unsecured creditors – in stark contrast with the Insolvency 
Act 1986 provisions. Moreover, the ability to trace further assists by permitting substitute 
assets, and any increase in the value of those assets, to form part of the resulting trust 
asset pool and potentially undo any misapplication of the transferred property.  
 
Each of the three forms of the resulting trust, it was concluded, is able to the assist the 
unsecured creditors and third parties.  
 
Under the gratuitous transfer resulting trust, property transferred in the absence of 
consideration is held on trust for the transferor unless it can be proven that the transfer 
was intended to be a gift or a loan. Although its application to personal property is 
unquestionable, and its application to genuine mistaken transfers is theoretically 
permissible, it is submitted that despite the uncertainty created by Petrodel, it is not 
applicable to gratuitous transfers of land. Hence, should the company gratuitously transfer 
property or mistakenly transfer property, it will be held on resulting trust. As concluded 
in Chapter 5, this is of use in the corporate group, where it is foreseeable that property 
would be transferred between corporate entities gratuitously. Further, should a third-party 
transfer property gratuitously to a company, then this too would be held on resulting trust.  
 
Likewise, under the purchase price resulting trust, should the company or third party 
provide the purchase moneys to either personal or real property, this too will be held on 
trust for the transferor unless it can be proven that the moneys were intended to be a gift 
or a loan. It was also concluded that such trusts would be particularly effective in two 
factual matrices. Under the first, as with the gratuitous transfer, should one company 
within a corporate group provide purchase moneys to another within the group, then the 
provider will the beneficial owner of the purchased property, which will either prevent 
them from becoming an unsecured creditor or be distributable to their unsecured creditors 
should they be insolvent themselves. Under the second, and ‘one-man companies’, should 
a shareholder utilise the company for their own personal activities and provide moneys, 
and these funds then be used to purchase property, the purchased assets will be held on 
trust for the company. These can then be used, if that company enters insolvency, to assist 
the liquidator in discharging unsecured debts.  
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The automatic resulting trust, which arises upon the failure of an express trust, also 
potentially assists unsecured creditors by returning to the company assets previously held 
on trust. It was concluded that this would most likely apply to instances of tax efficiency 
schemes and surpluses from charitable causes. However, it is the Quistclose trust – a form 
of automatic resulting trust – that has the greater applicability, and places assets provided 
for a specific (but now failed) purpose, and that were intended to be segregated, on 
resulting trust. As concluded in Chapter 5, this is applicable to loan moneys provided for 
a specific purpose, moneys provided by employees to employers, misapplication of client 
funds, and the purchase of equipment. In each of these matrices, the provider of the 
property is prevented from becoming an unsecured creditor.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 evidenced that beyond the theoretical uses, the resulting trust is also 
viable from a practical perspective. It was concluded from the analysis that the 
presumption of a resulting trust is only rebuttable should there be sufficient, actual 
evidence of there being a gift or loan – meaning that an adverse inference is not, in itself, 
sufficient. Thereby, there is a relatively high degree of certainty for liquidators and third 
parties initiating litigation as they can analyse the available evidence early on and 
determine whether or not there is a gift or loan. Moreover, it was also shown that the 
ability to trace and impose liability on trustees for breach of trust, when taken together, 
ensures that in the majority of resulting trusts there is an asset to recover. The relative 
certainty of the resulting trust, and the probability of recovering assets, means that the 
liquidator should be in a position to be able to acquire the necessary litigation funding for 
any prospective resulting trust claims. However, the amounts that are recoverable will 
depend on each individual insolvency, and so it is impossible for this thesis to provide a 
detailed conclusion as to the effect of the resulting trust on the liquidation process 
generally.  
 
Given the factors identified in Chapters 5 and 6, it is apparent that the criteria identified 
as being necessary for an alternative method to assist unsecured creditors are met through 
use of the resulting trust. Firstly, the resulting trust’s proprietary nature ensures priority 
to the trust assets. Secondly, the relative clarity over the resulting trust’s substantive 
provisions provides liquidators with confidence to commence litigation. Finally, 
acquiring the necessary litigation funding should also be practicable. Consequently, 
although the resulting trust may not be able to directly address the deficiencies of the 
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Insolvency Act 1986’s anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions, it is able to 
increase the liquidation divined of unsecured creditors or prevent third party transferors 
from becoming unsecured creditors where the applicable matrices occur. In doing so, it 
also fits within the Credit Wealth Maximisation theory’s limitations of protecting secured 
creditor’s interests, as these interests remain undisturbed.   
 
Section 3: Recommendations to Liquidators 
 
Given the analysis and conclusions of Chapters 5 and 6, it is necessary for this thesis to 
provide recommendations for liquidators and third parties in how the resulting trust can 
be utilised. Unfortunately, given that the resulting trust is an operation of law, and so 
arises due to a combination of presumptions and lack of rebutting evidence, and moreover 
is reliant upon the actions of parties before the company entered liquidation, the liquidator 
is not able to take a positive or active role in creating such trusts. As becomes apparent 
from the recommendations made below, the liquidator must instead take a passive role 
and merely identify whether the relevant conduct has occurred, rather than actively seek 
the imposition of a resulting trust.  
 
As a consequence of this enforced passivity, the recommendations for liquidators, and 
third parties, must centre on vigilance and interrogation. Indeed, the primary set of actions 
these parties must undertake is to interrogate any transfers of property involving the 
insolvent company, either as transferor or recipient. In this interrogation, it will be 
necessary to identify whether the transactions involved an absence of consideration (for 
potential gratuitous transfer resulting trusts), whether moneys or assets were provided to 
third parties to which property was eventually purchased (for potential purchase price 
resulting trusts), whether moneys were placed on trust for a purpose that has now failed 
(for potential automatic resulting trusts) or whether moneys were provided for a purpose 
that has now failed (for potential Quistclose trusts).  
 
Notwithstanding the applicability of this advice to both liquidators and third parties, it is 
evident that it will be easier for third parties to identify if any of the relevant conduct has 
occurred. Given that third parties will have been directly involved in the transaction – as 
either the recipient or transferor – it is much more likely that they will be cognisant of the 
terms of the transfer, and so aware (after becoming familiar with the pertinent law) of the 
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possibility of there being a resulting trust. Liquidators, meanwhile, must rely upon the 
written and oral evidence of the company, its employees and third parties. It is therefore 
much more difficult to first gather the relevant evidence, secondly analyse the gathered 
evidence, and then thirdly interpret the applicability of these interpretations. Although 
undoubtably a potentially arduous undertaking if the company has engaged in poor record 
keeping, the complexity and prospective challenge should not be overstated – particularly 
in comparison with the evidential hurdles involved in the Insolvency Act 1986 provisions.  
 
The necessary actions to be undertaken to identify the relevant conduct would include 
analysing any property transfer documents, analysing any loan documents, and should 
such documentation not be available, then oral evidence from those involved in the 
transfers must be gathered and analysed. Whilst this may give the impression of an 
increased workload for liquidators, such actions on their part would be necessary 
irrespective of attempts to identify possible resulting trusts, as they must ensure that 
correct title to property is identified. Hence, identification of resulting trusts could, and it 
is submitted should, form a standard and non-laborious action undertaken by liquidators 
and third parties upon a company entering liquidation, and one that would, should the 
applicable matrices occur, assist the company’s unsecured creditors or prevent a third 
party from an becoming unsecured creditor.  
 
Section 4: Theoretical Impact and Potential Future Research  
 
In addition to the recommendations made by thesis, and the potential practical impact of 
these recommendations, a number of theoretical submissions relating to the law on the 
resulting trust have been made that could, potentially, assist in clarifying the broader 
jurisprudence of the resulting trust.  
 
First of all, this thesis has submitted that the presumptions underpinning the resulting trust 
should be interpreted as taking on a positive characteristic (the property remains the 
transferor’s) and that rather than inferring an intention, they involve the imputation of an 
intention. As submitted in Chapter 5, this assists in explaining the underlying theory of 
the resulting trust in line with the historical jurisprudence of the courts and also does away 
with the problematic use of inferences. Moreover, it was also submitted that in contrast 
to claims that the presumptions can be rebutted by the ‘slimmest of evidence’ – such as 
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adverse inferences – they can only be rebutted should there be actual evidence adduced 
that a gift or a loan was intended.  
 
Secondly, this thesis has, building upon previous research by the author, proffered that 
the presumption of gratuitous transfer resulting trust does not apply to transfers of land 
owing to s60(3) Law of Property Act 1925, despite the confusion and uncertainty created 
by Prest v Petrodel. This thesis has also submitted that ‘genuine’ mistaken transfers are 
subject to a gratuitous transfer resulting trust, and although not being the first to suggest 
that Quistclose trusts are resulting trusts, has also added to the debate by analysing the 
competing arguments, confirming it is an automatic resulting trust, and clarifying when 
and how such trusts can be utilised.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis has also provided empirical evidence as to the effectiveness of 
the anti-deprivation and personal liability provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 – a 
previous lacuna in existing literature. Through the two case studies of BHS and Carillion, 
it was evidenced that the provisions have both an extremely limited applicability, and 
moreover, should they be applicable, then the chances of recovery are severely limited by 
the potential impecuniosity of the defendants.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that further empirical research into the Insolvency Act 1986 
provisions is necessary. Despite this thesis having conducted two case studies, it is 
acknowledged that further case studies on the provisions, focusing on the provisions 
individually, is needed. Moreover, although this thesis has proven the potential of the 
resulting trust theoretically, and this has been to some extent proven empirically by 
reference and application of the existing case law, further empirical research (should the 
relevant evidence ever become available from companies) could be conducted on the 
application of the resulting trust to liquidation. This would take the form of case studies 
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